Beyond Reversal: Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board and the Clarification of the Redundant-Remedies Doctrine in Texas Administrative Law

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Reynaldo “Rey” Gonzalez, Jr., M.D., J.D. v. Texas Medical Board, No. 24‑0340 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), sits at the intersection of administrative law, constitutional litigation strategy, and professional regulation of political speech. While the headline facts involve the Texas Medical Board’s attempt—apparently for the first time in its history—to discipline a congressional candidate for how he described himself on the campaign trail, the Court’s actual holding is primarily procedural and jurisdictional.

The Court does not decide whether the Texas Medical Board (TMB) can constitutionally punish a candidate for calling himself “Dr. Gonzalez” or a “physician.” Instead, it clarifies two important points of Texas law:

• The scope of the redundant-remedies doctrine in the context of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), holding that what matters is whether the remedy available under the APA is coextensive with the remedy sought under the UDJA—not merely whether the same arguments could have been raised in an APA appeal.
• The limits of agency-created judicial review, reaffirming that an administrative agency cannot, by rule, create or expand district court jurisdiction for “substantial evidence” review in the absence of statutory authorization.

These holdings have broad implications for how regulated parties challenge agency actions in Texas, particularly when raising constitutional and ultra vires claims, and they set the stage for a potentially significant First Amendment decision on remand concerning professional titles and campaign speech.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and the Dispute

Reynaldo “Rey” Gonzalez holds both an M.D. and a J.D. He is licensed to practice law in Texas but has never obtained a license to practice medicine. Instead, he practiced law, taught as an adjunct professor at the University of Texas, and was a member of the American Board of Legal Medicine.

While running for a seat in the United States House of Representatives, Gonzalez campaigned as “Dr. Gonzalez” and described himself as a “physician.” His candidate profile proclaimed:

By God's grace I am a physician and an attorney. I adopted a motto years ago which appears on my office's logo. It says in Latin, "Vocatus ad Sanandum," which means, "Called to Heal." My calling to serve in medicine was to heal the sick. My calling to serve in law is to heal my fellow man who is wronged by a third party. My most recent calling, to serve in the United States House of Representatives, is to contribute to the healing and a return to civility to our nation.

A complaint was filed with the Texas Medical Board, asserting that by calling himself a “physician” and using the title “Dr.” in campaign materials, Gonzalez was “holding himself out as a physician” despite not being a licensed medical practitioner.

B. The Texas Medical Board’s Action

The TMB opened an investigation under:

• The Medical Practice Act, which regulates the practice of medicine and prohibits unlicensed practice; and
• The Healing Art Identification Act, which regulates the use of professional titles associated with the healing arts (e.g., “doctor,” “physician”).

After a hearing, TMB concluded that Gonzalez had violated these statutes and issued a cease-and-desist order. The order required Gonzalez to:

• Stop using the titles “doctor,” “physician,” and “Dr.” (e.g., “Dr. Gonzalez”), unless he simultaneously disclosed the authority for those titles (e.g., that he holds an M.D. but is not licensed to practice medicine in Texas); and
• Face potential civil penalties of $5,000 per violation if he failed to comply.

Gonzalez moved for rehearing; the motion was overruled by operation of law. Eighty-one days after that, he filed suit in Travis County District Court.

C. Gonzalez’s Claims in the District Court

Although the petition was multifaceted, the Supreme Court rightly groups his claims into four core theories:

1. A substantial-evidence challenge to the cease-and-desist order (i.e., the order allegedly lacked evidentiary support and was unlawful).
2. An as‑applied constitutional challenge to Texas Occupations Code § 104.004 (part of the Healing Art Identification Act), arguing that applying the statute to his campaign speech violated:
   • the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and
   • Article I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution.
3. A facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004, contending that the statute broadly prohibits truthful descriptions of education and training by persons holding medical or other doctoral degrees, and is therefore unconstitutional in all or many of its applications.
4. An ultra vires claim, asserting that TMB exceeded its statutory authority by regulating him at all because:
   • he is not licensed to practice medicine; and
   • he did not practice or attempt to practice medicine in Texas—he only made campaign statements.

