Benavides v. Harris County: Distinguishing Intentional and Accidental Police Shootings Under the Texas Tort Claims Act’s Intentional‑Tort Exception

I. Introduction

The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished per curiam opinion in Benavides v. Harris County, No. 24‑20457 (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 2025), arises out of a tragic police shooting during a suspected home invasion that turned out to be a false alarm. The case sits at the intersection of federal appellate jurisdiction, Texas governmental and official immunity, and the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) intentional‑tort exception.

The plaintiff, Stephen Benavides, was shot by Deputy Jose Nunez of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office when Nunez responded to a 911 call about a possible home invasion at the home of Benavides’s daughter, Sandra Garibay. Benavides arrived first, discovered there was no intruder, but that fact was not communicated in time to the deputies. When Nunez arrived and encountered Benavides at the front door, he shot Benavides, who was unarmed.

Benavides brought:

• a federal § 1983 claim against Nunez for excessive force, and
• a state‑law negligence claim against Harris County under the TTCA, seeking to hold the County vicariously liable for Nunez’s alleged negligence.

Nunez claimed the shooting was accidental and asserted qualified immunity. Harris County invoked governmental immunity under the TTCA’s intentional‑tort exception and, in the alternative, official immunity (through Nunez) to defeat vicarious liability.

The district court denied both Nunez’s and Harris County’s motions for summary judgment. Nunez’s earlier interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it challenged only the genuineness, not the materiality, of the factual dispute over whether the shooting was intentional or accidental. See Benavides v. Nunez, 144 F.4th 751 (5th Cir. 2025).

Harris County then filed its own interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment on its state‑law immunity defenses. The Fifth Circuit again dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the process, however, the court drew an important line under Texas law: when a plaintiff’s TTCA negligence theory truly rests on an accidental discharge, supported by record evidence distinct from the facts underlying a § 1983 intentional excessive‑force theory, the TTCA’s intentional‑tort bar does not automatically apply. The dispute over whether the shooting was intentional or accidental is material to immunity, not merely factual noise.

Although unpublished and formally nonprecedential under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the decision offers significant guidance on:

• how federal courts should evaluate TTCA claims in police‑shooting cases where the officer claims an accidental discharge;
• the proper use of alternative pleading to navigate the TTCA’s intentional‑tort exception; and
• the limits of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over denials of governmental and official immunity.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit dismisses Harris County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The key holdings and moves are:

1. Interlocutory jurisdiction is limited to legal, not factual, disputes about immunity.
   Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine, denials of governmental and official immunity under Texas law are appealable to roughly the same extent as denials of federal qualified immunity. The appellate court may review the materiality of factual disputes but not their genuineness. It must accept the plaintiff’s version of the facts for purposes of the interlocutory appeal.
2. The intentional–vs.–accidental nature of the shooting is a material fact under the TTCA.
   The court rejects Harris County’s argument that this factual dispute is immaterial to TTCA immunity. If the shooting was intentional, the TTCA’s intentional‑tort exception (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.057(2)) bars the negligence claim and preserves governmental immunity. If the shooting was accidental, the exception may not apply, and the County’s immunity then turns on whether Nunez is entitled to official immunity.
3. Alternative negligence claims are not barred simply because the same incident also supports an intentional § 1983 excessive‑force claim.
   Distinguishing Saenz v. City of El Paso, 637 F. App’x 828 (5th Cir. 2016), and Texas authorities like Harris County v. Cabazos and Texas Dep’t of Public Safety v. Petta, the court emphasizes that here the TTCA negligence claim is based on a genuinely different factual theory: an accidental discharge while transitioning the firearm between hands, not the same intentional conduct alleged for the § 1983 claim.
4. Because the district court found genuine disputes of material fact as to both governmental immunity (via the TTCA) and official immunity, the Fifth Circuit cannot reach the merits of those immunity defenses.
   Harris County’s appeal invites the appellate court to reassess the genuineness of the dispute over intent and good faith. That is barred by Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), and Fifth Circuit precedent. With no clean, purely legal question to decide, the appeal must be dismissed.

