Bell v. Streeval: Fourth Circuit Retires the Jones / Wheeler / Young Saving-Clause Doctrine After Jones v. Hendrix

I. Introduction

Jason Tyann Bell, a federal inmate sentenced in 2003 under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, sought post-conviction relief claiming that the Guidelines’ residual clause used to classify him as a “career offender” is unconstitutionally vague. Because Mr. Bell had already filed (and lost) an initial motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, he tried to invoke the “saving clause” in § 2255(e) and file a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 instead. The district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

On appeal the Fourth Circuit faced three headline issues:

1. Whether Bell’s release from prison mooted the case or destroyed § 2241 “custody” jurisdiction.
2. Whether the § 2255(e) saving clause allowed him to proceed under § 2241 despite § 2255(h)’s bar on second or successive motions.
3. Whether reading § 2255(h) to bar relief would violate the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.

A divided panel (Judge Richardson for Parts I & II(A)–(B); Judge Thacker for Part II(C); Judge Benjamin joining both) affirmed the dismissal, establishing binding Fourth Circuit precedent that its prior saving-clause framework (In re Jones → Wheeler → Young) cannot survive the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Jones v. Hendrix.

II. Summary of the Judgment

• Custody & Mootness. Jurisdiction persisted because Bell filed while still incarcerated, and meaningful relief (shortening or terminating supervised release) was still possible.
• Saving Clause. Under Jones v. Hendrix, inability to satisfy § 2255(h) does not mean § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective.” Hence § 2241 is unavailable and the court lacks jurisdiction.
• Abrogation of Fourth-Circuit Precedent. The panel acknowledged that Jones, Wheeler, and Young are no longer good law after Hendrix.
• Suspension Clause. Relying on the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in In re Vial (and with a separate concurrence invoking Hendrix and Davenport), the panel held that § 2255(h)’s bar is not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.
• Disposition. The district court’s dismissal was affirmed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023) – Decisively held that failure to meet § 2255(h) does not unlock the saving clause; only structural inability to approach the sentencing court does. This case is the lynchpin of the Fourth Circuit’s decision.
2. In re Jones (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wheeler (4th Cir. 2018); and Young v. Antonelli (4th Cir. 2020) – The old, more lenient test letting prisoners use § 2241 when new (sometimes circuit-level) authority undermined their conviction or sentence. The panel declared these cases abrogated by Hendrix.
3. Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. 256 (2017) & United States v. Johnson, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) – Framed Bell’s merits theory about vagueness in sentencing enhancements, though the merits were never reached.
4. United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2017) – Earlier Fourth-Circuit reading of Beckles that left prisoners like Bell without a new Supreme Court rule and therefore outside § 2255(h)(2).
5. In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) – Previously upheld § 2255(h) against a Suspension-Clause challenge; relied on by the panel majority.
6. Foundational Suspension-Clause cases: Boumediene (2008), Thuraissigiam (2020), Brown v. Davenport (2022) – Provide the historical test (“as it existed in 1789”) that both majority and concurrence invoke.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction Despite Release

The panel applied settled doctrine: custody is measured at filing, and potential reduction in supervised release prevents mootness (see Knox; Johnson 2000).

2. Interplay of §§ 2241, 2255(e), and 2255(h)

Congress chose § 2255 as the exclusive vehicle for federal prisoners. Section 2255(e)’s saving clause is a narrow safety valve designed only for situations where the sentencing court is unavailable (e.g., abolished). The Supreme Court in Hendrix made clear that inability to meet § 2255(h) is not such a situation; permitting § 2241 in that circumstance would “make AEDPA curiously self-defeating.” Because Bell can still file in the sentencing court (even if procedurally barred), § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective.

3. Abrogation of Circuit Doctrine

By siding with Hendrix, the panel explicitly recognized that its earlier three-part and four-part tests (Jones/Wheeler/Young) survive in name only. Those tests hinged on the very premise that § 2255(h) impasse triggers the saving clause—now foreclosed.

4. Suspension Clause

Two opinions reach the same result via different roads. The majority (Judge Thacker) applies circuit precedent (In re Vial) which already held § 2255(h) constitutional. Judge Richardson’s concurrence, invoking Hendrix and the historical understanding of habeas, contends that only jurisdictional defects in the original judgment fall within the Suspension Clause, and Bell’s vagueness claim is merely a merits question. Either way, no suspension occurs.

C. Potential Impact

• Closure of § 2241 Path in the Fourth Circuit. Prisoners with sentencing or conviction claims that hinge on new circuit or statutory developments now have no § 2241 fallback; they must fit within § 2255(h) or obtain Supreme Court retroactivity.
• Uniformity Nationwide. The decision brings the Fourth Circuit into full alignment with the Supreme Court’s reading in Hendrix, reducing inter-circuit conflict and forum shopping.
• Retroactivity Battles Shift to the Supreme Court. Claimants must now lobby the High Court for new, retroactive constitutional rules; lower-court recognitions (e.g., of Burrage or Johnson-style vagueness) will no longer suffice.
• Administrative Consequences. District courts in the Fourth Circuit will see fewer § 2241 filings overlapping with § 2255 claims, streamlining case management yet potentially increasing motions to authorize successive § 2255 petitions in the Court of Appeals.
• Residual Questions. The concurrence signals openness to future structural challenges where the petitioner alleges a “true jurisdictional defect” – leaving a narrow but significant window for litigation over what counts as jurisdictional.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 2255 Motion

The normal vehicle for a federal prisoner to attack the conviction or sentence in the same court that imposed it.

Second or Successive Motion (§ 2255(h))

A repeat § 2255 filing. Allowed only if (i) new, previously unavailable Supreme Court retroactive constitutional rule, or (ii) new evidence of innocence.

§ 2241 Petition

General habeas statute filed in the district of confinement; rarely available to federal prisoners because § 2255 is considered “exclusive” unless the saving clause applies.

Saving Clause (§ 2255(e))

Allows a § 2241 petition if § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective.” Post-Hendrix this means only when the sentencing court is literally unavailable.

Suspension Clause

Constitutional guarantee that Congress cannot suspend habeas corpus except in rebellion or invasion. Modern courts test alleged suspensions by asking whether the petitioner’s claim was cognizable in habeas circa 1789.

Jurisdiction vs. Merits

A jurisdictional defect means the court had no power to act (e.g., convicting a civilian in a court-martial). A merits error means the court got the law or facts wrong but still had power; habeas traditionally reaches only the former.

V. Conclusion

Bell v. Streeval cements a pivotal shift in Fourth-Circuit habeas practice: after the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Hendrix, failure to clear the stringent gatekeeping of § 2255(h) no longer unlocks the saving clause. By acknowledging that its own trilogy of cases is abrogated, the court eliminates a once-vibrant avenue for sentencing and conviction challenges via § 2241. The ruling underscores Congress’s preference for finality, clarifies that custody jurisdiction persists through supervised release, and aligns Suspension-Clause doctrine with a historically anchored, jurisdiction-centric view of habeas corpus. Future litigants must now pursue relief either through an initial § 2255 motion, the narrow statutory exceptions for successive motions, or direct Supreme Court intervention—leaving § 2241 a truly extraordinary remedy in federal cases.