Best Interests, Not Punishment: Third Department Confirms Flexible Relocation Analysis in Initial Custody Determinations and Treats Self-Help Relocation as a Factor, Not a Bar

Introduction

In Matter of Thomas K. v. Shauna L., 2025 NY Slip Op 05729 (App Div, 3d Dept, Oct. 16, 2025), the Third Department affirmed a Family Court order awarding joint legal custody, primary physical custody to the mother, and permission for her to remain in Minnesota with the parties’ three minor children. The case arises from a nonmarital relationship marked by extensive travel for both parents, a multi-state living arrangement over several years (Utah, New York, Florida, Minnesota), and the mother’s unilateral relocation to Minnesota with the children following the parties’ separation.

The central legal issues were (1) how New York courts evaluate relocation in the context of an initial custody determination when a parent has already moved out of state; (2) the degree to which a parent’s “self-help” relocation (moving the children without prior notice or consent) should affect the custody outcome; and (3) the proper application of the best-interests standard considering the parents’ relative caregiving histories, stability, and ability to foster the children’s relationship with the other parent. The Third Department’s opinion clarifies, consolidates, and applies its recent line of cases on relocation in initial determinations, emphasizing that strict application of the Tropea relocation factors is not required and that unilateral relocation, while a serious and disfavored act, is not dispositive where the best interests of the children point in the other direction.

Summary of the Opinion

After a UCCJEA hearing, New York was deemed the children’s home state for jurisdiction. Following a nine-day fact-finding, Family Court awarded joint legal custody, primary physical custody to the mother, and authorized her to continue residing in Minnesota with the children, while structuring generous, travel-intensive parenting time for the father and directing the mother to facilitate and subsidize necessary travel.

On appeal, the Third Department affirmed. The court held that, because this was an initial custody determination precipitated by relocation, strict application of the Matter of Tropea v Tropea relocation factors was not required. Instead, the relocation was treated as one significant consideration among a constellation of best-interests factors. The court emphasized:

The mother had been the children’s primary caregiver, handling daily care, schooling, and activities.
The father’s work entailed extensive travel and overnights away during the ski season, plus an annual multi-week trip abroad; by contrast, the mother’s travel was typically day trips facilitated by proximity to a major airline hub.
Although the mother’s unilateral move was criticized, the court credited her testimony that she acted out of legitimate fears related to the father’s threats and controlling conduct, despite the absence of physical abuse.
The father’s argument that the children’s “home base” was New York was undercut by the fact that their New York connections were in Lake Placid, not in Queensbury where the father later moved for work; the family had never lived together in Queensbury.
The standard of review—whether Family Court’s order had a sound and substantial basis—was met, given the detailed record and credibility findings.

