Bergnes v. Zayas: Clarifying Standing Under § 1983 and Evidentiary Thresholds for Equal Protection Claims

Introduction

In Bergnes v. Zayas, 24-2434 (2d Cir. May 22, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed two recurring issues in civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

Whether a membership organization may assert the § 1983 claims of its members (i.e., organizational standing), and
What level of factual detail—particularly in the form of statistical or anecdotal evidence—is required at the motion-to-dismiss stage to state an equal protection claim based on alleged national-origin discrimination.

The plaintiffs comprised the non-profit advocacy group New York Communities for Change (“NYCC”) and twenty-nine individual court interpreters employed by the New York State Unified Court System. They sued the Chief Administrative Judge and the Director of Human Resources, alleging that court interpreters—predominantly non-Anglo, foreign-born employees—receive lower pay than court reporters—predominantly white, English-speaking employees—in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed NYCC for lack of standing and the individual plaintiffs for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in all respects.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit’s summary order affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Its key holdings were:

NYCC lacked standing to bring § 1983 claims on behalf of its members, in accordance with binding Circuit precedent (e.g., Nnebe v. Daus).
The individual interpreters failed to plead sufficient facts to show discriminatory intent under the Equal Protection Clause. Their generalized assertions that “most” interpreters are foreign-born and “most” court reporters are not, without precise numbers or percentages, fell short of the “plausible” and “minimal support” standards for statistical proofs.
Anecdotal allegations of hostility or mistreatment, unlinked to any official policy or custom and without any allegation that the named defendants directed or knew of such acts, cannot substitute for the required showing of a discriminatory state policy or custom when suing officials in their official capacities.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court relied on several Second Circuit and Supreme Court precedents to shape its ruling:

Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2011): Held that a private organization lacks standing under § 1983 to vindicate its members’ rights.
Conn. Citizens Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont, 6 F.4th 439 (2d Cir. 2021): Reaffirmed that organizations cannot pursue § 1983 claims for their members.
In re 305 E. 61st St. Grp. LLC, 130 F.4th 272 (2d Cir. 2025): Clarified the de novo standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1999): Set out that intentional discrimination on the basis of national origin violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Burgis v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2015): Explained that statistical evidence alone must be strong enough to make non-discriminatory explanations unlikely.
Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64 (2d Cir. 2023): Articulated that at least “minimal support” is needed for the proposition of discriminatory intent at the pleading stage.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985): Established that official-capacity claims require showing a state policy or custom causing the alleged violation.
Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2003): Held that isolated or unconnected incidents do not establish an actionable policy or custom under Monell.
Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494 (2d Cir. 2001): Emphasized the requirement that comparator groups be “similarly situated” in all material respects.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in two main steps:

Standing of NYCC: Citing Nnebe and Lamont, the court held that an organization cannot litigate under § 1983 to enforce its members’ rights. NYCC conceded this point, and the court accordingly dismissed it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Equal Protection Claim of Individual Plaintiffs:
- De Novo Review: Under In re 305 E. 61st St. Grp., the court accepted all factual allegations as true and drew all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor—but still required plausibility under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
- Discriminatory Intent: To establish an Equal Protection violation, plaintiffs must show intentional discrimination. They attempted this with:
  1. Statistical Evidence: The complaint alleged only that “the majority” of interpreters are foreign-born and “the majority” of reporters are not. Under Burgis, such vague assertions—without concrete numbers or percentages—are insufficient to render other explanations unlikely.
  2. Anecdotal Evidence: The plaintiffs recited isolated instances of hostility toward interpreters. But under Kentucky v. Graham and Webb, official-capacity claims require a connection to a state policy or custom, and the complaint lacked any allegation that Judges Zayas or Grimaldi directed, adopted, or knew of discriminatory acts.
- Comparator Group: The district court noted, and the Second Circuit agreed, that interpreters and reporters are not “similarly situated” because they face different exams, training requirements, and job duties (Harlen Assocs.). Thus no inference of discrimination arises from a pay differential between these distinct roles.

Impact

Bergnes v. Zayas reinforces critical pleading standards in § 1983 equal protection suits:

Organizations cannot invoke § 1983 on behalf of members—a limitation that will streamline future litigation and channel membership disputes into other procedural vehicles (e.g., associational standing under different provisions).
Plaintiffs must plead specific, quantitative statistical data when alleging group disparities. “Majority” or “most” is insufficient without percentages, numerical counts, or rates that negate alternative explanations.
Anecdotal or isolated instances of bias must be tied to a policy, custom, or official action to sustain an official-capacity claim.
Careful comparator analysis remains essential: parties must show that the comparator group is similarly situated in all material respects, not merely share a broad job category.

Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1983: A federal statute allowing individuals to sue state actors who, acting under color of state law, violate constitutional rights.
Standing: The requirement that a party have a concrete and particularized injury that the court can redress. Organizations generally cannot assert members’ claims under § 1983.
De Novo Review: A fresh (independent) review of a lower court’s decision. For motions to dismiss (Rule 12(b)(6)), appeals courts accept all well-pleaded facts as true and assess whether the complaint alleges a plausible claim.
“Plausible” Pleading Standard: Under Twombly/Iqbal, a complaint must provide enough factual detail to allow a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.
Comparator Group: In discrimination cases, the group to which the plaintiff is compared. They must be similarly situated in all material respects (e.g., job duties, qualifications, supervision).
Official-Capacity Claims: Lawsuits against government officials in their official roles. To hold them liable, plaintiffs must show a policy, custom, or practice that caused the constitutional violation (Monell doctrine).

Conclusion

Bergnes v. Zayas serves as an instructive guidepost for litigants in § 1983 equal protection cases. It underscores that:

Membership organizations cannot pursue § 1983 claims on behalf of their members.
Generalized or conclusory statistical allegations fail to meet the threshold for discriminatory intent; precise, disaggregated data are required.
Anecdotal allegations, without a clear link to a state policy or practice, cannot sustain official-capacity claims.
Comparator groups must be truly comparable in job requirements and context.

These clarifications will shape complaint drafting and early-stage litigation strategy, ensuring that only well-founded equal protection claims proceed beyond the pleadings.