The net effect is to leave the case in the district court for trial, where a jury will decide whether Nunez acted intentionally or accidentally and whether he acted in good faith—decisions that will determine the County’s exposure under the TTCA and any derivative immunity from official immunity.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. The Procedural Posture and Jurisdictional Framework

1. Final decisions, § 1291, and the collateral order doctrine

Federal appellate jurisdiction ordinarily extends only to “final decisions” of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A decision is final if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Vantage Health Plan, Inc. v. Willis‑Knighton Med. Ctr., 913 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)).

Denials of summary judgment are usually not final and therefore not immediately appealable. The collateral order doctrine, however, allows appeals from a “small category” of orders that:

1. conclusively determine the disputed question,
2. resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits, and
3. would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.

See BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Admin., L.L.C., 863 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)).

Denials of immunities from suit—federal qualified immunity and analogous state official/governmental immunities—typically satisfy these requirements, because immunity is a “right not to stand trial,” which is lost if review is postponed. Thus:

• Denials of federal qualified immunity are usually immediately appealable.
• By parity of reasoning, denials of Texas official immunity and governmental immunity are likewise appealable. See Heidi Grp., Inc. v. Texas Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 138 F.4th 920, 928 (5th Cir. 2025); Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 724 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 2013).

2. Johnson v. Jones and the “materiality vs. genuineness” distinction

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), sharply curtails interlocutory review where the only dispute concerns what actually happened. The Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot bring an interlocutory appeal from a qualified‑immunity denial “insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Id. at 319–20.

The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly applied this rule:

• The appellate court may review whether a factual dispute is material to immunity (a legal question).
• But it may not revisit the district court’s assessment that the dispute is genuine (a factual/sufficiency question).

The panel restates this familiar rule:

“We have appellate ‘jurisdiction to review the materiality of any factual disputes, but not their genuineness.’” (quoting Escobar v. Montee, 895 F.3d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 2018)).

When assessing materiality, the appellate court must accept the plaintiff’s version of events as true. See Ramirez v. Escajeda, 44 F.4th 287, 291–92 (5th Cir. 2022); Juarez v. Aguilar, 666 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2011).

3. Applying this framework to Harris County’s appeal

The district court’s written order denying Harris County’s motion for summary judgment was terse—essentially a one‑paragraph statement that a “genuine issue of material fact” precluded summary judgment. Although such brevity complicates appellate review, the Fifth Circuit chose (consistent with Thompson v. Upshur County and Poole v. City of Shreveport) to “scour the record” and related orders rather than remand for clarification.

The key was the district court’s separate, detailed memorandum denying Nunez’s qualified‑immunity motion. There, the court identified a central disputed fact: whether Nunez intentionally aimed and fired his weapon at Benavides, or whether the gun discharged accidentally while Nunez was switching it between hands. The district court expressly concluded this dispute was material to Nunez’s Fourth Amendment liability and his entitlement to qualified immunity.

Harris County tried to reframe this dispute as immaterial to its own immunity defenses, arguing:

• that under the TTCA’s intentional‑tort exception, the negligence claim was barred regardless of whether the final shot was intentional or accidental, and
• that, in any event, official immunity should shield Nunez and thus the County from vicarious liability.

The Fifth Circuit disagreed. As discussed below, the court held that the intentional/accidental distinction is critical under TTCA doctrine and therefore material to immunity. With materiality established, the court was barred by Johnson and its own precedent from revisiting the genuineness of the factual dispute, so jurisdiction was lacking.

B. The Texas Tort Claims Act and the Immunity Landscape

1. Sovereign and governmental immunity; TTCA’s limited waiver

Texas law draws a distinction between:

• Sovereign immunity, which protects the State and its agencies; and
• Governmental immunity, which protects political subdivisions (counties, cities, school districts).

Both immunities:

• bar suits against the government absent a legislative waiver, and
• bar liability even when suit is allowed (immunity from suit vs. immunity from liability).

See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 & n.2 (Tex. 2008); Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006).

The TTCA creates a “limited waiver” of this immunity — notably for:

• Use of tangible property causing personal injury or death
  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(2): a governmental unit is liable for personal injury “caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.”

