Best Interests, Not Equal Time: No Constitutional Right to 50/50 Parenting Between Fit Parents in Wyoming

I. Introduction

The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Peter Augustus Smith v. Justine Delores Smith, 2025 WY 128, squarely addresses a recurring argument in modern custody litigation: whether a fit parent has a constitutional right to equal (50/50) parenting time with his or her children.

In this divorce and custody dispute, the Father argued that, because both parents were “fit” and no statutory “best interest” factor weighed decisively against him, the district court was constitutionally prohibited from awarding him less than half of the children’s time. He relied heavily on Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), a leading United States Supreme Court decision on parental rights in the context of grandparent visitation.

The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected that argument, reaffirming a core principle of Wyoming family law: when two fit parents disagree about custody, the court’s task is to resolve the dispute by applying the best interests of the child factors in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑201(a). There is no constitutional right to equal parenting time and no presumption in favor of shared custody, even between fit parents; shared custody remains one option that must be evaluated “on an equal footing” with other arrangements.

This commentary examines the opinion in depth: the factual and procedural background, the court’s handling of the constitutional claim, its application of the statutory best-interest framework, the precedents it relies on, and the decision’s significance for Wyoming custody law and practice.

II. Overview and Summary of the Opinion

A. The Parties and the Case

The parties, Peter (Father) and Justine (Mother) Smith, married in 2020 and had two very young children: CJS (born 2022) and NAS (born 2023). After marital difficulties that Mother characterized as “toxic” and “emotionally abusive,” she moved out of the marital home in August 2023 and later filed for divorce in 2024.

At a two-day bench trial, the district court took extensive evidence on parenting roles, work schedules, disciplinary styles, health care and education views, communication, and each parent’s conduct toward the other. Applying Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑201(a), the court:

• Awarded joint legal custody to both parents;
• Designated Mother as the primary residential caregiver and final decision maker on major decisions (medical care, religion, and education);
• Granted Father parenting time:
  • Every first, third, and fifth weekend of each month;
  • Tuesday and Thursday evening visits;
  • Holiday time; and
  • Additional summer time.

Father appealed only the custody portion of the decree.

B. Issues on Appeal (as Reframed by the Court)

1. Did the district court violate Father’s fundamental constitutional right to associate with his children by failing to order equal parenting time?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it limited Father’s time with the children to less than half time?

C. Holdings in Brief

1. No constitutional violation. The Court held that the use of the statutory best-interest framework in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑201(a) to resolve a custody dispute between two fit parents does not violate a parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children. Troxel and Wyoming’s grandparent-visitation cases do not create a constitutional right to 50/50 parenting time between parents.
2. No abuse of discretion. The Court concluded that the district court performed a thorough and reasonable best-interest analysis, that its findings were supported by the record, and that its decision to designate Mother as primary residential caregiver with a majority of the time did not exceed the bounds of reason.
3. No presumption in favor of equal/shared custody. Reaffirming Bruegman v. Bruegman and Castellow v. Pettengill, the Court reiterated that Wyoming law recognizes no presumption that shared custody is required or preferred; instead, shared custody is merely one option to be evaluated under the best-interest standard.

III. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. Standards of Review

The Court carefully distinguished the standards of review applicable to the two issues:

• Constitutional issues – de novo review. Whether a custody order violates constitutional rights is reviewed de novo. The Court cited Burbridge v. Dalin, 2024 WY 119, ¶ 10, 558 P.3d 954, 957 (Wyo. 2024), and Taulo-Millar v. Hognason, 2022 WY 8, ¶ 16, 501 P.3d 1274, 1280 (Wyo. 2022).
• Non-constitutional custody issues – abuse of discretion. The overall custody allocation, absent a constitutional claim, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Court relied on Bailey v. Bailey, 2024 WY 65, ¶ 6, 550 P.3d 537, 542 (Wyo. 2024), which describes an abuse of discretion as acting beyond the bounds of reason, violating a legal principle, or ignoring a material factor deserving significant weight.

The Court reiterated that it must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (here, Mother), giving every favorable inference and not reweighing the evidence. See Ianelli v. Camino, 2019 WY 67, ¶ 20, 444 P.3d 61, 66 (Wyo. 2019); Bishop v. Bishop, 2017 WY 130, ¶ 9, 404 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Wyo. 2017).

B. Substantive Legal Framework: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑201

The governing statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑201(d), provides:

The court shall order custody in well defined terms to promote understanding and compliance by the parties. In determining custody a court shall not favor or disfavor any form of custody. Custody shall be crafted to promote the best interests of the children, and may include any combination of joint, shared or sole custody.

