Belief vs. Practice: Fifth Circuit Clarifies Title VII Religion Claims, Tightens RLA Access, and Polices Injunctions and Civil Contempt

Introduction

Carter v. Local 556 (5th Cir. 2025) arises from Southwest Airlines’ termination of veteran flight attendant Charlene Carter after she sent the union president graphic anti-abortion videos and messages and posted similar content publicly. Carter sued both Southwest and her union, Transport Workers Union of America, Local 556, under Title VII and the Railway Labor Act (RLA), and she prevailed at trial on multiple theories. The district court not only awarded individualized relief but also entered a sweeping permanent injunction and later held Southwest in contempt for its compliance notice.

On panel rehearing, the Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion and issued a comprehensive substitute decision that does several things at once:

• Reframes the doctrinal architecture of Title VII religion cases by expressly separating belief-based claims from practice-based claims and clarifying how the “undue hardship” defense fits into that framework.
• Affirms union liability under Title VII for “attempting to cause” employer discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3).
• Cabins post-certification RLA retaliation/interference claims by insisting on a showing of anti-union animus or a breakdown in the statutory dispute-resolution scheme.
• Vacates a broad “obey-the-law” permanent injunction for vagueness and overbreadth and constrains civil contempt sanctions to remedial, least-restrictive measures.

The parties are Carter (plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant), Southwest (defendant-appellant), and the Union (defendant-appellant/cross-appellee). The opinion therefore touches four major domains: Title VII religious discrimination, union liability, the RLA’s narrow path to federal court, and remedial powers (injunctions and contempt).

Summary of the Opinion

• Title VII against Southwest:
  • Belief-based intentional discrimination: REVERSED. No legally sufficient evidence that Southwest acted “because of” Carter’s religious beliefs themselves, as opposed to her conduct; judgment as a matter of law ordered for Southwest.
  • Practice-based claims (intentional discrimination based on practice and failure-to-accommodate): AFFIRMED. Southwest failed to prove an undue hardship even under the pre-Groff standard; no new trial warranted despite Groff’s later, more demanding standard for employers.
• Title VII against the Union:
  • Liability AFFIRMED on all theories, including for “attempting to cause” Southwest to discriminate (§ 2000e-2(c)(3)), disparate treatment, and failure to accommodate. The Union forfeited several challenges (including an undue hardship defense) through litigation choices.
  • Backpay: Joint and several liability with Southwest affirmed.
• RLA:
  • Retaliation claim against Southwest: REVERSED. No post-certification cause of action absent anti-union animus or a breakdown in the statutory dispute-resolution process.
  • Interference claim against Southwest: AFFIRMED dismissal; no plausible showing of anti-union animus or interference with designation of representatives.
  • Duty of fair representation claim against the Union: AFFIRMED. Reporting Carter to Southwest could be arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith; the Union’s challenge centered on a “protected activity” instruction was immaterial.
• Permanent injunction: VACATED for vagueness and overbreadth under Rule 65(d) and tailoring principles; remanded.
• Contempt: Contempt finding AFFIRMED (Southwest’s “does not discriminate” notice failed to comply with “may not discriminate”), but the sanction (mandatory religious-liberty training for lawyers) VACATED as punitive and not the least restrictive remedial measure; remanded for a narrow, remedial sanction.
• Appellate attorneys’ fees: Carter’s motion GRANTED; remanded to the district court to set the amount under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Driving the Decision