But this waiver is subject to crucial exceptions, including:

• Intentional‑tort exception
  § 101.057(2): The TTCA “does not apply to a claim . . . arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort.”

Consequently, as City of Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. 2014), makes clear, a claim arising from an intentional tort remains barred by governmental immunity; it does not fall within the TTCA’s waiver.

2. Official immunity and vicarious liability

Under Texas law, official immunity is a common‑law affirmative defense that shields governmental employees from liability when:

1. they perform discretionary duties,
2. within the scope of their authority,
3. in good faith.

See City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994); Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 460–61 (Tex. 2002). It is intended to “encourage[] [government employees] to vigorously perform their official duties.” Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 460–61.

If an employee is protected by official immunity, then the governmental unit usually cannot be held vicariously liable for the employee’s conduct:

“When official immunity shields a governmental employee from liability, sovereign immunity shields the governmental employer from vicarious liability.” Univ. of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000); see also DeWitt v. Harris Cnty., 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1995).

Thus, for Harris County, the road to immunity ran along two related but distinct paths:

1. Governmental immunity via the TTCA – arguing that the negligence claim is really an intentional‑tort claim barred by § 101.057(2); and
2. Official immunity – asserting that Nunez acted in good faith within his discretion and authority, so the County cannot be vicariously liable even if the TTCA would otherwise allow suit.

C. The TTCA Intentional‑Tort Exception and Alternative Negligence Theories

1. Harris County’s central TTCA argument

Harris County’s main contention on appeal was doctrinally simple: under Texas law, if the facts pleaded amount to an intentional tort (e.g., an excessive‑force battery), a plaintiff cannot evade the TTCA’s intentional‑tort bar by re‑labeling the claim as “negligence.” The County relied chiefly on:

• Saenz v. City of El Paso, 637 F. App’x 828 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished); and
• the Texas cases cited in Saenz, including Harris Cnty. v. Cabazos, 177 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005), and Texas Dep’t of Public Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. 2001).

Saenz articulated a widely cited principle:

“[I]f a plaintiff pleads facts which amount to an intentional tort, no matter if the claim is framed as negligence, the claim generally is for an intentional tort and is barred by the TTCA.” 637 F. App’x at 830 (quoting Cabazos, 177 S.W.3d at 111).

And it added that a plaintiff cannot avoid this bar by pleading negligence “alternatively” where the negligence claim is based on “the same conduct” as an intentional tort claim. Id. at 831 (citing Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 580).

Harris County argued that:

• Benavides’s TTCA negligence claim arises from the same shooting and the same alleged “use of force” as his § 1983 excessive‑force claim.
• Therefore, under Saenz and Petta, the TTCA claim necessarily “arises out of” an intentional tort and is barred by § 101.057(2), regardless of how Benavides labels it.

2. Why Saenz, Cabazos, and Petta were distinguishable

The Fifth Circuit carefully distinguished this case from Saenz and its Texas counterparts.

a. The facts and pleading posture in Saenz

In Saenz, the plaintiff alleged that her son, Daniel Saenz, was in custody, handcuffed, unarmed, and restrained when an officer shot and killed him. The complaint portrayed the shooting as part of a sequence of clearly intentional uses of force:

• handcuffing,
• dragging by handcuffs,
• use of tasers, and
• drawing and firing a pistol at a restrained detainee.

The Fifth Circuit concluded:

• The “gravamen” (core) of the claim was the officer’s intentional use of excessive force—a battery.
• Such a claim “sounds in intentional tort” and falls outside the TTCA’s waiver.

Even assuming arguendo that the ultimate trigger pull was accidental, the court emphasized that there was underlying intentional force sufficient to invoke the intentional‑tort exception. See Saenz, 637 F. App’x at 830–31 & n.1 (relying on City of Watauga and Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)).

b. The Texas cases: Cabazos and Petta

The opinion also revisits Cabazos and Petta to show why those cases do not control here.