The order was affirmed in full, without costs.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Matter of Tropea v Tropea, 87 NY2d 727 (1996):
Tropea established New York’s flexible, best-interests framework for relocation disputes, identifying factors such as the reasons for relocation and opposition, the quality of relationships, the impact on the noncustodial parent’s access, and the enhancement to the lives of the custodial parent and child. Here, the Third Department reiterates that in an initial custody determination triggered by relocation, strict application of Tropea’s relocation factors is not required; rather, relocation is one facet of the broader best-interests analysis.
Matter of Jesse HH. v Lindsey II., 233 AD3d 1410, 1411–1412 (3d Dept 2024), lvs denied 43 NY3d 906 (2025):
Cited for two points central to this appeal: (a) strict Tropea analysis is not required in an initial custody setting precipitated by relocation; and (b) the appellate court defers to Family Court’s credibility determinations and will not disturb its decision if supported by a sound and substantial basis.
Matter of Christopher MM. v Mackenzie NN., 237 AD3d 1271, 1272–1273 (3d Dept 2025):
Reinforces that relocation is a “very important factor” but still only one among the full constellation of best-interests considerations in an initial determination.
Matter of Jahari BB. v Zada CC., 232 AD3d 1142, 1144 (3d Dept 2024):
Provides a comprehensive list of best-interests factors—quality of home environments, stability, willingness to promote the other parent’s relationship, past performance, relative fitness, and ability to meet the children’s developmental and emotional needs—used by the court here.
Matter of Dusten T. v Trisha U., 235 AD3d 1215, 1216 (3d Dept 2025):
Another recent affirmation of the best-interests framework guiding initial custody determinations.
Matter of Hostetler v Montanye, 30 AD3d 720, 721–722 (3d Dept 2006), lv denied 7 NY3d 710 (2006):
Cited for the principle that self-help relocation can weigh strongly against the relocating parent but is not singularly dispositive. The court relies on this to avoid a punitive approach toward the mother’s unilateral move.
Matter of Baxter v Borden, 122 AD3d 1417, 1418 (4th Dept 2014), lv denied 24 NY3d 915 (2015), accord Matter of Aden HH. v Charish GG., 226 AD3d 1109, 1112–1113 (3d Dept 2024):
These cases underscore that custody decisions must center on the children’s best interests, not on punishing a parent’s misconduct—an approach explicitly embraced by Family Court and affirmed here.
Matter of Adam OO. v Jessica QQ., 176 AD3d 1418, 1420 (3d Dept 2019); Matter of Adam E. v Heather F., 151 AD3d 1212, 1214 (3d Dept 2017); Matter of Derek KK. v Jennifer KK., 196 AD3d 765, 769–770 (3d Dept 2021):
Cited for deference to Family Court’s credibility findings and for the principle that relocation and custody outcomes are sustained where there is a sound and substantial basis in the record.
Matter of Baker v Spurgeon, 85 AD3d 1494, 1496 (3d Dept 2011), lv dismissed 17 NY3d 897 (2011):
Emphasizes the significance of relocation’s effect on the noncustodial parent’s relationship but treats it within a holistic best-interests analysis.

2) Legal Reasoning and Application

The Third Department’s reasoning proceeds in three clear steps:

Framework: Initial Determination Means Flexible Relocation Analysis. Because this case involved an initial custody order initiated by relocation, the court declined to rigidly apply Tropea’s relocation factors. Instead, it reaffirmed that relocation is one—albeit very important—consideration subsumed within the broader best-interests analysis. This choice of framework is outcome-shaping: it prevents relocation from being treated as a near-dispositive issue and keeps the spotlight on the children’s needs and parental fitness.
Evidence-Based Best-Interests Assessment. The record showed the mother had consistently been the primary caregiver, overseeing daily care, schooling, extracurriculars, and household management. The father, by contrast, had limited participation in the children’s activities, occasionally characterized the children’s matters as “her thing,” and maintained sleeping habits (earplugs) to avoid disturbances from the children. The court also credited testimony that the father routinely belittled the mother in front of the children, and that their eldest child took protective actions toward the mother—facts bearing on emotional environment and stability.

Employment and travel considerations weighed notably: the father’s coaching career involved extensive seasonal travel and significant overnight absences, plus a regular three-week overseas trip, reflecting instability and reduced availability. The mother, an airline sales executive, traveled for day meetings but—because she lived near a hub—could mostly avoid overnights. The court also observed the father’s recent job history included short stints and abrupt terminations, despite his testimony of current stability.
Self-Help Relocation: A Serious Factor, Not a Bar. Family Court “expressed severe disapproval” of the mother’s unilateral move, but—guided by Hostetler and Baxter—refused to convert that disapproval into a punitive custody shift. The court credited the mother’s explanation that she feared the father’s reaction to separation due to threats to “bury” her and alienate the children, as well as a pattern of manipulation and control. The absence of physical abuse did not negate the legitimacy of her concerns. The appellate court deferred to Family Court’s credibility findings and agreed that, on balance, best interests favored the mother’s primary physical custody and continued residence in Minnesota.

The court also rejected the father’s “home base” argument. The children’s historical New York ties were in Lake Placid, not in Queensbury where the father moved for work; the family never lived together in Queensbury, and the record showed no particular ties for the children there. Juxtaposing that with the mother’s support network in Minnesota, the court found the children’s stability and well-being better served by remaining with the mother in Minnesota, supplemented by robust, facilitated parenting time for the father.

Finally, the court emphasized the standard of review: appellate intervention is unwarranted if Family Court’s findings rest on a sound and substantial record basis—particularly given Family Court’s superior vantage on credibility. That standard was satisfied here.

