Bellinsky v. Galan: The Tenth Circuit Re-Sets the Boundaries of Younger Abstention in Domestic-Relations-Related §1983 Actions

Introduction

Bellinsky v. Galan concerns two federal civil-rights suits filed by Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky against his former spouse, her attorney, various state officials and judges, and the State of Colorado. The allegations, rooted in an acrimonious child-custody dispute and related criminal prosecutions, describe an extensive conspiracy to deprive Rabbi Bellinsky of his parental rights and liberty under the guise of state “family” and “criminal-justice” procedures.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed both suits at the pleading stage, principally on grounds of Younger v. Harris abstention (with supplementary reliance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine) and stayed all discovery. Rabbi Bellinsky appealed. On 22 July 2025, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court:

misapplied Younger by skipping the threshold “Sprint Categories” inquiry;
misapplied Rooker-Feldman because no final adverse state judgment existed and the federal claims did not seek review or modification of state decrees;
correctly denied recusal and permitted the Colorado Attorney General to represent state-employee defendants.

The decision importantly refines the use of Younger abstention in domestic-relations-adjacent §1983 litigation — an area in which federal courts have historically exhibited reluctance to intervene.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Judges Tymkovich, Bacharach, and Federico) issued an order and judgment that, although not precedential in the Tenth Circuit’s formal sense, carries persuasive weight. Its key points are:

Recusal Denied: No reasonable, fully informed observer would question the impartiality of the district or magistrate judges merely because they ruled against Rabbi Bellinsky. (Liteky v. United States reaffirmed).
Representation Valid: Under Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-31-101(1)(a), the Colorado Attorney General may defend state employees sued in their individual capacities for acts within the scope of duty.
Younger Misapplied: The domestic-relations case does not automatically qualify for abstention; the district court failed to decide whether it came within one of the three categories identified in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs.
Rooker-Feldman Misapplied: Because (i) no final adverse state judgments existed when the federal actions were filed, and (ii) the complaints sought damages for an alleged conspiracy rather than appellate-style reversal of state judgments, the doctrine was inapplicable.
Disposition: Both dismissals were reversed; both cases were remanded for proceedings on the merits. IFP status was granted; all other pending motions were denied.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and their Influences

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971): Originates the principle that federal courts should not interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings.
Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013): Clarifies that Younger abstention is limited to three “exceptional” categories — (i) criminal prosecutions, (ii) certain civil enforcement actions, and (iii) civil proceedings involving orders in furtherance of state courts’ judicial functions.
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982): Supplies the traditional three-factor test for abstention only after a proceeding fits a Sprint category.
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. (NOPSI) v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989): Early articulation of the “judicial-in-nature” requirement for abstention, foreshadowing Sprint.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) & District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983): Taken together, they bar de facto appellate review of state judgments by lower federal courts.
Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., 956 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2020) & United States v. Woodmore, 135 F.4th 861 (10th Cir. 2025): Provide the objective standard for judicial recusal.
Morkel v. Davis, 513 F. App’x 724 (10th Cir. 2013): An unpublished, pre-Sprint decision that once permitted Younger abstention in custody disputes; cited (improperly) by the district court.
Analogous circuit cases rejecting Rooker-Feldman in custody-rights civil-rights suits: Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 1995); Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2008).

By contrasting Morkel with the controlling authority in Sprint, the Court underscored that a district court must determine Sprint applicability before reaching the familiar Middlesex factors. The distinction is not academic; it narrows automatic abstention in domestic-relations cases that lack the characteristics of state criminal or civil-enforcement proceedings.

2. Legal Reasoning

Recusal: The Court rejected recusal because the allegations concerned mere dissatisfaction with rulings. The objective test asks what a fully informed outsider would think, and adverse rulings rarely suffice.

Attorney-General Representation: Colorado’s statute extends representation to state employees when sued for acts within duty scope. The Court read the statute straightforwardly, rejecting the appellant’s argument as contrary to state law.

Younger Analysis

1. Threshold Sprint Inquiry Ignored. The district court abstained because child-custody matters implicate “important state interests,” but Sprint makes clear that importance alone is insufficient. The domestic-relations case — a private custody dispute — does not fit neatly into any Sprint category. Unlike juvenile-delinquency or abuse-neglect proceedings (often analogized to criminal enforcement), custody litigation is not “quasi-criminal” or coercive state enforcement.