Subsection (a) provides a nonexclusive list of best interest factors that courts must evaluate when determining custody, including:

• Each child’s relationship with each parent;
• Each parent’s ability to provide care;
• Each parent’s competency and fitness;
• Willingness to accept parental responsibilities and to relinquish care appropriately;
• How to best maintain and strengthen parent–child relationships;
• Communication and interaction patterns;
• Respect for the other parent’s rights and responsibilities;
• Geographic distance;
• Physical and mental ability to care for the child; and
• Any other relevant factors.

Importantly, the list is nonexclusive and the statute expressly bars any built-in preference for or against any particular “form” of custody (sole, joint, shared).

C. The Troxel Line: Grandparent Visitation and Parental Rights

Father’s primary constitutional argument rested on Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), where the United States Supreme Court invalidated Washington’s broad grandparent visitation statute. Troxel emphasized:

• The parents’ interest in the care, custody, and control of their children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
• Simply substituting a court’s view of the child’s “best interests” for a fit parent’s decision is insufficient to protect that liberty interest when the dispute is between a parent and a nonparent (e.g., grandparents).
• Courts must give “special weight” or deference to a fit parent’s decision about nonparent visitation.

Wyoming has applied Troxel in grandparent visitation cases such as:

• Ailport v. Ailport, 2022 WY 43, 507 P.3d 427 (quoting and applying Troxel);
• Ward v. Belden, 2023 WY 111, 538 P.3d 980;
• Burbridge v. Dalin, 2024 WY 119, 558 P.3d 954;
• Galvan v. Malone, 2025 WY 65, 569 P.3d 1131.

In those cases, the Court has consistently held that a fit parent’s decision about grandparent visitation is presumed valid and is entitled to “special weight.” Only upon a showing of parental unfitness or harm to the child may courts override that decision based on best interests.

The central question in Smith was whether this Troxel framework—developed for parent vs. nonparent disputes—extends to custody disputes between two fit parents so as to require 50/50 parenting time in the absence of a showing of unfitness.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The Constitutional Claim: No Right to Equal Parenting Time Between Fit Parents

1. Father’s argument

Father contended that:

• Both parents were “fit.”
• No best-interest factor “prevented” 50/50 custody.
• Under Troxel and its Wyoming progeny, a fit parent’s fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of his children bars the court from restricting his time with the children below one-half absent a compelling reason.

He further criticized the application of the statutory best interest factors—arguing that this “simple weighing” of interests could not override his constitutional right to equal time.

2. The Court’s immediate limitation: procedural default on a facial challenge

The Court first noted a procedural problem under W.R.A.P. 7.07: any party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must serve the Wyoming Attorney General with a copy of the brief. Father did not do so. Thus:

• To the extent Father argued that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑201(a) is itself unconstitutional, the Court refused to consider that argument. See Conrad v. Uinta Cnty. Republican Party, 2023 WY 46, ¶ 30, 529 P.3d 482, 494 (Wyo. 2023).
• The Court nonetheless addressed his broader constitutional claim that the application of the statute and best-interest standard in his case violated his individual parental rights.

3. Distinguishing Troxel and the grandparent-visitation line

The Court directly rejected Father’s attempt to import Troxel into the realm of disputes between two fit parents. It reaffirmed a key holding from Burbridge and Domenico:

“The analysis is different when the dispute is between two fit parents.” Burbridge, ¶ 13, 558 P.3d at 957.

“When two fit parents disagree, the court must provide a resolution of the dispute.” Domenico v. Daniel, 2024 WY 2, ¶ 60, 541 P.3d 420, 436.

The Court explained that when both parents are fit:

• Each parent possesses a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of the children;
• These rights are effectively “pitted against” one another;
• Courts must resolve the conflict; and
• The method for resolution is the best interests of the child test, not a presumption that each parent is constitutionally entitled to 50% of the time.

In this context, court resolution of the dispute does not constitute the kind of “state intrusion” targeted in Troxel (where the state authorizes a nonparent to override parental decisions). Instead, it is the mechanism by which conflicting parental rights are reconciled with the child’s welfare. As the Court put it in Domenico, court resolution of disputes between fit parents “involve[s] no state intrusion on the parties’ right to parent.”

4. The controlling test: best interests of the child, not equal time

The Court explicitly held that when two fit parents disagree over custody, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑201(a) governs. It cited approvingly to out-of-state authority:

• Padula-Wilson v. Wilson, No. 1203-14-2, 2015 WL 1640934, at *9 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015) – holding that consideration of the child’s best interests in a custody dispute between parents does not violate constitutional rights.
• Roberts v. Roberts, 586 S.E.2d 290, 295 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) – emphasizing that the “lodestar” in such cases is the child’s best interests, and parental rights must be “tempered” by that guiding principle.
• Banning v. Newdow, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447, 456 (Ct. App. 2004) – characterizing the child’s best interests as a compelling state interest.