3) Impact and Practical Implications

The opinion’s principal impact is to solidify the Third Department’s doctrinal approach to relocations in initial custody proceedings:

Relocation within Initial Determinations: Flexible, Best-Interests-First Analysis. This decision reinforces that strict Tropea factor-by-factor analysis is not mandatory in initial determinations. Practitioners should frame relocation as a key element within a comprehensive best-interests presentation rather than as a standalone relocation “test.”
Self-Help Is Not Dispositive. Unilateral moves can hurt a relocating parent’s case, but they do not automatically foreclose a best-interests finding in that parent’s favor—particularly where there is credited evidence of threats, coercive control, or other legitimate safety and stability concerns.
Evidence of Primary Caregiving and Stability Carries Significant Weight. Detailed proof of day-to-day caregiving, educational oversight, and a stable, supportive community environment can outweigh the negative inference from self-help. Conversely, a parent’s substantial travel, inconsistent employment history, and limited engagement with children’s activities may undercut a bid for primary custody.
Geographic “Home Base” Is Nuanced. A child’s past New York contacts do not automatically favor the parent remaining in New York, especially where those contacts are not in the parent’s current locale and the family never cohabited there.
Remedial Structuring of Parenting Time Across State Lines. Courts may mitigate the impact of out-of-state relocation by ordering generous, structured parenting time for the noncustodial parent and requiring the relocating parent to facilitate and subsidize travel. Practitioners should be prepared to present feasible, detailed cross-state plans and cost-sharing proposals.
AFC Positions Are Considered But Not Controlling. Notably, the attorney for the children initially recommended shared physical custody and a week-on/week-off schedule, while on appeal the AFC supported the mother’s primary physical custody. The court’s ultimate best-interests analysis can diverge from AFC recommendations where the record supports a different outcome.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Best Interests of the Child: The governing standard in custody cases. Courts consider a range of factors—caregiving history, stability, parental fitness, willingness to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent, and the child’s developmental and emotional needs—rather than any single determinative element.
Relocation in Initial Custody Determinations: When a custody case is being decided for the first time, and one parent has relocated or seeks to do so, the court does not have to apply the Tropea relocation factors strictly. Instead, relocation is treated as an important part of the broader best-interests analysis.
Self-Help Relocation: A parent’s unilateral decision to move the children without consent or court order is disfavored and can weigh against that parent. However, it is not automatically disqualifying; the court must still decide what is in the children’s best interests.
UCCJEA “Home State” Jurisdiction: Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (DRL art 5‑a), courts determine which state has authority to decide custody—generally the child’s “home state.” Here, after a UCCJEA hearing, New York was determined to be the home state, allowing the New York court to adjudicate custody even though the children were then in Minnesota.
Standard of Review—“Sound and Substantial Basis”: On appeal, custody determinations are given significant deference. The appellate court will not disturb Family Court’s order if it rests on credible evidence and reasonable inferences, particularly given Family Court’s ability to assess witness demeanor and credibility firsthand.
Coercive Control and Nonphysical Abuse: Even without physical violence, evidence of threats, manipulation, and controlling behavior can be relevant to assessing the children’s emotional environment, each parent’s fitness, and the reasons underlying a relocation.

Conclusion

Matter of Thomas K. v. Shauna L. crystallizes the Third Department’s approach to relocation when the move prompts an initial custody determination: the court re-centers the inquiry on the children’s best interests and declines to treat relocation or self-help as dispositive. The opinion underscores the decisive role of caregiving history, stability, credible safety and control concerns, and practical parenting logistics. It also models remedial tools—generous cross-state parenting time and travel facilitation—to preserve the noncustodial parent’s relationship post-relocation.

The key takeaway is twofold: for relocating parents, unilateral moves are risky and disfavored but not fatal if supported by credible, child-centered reasons and a robust best-interests record; for non-relocating parents, success hinges on demonstrating hands-on caregiving, stability, and a concrete plan that better serves the children’s day-to-day needs than the alternative. Above all, the decision reinforces that New York’s custody jurisprudence resists punitive outcomes and remains steadfastly child-focused.