• Title VII—religion:
  • 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and § 2000e(j): Defines “religion” to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,” subject to the employer’s undue hardship defense for observance/practice.
  • EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015): Title VII demands favored treatment for religious practice through reasonable accommodation; motive to avoid accommodation violates Title VII.
  • Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023): Rejects de minimis test; undue hardship now requires showing “substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of [the] particular business,” and coworker impacts matter only insofar as they impose substantial business costs, not mere bias or discomfort.
  • Hebrew v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 80 F.4th 717 (5th Cir. 2023): Post-Groff articulation of heavy burden on employers and separation of intentional discrimination and accommodation theories.
  • Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013): Illustrates practice-based analysis (Sikh kirpan in federal building) and the need to evaluate accommodations against hardship.
  • Pre-Groff undue hardship in the Fifth Circuit: Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982); Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988); Howard v. Haverty Furniture, 615 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1980); Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001).
• Union liability under Title VII:
  • 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c): Unions may not discriminate and may not “cause or attempt to cause” an employer to discriminate.
  • United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975): Unions are subject to Title VII constraints.
  • Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 1999): Recognizes union liability when it prevents employer compliance with Title VII.
  • Cooper v. General Dynamics (5th Cir. 1976) (separate opinions): Acknowledges union obligations to accommodate and availability of undue hardship defense, later widely recognized by circuits and the EEOC.
• RLA access to federal court:
  • 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third & Fourth; TWA v. Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989): RLA principally protects precertification rights; judicial intervention limited to enforcing the Act’s dispute-resolution scheme.
  • Mitchell v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 481 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2007): When the CBA requires arbitration and the union controls grievances, employees generally lack standing to relitigate in court, except for duty of fair representation claims.
  • Roscello v. Southwest Airlines Co., 726 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1984): Precertification discharge case assumed a cause of action; emphasized anti-union animus/interference with representative choice.
  • Post-certification limits: Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v. Union Pacific R.R., 31 F.4th 337 (5th Cir. 2022); Southwest Airlines Pilots Ass’n v. Southwest Airlines Co., 120 F.4th 474 (5th Cir. 2024); cases from other circuits (Kansas City Southern (8th Cir.), Wightman (1st Cir.), Dempsey (7th Cir.), Herring (9th Cir.)): anti-union animus or undermining the union’s functioning required for a judicial role.
  • Duty of fair representation: Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991): Union conduct must not be arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
• Injunctions and contempt:
  • Rule 65(d): Injunctions must state reasons, terms specifically, and describe in reasonable detail the acts restrained or required.
  • Louisiana v. Biden, 45 F.4th 841 (5th Cir. 2022); Scott v. Schedler, 826 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2016): Specificity and narrow tailoring demanded; “obey-the-law” injunctions are improper.
  • Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1978); E.T. v. Paxton, 19 F.4th 760 (5th Cir. 2021); Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48 (2018): Tailor relief to the plaintiff’s injury; avoid sweeping relief benefiting non-parties absent necessity.
  • Contempt standards: Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 228 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2000) (clear and convincing proof of violation; review for abuse of discretion); Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994) (civil vs. criminal contempt); Gompers, 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (character/purpose controls); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Abbott, 119 F.4th 373 (5th Cir. 2024) (substantial compliance); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Energy Gathering, 86 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1996) (least restrictive means); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992) (Rule 11’s punitive purpose distinguished).
• Preservation and preclusion:
  • Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S. 729 (2023); Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011): Rule 50(b) needed to preserve sufficiency arguments; purely legal issues at summary judgment are different.
  • Grimes v. BNSF Ry., 746 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2014): Arbitral issue preclusion can apply; the parties forfeited the argument on appeal here.

Legal Reasoning and How the Court Reached Its Conclusions

1) Title VII’s “belief” vs. “practice” architecture

The court held that Title VII religion claims must be analyzed through three distinct routes:

• Intentional discrimination “because of” religious belief (no undue hardship defense).
• Intentional discrimination “because of” religious practice (subject to undue hardship on the employer’s business).
• Failure to accommodate religious practice (also subject to undue hardship).

This separation flows from the statutory definition of “religion” in § 2000e(j), which conditions protection for “observance or practice” on the absence of undue hardship, but contains no such limitation for “belief.” The court rejected Carter’s invitation to collapse all faith-related conduct into a single “motivating factor” inquiry that would effectively erase the undue hardship defense—illustrated by the court’s Tagore hypothetical (sword-carrying at work) and the Eighth Circuit’s caution against turning conduct claims into belief claims.

Applying that framework:

• Belief-based intentional discrimination failed as a matter of law. Carter showed Southwest knew her beliefs and fired her for her messages, but she did not produce direct evidence that Southwest harbored hostility toward her religious beliefs themselves. Comparator evidence (e.g., another employee’s Women’s March posting) was not “nearly identical”: no similar direct messages, hostility, supervisor, duties, or disciplinary history. The verdict could not stand on a belief-based theory.
• Practice-based theories survived. Southwest argued accommodating Carter’s practice of sending graphic unsolicited videos would harm morale and disrupt the workplace under company policies. The jury—properly instructed under then-binding Fifth Circuit “more than de minimis cost” caselaw—found no undue hardship. Notably, the trial record allowed the jury to consider coworker effects and morale as business costs; Southwest simply did not persuade the jury.

