Belknap v. Spinks: Clearly Established Bar on Housing Known‑Suicidal Detainees with Loose Bedding and Tie‑Off Points; No Deliberate‑Indifference Claim for Failure to Render Aid Absent Belief of Rescuability

Introduction

In Belknap v. Spinks, the Fifth Circuit addressed qualified immunity at the pleading stage for jail officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 following the suicide of pretrial detainee Dakota Eugene Belknap. The case sits at the intersection of detainee suicide prevention obligations, the subjective deliberate‑indifference standard that governs episodic acts under the Fourteenth Amendment in the Fifth Circuit, and the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis.

Plaintiffs—family members and the estate of Mr. Belknap—alleged that jailer Tisha Marie Spinks and supervisor Sergeant Harry Ernest Vanskike violated Belknap’s constitutional rights by (1) removing him from suicide watch and placing him in a cell with “tie‑off points” and loose bedding; (2) failing to provide lifesaving measures when they found him hanging; and (3) failing to intervene to stop each other’s constitutional violations. The district court denied qualified immunity on all but certain claims against a nurse. On interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The opinion crystallizes two central rules for the Fifth Circuit: First, by December 2020 it was clearly established that jailers may not, with deliberate indifference, house a detainee known to present a substantial suicide risk in a cell that presents obvious suicide hazards—specifically loose bedding and tie‑off points—without mental‑health clearance. Second, a failure‑to‑render‑aid claim requires plausible allegations that the officer actually believed the detainee still faced a substantial risk of serious harm at that moment; where the facts plausibly indicate the officer believed the detainee was already beyond saving, deliberate indifference is not stated.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to jailer Spinks on the claim that she violated clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights by moving Belknap off suicide watch and housing him in a cell with tie‑off points and loose bedding without mental‑health clearance. Relying on Converse v. City of Kemah and Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff’s Department, the court held that, as pleaded, her conduct could constitute deliberate indifference to a known suicide risk and violated clearly established law.
The court reversed as to all other claims. It held the complaint did not plausibly allege that Sergeant Vanskike was deliberately indifferent in connection with the removal from suicide watch because he instructed Spinks to obtain mental‑health clearance, which “accounted for” the suicide risk.
On the medical‑care claims, the court held the complaint failed to plausibly allege deliberate indifference against either officer for failing to administer lifesaving measures. Accepting the pleaded facts, both officers believed Belknap was beyond saving after a pulse check; absent plausible allegations that they actually believed he could be resuscitated, no deliberate‑indifference claim lies.
Failure‑to‑intervene claims failed as to both officers, including the claim that Vanskike failed to intervene in Spinks’s removal decision; instructing her to get mental‑health clearance did not constitute “acquiescence.”
Judge Oldham concurred in part and dissented in part, contending that qualified immunity should also shield Spinks because existing precedent did not clearly prohibit her actions “in the particular circumstances,” given contemporaneous information arguably suggesting an abated suicide risk.

Detailed Analysis

Factual and Procedural Posture

The complaint is built largely on interviews conducted by a Texas Ranger after Belknap’s death; the Fifth Circuit treated those witness statements as adopted factual allegations where the complaint so indicated. Belknap was booked in December 2020. His intake screening reflected a suicide attempt by wrist‑cutting three days earlier, depression, and PTSD‑related symptoms. He answered “No” when asked if he was thinking of self‑harm “today.” The supervisor, Sergeant Vanskike, signed the form and checked “SUICIDAL,” triggering suicide watch, and a judge and mental‑health notification. An MHMR (mental‑health) employee evaluated Belknap and, on a 0–3 scale, rated him 1 for ideation, intent, and history, concluding he was not then a threat to self or others; the employee understood that assessment as strictly “here‑and‑now.”