• Cabazos
  In Cabazos, irrespective of “negligence” language in the pleadings, the undisputed evidence showed that the deputy intentionally pulled, aimed, and fired his weapon at the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not allege an accidental discharge. The Texas court concluded the shooting was “anything but intentional,” so the intentional‑tort exception applied.
• Petta
  In Petta, the officers intentionally:
  • banged on the plaintiff’s car windows,
  • used cruisers to block her in, and
  • aimed and fired at her car tires.
  These were “clearly intentional” acts that “fit squarely within section 101.057’s exclusion of claims arising out of assault, battery, and false imprisonment.” 44 S.W.3d at 580. Again, negligence labels did not change the fundamentally intentional nature of the conduct.

In both cases, the “negligence” theories did not rest on any truly accidental or distinct conduct; they simply relabeled obviously intentional actions.

3. The key distinction in Benavides: genuinely different factual predicates

By contrast, the Fifth Circuit emphasizes that Benavides’s two theories genuinely rest on different versions of what Nunez did:

• § 1983 excessive‑force claim (against Nunez personally):
  Alleged intentional conduct — Nunez deliberately aimed and fired his gun at Benavides with intent to shoot him.
• TTCA negligence claim (against Harris County vicariously):
  Alleged unintentional conduct — Nunez’s gun accidentally discharged, perhaps due to mishandling while switching hands, causing unintended injury.

Crucially, there is record evidence supporting both versions. The body‑camera footage can reasonably be viewed either as:

• showing Nunez deliberately aiming and firing; or
• showing an accidental discharge while transitioning the firearm between hands.

This is not, in the panel’s view, a case of artful pleading recharacterizing the same conduct. Rather, it is a case of:

• one physical event—a shot fired—but
• two possible factual explanations for how and why it occurred.

The plaintiff, understandably uncertain about Nunez’s actual mental state, pleaded two alternative theories consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3), which expressly allows claims for relief “in the alternative.”

As the court notes, the alternative claims do not seek double recovery; they are mutually exclusive liability theories premised on different alleged states of mind. If the jury finds that Nunez acted intentionally, the federal § 1983 claim may succeed (subject to qualified immunity), while the TTCA claim would be barred by the intentional‑tort exception. If the jury finds that the shooting was purely accidental, the § 1983 excessive‑force theory may fail, but the TTCA negligence theory could succeed—subject to official immunity.

4. Why the intent dispute is material (and therefore jurisdiction‑blocking)

This leads to the core jurisdictional conclusion: the intentional/accidental dispute is material to TTCA immunity, not just to federal qualified immunity.

• If the shooting was intentional (Nunez deliberately aimed and fired at Benavides):
  • the TTCA’s intentional‑tort exception, § 101.057(2), applies;
  • Harris County’s governmental immunity is not waived for this claim; and
  • the County is entitled to dismissal of the TTCA claim.
• If the shooting was accidental (a negligent mishandling / accidental discharge):
  • the claim does not “arise out of” an intentional tort within the meaning of § 101.057(2);
  • the TTCA’s waiver for negligent use of tangible property (§ 101.021(2)) potentially applies; and
  • Harris County’s liability then depends on whether Nunez is shielded by official immunity (which would in turn shield the County from vicarious liability).

Because the district court found a genuine issue of fact on this very point—and the appellate court agrees that the point is legally material—the Fifth Circuit cannot revisit the genuineness of that dispute in an interlocutory appeal. It must accept for jurisdictional purposes that a reasonable jury could find the shooting either intentional or accidental.

In short, unlike Saenz and the Texas cases where the record admitted of only intentional conduct, here the record plausibly supports an accidental discharge theory that would take the claim outside the intentional‑tort exception and within the TTCA’s limited waiver.

D. Official Immunity and the Limits of Interlocutory Review

1. Official immunity as a backstop

Even if the TTCA’s intentional‑tort bar does not apply because the shooting was accidental, Harris County argued that it should be immune from vicarious liability because Nunez is entitled to official immunity. That turns on whether:

1. Nunez was performing discretionary duties,
2. within the scope of his authority,
3. in good faith.

The district court denied summary judgment on official immunity, again citing genuine issues of material fact—including those surrounding the manner in which Nunez used his firearm and his subjective and objective good faith.