Applying those principles, the Court concluded that the district court’s use of the statutory best-interest factors—and its resulting award of less than equal time to Father—did not violate his fundamental parental rights.

5. Rejection of Father’s requested new constitutional rule

Most significantly, the Court explicitly rejected Father’s invitation to announce a new constitutional rule:

Father invites this Court to adopt a new rule—absent proof of parental unfitness, two fit parents possess a right to equal parenting time that cannot be overridden under an abuse of discretion standard. His position is not supported by Wyoming precedent, and we decline his invitation.

The Court thus firmly closes the door, at least under current law, on constitutional claims that demand 50/50 parenting as a right of fit parents.

B. The Best-Interest Analysis and Alleged Abuse of Discretion

1. The district court’s factor-by-factor analysis

The Wyoming Supreme Court approved the district court’s detailed analysis of each of the statutory factors in § 20‑2‑201(a). The trial court concluded that:

• Two factors favored Father (willingness to accept parental responsibilities and respect for the other’s parenting time, after earlier contempt issues);
• Three factors favored Mother (quality of relationships, ability to provide care, and communication/interaction); and
• All other factors were neutral.

The Supreme Court summarized—and implicitly endorsed—the trial court’s reasoning on each factor:

• Relationship quality (a)(i). Mother had been the primary caregiver since birth, staying home with the children. Evidence showed Father historically worked long hours and sometimes had limited daily contact with the children. Mother testified to the older child’s distress before visits with Father and to harsh disciplinary practices (including spanking and isolation). This factor favored Mother.
• Ability to provide care (a)(ii). Mother had been the primary day-to-day caregiver. There was evidence that after Father’s time with the children, diapers were left unchanged and one child had a severe diaper rash requiring medical attention. Father testified he would rearrange his work schedule. Overall, this factor favored Mother.
• Relative competency and fitness (a)(iii). Both parents had some history of heavy drinking (Mother, mostly pre-children; Father, more recent). Neither party was found unfit, and the factor was deemed neutral.
• Willingness to accept responsibilities and relinquish care (a)(iv). Mother had consistently cared for the children since birth, and Father had exercised all visitation granted under the temporary order. Mother had once been held in contempt for denying Father parenting time but later complied fully. This factor favored Father.
• How to maintain and strengthen relationships (a)(v). Given the children’s young ages, the trial court emphasized the importance of in-person time with both parents. It noted the parents’ intense disagreements and predicted ongoing conflict, especially about medical and educational decisions. This factor was neutral.
• Interaction and communication (a)(vi). Evidence showed “voluminous” text messages from Father to Mother, described as sometimes “derogatory and threatening.” While the texts were not in the record, the trial court treated this as negative for Father and found the factor favored Mother.
• Respect for the other parent’s rights / nonintrusion (a)(vii). The trial court considered:
  • Father’s reluctance to facilitate FaceTime or phone contact with Mother during his time;
  • Mother’s past reluctance to allow visitation and her “surveilling” behavior (parking near Father’s sister’s home during his time with the children).
  The trial court admonished both parents and directed them to allow reasonable video or phone contact going forward. It concluded this factor favored Father, taking into account Mother’s earlier interference and contempt.
• Geographic distance (a)(viii). Both parties lived in Worland; neutral.
• Physical and mental ability to care (a)(ix). Both were capable; neutral.
• Other relevant factors (a)(xi). The court acknowledged significant hostility between the parents and stated that both must work to reduce it. Neutral overall.

2. The trial court’s global conclusion: conflict, divergent parenting, and the need for consistency

After weighing the factors, the district court articulated its core rationale:

[T]hese parents have substantially different parenting styles and expectations as to how the children will be raised. Seemingly minor decisions as to when and if the minor children should drink raw milk is like World War III. This is a minor issue compared to decisions that will have to be made about medical care and education. This Court always considers and generally finds it is in the best [interests] of the children to spend as much time as possible with each of their parents, but after considering the substantial differences between these parents and weighing all the factors listed above it cannot find that an alternating weekly schedule would be in the best interests of these children. The children need some consistency in their life and the Court believes that will only happen in this situation if one parent is the primary caregiver.

Thus, even though the court recognized that children generally benefit from substantial time with both parents, it found that an alternating 50/50 schedule would not foster stability, given:

• The parents’ extreme and persistent disagreements over even minor issues;
• Sharp differences in medical and education philosophies;
• The children’s young ages and need for consistency.