The next day, Belknap was removed from suicide watch and moved to a different cell. The complaint alleges ambiguity about who made that decision; it asserts only that the nurse “failed to either continue” or “initiate a new” suicide watch. The complaint alleges Spinks wanted to move him and that when she told Vanskike, he said: “Make sure MHMR clears him before you move him anywhere.” Later, after dinner, Spinks and a trustee found Belknap hanging from bedding tied to the top bunk. Neither Spinks nor Vanskike performed CPR; EMS arrived about 23 minutes later and resuscitated a pulse, but Belknap was later declared brain dead.

On motions to dismiss, the district court denied qualified immunity to Spinks and Vanskike (with limited exceptions). The Fifth Circuit took interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral‑order doctrine, reviewed de novo, and conducted the two‑prong qualified‑immunity analysis: constitutional violation and clearly established law, with discretion over sequencing.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Hare v. City of Corinth (5th Cir. en banc): Establishes the episodic‑acts framework for pretrial detainees and the subjective deliberate‑indifference standard for individual‑officer liability under the Fourteenth Amendment. This standard permeates the court’s analysis.
Estate of Henson v. Wichita County; Sanchez v. Oliver: Recognize a pretrial detainee’s right to protection from known suicide risks as a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right in the Fifth Circuit since at least 1989.
Converse v. City of Kemah (2020): A pleading‑stage case where officers placed a suicidal detainee—with contemporaneous statements evincing suicidality—into a cell with a blanket; the detainee hanged himself. The Fifth Circuit reversed dismissal, finding plausible allegations of deliberate indifference and clearly established law. The Belknap panel uses Converse as the principal clearly‑established comparator for “loose bedding + tie‑off points.”
Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff’s Department (2000): A summary‑judgment case affirming denial of qualified immunity where officers knew a detainee was a suicide risk “at all times,” housed her in a cell with known tie‑off points, and provided a sheet she used to hang herself. Jacobs anchors the rule that bedding and tie‑off points are obvious hazards for known‑suicidal detainees.
Cope v. Cogdill (2021): The court granted qualified immunity on a “clearly established” question where the hazard was a 30‑inch phone cord—distinguishing it from the “well‑documented” danger of bedding. Belknap leverages Cope’s contrast to underscore that bedding/tie‑offs are squarely within clearly established law; phone cords are not.
Hyatt v. Thomas (2016); Flores v. County of Hardeman (1997): Address when ceasing suicide‑prevention procedures may or may not reflect deliberate indifference; highlight that the analysis is context‑dependent and that negligence does not suffice.
Thompson v. Upshur County; Domino v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Sims v. Griffin (2022): Articulate the subjective knowledge requirement for medical‑care claims—officers must actually draw the inference of substantial risk of serious harm.
Brumfield v. Hollins (2008); Whitt v. Stephens County (2008): No deliberate indifference where officers, after checking and finding no pulse, assumed an inmate who hanged himself was dead and did not render aid.
Joseph v. Bartlett; Whitley v. Hanna: Define bystander/failure‑to‑intervene liability in the Fifth Circuit, including the requirement of “acquiescence.”
Pearson v. Callahan; Mullenix v. Luna; Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd; District of Columbia v. Wesby; Taylor v. Riojas: Supreme Court qualified‑immunity benchmarks—particularity, robust consensus, and the narrow “obviousness” exception. The panel acknowledges these standards but resolves the case within existing Fifth Circuit suicide‑jurisprudence.

Legal Reasoning

A. Removal from Suicide Watch and Placement with Tie‑Off Points and Bedding

The panel separates the analysis for the two defendants. As to Sergeant Vanskike, the complaint was insufficient to allege deliberate indifference. Although the complaint recounts that he harbored an internal “I don’t care” frustration about decision‑making, it does not allege he expressed that sentiment to Spinks. What he did say—“Make sure MHMR clears him before you move him anywhere”—demonstrated that he accounted for Belknap’s suicide risk. Because deliberate indifference requires that an officer “effectively disregard” a known substantial risk, the instruction to secure mental‑health clearance defeated the claim at the pleading stage.