2. Middlesex Factors Misapplied. Even if the case were within a Sprint category, the district court recited the Middlesex factors but failed to examine whether the state forum afforded an “adequate opportunity” to press the specific federal constitutional and civil-rights claims alleged (e.g., conspiracy under §§1983/1985).

3. Effect on Saga-Like Litigation. The opinion highlights that domestic cases intertwined with criminal cases require separate examinations. Here, one criminal matter had concluded (dismissed); the other was pending on appeal, but the abstention analysis should have separated them rather than impose a blanket stay.

Rooker-Feldman Analysis

1. Finality Requirement. The Court reiterated that the doctrine applies only when a state judgment is final and adverse to the federal plaintiff before the federal action is filed.

2. Injury Source Test. Rabbi Bellinsky alleged a conspiracy causing constitutional injury, not injury derived from the mere existence of a state judgment. The federal relief sought — money damages — would leave state orders intact.

3. Narrow Construction. The panel cited out-of-circuit authority to reinforce that a civil-rights damages claim predicated on corruption or fraud in state proceedings does not automatically attack the judgment itself.

3. Impact of the Decision

Restores Federal Forum Access in Custody-Related Civil-Rights Suits. Litigants alleging constitutional violations in the context of family-court litigation can no longer be turned away solely by invoking “important state interests.” District courts must first apply the Sprint gatekeeping test.
Practical Checklist for District Judges. The opinion implicitly supplies a sequence:
1. Identify any ongoing state proceeding;
2. Ask whether it is (i) criminal, (ii) quasi-criminal civil enforcement, or (iii) civil containing uniquely judicial-function orders;
3. Only if “Yes,” apply Middlesex for discretionary abstention.
Limits Blanket Stays of Discovery. Because abstention was improper, automatic stays predicated on it lack basis, permitting §1983 plaintiffs to obtain discovery — critical where alleged conspiracies involve court personnel.
Clarifies Rooker-Feldman’s Narrow Reach. The decision aligns the Tenth Circuit with others in confining the doctrine to genuine appellate-style attacks, distinguishing collateral damages actions.
Encourages Nuanced Treatment of Parallel Criminal and Civil Proceedings. The panel reminds lower courts that each state proceeding (custody, criminal, protection-order) must be discretely analyzed; pendency in one does not immunize another.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Younger Abstention: A doctrine that sometimes forces federal courts to step aside in favor of ongoing state proceedings, but only in exceptional categories (post-Sprint).
Sprint Categories: The three exclusive lanes where Younger may operate (criminal, quasi-criminal civil enforcement, and civil proceedings tied to state-court functioning).
Middlesex Factors: A three-part test (ongoing proceeding, important state interest, adequate opportunity for federal issues) applied after a Sprint category is satisfied.
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Bars federal district courts from acting as appellate courts over final state judgments. It applies only when the plaintiff asks the federal court to nullify or modify a final state court decision.
Recusal Standard (28 U.S.C. §455): Judges must step aside if their impartiality might reasonably be questioned; mere negative rulings are almost never enough.
Representation Statute (Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-31-101(1)(a)): Permits the state Attorney General to defend state officials sued for actions taken within their official roles, even when suits style them as “individual capacity.”

Conclusion

Bellinsky v. Galan is a noteworthy corrective to over-expansive abstention in the domestic-relations context. By insisting that courts walk through the Sprint gate before invoking Younger, the Tenth Circuit has reaffirmed that federal courts remain open for §1983 plaintiffs who claim systemic abuse under the color of state law, even when those abuses arise amid custody or protection-order battles.

For practitioners, the case provides a clear roadmap: challenge blanket abstention; highlight whether the state proceeding truly falls within a Sprint category; demonstrate independent injuries actionable under §1983; and distinguish any request for damages from impermissible appeals of state judgments.

For district courts, the decision is a cautionary tale against reflexive reliance on unpublished, pre-Sprint precedent, and a reminder to apply Rooker-Feldman sparingly.

Finally, although issued as a non-precedential order, the reasoning is thorough and likely to influence future cases in the Tenth Circuit and beyond where federal civil-rights claims intersect with ongoing family-law proceedings.