No new trial after Groff. Although Groff raised the employer’s burden (requiring “substantial increased costs”), the Fifth Circuit declined to remand. Remands are appropriate when an intervening change lowers the burden for the party who lost and when additional evidence might matter. Here, the change increased Southwest’s burden, and the court found it implausible that Southwest withheld stronger cost evidence; much of what Southwest says it would now offer would have been equally relevant before Groff. Fairness did not require a do-over.

2) Union liability under Title VII

The union’s Title VII liabilities were affirmed on multiple fronts:

• “Attempting to cause” discrimination is actionable. Section 2000e-2(c)(3) expressly makes it unlawful for a union to “cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate.” The district court’s jury instruction tracking this language was correct, and reliance on employer-only pattern instructions was misplaced.
• Belief-based sufficiency challenge forfeited. The Union failed to file a Rule 50(b) motion post-verdict; under Dupree/Ortiz, the Fifth Circuit lacked power to review sufficiency-of-the-evidence on appeal. The Union also did not preserve a purely legal challenge at summary judgment.
• Backpay liability. Title VII permits backpay against the “labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice.” Given the verdict and the Union’s forfeitures, joint and several backpay liability stood.
• Undue hardship defense forfeited. The Union did not plead undue hardship and moved to amend only after trial began; denial for undue delay was within the district court’s discretion (Rule 15, Robertson/Mayeaux). The Fifth Circuit also noted that unions can, in principle, assert undue hardship defenses to accommodation claims—but not when they fail to plead them.

3) Narrow path to federal court under the RLA

The RLA channels most disputes to arbitration. Outside that channel, courts step in only when:

• Precertification rights are at stake (e.g., employer interference with selection of representatives), or
• Post-certification, there is anti-union animus, a fundamental attack on the union’s functioning, or the RLA’s dispute scheme is unavailable or ineffective.

Carter’s post-certification “retaliation” and “interference” theories against Southwest failed because she did not show anti-union animus or breakdown of the RLA scheme. She could have raised her organizing/anti-union arguments in the arbitration process (and the Union represented her there), but she chose not to. The court reaffirmed that, without anti-union animus, the RLA does not supply a private cause of action in this posture.

By contrast, the duty of fair representation claim against the Union stands on a different footing. Reporting Carter to Southwest could be “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,” and the jury so found. The Union’s argument that Carter’s conduct wasn’t “protected” under the RLA missed the point: fair-representation liability turns on the Union’s conduct (arbitrariness, etc.), not on whether the member’s underlying expression was statutorily protected. Any jury-instruction error on “protected activity” was immaterial.

4) Injunction specificity and scope; civil contempt limits

The permanent injunction was vacated for two independent reasons:

• Vagueness (Rule 65(d)): The decree largely told Southwest and the Union not to “discriminate” or to “reasonably accommodate”—classic “obey-the-law” language. That fails the requirement that an ordinary person be able to discern exactly what conduct is proscribed without resort to external documents.
• Overbreadth/tailoring: Relief extended to all Southwest flight attendants, many of whom were non-parties, without showing that such breadth was necessary to redress Carter’s injury. Federal courts must tailor relief to the plaintiff’s injury, not legislate general compliance.

Contempt was split:

• Finding of contempt: Affirmed. The order required Southwest to tell flight attendants it “may not” discriminate; Southwest instead said it “does not” discriminate and paired that with internal commentary undercutting the verdict. The semantic substitution materially deviated from the order; substantial compliance defense failed.
• Sanction: Vacated. Mandatory “religious-liberty training” for in-house lawyers was punitive, not coercive or compensatory; it was also not the least restrictive remedy to secure compliance. On remand, any contempt sanction must be remedial and narrowly tailored (e.g., corrected notice, fee-shifting tied to enforcement, compliance reporting).

Impact

On employers: how to manage “belief” vs. “practice” after Carter

• Segregate analyses:
  • Belief-based: Ensure no action is taken “because of” an employee’s religious identity or beliefs; document belief-neutral reasons and comparators.
  • Practice-based: Engage in an interactive process; assess accommodations; under Groff, build a record of specific, substantial costs tied to your business (not abstract morale concerns or coworker bias).
• Policies and social media: Neutral policies can be enforced, but you must consider religious accommodations and cannot rely on generalized “morale” without evidencing substantial business impact. Harassment and threats can be addressed, but consider narrower steps before termination and document why lesser accommodations would fail.