As to jailer Spinks, the complaint plausibly alleged actual knowledge of Belknap’s suicide risk (awareness of the intake form and prior attempt) and deliberate indifference by moving him to a cell with tie‑off points and loose bedding without a mental‑health sign‑off. The complaint does not allege she received the MHMR assessment, nor that a nurse or clinician cleared removal from suicide watch; and it does not allege that Spinks followed through on the instruction to check with MHMR. Drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor at 12(b)(6), her conduct—knowingly placing a known‑risk detainee into an obviously hazardous environment without professional clearance—could constitute deliberate indifference.

On clearly established law, the panel holds that by December 2020, Fifth Circuit precedent (Converse and Jacobs) clearly established that officers may not, with deliberate indifference, house known‑suicidal detainees in cells with loose bedding and tie‑off points. Cope’s distinction between bedding and a phone cord reinforces the point: bedding is a well‑documented suicide hazard; the law is not “beyond debate” as to less obvious hazards like phone cords. The court also rejects Spinks’s reliance‑on‑clinicians argument at this stage because the complaint permits the inference that she acted without any mental‑health clearance.

B. Failure to Render Lifesaving Aid

The Fourteenth Amendment medical‑care claim failed against both officers. The court applied the subjective deliberate‑indifference standard: a plaintiff must plead facts showing the officer was “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn” that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and that the officer actually drew that inference. Here, the pleaded facts show that after cutting Belknap down, Vanskike (trained in CPR) checked for a pulse; his expression led Spinks to believe there was none; neither initiated CPR, and Vanskike said, “Yeah, he’s gone.” Although EMS later obtained a pulse, the complaint does not plausibly allege that either defendant at the time believed Belknap could be resuscitated. Consistent with Brumfield and Whitt, assuming a detainee is already deceased after a pulse check, without more, is not deliberate indifference—even if negligent—absent allegations supporting the inference that the officer believed lifesaving measures could still help.

C. Failure to Intervene

By‑stander liability requires that the officer knew a colleague was violating rights, was present, had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and “acquiesced in” the violation by choosing not to act. Because the court found no underlying constitutional violations on the medical‑care theory, those failure‑to‑intervene claims necessarily failed. As to the one surviving underlying violation (Spinks’s removal and placement), the failure‑to‑intervene claim against Sergeant Vanskike still failed because instructing Spinks to obtain MHMR clearance is not “acquiescence”; rather, it is the opposite.

D. The Concurrence/Dissent

Judge Oldham would have granted qualified immunity to Spinks as well. He emphasized the Supreme Court’s insistence on particularized, not generalized, clearly‑established standards. In his view, Converse and Jacobs are materially distinguishable because, on the complaint’s face, Belknap’s risk appeared to have abated: an MHMR employee concluded he was not then a threat; a judge and nurse visited; and Spinks consulted a supervisor. He underscored that Fifth Circuit law does not clearly dictate specific measures jailers must take once a risk is recognized (Hyatt), and that where officers reasonably credit indications of reduced risk, qualified immunity should attach. The majority, by contrast, read the complaint to permit the inference that Spinks acted without clearance.

