Basque (Mont. 2025): Denial of Venue Change in Parenting-Plan Enforcement Under Ends-of-Justice and Continuing Jurisdiction (Noncitable)

Basque (Mont. 2025): Denial of Venue Change in Parenting-Plan Enforcement Under Ends-of-Justice and Continuing Jurisdiction (Noncitable)

Introduction

In In re the Marriage of Basque, 2025 MT 247N, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s denial of a motion to change venue in a post-dissolution parenting-plan enforcement dispute. Although issued as a memorandum opinion under Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of the Court’s Internal Operating Rules—and therefore noncitable and nonprecedential—the opinion clarifies how Montana courts balance the “convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice” in change-of-venue motions under § 25-2-201(3), MCA, particularly in the family-law context where the original court’s continuing familiarity with the case is pivotal. A special concurrence would have affirmed expressly on the longstanding Billings v. Billings rule that the original dissolution court retains continuing jurisdiction over child custody matters, underscoring the primacy of continuity and stability in parenting litigation.

The parties—Matthew Thomas Basque (appellant, pro se on appeal) and Gina Alicia Basque (appellee)—divorced in Yellowstone County with a stipulated final parenting plan. After reciprocal contempt skirmishes over plan compliance and a late-stage change of residence by Matthew, he sought to move the litigation to Missoula County (where Gina resided). The District Court denied the venue change, citing convenience and the ends-of-justice factors, and the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court also addressed, without deciding, concerns about interlocutory appealability of discretionary venue decisions and confirmed that a trial court’s management of remote appearances (Zoom) lies within its discretion—especially where a party’s own litigation choices produce the inconvenience later claimed as error.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Procedural posture: After a 2023 dissolution decree with a stipulated parenting plan in Yellowstone County, both parties filed contempt motions related to plan compliance. Matthew moved to Ravalli County and, on October 25, 2024, sought to change venue to Missoula County. The District Court denied the motion under § 25-2-201(3), MCA.
  • District Court’s rationale: Changing venue would force Gina to obtain new counsel unfamiliar with the case’s long history; the current court was “in the best position” to evaluate compliance with its own orders; and remote appearances could address witness convenience.
  • Supreme Court review: Applying abuse-of-discretion review for venue denials (In re Marriage of Lockman), the Court affirmed. It acknowledged the Billings rule on continuing jurisdiction in custody matters but declined to decide which venue statute governs dissolution proceedings because the parties had not raised Billings below. Even under the general venue statute, the District Court did not abuse its discretion.
  • Key holdings and points:
    • Ends of justice favored keeping the case in Yellowstone County, where the same judge had presided since 2022 and only a contempt motion remained.
    • The marginal convenience gains did not outweigh the benefits of continuity and the court’s familiarity.
    • Remote-appearance management is discretionary; Matthew could not object to Zoom and then claim prejudice from the lack of remote testimony—his four witnesses’ inability to appear was “self-inflicted.”
    • Comments about Matthew’s “revolving door of counsel” did not show favoritism; the District Court had admonished his prior counsel for conflict screening lapses, underscoring efforts to ensure fair process.
  • Special concurrence: Justice McKinnon would affirm directly on Billings’s continuing jurisdiction rationale (right result, wrong reason), rather than analyze § 25-2-201, MCA, at all.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Billings v. Billings, 189 Mont. 520, 616 P.2d 1104 (1980): Established that, under Montana’s Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act framework, the original dissolution court retains continuing jurisdiction in child custody matters. The majority acknowledged Billings as empowering the District Court to keep the case, though it declined to rest the decision squarely there. The concurrence would have relied on Billings alone, emphasizing continuity, stability, and the child’s best interests as dispositive.
  • In re B.C.B.W., 2008 MT 147, 343 Mont. 215, 185 P.3d 327: In a parenting plan case involving never-married parties, the Court reversed a transfer of venue that contravened § 40-4-211(4), MCA—the specific statute requiring initiation of parenting proceedings where the child is permanently resident or found. This case underscores that specific parenting-plan venue/jurisdiction statutes can displace general venue rules at the commencement phase.
  • In re S.C.B., 2015 MT 19, 378 Mont. 89, 342 P.3d 46: Confirmed § 40-4-211, MCA, governs jurisdiction for starting a parenting proceeding. Together with B.C.B.W., it frames commencement rules distinct from post-judgment enforcement/modification, where Billings’s continuing-jurisdiction logic predominates.
  • In re Marriage of Toavs, 2002 MT 230, 311 Mont. 455, 56 P.3d 356: Affirmed retention of jurisdiction to ensure continuity and stability in custody disputes—core to best interests of the child. The Basque majority invoked Toavs to explain why the original court was best positioned to decide contempt of its own parenting orders.
  • In re Marriage of Lockman, 266 Mont. 194, 879 P.2d 710 (1994): Provides the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing venue denials. The Basque Court used this standard to uphold the Yellowstone court’s balancing of convenience and ends-of-justice factors.
  • BNSF Ry. Co. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 2010 MT 46, 355 Mont. 296, 228 P.3d 1115; State v. Pegasus Gold Corp., 270 Mont. 32, 889 P.2d 97 (1995); M. R. App. P. 6(3)(f): Collectively indicate that discretionary venue decisions under § 25-2-201(3), MCA, are not subject to interlocutory appeal. Basque did not resolve the appealability issue because the case had concluded and the parties did not raise it; the Court declined to address it sua sponte.
  • In re L.S., 2009 MT 83, 349 Mont. 518, 204 P.3d 707: Confirms abuse-of-discretion review for trial administration and evidentiary calls, including remote appearances. Basque applied this to uphold denial of a Zoom hearing.
  • State v. Marcial, 2013 MT 242, 371 Mont. 348, 308 P.3d 69: The “right result, wrong reason” principle. The concurrence would apply Marcial to affirm on Billings grounds even if the District Court relied on the wrong statute.