On unions: enlarged exposure and procedural discipline

• “Attempt to cause” liability is real. Communications or pressure that seek employer action can trigger § 2000e-2(c)(3) exposure.
• Plead affirmative defenses early. If you intend to assert undue hardship to an accommodation claim, plead it; late amendments risk denial.
• Duty of fair representation: Internal actions—including reporting a member/nonmember to management—can be scrutinized for arbitrariness, discrimination, or bad faith. Train officers on neutrality and process discipline, particularly when the member is a dissident or fee objector.

On RLA litigation strategy

• Post-certification claims require anti-union animus or similar extraordinary circumstances. Otherwise, use the CBA’s grievance/arbitration path and preserve arguments there.
• Employees opposing union leadership should bring those arguments in arbitration and, if necessary, through fair-representation claims—not as stand-alone “retaliation” suits in federal court.

On remedies: injunctions and contempt

• Drafting injunctions: Be specific (who must do what, when, and how), and tailor relief to the prevailing party’s injury. Avoid “obey-the-law” decrees.
• Compliance notices: Track the court’s language exactly. Editorializing or “spin” risks contempt—even small wording changes can matter.
• Civil contempt sanctions: Aim to coerce compliance or compensate harm (e.g., corrected notices, fee awards, compliance reports). Avoid punitive or message-sending sanctions in civil contempt.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Belief vs. practice under Title VII:
  • Belief-based: Your religion or beliefs themselves. The employer may not act “because of” these—no undue hardship defense applies.
  • Practice-based: What you do for religious reasons (attire, grooming, schedule, speech). Employers must accommodate unless they can prove substantial increased costs to their business (Groff).
• “Attempt to cause” discrimination by unions: A union can be liable under Title VII if it tries to get the employer to discriminate, even if the attempt fails.
• Anti-union animus (RLA): Post-certification, courts will generally not hear retaliation/interference claims unless the carrier acted with hostility toward union activity or undermined the union’s functioning—otherwise, use arbitration.
• “Obey-the-law” injunctions: Courts cannot just order a party to follow the law. Orders must be specific, so parties know exactly what to do or not do.
• Civil vs. criminal contempt:
  • Civil: Coercive or compensatory—designed to make you comply or to make the other side whole; must be the least restrictive means.
  • Criminal: Punitive—punishes past disobedience. Requires heightened procedural protections and is not available under the guise of civil contempt.

What Happens Next on Remand

• Enter judgment for Southwest on the belief-based Title VII claim and on the RLA retaliation claim.
• Proceed with the affirmed verdicts: Title VII practice-based claims against Southwest and all Title VII claims against the Union; duty of fair representation against the Union.
• Redraft any permanent injunction: It must be specific and narrowly tailored to Carter’s injury and the adjudicated violations.
• Revisit contempt sanctions: Impose a remedial, least-restrictive sanction (e.g., corrected notice and fees), not punitive measures like broad “training.”
• Determine appellate attorneys’ fees for Carter under § 2000e-5(k).

Conclusion

Carter v. Local 556 is a significant Fifth Circuit decision that clarifies how courts should analyze religion claims under Title VII. The court draws a sharp line between belief-based and practice-based theories, preserves the employer’s mandatory accommodation duty (now measured by Groff’s substantial-cost standard), and simultaneously amplifies union exposure under Title VII by underscoring § 2000e‑2(c)(3)’s “attempt to cause” language. In the RLA arena, the decision reinforces that, after certification, federal courts are not an alternative grievance forum; absent anti-union animus or a breakdown in the statutory process, claims must proceed through arbitration or as fair-representation claims against unions. Finally, the opinion is a primer on remedies: injunctions must be specific and tailored, and civil contempt must be remedial, not punitive.

The net effect is a careful rebalancing: employees retain robust Title VII protection for religious practices requiring accommodation, unions face clearer Title VII exposure for catalyzing employer discrimination and for arbitrary conduct toward dissidents, carriers are channeled back to the RLA dispute machinery unless they act with anti-union animus, and district courts are reminded to craft precise, plaintiff-focused remedies and measured, remedial contempt sanctions.