Beach v. Wyoming DOC: Tenth Circuit Re-Affirms Limits on the Continuing-Wrong Doctrine, PLRA Injunctive Relief, and Threat-Only Eighth Amendment Claims

1. Introduction

Jesse Allan Jewett Beach, an inmate within the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC), filed an extensive pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against more than fifty individual and official-capacity defendants, including the Governor of Wyoming, multiple WDOC wardens, officers, mental-health staff, and the private medical contractor YesCare (formerly Corizon). His amended complaint alleged constitutional deprivations arising out of:

Refusal to house him in “A-3.”
Alleged alteration of a prior mental-health diagnosis.
Use of restraints, relocation to a segregation cage, and a threat of pepper spray incident to suspected drug use.

The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming dismissed the amended complaint at the screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim. Beach appealed, chiefly asserting ongoing constitutional violations, entitlement to injunctive relief, and compensatory damages. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished—but citable—Order and Judgment issued 7 July 2025.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit held:

Statute of Limitations: Beach’s housing-unit and diagnosis-alteration claims were time-barred. The “continuing-wrong” doctrine did not toll limitations because the alleged injuries were discrete and discoverable.
Equal Protection (Class-of-One): Beach waived appellate challenge to the district court’s dismissal by failing to address its reasoning that discipline decisions are inherently discretionary.
Eighth Amendment: A mere threat to use pepper spray, without actual force or injury, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, citing McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2001).
PLRA Injunctive Relief: Requested prospective relief (e.g., creation of a federal oversight “department”) violated 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) because it was not narrowly drawn to remedy Beach’s individual injuries.
Compensatory Damages: 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) bars such damages absent physical injury; Beach alleged none.
Waiver & Pleading Deficiencies: The vast majority of arguments were deemed waived for insufficient briefing under Tenth Circuit precedent (Nixon, Eizember, Garrett).

Accordingly, the panel (Judges Tymkovich, Bacharach, and Eid) affirmed dismissal, granted in-forma-pauperis status, and denied motions for oral argument and further record supplementation.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Nixon v. City & County of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364 (10th Cir. 2015) – Reinforced that an appellant must explain why the lower court erred; failure results in waiver.
Eizember v. Trammell, 803 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2015) – “Stray sentences” do not amount to argument; used to discount Beach’s conclusory assertions.
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005) – Liberal construction of pro se filings is limited; courts do not act as counsel.
Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2009) – Standard of de novo review for § 1915A dismissals.
Tiberi v. Cigna Corp., 89 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1996) – Defined the continuing-wrong doctrine; central to limitations analysis.
McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2001) – Threat of chemical agent, without use, is not Eighth Amendment violation.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) & Estate of Larsen v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2008)

Beach unsuccessfully invoked these Fourth Amendment excessive-force cases; the panel clarified that a different test applies to Eighth Amendment claims (Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. 2010)).

Statutory Authority: 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (screening), 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (PLRA prospective relief), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (physical-injury requirement).

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Waiver Doctrine. The panel opened by repeating that appellate review is confined to issues actually raised. Beach’s general protestations did not challenge the district court’s step-by-step analysis; therefore, unargued points were waived.
Statute of Limitations & Continuing Wrong.
- The refusal to house Beach in “A-3” and the alleged alteration of his mental-health record occurred on identifiable dates and required no ongoing official conduct.
- Because the injuries were “definite and discoverable,” Tiberi foreclosed tolling. The limitations period (borrowed Wyoming two-year personal-injury period) therefore expired before suit.
Equal Protection (Class-of-One).
- The district court dismissed the claim because disciplinary decisions in prison are inherently discretionary, defeating the “irrational and wholly arbitrary” standard required for class-of-one claims. Beach’s failure to engage the district court’s rationale forfeited review.
Eighth Amendment.
- Under McBride, verbal threats—even when coupled with displays of force—do not satisfy the objective component (sufficiently serious deprivation) or the subjective component (deliberate indifference/malicious intent) absent actual application of force or injury.
PLRA Prospective Relief.
- Section 3626(a)(1)(A) imposes the “need-narrowness-intrusiveness” test. Beach requested systemic reforms (e.g., creation of oversight department) unrelated to his individual circumstances, thus flunking the narrowness prong.
Compensatory Damages & § 1997e(e).
- Because Beach did not allege physical injury—only emotional distress from threats—§ 1997e(e) limited him to nominal damages. Yet even nominal damages require a constitutional violation, which was absent.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Although designated “not binding precedent,” Tenth Circuit practitioners frequently rely on such unpublished orders for persuasive value (Fed. R. App. P. 32.1). The ruling has several forward-looking implications:

Reinforced Pleading Standards for Pro Se Prisoners. Inmates must articulate specific error on appeal; broad accusations are insufficient.
Clarified Limits of the Continuing-Wrong Doctrine. Attempts to revive stale § 1983 claims by labeling them “ongoing” will fail absent allegations of continuous, presently occurring conduct.
Confirmed Threat-Only Force Claims Fail. The court signaled it will continue to follow McBride absent Supreme Court guidance to the contrary, influencing litigation strategies on threats and psychological harm.
Constrained System-Wide Injunction Requests. Beefed-up requests for external oversight must pass the PLRA’s narrow-tailoring gate or be dismissed early.
Practical Lesson for Counsel. Even large-scale, multi-defendant complaints must tie requested relief to individualized injuries and allege concrete harms to survive § 1915A screening.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1983: A federal statute allowing individuals to sue state actors for constitutional violations.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A Screening: Before defendants are served, courts must dismiss prisoner complaints that fail to state a claim, are frivolous, or seek monetary relief from immune parties.
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA): A 1996 statute designed to curb frivolous inmate suits. Relevant here:
- § 3626(a)(1)(A): Prospective relief must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary, and be the least intrusive means.”
- § 1997e(e): No compensatory damages for mental/emotional injury without prior physical injury.
Continuing-Wrong Doctrine: Tolls the statute of limitations when wrongful acts are ongoing. Not available for isolated, completed deeds.
Equal Protection – Class-of-One: A claim that a single individual was treated differently from others similarly situated without a rational basis. Rarely succeeds in discretionary settings such as prison discipline.
Eighth Amendment – Excessive Force vs. Threat: Actual force causing harm typically required. Verbal or threatened force alone is insufficient absent tangible injury or pervasive pattern of harassment.

5. Conclusion

Beach v. Wyoming DOC offers a concise reaffirmation of core doctrinal constraints on prisoner civil-rights litigation in the Tenth Circuit:

Discrete prison decisions trigger the statute of limitations immediately; the continuing-wrong doctrine is narrow.
Verbal threats, without more, do not cross the constitutional threshold for Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims.
The PLRA’s narrow-tailoring requirement severely limits broad institutional injunctions brought by individual inmates.
Physical injury remains a gateway for compensatory damages under § 1997e(e).
On appeal, specificity is paramount; generalized grievances result in waiver.

While the judgment is unpublished, its rigorous application of procedural doctrines and substantive standards will likely be invoked to defend future § 1915A dismissals and to cabin prisoner requests for sweeping relief. For litigators and courts alike, the decision underscores that even voluminous pleadings must connect each alleged constitutional violation to concrete harm, timely suit, and appropriately scoped remedies.