Gonzalez sought:

• Reversal of the cease-and-desist order;
• Declatory and injunctive relief (including a declaration that TMB lacked authority to regulate his speech and that § 104.004 was unconstitutional); and
• Temporary injunctive relief against enforcement of the order, plus “such other and further equitable relief” as appropriate.

D. Lower Courts’ Rulings

District Court. The district court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals (Third Court of Appeals, Austin). The court of appeals largely affirmed, but:

• It held that Gonzalez’s facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004 was not barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine because invalidating the statute on its face would “go beyond reversal” of the cease-and-desist order.
• It held that his as-applied constitutional claim, ultra vires claim, and substantial-evidence claim were barred or jurisdictionally defective:
  • As to as-applied and ultra vires, because they could have been raised in a timely APA proceeding and thus were “redundant.”
  • As to substantial-evidence review, because any challenge to the order was untimely under the APA’s 30-day deadline for judicial review.

Gonzalez petitioned for review to the Supreme Court of Texas. TMB did not file a cross-petition, so the court of appeals’ partial remand of the facial challenge was not at issue and remained intact.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice Sullivan, writing for the Court (with Justice Hawkins not participating), reverses in part, affirms in part, and remands. The Court’s principal holdings are:

1. Redundant-Remedies Doctrine: Ultra Vires and As-Applied Claims May Proceed.
   Gonzalez’s ultra viresas-applied constitutional challenge to § 104.004 are not barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine. Even though he could have raised the same arguments in an APA appeal, the APA would have limited him to reversal of the specific cease-and-desist order. By contrast, his UDJA-based claims seek prospective declarations and injunctive relief that would protect him from future enforcement actions—relief that “goes beyond reversal.” Accordingly, they are not “redundant” of APA remedies.
2. Substantial-Evidence Claim Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction.
   Gonzalez’s attempt to obtain “substantial evidence” review of the cease-and-desist order, independent of the APA, fails. He disclaimed reliance on the APA and instead invoked a TMB rule (22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f)) that ostensibly allowed judicial review without a deadline. The Court holds that agency rules cannot create or expand district court jurisdiction for judicial review; only statutes or constitutional provisions can. Because Gonzalez identified no statutory basis for judicial review outside the APA, the district court lacked jurisdiction over this claim.
3. Remand.
   The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings on:
   • the facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004 (already remanded by the court of appeals);
   • the as-applied constitutional challenge; and
   • the ultra vires claim.
   The substantial-evidence challenge to the cease-and-desist order remains dismissed.

The Court closes with a pointed observation: if the Texas Medical Board believes it has authority to police campaign speech, it must now defend that position on the merits.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015)

Patel is the linchpin of the Court’s analysis of the redundant-remedies doctrine. In Patel, eyebrow-threading practitioners challenged licensing requirements under the cosmetology statute. They had been cited by the agency and could have sought judicial review under the APA. Instead, they brought a UDJA action asserting, among other things, an as-applied constitutional challenge.

The Court in Patel held that the UDJA suit was not barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine because:

“The available remedies on appeal from an administrative finding are limited to reversal of the particular orders at issue.” Because the plaintiffs wanted “more than a reversal of the citations issued,” in that they sought “prospective injunctive relief against future agency orders based on the statutes and regulations,” the APA did “not provide a redundant remedy.”

Gonzalez squarely applies that logic: what matters is whether an APA appeal provides the same remedy as the UDJA suit, not whether the same claims or arguments could have been asserted. Thus, the Court emphasizes: it is the redundant-remedies doctrine, not the “redundant-claims” doctrine.

2. Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2022)

The Court cites Jones v. Turner for the principle that a declaratory judgment action is improper only when the plaintiff “could be awarded relief that would render a declaratory judgment redundant and thus improper” (emphasis added). This reinforces that the focus is on whether another remedy makes the UDJA superfluous.

3. City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission, 51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam)

City of Corpus Christi is invoked to demonstrate that even facial constitutional challenges may be heard in the context of APA contested-case review. It illustrates that Gonzalez could have raised his facial and as-applied constitutional objections in a timely APA appeal. But, crucially, the Supreme Court explains that this possibility does not itself render his independent UDJA claims barred, because:

• The APA would have allowed review only of the existing order; and
• The UDJA claims seek broader, forward-looking relief.