3. Supreme Court’s response to Father’s abuse-of-discretion arguments

Father advanced two main abuse-of-discretion arguments:

1. The district court improperly based its decision on the parents’ inability to get along and misweighed conflicting evidence.
2. The court did not expressly “identify” how the ordered custody arrangement was in the children’s best interests.

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments.

• No reweighing of evidence. The Court reiterated that it does not reweigh evidence or second-guess credibility determinations. So long as the findings are supported by the record and rationally related to the best-interests analysis, the appellate court will not substitute its judgment. It cited Bruegman v. Bruegman, 2018 WY 49, ¶ 57, 417 P.3d 157, 174 (Wyo. 2018) (appellants may not simply summarize alleged errors and their own view of the evidence), and Lopez v. Lopez, 2005 WY 88, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d 1098, 1103 (Wyo. 2005).
• Explicit best-interest reasoning. The Supreme Court emphasized that the district court did explain why the chosen schedule served the children’s best interests—especially the need for consistency given the parents’ deep and recurring conflicts. The statement that “one parent [must be] the primary caregiver” to provide needed consistency was a reasonably articulated best-interest conclusion supported by the evidence.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.

C. Shared Custody and Presumptions: Reaffirming Bruegman and Castellow

In responding to Father’s equal-time argument, the Court reaffirmed its post‑Bruegman position on shared custody:

• In Bruegman v. Bruegman, 2018 WY 49, ¶ 16, 417 P.3d 157, 164 (Wyo. 2018), the Court reversed its older precedent that disfavored shared custody and held:

  “[T]here is no presumption that shared custody is contrary to the best interests of the children and shared custody should be considered on an equal footing with other forms of custody.”

• In Martin v. Hart, 2018 WY 123, ¶ 19, 429 P.3d 56, 63 (Wyo. 2018), the Court emphasized that instead of applying any presumption in favor of a particular custody form, courts must focus solely on the best interests of the child.
• In Castellow v. Pettengill, 2021 WY 88, ¶ 13, 492 P.3d 894, 899–900 (Wyo. 2021), the Court clarified that shared custody is to be considered “on an equal footing with other forms of custody,” but there is no presumption requiring shared custody in any given case.

Smith fits cleanly within this framework:

• The district court clearly considered Father’s request for equally shared (alternating week) custody.
• It found that arrangement contrary to the children’s best interests in light of the evidence.
• The Supreme Court confirmed that this conclusion was reasonable and in line with Wyoming’s “no-presumption” approach.

The decision therefore solidifies Wyoming’s position: shared or 50/50 custody is a fully legitimate option, but never an automatic entitlement—even for fit parents.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Doctrinal Impact on Parental Rights and Custody Law

The opinion has several important doctrinal effects:

1. Clarifies the limits of Troxel in Wyoming. Smith confirms that Troxel governs parent vs. nonparent visitation cases and does not create a constitutional framework that mandates equal parenting time between fit parents.
2. Reaffirms the centrality of the best-interest standard between parents. When two fit parents disagree, the court must apply Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑201(a) and (d). The child’s best interests are the controlling standard—not parental symmetry or equality of time.
3. Rejects constitutionalization of 50/50 parenting. The Court expressly declined to recognize any “fundamental right” to equal parenting time that would constrain trial courts under a stricter standard than abuse of discretion.
4. Stabilizes the post-Bruegman regime. By tying this decision firmly to Bruegman, Martin, and Castellow, the Court further entrenches the principle that no custody form—sole, joint, shared—is presumed superior or required.

B. Practical Implications for Parents and Practitioners

• Arguments premised on a “right to 50/50” are foreclosed. Parents can no longer plausibly argue in Wyoming that they have a constitutional entitlement to equal time simply because both parents are fit and geographically close.
• Focus shifts to best-interest evidence. Custody litigants will need to focus more sharply on:
  • Evidence of their own caregiving capacity and relationship quality;
  • Ability to cooperate and communicate with the other parent;
  • How specific schedules will affect the children’s stability, routine, and emotional well-being.
• Trial courts enjoy substantial discretion, but must explain their reasoning. Smith illustrates the kind of detailed factor-by-factor analysis the Supreme Court expects. Where the record shows thoughtful engagement with each statutory factor and a reasoned explanation (e.g., need for consistency given high conflict), appellate courts will defer.
• High-conflict parenting may justify a primary residential caregiver. The decision reinforces that chronic and intense disagreement—even over seemingly small issues (raw milk, for example)—can legitimately count as a reason against 50/50 arrangements for very young children.
• Procedural compliance is essential for constitutional challenges. The Court’s refusal to consider a facial challenge to § 20‑2‑201(a) underscores the need to comply with W.R.A.P. 7.07 by serving the Attorney General when challenging a statute’s constitutionality.

