Beyond § 30-2-57(c): Alabama Supreme Court Affirms Ongoing Common-Law Authority to Reserve Jurisdiction for Future Periodic Alimony

Introduction

In Ex parte Edward Conant Gartrell, Jr., the Supreme Court of Alabama (June 27, 2025) confronted a question of first impression: Does newly enacted § 30-2-57(c), Ala. Code 1975, exclusively govern when a trial court may reserve jurisdiction to award periodic alimony after the divorce judgment, or does a court retain its historic equitable power to do so whenever “justice may require”? The Court unanimously answered that the statute is mandatory but not exclusive. Consequently, Alabama trial courts still possess—and should exercise—common-law discretion to reserve jurisdiction where future need is probable, even if the precise statutory prerequisites are unmet.

The decision clarifies the interplay between statutory reform and long-standing equitable authority in domestic-relations cases, and it resolves a conflict hinted at in earlier Court of Civil Appeals opinions.

Summary of the Judgment

The wife sought periodic alimony; the trial court denied it twice but did not reserve jurisdiction.
The Court of Civil Appeals (plurality) affirmed denial of current alimony but required reservation of jurisdiction, citing likely depletion of the wife’s assets.
The husband petitioned for certiorari, arguing that § 30-2-57(c) permits reservation only when the payor currently lacks ability but the recipient presently lacks means—conditions not met here.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals, holding:
- § 30-2-57(c) requires reservation in the circumstances it describes, but it does not repeal the broader common-law authority.
- Statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed; the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not compel exclusivity here.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court canvassed a century of Alabama jurisprudence on alimony jurisdiction:

Jones v. Jones, 131 Ala. 443 (1901) & Morgan v. Morgan, 211 Ala. 7 (1924): Established inherent equitable power to modify alimony decrees and to retain jurisdiction.
Miller v. Miller, 361 So. 2d 577 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978): Confirmed discretion to reserve jurisdiction when no periodic alimony is awarded.
Rockett v. Rockett, 77 So. 3d 599 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 743 So. 2d 487 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999): Warning that failure to reserve jurisdiction permanently bars later awards.
Crenshaw, Grice, and Lane: Examples where reservation was required because assets or health could deteriorate.
Statutory-construction cases—State v. Grant, 378 So. 3d 576 (Ala. 2022); Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056 (Ala. 2003)—provided the framework that statutes altering common law must be narrowly read.

By reaffirming these authorities, the Court preserved a continuum of equitable discretion dating back to 1901.

2. Legal Reasoning

Strict Construction of Statutes in Derogation of Common Law. The Court reiterated that such statutes “will not be extended further than is required by the letter of the statute.” Because § 30-2-57(c) mandates reservation in one scenario, it does not implicitly forbid reservation elsewhere.
Expressio Unius Rebuffed. The husband urged the canon to infer exclusivity. The Court rejected this for two reasons:
- § 30-2-57(c) contains a single scenario, not a “list,” weakening the negative-implication argument.
- Applying the canon would undermine, without explicit legislative command, a century-old equitable doctrine—contrary to Alabama’s presumption against unintended common-law repeal.
Harmony, Not Conflict, with Statute. Viewing § 30-2-57(c) as a floor (mandatory reservation in specified hardship cases) rather than a ceiling preserves both the statute’s purpose and equitable flexibility.

3. Potential Impact

Domestic-Relations Practice: Trial courts can—and must—continue to weigh future contingencies even when a spouse currently appears financially secure. Failing to reserve jurisdiction risks reversible error.
Legislative Drafting: The decision signals that if the Legislature intends to displace equitable powers, it must do so with unmistakable clarity.
Procedural Strategy: Litigants arguing for or against reservation must address both the statutory test and the broader “justice may require” standard. Evidence of likely asset depletion, health decline, or income volatility remains critical.
Appellate Guidance: The Court implicitly disapproves any contrary readings, overruling Myrick v. Myrick (2022) to the extent of inconsistency.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Periodic Alimony: Regular (usually monthly) payments by one ex-spouse to support the other; modifiable upon changed circumstances.
Reservation of Jurisdiction: The trial court’s explicit statement in the divorce decree that it retains power to award or modify alimony later. Without such language, that power is lost once the judgment is final.
§ 30-2-57(c) Framework: Mandates reservation when (1) the recipient cannot maintain the marital lifestyle, (2) the payor currently lacks ability, and (3) equity so dictates.
Common-Law Authority: Judge-made law predating statutes, especially the divorce court’s equitable power to tailor relief as justice requires.
Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius: A Latin canon meaning “the mention of one thing excludes others.” Courts use it cautiously, particularly when it would shrink historic powers.

Conclusion

The Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Ex parte Gartrell decisively preserves judicial flexibility in alimony cases. Section 30-2-57(c) sets a compulsory minimum circumstance for reserving jurisdiction but does not extinguish the broader equitable authority rooted in case law since Jones (1901). By harmonizing statute and common law, the Court ensures that future spouses facing evolving financial realities can still petition for relief, and trial courts remain empowered to craft fair outcomes. Practitioners, judges, and legislators alike must now operate with this clarified dual framework: statutory mandates plus enduring equitable discretion.