4. King Street Patriots v. Texas Democratic Party, 521 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2017)

The Court cites King Street Patriots for the “usual judicial practice” of addressing as-applied challenges before facial ones. In a footnote, the Court observes that the court of appeals’ limited remand (facial claim only) would have placed the district court in the awkward position of tackling the facial question first, contrary to ordinary doctrine and judicial restraint.

5. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009)

Heinrich is cited for a procedural but important point: ultra vires suits must be brought against state actors in their official capacity. The Court notes that on remand, Gonzalez will be free to amend his petition to add appropriate state-official defendants (e.g., TMB officials in their official capacity) and to clarify the prospective relief sought.

6. Continental Casualty Insurance Co. v. Functional Restoration Associates, 19 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. 2000)

Continental Casualty is pivotal on the jurisdictional question. It stands for two key propositions:

• There is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless:
  • a statute provides such a right, or
  • the order violates a constitutional right.
• An agency’s rulemaking authority cannot expand district-court jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature has authorized.

Applying this, the Court rejects Gonzalez’s reliance on a TMB rule (22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f)) as an independent basis for substantial-evidence review. Without a statute (or a properly invoked constitutional right) authorizing such review, the district court had no jurisdiction.

7. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963)

The Court notes that Texas cases have entertained the possibility of an inherent constitutional right to judicial review of certain administrative actions. But Gonzalez did not argue that theory, so the Court leaves it unaddressed.

8. Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2016)

Although a federal case, Serafine is an important backdrop. There, the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists violated a political candidate’s First Amendment rights by prohibiting her from using the title “psychologist” in her campaign. The Court in Gonzalez notes that:

• This is apparently the first time the TMB has disciplined someone for campaign speech; and
• Serafine shows that such restrictions can implicate serious First Amendment concerns.

By citing Serafine, the Court signals that Gonzalez’s constitutional objections are far from frivolous, even though it reserves those issues for another day.

9. Academic Commentary on “Contested Cases”

The Court references an article by Hamilton & Jewett, The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act: Contested Cases and Judicial Review, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 285 (1976), suggesting that a “contested case” under the APA more likely refers to legislatively mandated adjudicative hearings, not hearings an agency offers purely as a matter of discretion.

However, the Court ultimately finds it unnecessary to resolve whether TMB’s proceeding against Gonzalez was a “contested case” because Gonzalez disclaimed reliance on the APA altogether.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Redundant-Remedies Doctrine Refined: Focus on Remedy, Not Claims

The Third Court of Appeals held that Gonzalez’s as-applied and ultra vires claims were barred because he could have pursued the “same claims” via an APA appeal of the cease-and-desist order. The Supreme Court rejects this approach on two grounds:

(a) Misreading of the Petition

The court of appeals characterized everything but the facial challenge as attacking only the cease-and-desist order. The Supreme Court reads the pleadings more broadly:

• The ultra vires claim asserts that TMB lacked statutory authority to regulate his use of “doctor” and “physician” in campaign speech at all, precisely because he is not a medical licensee and did not practice medicine.
• The as-applied constitutional claim asserts that applying § 104.004 to his truthful, degree-based, political self-description violates his free-speech rights.

On their face, these claims seek more than reversal of the existing order. They seek a declaration that TMB cannot lawfully punish Gonzalez in the future for such speech. As the Court notes:

“A declaration that the statutes do not apply to Gonzalez would protect him from future sanctions, not just from the cease-and-desist order. The same is true of a declaration that it would violate Gonzalez's constitutional rights for TMB to punish him for calling himself a doctor or physician.”

Thus, these are prospective challenges, aimed at future enforcement, not merely retrospective attacks on a single order.

(b) Wrong Legal Test—Redundant Remedies vs. Redundant Claims

The court of appeals asked whether Gonzalez could have raised his as-applied and ultra vires theories in a timely APA appeal, and answered “yes.” The Supreme Court calls this “true but irrelevant.” Under Patel, the correct inquiry is:

• Does the APA provide a remedy that is coextensive with what the plaintiff seeks under the UDJA?
• Or does the UDJA suit seek broader or different relief—especially prospective declarations and injunctions against future enforcement?

If the APA provides only a limited backward-looking remedy (reversal or modification of the particular order), while the UDJA suit seeks broader forward-looking relief, the remedies are not redundant, and the UDJA claim is allowed.