2. Why the Fifth Circuit could not reach official immunity

Harris County asked the Fifth Circuit, in the alternative, to reverse on official‑immunity grounds. But the court concluded that, as with governmental immunity, it lacked jurisdiction. The reasons are parallel:

• Denials of official immunity are immediately appealable as collateral orders—but only to the extent they present pure questions of law about whether, on the plaintiff’s assumed facts, the defendant is entitled to immunity.
• Here, the district court’s denial was explicitly based on the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding Nunez’s conduct and good faith.
• Harris County’s arguments necessarily invited the appellate court to reweigh evidence and decide whether the factual disputes were real, not whether they were legally material.

Under Johnson and Fifth Circuit precedent (Ramirez, Escobar, Michalik, etc.), that is impermissible on interlocutory review. The panel thus declined to decide official immunity and dismissed the appeal in its entirety.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Governmental immunity,” “sovereign immunity,” and “official immunity”

• Sovereign immunity
  Protects the State of Texas and its agencies from being sued and from being held liable for money damages, unless the Legislature clearly says otherwise.
• Governmental immunity
  A similar protection extended to political subdivisions like counties and cities. Both forms of immunity involve:
  • immunity from suit (you can’t bring the case at all), and
  • immunity from liability (even if sued, no judgment can be enforced).
• Official immunity
  A personal defense for individual public employees. If they were doing discretionary work, within their authority, in good faith, they won’t be personally liable. If they’re not liable, their employer usually can’t be vicariously liable either.

2. TTCA “intentional‑tort exception”

The Texas Tort Claims Act partially waives governmental immunity, but it specifically excludes claims that “arise out of” intentional torts like assault and battery. In practice:

• If an officer intentionally uses force (e.g., deliberately shooting someone), claims based on that conduct are generally barred by this exception.
• Courts look at the “gravamen” or real nature of the conduct—not just the labels (“negligence” vs. “battery”) in the pleadings.

Benavides clarifies that where there is genuine evidence of an accidental discharge—and a negligence theory is based on that accidental conduct rather than the same intentional conduct underlying a § 1983 claim—the TTCA’s intentional‑tort exception does not automatically apply.

3. “Alternative pleading”

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 allows plaintiffs to plead in the alternative. This means:

• A plaintiff can say, “If the jury believes Version A of the facts, then I win under Theory A. But if the jury believes Version B, then I win under Theory B.”
• The theories can even be mutually inconsistent, as long as they are made in good faith based on uncertainty about what actually happened or what the evidence will show.

Here, Benavides credibly alleges:

• Either Nunez intentionally shot him (supporting an intentional excessive‑force claim); or
• Nunez accidentally discharged his weapon (supporting a negligence claim under the TTCA).

The Fifth Circuit accepts this as proper alternative pleading, not a mere attempt to evade the TTCA’s intentional‑tort bar through clever labeling.

4. “Materiality” vs. “genuineness” of factual disputes

• Material facts are those that could change the outcome of the case under the governing law. If a fact, when assumed true, would affect whether immunity applies, it is material.
• Genuine disputes are those where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could decide the fact either way. A dispute is not genuine if no reasonable jury could differ about it.

On interlocutory appeal from immunity denials:

• The appellate court can decide whether a factual issue is material to immunity (a legal question).
• The appellate court cannot re‑decide whether a factual dispute is genuinely disputed (a fact/evidence question). It must take the district court’s assessment of genuineness as given and accept the plaintiff’s version of the facts.

In Benavides, the court holds that whether Nunez acted intentionally or accidentally is clearly material to the TTCA and official‑immunity analysis. Once that is established, the Fifth Circuit is barred from second‑guessing the district court’s view that the dispute is genuine.

V. Impact and Implications

1. For Texas police‑shooting litigation under the TTCA

The opinion, though unpublished, sends a strong signal in an area of frequent litigation:

• Alternative accidental‑discharge theories are viable TTCA claims when supported by record evidence distinct from the intentional‑force narrative underlying a § 1983 claim. Plaintiffs are not foreclosed from pursuing TTCA negligence simply because they simultaneously assert § 1983 excessive‑force claims about the same general incident.
• Saenz is limited to its facts. Where the record shows intentional conduct (as in Saenz, Cabazos, and Petta), negligence labels will not circumvent the intentional‑tort exception. But when the record genuinely supports a different, accidental version of events, the TTCA’s limited waiver remains in play.
• Factual development matters. The court notes that the district court initially dismissed the negligence claim under the TTCA’s intentional‑tort exception but later allowed repleading after discovery revealed Nunez’s assertion that the shooting was accidental. This underscores the importance of discovery and sworn statements in shaping whether a TTCA claim survives jurisdictional challenges.

