Introduction

Orlando Bell, a federal prisoner once housed at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth (USP-Leavenworth), filed a pro se civil rights complaint against several prison officials. Bell alleged (1) workplace harassment culminating in the loss of his kitchen job and (2) religious retaliation when prison staff purportedly withheld his kosher meals and served him pork in response to his complaints. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he sought damages and injunctive relief for violations of the First and Eighth Amendments.

The District Court for the District of Kansas screened the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. It also denied Bell’s post-judgment motion to reopen and amend his complaint to advance a claim under the FTCA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

The appellate decision, rendered on 11 June 2025, crystallises two key principles:

1. After Egbert v. Boule, federal courts will not extend Bivens to First-Amendment retaliation or religious-liberty claims brought by federal prisoners.
2. An FTCA amendment is futile when the prisoner alleges only non-physical injuries because (a) the FTCA waives sovereign immunity solely for money damages and (b) 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) bars compensatory damages in the absence of physical injury while 28 U.S.C. § 2674 precludes punitive damages against the United States.

Summary of the Judgment

• Bivens Claim: The court declined to recognise a Bivens remedy for Bell’s First-Amendment retaliation claim. Citing Egbert and Silva v. United States, it reiterated that extending Bivens is “impermissible in virtually all circumstances.”
• FTCA Amendment: The panel upheld the district court’s denial of Bell’s motion to amend because he could not plausibly recover money damages absent a physical injury and the FTCA does not provide relief for constitutional torts.
• Injunctive Relief: Any requested injunctive relief was moot because Bell had been transferred from USP-Leavenworth; the recent Supreme Court decision in FBI v. Fikre did not salvage his claim.
• Disposition: Dismissal affirmed; in forma pauperis status granted on appeal.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning interwove a network of Supreme Court and Tenth-Circuit authorities:

• Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) – original recognition of an implied damages remedy against federal officers for Fourth-Amendment violations.
• Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022) – refused to extend Bivens to First-Amendment retaliation; articulated a single-question framework (“Is Congress better suited to create a damages remedy?”).
• Silva v. United States, 45 F.4th 1134 (10th Cir. 2022) – characterised Bivens expansion as “impermissible in virtually all circumstances.”
• Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234 (2024) – rejected mootness where recurrence was reasonably possible; distinguished here because Bell’s transfer eliminated the possibility of recurrence at the same facility.
• Statutory authorities: 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (FTCA jurisdiction), § 1997e(e) (physical-injury requirement for prisoner damages), and § 2674 (no punitive damages against the United States).

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Bivens Inapplicability

The panel applied Egbert’s “single-question” approach. Bell advanced no argument demonstrating why Congress was ill-equipped to fashion a remedy or why special factors favoured judicial intervention. Because the Supreme Court has already refused to recognise a Bivens remedy for First-Amendment retaliation (Egbert), Bell’s claim, framed as religious retaliation under the First Amendment, necessarily failed.

b. Futility of FTCA Amendment

A viable FTCA action must:

1. Name the United States as the sole defendant,
2. Show prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, and
3. Seek money damages for a non-constitutional tort committed by a federal employee acting within the scope of employment.

c. Mootness of Injunctive Relief

The panel distinguished Fikre. Whereas the No Fly List operates nationally and the government could restore Fikre’s name, Bell’s removal from USP-Leavenworth to another facility meant the challenged conduct (withholding kosher meals and pork service) “cannot reasonably be expected to recur” with the same defendants. Therefore, the injunctive component was moot.

3. Impact of the Judgment

• Cementing Post-Egbert Landscape: The decision fortifies the near-total bar on new Bivens contexts, especially First-Amendment religious-liberty or retaliation claims brought by prisoners.
• Strategic Litigation Shift: Prisoners alleging religious or retaliatory misconduct by federal officials must now look to statutory avenues (e.g., RFRA, Prison Litigation Reform Act injunctive claims, or § 2000cc-1 claims under RLUIPA where applicable) rather than Bivens.
• FTCA Pleading Guidance: Prison litigants are reminded that FTCA suits are viable only for common-law torts causing physical harm or property loss, not for constitutional or purely emotional injuries.
• Mootness Doctrine Clarification: Fikre does not automatically forestall mootness in the prison-transfer context; plaintiffs must demonstrate a realistic prospect of recurrence with the same actors or policies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Bivens Action – A judge-made remedy allowing individuals to sue federal officers for certain constitutional violations. The Supreme Court now treats expansion of this remedy as almost categorically forbidden.

FTCA (Federal Tort Claims Act) – A statute waiving the United States’ sovereign immunity for common-law torts committed by federal employees, but only if the plaintiff seeks money damages and satisfies administrative procedures.

§ 1997e(e) Physical-Injury Rule – Part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act; it blocks prisoners from obtaining monetary compensation for mental or emotional injuries unless they also suffer a physical injury.

Mootness – A case becomes moot when the court can no longer grant effective relief. Transfer to another prison typically moots claims for injunctive relief aimed at the original facility unless the plaintiff shows likely recurrence.

Conclusion

Bell v. Leavenworth offers a textbook application of the Supreme Court’s recent scepticism toward judicially created remedies. By refusing to extend Bivens into the sphere of prisoner religious-retaliation claims and by deeming an FTCA amendment futile absent physical injury, the Tenth Circuit underscores a reduced judicial role in crafting damages remedies against the federal government. Prisoners and practitioners must therefore rely on express statutory schemes and carefully plead physical injuries or tangible losses when invoking the FTCA. The decision marks yet another incremental but decisive step in confining Bivens to its original factual footprints and clarifying the narrow terrain on which FTCA claims can proceed.