Thus, even if Gonzalez could have asserted his facial and as-applied constitutional objections, and his statutory authority (ultra vires) arguments, in an APA appeal, such an appeal would have been confined to:

• Reviewing and potentially reversing that one cease-and-desist order (and no more).

By contrast, the UDJA suit aims to:

• Establish that TMB has no statutory authority to regulate his campaign use of professional titles; and/or
• Secure a declaration that future enforcement of § 104.004 against his campaign speech would violate the state and federal constitutions.

That is “more than a reversal of the citations issued” (to use Patel’s phrase), and so the redundant-remedies doctrine does not bar his ultra vires and as-applied claims.

2. Application to Ultra Vires and As-Applied Constitutional Claims

The Court explicitly extends its reasoning to both:

• The ultra vires claim (challenging TMB’s statutory authority); and
• The as-applied constitutional claim (challenging the constitutionality of applying § 104.004 to his campaign speech).

In each instance:

• The APA remedy would have been limited to reversing the cease-and-desist order (if unlawful).
• Gonzalez now seeks ongoing protection for his continued campaign speech without fear of new TMB enforcement actions.

Thus, the redundant-remedies doctrine is inapplicable, and the district court has jurisdiction over these UDJA-based claims.

3. Substantial-Evidence Review and the Limits of Agency-Created Jurisdiction

Gonzalez took a different strategic approach with his substantial-evidence challenge. Because he filed suit outside the APA’s 30-day window, he disclaimed the APA altogether and instead pointed to a TMB rule—22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f) (since repealed)—which purported to allow an aggrieved party to seek judicial review of a cease-and-desist order in Travis County District Court, with no specified deadline.

The Supreme Court’s response is concise and categorical:

“It is well recognized under Texas law that there is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides a right or unless the order . . . violates a constitutional right.” And “an agency's rulemaking power cannot validly expand or create district court jurisdiction beyond that given in the Legislature's own enactments.”

Because:

• Gonzalez expressly disavowed reliance on the APA; and
• He identified no statutory source (outside the APA) for judicial review of this type of order;

the Court holds that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the substantial-evidence claim. Agency rules alone cannot open the courthouse doors where the Legislature has not.

Notably, the Court does not decide whether the TMB proceeding qualified as a “contested case” under the APA—a contested issue below and one on which the Third Court of Appeals had taken a relatively expansive view. Because Gonzalez framed his substantial-evidence claim as non-APA review, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the “contested case” question.

4. Pleading, Amendment, and Future Litigation Strategy

The Court also addresses, implicitly and explicitly, how constitutional and ultra vires claims should be structured:

• It notes that although TMB argued Gonzalez’s petition did not expressly include a stand-alone claim for declaratory or injunctive relief on constitutional grounds, the petition did request “such other and further equitable relief” and clearly alleged constitutional violations. On remand, Gonzalez may:
  • amend his petition;
  • clarify and expand his requests for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief; and
  • name appropriate defendants (state officials in their official capacities) as required by Heinrich.
• The Court confirms that because TMB did not file a cross-petition for review, the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment that remanded the facial challenge stands undisturbed.

In short, the Supreme Court ensures that Gonzalez gets a full merits hearing on:

• whether TMB has statutory authority to regulate his campaign titles (ultra vires);
• whether § 104.004 is unconstitutional as applied to his campaign speech; and
• whether § 104.004 is facially unconstitutional (after the as-applied issues are addressed).

V. Impact and Significance

A. Clarification and Expansion of Non-APA Remedies

The most immediate doctrinal impact of Gonzalez is the reaffirmation and extension of Patel’s approach to the redundant-remedies doctrine. The decision sends several clear signals:

1. UDJA Constitutional and Ultra Vires Claims Remain Available Even When APA Review Was Possible.
   The mere fact that a party could have raised constitutional or ultra vires arguments in an APA appeal does not render a later UDJA action jurisdictionally barred. What matters is:
   • Does the APA remedy provide only backward-looking relief (reversal of the specific order)?
   • Or does the UDJA action seek broader prospective relief (e.g., a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, or that the agency lacks authority to act)?
2. Missing the APA Deadline Does Not Necessarily Foreclose All Litigation.
   A regulated party who misses the APA’s strict deadline may still bring:
   • a UDJA-based ultra vires suit, and/or
   • facial or as-applied constitutional challenges,
   so long as the suit genuinely seeks prospective, non-redundant relief and is not simply an untimely attack on a single, already-final order.
3. But UDJA Cannot Be Used as an Untimely Substitute for APA Appeals.
   Where a plaintiff seeks only to undo a specific agency order—to obtain precisely the relief that would have been available under a timely APA appeal—courts will likely deem the UDJA action barred as a redundant remedy. Gonzalez thus strengthens both sides of the doctrine: it keeps the APA from being treated as exclusive when it is not, and prevents the UDJA from being used as a workaround for missed APA deadlines when it is.

Practically, Gonzalez encourages sophisticated litigants to:

• File timely APA appeals when they wish to overturn specific agency orders on evidentiary or procedural grounds; and
• Simultaneously or additionally bring UDJA actions when they seek broader declarations about the scope of statutory authority or constitutional validity.

B. Reinforcing Legislative Control Over Judicial Review

On the jurisdictional front, the Court’s rejection of agency-created review underlines a fundamental separation-of-powers principle:

• The Legislature, not the agency, decides whether and how judicial review is available.
• Agencies may adopt rules about their internal procedures, but they cannot confer on courts a jurisdiction the Legislature has not granted.

This has concrete consequences:

• Agencies should draft rules with care, ensuring not to suggest that review exists where no statutory authorization supports it.
• Regulated parties and their counsel must identify the statutory basis for any request for judicial review. Reliance on an agency rule, without more, is a dead end.

C. Implications for Professional Regulation of Political Speech

Although the Court’s holding is procedural, the factual context highlights a contentious and evolving area: the extent to which professional licensing boards may regulate how individuals describe themselves in the public sphere, especially in campaigns for public office.

Gonzalez presents a particularly sharp scenario:

• Gonzalez holds an M.D. from an accredited medical school (the degree is not disputed), but he is unlicensed as a physician.
• He ran for Congress and used the titles “Dr.” and “physician” in his campaign materials, in a non-clinical context.
• The TMB treated this as “unlicensed practice” or improper holding out under the Medical Practice Act and the Healing Art Identification Act.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Serafine strongly suggests that restrictions on truthful use of professional titles by candidates in political campaigns can violate the First Amendment. Gonzalez now opens the door to a similar challenge under both the Texas and federal constitutions.

On remand, key questions may include:

• Can the State prohibit a person with a valid medical degree, but no license, from calling himself a “doctor” or “physician” in a political campaign when the context does not involve providing medical services or advising patients?
• Is such a restriction a permissible regulation of professional conduct, or an impermissible regulation of political speech or truthful commercial speech?
• How do the Texas Constitution’s free-speech protections (often interpreted as at least as protective as the First Amendment) play into this analysis?

While the Supreme Court of Texas declines to resolve these issues now, its framing of the case—and reliance on Serafine—indicates that the constitutional questions are serious and will have to be squarely addressed.

D. Procedural Sequencing of Facial and As-Applied Challenges

The Court’s footnote about the “awkward” posture created by a remand limited only to the facial challenge reiterates an important principle of constitutional adjudication:

• As-applied challenges should ordinarily be addressed before facial challenges.
• This approach avoids unnecessary broad rulings and respects judicial restraint by resolving only as much of the constitutional question as is necessary to decide the case.

By remanding Gonzalez’s as-applied and ultra vires claims alongside his facial challenge, the Supreme Court ensures that the district court can follow the usual pattern:

1. Determine whether the statute is unlawfully applied to this particular plaintiff under these particular facts;
2. Only then, if needed, decide whether the statute is invalid more broadly.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)

The UDJA allows a person to go to court and request an official declaration of:

• what a statute or regulation means;
• whether it applies to them; or
• whether it is constitutional.

A UDJA action can seek:

• Declaratory relief (a judicial statement of rights or legal status); and
• Injunctive relief (an order prohibiting the government from enforcing an unlawful statute or acting beyond its authority).

B. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and “Contested Cases”

The Texas APA provides a framework for:

• how agencies conduct formal adjudicative hearings (“contested cases”); and
• how parties can appeal those agency decisions to state district court.