Impact and Implications

For jail operations: The opinion reinforces that, in the Fifth Circuit, bedding and tie‑off points are obvious suicide hazards. Absent professional clearance, moving a detainee with a known substantial suicide risk into such an environment exposes officers to personal liability. Jail administrators should implement and enforce protocols that require documented mental‑health clearance before removing suicide precautions and that eliminate bedding and tie‑offs for any detainee with an identified risk.
For training and documentation: The different outcomes for the supervisor and the line jailer turn on contemporaneous directions and documentation. Instructing subordinates to get mental‑health clearance, and documenting that instruction and any clearance obtained, can be dispositive at the pleading stage.
For failure‑to‑render‑aid theories: At least at the pleading stage, allegations must plausibly show the officer actually believed the detainee still faced a substantial risk of serious harm; the belief that the detainee is already dead—even if mistaken—undercuts the subjective prong. Agencies should still train personnel to initiate CPR absent definitive signs of death; however, legally, the subjective belief requirement remains a significant barrier to liability in the Fifth Circuit.
For failure‑to‑intervene claims: Mere presence is insufficient. Plaintiffs must plausibly allege knowledge plus acquiescence. Supervisory directions to follow safety protocols can defeat by‑stander liability even where an underlying violation survives against the subordinate.
On the “clearly established” landscape: The panel’s contrast with Cope reiterates a taxonomy of hazards—bedding is obvious; certain fixtures (e.g., phone cords) are less so. The opinion signals that reliance on contemporaneous clinical assessments could support qualified immunity at later stages if substantiated in the record, even if such reliance cannot defeat a well‑pleaded claim at 12(b)(6).
Publication status: Although the opinion is unpublished and not precedential under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, its reasoning aligns with and applies binding Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent; practitioners should expect district courts within the circuit to follow its approach to bedding/tie‑off hazards and the medical‑care subjective‑belief requirement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A defense shielding officials from damages unless (1) the complaint plausibly alleges a constitutional violation and (2) the violated right was “clearly established” at the time—meaning precedent put the unlawfulness “beyond debate” in the specific context. Courts can skip to either prong first.
Deliberate indifference (Fourteenth Amendment, episodic acts): A subjective test. Plaintiffs must plausibly allege the officer actually knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and effectively disregarded it. Negligence—even gross negligence—does not suffice.
Known suicide risk: In the Fifth Circuit, once officers have actual knowledge of a detainee’s substantial suicide risk (e.g., recent attempt, expressed ideation), it is clearly established that they must not, with deliberate indifference, expose the detainee to obvious suicide hazards like loose bedding and tie‑off points.
Tie‑off points and loose bedding: “Tie‑off points” are fixtures or features (e.g., bunk corners, bars, hooks) that allow anchoring a ligature. “Loose bedding” (sheets, blankets) is a recognized, frequently used means of jail suicide. Their combination is a well‑documented hazard.
Failure to render aid: To plead deliberate indifference for medical care, it’s not enough to say aid was not provided. The complaint must plausibly indicate the officer actually believed the detainee faced an ongoing substantial risk that aid could mitigate. If the officer believed the detainee was already beyond saving (e.g., after a pulse check), courts in this circuit have rejected deliberate‑indifference claims.
Failure to intervene: Liability requires more than being nearby. The officer must know a constitutional violation is occurring, be present, have a reasonable chance to stop it, and nonetheless acquiesce in the violation.
“Obviousness” exception: In rare, extreme cases, the Supreme Court allows liability without a factually similar precedent if the violation is obvious (Taylor v. Riojas). Belknap did not turn on that doctrine because Converse and Jacobs already clearly established the bedding/tie‑off rule.

Conclusion

Belknap v. Spinks delivers two strong messages to correctional officials in the Fifth Circuit. First, it reaffirmed that by 2020 the law was clearly established: officers may not, with deliberate indifference, place a known‑suicidal detainee in a cell with loose bedding and tie‑off points. Where the complaint plausibly alleges that a jailer removed suicide safeguards and exposed the detainee to obvious hazards without mental‑health clearance, qualified immunity will not block suit at the pleading stage. Second, the court underscored the subjective nature of deliberate indifference in medical‑care claims: absent plausible allegations that officers actually believed lifesaving measures could still help, failure to initiate CPR does not state a constitutional violation.

The opinion also shows how contemporaneous instructions and documentation matter. A supervisor who directs subordinates to seek mental‑health clearance before any change in status can defeat deliberate‑indifference and by‑stander theories at the outset. Finally, the partial dissent highlights ongoing tension in qualified‑immunity jurisprudence: how particularized the clearly‑established inquiry must be in detainee‑suicide contexts, especially when officers credit clinical assessments suggesting risk abatement. On balance, Belknap fortifies existing Fifth Circuit suicide‑prevention jurisprudence while cabining medical‑care liability to scenarios where officers are plausibly alleged to have recognized an ongoing, remediable risk and consciously disregarded it.