2. For appellate strategy in immunity cases

The decision reinforces strict limits on interlocutory appeals:

• Legal framing is crucial. Defendants appealing immunity denials must isolate a clean legal issue—e.g., “even if all facts are as plaintiff says, immunity still applies.” Appeals that largely contest the district court’s view of the facts (body camera interpretations, credibility, etc.) are likely to be dismissed.
• “Materiality” vs. “genuineness” must be kept distinct. Harris County attempted to argue that the intent dispute was legally immaterial, but the panel found the dispute clearly outcome‑determinative under the TTCA and official‑immunity doctrines. Once materiality is conceded or established, any attempt to contest genuineness is jurisdictionally barred.
• Counts against piecemeal appeals. The opinion continues the trend of confining interlocutory immunity appeals to true legal questions, preventing the appellate process from becoming a vehicle for relitigating factual disputes before trial.

3. For district courts managing immunity motions

The court again encourages district courts to explain their immunity rulings with sufficient specificity, particularly to:

• identify which factual disputes are deemed genuine and why, and
• articulate how those disputes are material to immunity.

Although the panel here chose to reconstruct the district court’s reasoning from related orders, it repeats the advice in Thompson v. Upshur County that such clarity greatly facilitates appropriate appellate review.

4. For the substantive law: clarifying the TTCA intentional‑tort exception

Substantively, Benavides refines the TTCA landscape in a nuanced way:

• The focus remains on the actual conduct and mental state, not mere labels. Courts will still look to the “gravamen” of the claim.
• But where an officer’s state of mind is genuinely disputed, and an accidental‑discharge theory is supported by evidence and pleaded distinctly, the TTCA does not automatically bar the claim.
• Underlying intentional acts vs. the injuring act itself. Prior cases like Saenz treated underlying intentional uses of force (e.g., restraining, tasing) as sufficient to invoke § 101.057(2) even if a specific injury was arguably accidental. Benavides signals that where the injury is plausibly caused by a distinct accidental act (e.g., negligent handling or transitioning of a firearm) rather than by an intentional application of force, a TTCA negligence claim can proceed.

For practitioners, this suggests closer attention to how the injury actually occurred and to whether there is evidence of separate negligent acts beyond the core intentional conduct alleged in § 1983 claims.

VI. Conclusion

Benavides v. Harris County is, formally, an unpublished jurisdictional dismissal. But beneath that surface it delivers several important messages about Texas tort immunity, federal appellate jurisdiction, and police‑shooting litigation.

First, it confirms that in TTCA cases involving alleged police shootings, the officer’s mental state—whether the shot was intentional or accidental—can be legally dispositive of governmental immunity. That factual question is therefore material, and when genuinely disputed, cannot be revisited on interlocutory appeal.

Second, it narrows the reach of cases like Saenz, Cabazos, and Petta by clarifying that the TTCA’s intentional‑tort exception does not automatically bar all negligence claims arising from use‑of‑force incidents. Where a plaintiff can plausibly and in good faith allege an alternative, accidental‑discharge theory supported by evidence, TTCA negligence claims remain viable.

Third, it reinforces the limits of the collateral order doctrine. Defendants seeking interlocutory review of immunity denials must present pure legal questions; attempts to re‑litigate factual disputes—especially about what is shown on body‑camera video—will not confer jurisdiction.

Taken together, these points make Benavides an instructive decision on how federal courts should navigate the complex interplay between § 1983 claims, Texas immunity doctrines, and the TTCA’s intentional‑tort bar. It underscores that in close factual cases involving alleged accidental discharges, full trials—not interlocutory appeals—are often the appropriate forum for resolving what truly happened and who, if anyone, should bear legal responsibility.