A “contested case” generally involves:

• a legal right, duty, or privilege that is determined only after an opportunity for an adjudicative hearing; and
• the right to judicial review within a short time (usually 30 days) from the date the decision becomes final.

In an APA appeal, the court typically:

• does not take new evidence; and
• reviews the agency record under a “substantial evidence” standard (asking whether a reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion as the agency, even if the court might have decided differently).

C. The Redundant-Remedies Doctrine

The redundant-remedies doctrine is a judge-made rule designed to:

• prevent parties from using a declaratory-judgment action (UDJA) to duplicate or circumvent another adequate remedy the Legislature has provided.

In practice:

• If the APA gives you all the relief you want (for example, reversal of an agency order), you can’t file a UDJA suit just to repackage the same request.
• However, if the UDJA suit seeks broad, forward-looking relief (e.g., a declaration that a statute is unconstitutional, or that the agency lacks authority in general), and the APA offers only a narrow, backward-looking remedy (reversal of one order), then the UDJA action is not barred.

D. Ultra Vires Actions

“Ultra vires” is Latin for “beyond the powers.” An ultra vires suit alleges that:

• a government official or agency is acting outside the authority granted by law (for example, enforcing a statute that does not apply, or assuming powers the statute does not confer).

In Texas:

• Ultra vires suits must ordinarily be brought against the relevant state officials in their official capacity, not against the state itself (which often enjoys sovereign immunity).
• They are a key vehicle for restraining unlawful governmental action and securing prospective relief.

E. Facial vs. As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

• A facial challenge attacks a statute’s validity across the board. The plaintiff claims that the law is unconstitutional in all or most of its applications, not just against them.
• An as-applied challenge argues that, even if the statute might be valid in some circumstances, its application to the plaintiff in their particular situation is unconstitutional.

Courts usually prefer to resolve:

1. as-applied challenges first, because they are narrower; and
2. only then consider facial challenges if necessary.

F. Substantial-Evidence Review

When a court reviews an agency order under the APA’s substantial-evidence standard, it asks:

• Is there more than a scintilla of evidence in the record to support the agency’s decision?
• Could a reasonable person have reached the same conclusion based on the evidence, even if the court might have reached a different conclusion?

This is a deferential standard. It does not permit the court to substitute its own judgment for the agency’s, merely to check whether the agency acted arbitrarily or without evidentiary support.

G. Agency Rules vs. Statutory Grants of Jurisdiction

Agencies can adopt rules within the scope of their delegated authority. However:

• They cannot grant courts jurisdiction they do not already have under a statute or the constitution.
• Thus, a rule purporting to create a new path to judicial review, or to extend deadlines, cannot confer jurisdiction if the Legislature has not done so.

VII. Conclusion

Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board is a significant administrative-law decision with constitutional overtones. Its core contributions are:

• A clarified and strengthened redundant-remedies doctrine, emphasizing that what bars UDJA suits is not the mere availability of APA review, but whether the APA affords an equally broad remedy. UDJA-based ultra vires and constitutional claims seeking prospective relief are not foreclosed simply because they could have been raised in an APA appeal, especially when the APA would only reverse a single order.
• A firm reaffirmation that agency rules cannot independently create judicial-review jurisdiction. Parties must root their requests for review in statutory or constitutional grants of authority; otherwise, courts lack power to act.
• An explicit invitation for lower courts to reach the merits of serious questions about the scope of professional regulatory authority over campaign speech and the truthful use of professional titles by individuals with advanced degrees but without licenses. The TMB must now defend, under both statutory and constitutional scrutiny, its effort to sanction a congressional candidate for calling himself “Dr. Gonzalez” and a “physician.”

In the broader legal landscape, Gonzalez reinforces the flexibility Texas law affords individuals seeking to challenge the constitutionality of regulatory schemes and the legality of agency actions, even when formal APA appeal routes have closed. At the same time, it underscores the central role of the Legislature in defining the availability and scope of judicial review.

How the lower courts resolve the statutory (ultra vires) and constitutional questions on remand—particularly in light of cases like Serafine—may ultimately reshape the boundaries of professional licensing boards’ authority over political speech in Texas. For now, Gonzalez stands as a key precedent on procedural access to the courts and the proper alignment of administrative remedies, declaratory judgments, and constitutional oversight.