C. Policy-Level Observations

From a policy perspective, Smith strikes a balance between:

• Respecting fundamental parental rights; and
• Preserving trial courts’ flexibility to tailor custody orders to the particular needs of each child and family system.

The decision resists a national trend in some quarters toward legislative or judicial presumptions for equal parenting time. Wyoming’s Supreme Court keeps the focus squarely on individualized determinations guided by statutory factors, rather than enshrining any custody formula as a constitutional mandate.

VI. Key Legal Concepts Simplified

For clarity, this section explains some of the more technical concepts used in the opinion.

A. “Fundamental Right” to Parent

Under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children. This means:

• The government cannot unjustifiably interfere with this interest (e.g., by removing children without due process or by substituting its judgment for a fit parent’s in favor of a nonparent without strong justification).
• When the government does intrude (for example, in termination of parental rights), it must satisfy a high level of scrutiny and provide robust procedural protections.

In Smith, the Court explains that this fundamental right does not translate into a guarantee of a particular custody schedule as between two fit parents.

B. “Fit Parent”

A “fit” parent is one who is not shown to be abusive, neglectful, or otherwise incapable of safely and responsibly caring for a child. In many grandparent-visitation cases, showing that the parent is “fit” creates a presumption that the parent’s decisions are in the child’s best interests.

In disputes between two fit parents, that presumption cannot operate in favor of both in the same way. Instead, courts must resolve the conflict by focusing on the child’s best interests.

C. Best Interests of the Child

“Best interests” is the guiding legal standard in Wyoming custody cases. It directs courts to look at the child’s welfare holistically, considering:

• Emotional bonds and stability;
• Physical care and safety;
• Parental capacities and mental health;
• Ability and willingness to cooperate and support the other parent’s role;
• Practical concerns such as distance, schedules, and routines.

No single factor is automatically controlling; the court weighs and balances all factors, including any other circumstance it finds relevant.

D. Joint Legal Custody vs. Primary Residential Caregiver

• Joint legal custody means both parents share decision-making authority over major aspects of the child’s life (e.g., education, major medical decisions, religion).
• A primary residential caregiver is the parent with whom the child lives most of the time. This designation often influences:
  • Day-to-day routines;
  • Access to the child’s school and community activities;
  • Child support calculations.
• A court may grant joint legal custody but still give one parent final decision-making authority on specified issues where the parents cannot agree (as happened here for medical care, religion, and education).

E. Abuse of Discretion

A court “abuses” its discretion when:

• It ignores a material factor that should have been given significant weight;
• It relies on an improper factor; or
• It considers only proper factors but makes a serious error in weighing them.

In custody appeals, this is a highly deferential standard. The appellate court does not retry the case or redo the balancing; it asks whether the decision was within a range of reasonable outcomes supported by the record.

F. “Special Weight” in Grandparent Visitation Cases

When a fit parent refuses grandparent visitation, Troxel and Wyoming cases require the court to give the parent’s decision “special weight.” That is:

• The court starts from a presumption that the parent’s decision is in the child’s best interest.
• Grandparents must overcome that presumption by showing unfitness or harm, and only then may the court consider overriding the parent’s choice.

Smith stresses that this “special weight” doctrine does not apply when the dispute is between two fit parents.

VII. Conclusion

Peter Augustus Smith v. Justine Delores Smith, 2025 WY 128, is a significant reaffirmation and clarification of Wyoming custody law. It holds that:

• There is no constitutional right
• Troxel’s protections for parental decision-making against nonparent intrusion do not create a presumption of 50/50 custody in parent–parent disputes;
• The controlling standard when fit parents disagree is—and remains—the best interests of the child, as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑201(a);
• Trial courts retain broad discretion to choose among joint, shared, or sole custody arrangements, provided they carefully apply the statutory factors and articulate a child-centered rationale; and
• Shared custody is on “equal footing” with other forms of custody, but it is not presumptively required or preferred in every case.

By rejecting the constitutionalization of 50/50 parenting while insisting on careful best-interest analyses, the Wyoming Supreme Court preserves both the flexibility and the structure of its custody jurisprudence. Practitioners and parents in Wyoming should understand that constitutional arguments for equal time will not substitute for the hard work of developing clear, evidence-based, child-focused proposals under the statutory best-interest framework.