Legal Reasoning

The Court framed its analysis around the standard of review: abuse of discretion for denials of venue change and for trial-management decisions like remote appearances. While the parties had argued the general venue statute (§ 25-2-201, MCA) in the District Court, the Supreme Court flagged the Billings continuing-jurisdiction line as the background rule in child-custody-related litigation under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. Still, it expressly declined to decide “which transfer of venue statute applies to dissolution of marriage proceedings,” both because the parties had not raised Billings below and because, on the arguments presented, the District Court’s ruling was sustainable under § 25-2-201(3).

Applying § 25-2-201(3), the District Court weighed (a) convenience of witnesses and (b) the ends of justice. Two considerations were decisive:

  • Ends of justice: After three years of proceedings, only Gina’s contempt motion remained—alleging violations of a stipulated parenting plan issued by that very court. The original judge’s familiarity with the detailed record made it “uniquely positioned” to adjudicate compliance. Keeping the case in Yellowstone County served the ends of justice.
  • Convenience: Although relocating the case might marginally ease travel burdens for parties and witnesses in Missoula and Ravalli counties, that benefit was outweighed by the burdens of replacing Gina’s long-standing counsel and losing a judge with deep case knowledge. The court also noted that remote appearances could address convenience concerns.

Matthew argued on appeal that the denial of a subsequent Zoom request undercut the District Court’s venue rationale. The Supreme Court rejected this for two independent reasons. First, decisions about remote appearance are discretionary; no abuse was shown. Second, the record revealed that Matthew had objected to Gina’s Zoom request and never sought remote appearances for his own witnesses. His claim that four witnesses were unable to testify because of travel was, in the Court’s words, a “self-inflicted injury.” The invited-error principle—while not named—animated the analysis: a party cannot create the very problem later invoked to claim reversible error.

The Court also rejected the suggestion that the District Court favored Gina because it noted Matthew’s “revolving door of counsel.” The record showed the court actually protected Matthew’s interests by admonishing his prior attorney for failing to screen a conflict after hiring a paralegal from opposing counsel’s firm. The Supreme Court found no bias—only a candid assessment of case history relevant to whether the ends of justice favored keeping the case.

Impact

Although noncitable, Basque delivers several practice-significant messages consistent with settled Montana law:

  • Continuity matters in parenting litigation. Whether analyzed through Billings’s continuing-jurisdiction lens (as the concurrence urges) or the ends-of-justice factor under § 25-2-201(3), courts are reluctant to move post-judgment enforcement of parenting plans away from the court that issued and has monitored them—especially for contempt of the court’s own orders.
  • Counsel convenience is a weak basis for venue change. A party’s inability to secure counsel willing to travel is not a compelling “ends of justice” factor when the opposing party would need to replace long-engaged counsel and the presiding judge already has deep familiarity with the case.
  • Raise the right law at the right time. The Court highlighted Billings and related parenting-plan statutes but did not decide their application because they were not raised below. Litigants should identify and preserve the specific parenting-plan venue/jurisdiction framework rather than defaulting to general venue provisions.
  • Remote appearances are discretionary, not guaranteed. Parties must timely request remote options for their own witnesses and avoid inconsistent positions. Objecting to the other side’s Zoom request while later claiming prejudice from lack of remote access is unlikely to succeed.
  • Interlocutory limits persist. Discretionary venue decisions under § 25-2-201(3) are generally not subject to interlocutory appeal. While Basque did not resolve appealability due to procedural posture, practitioners should expect appellate courts to enforce those limits.
  • Conflict screening is critical. The District Court’s admonishment of Matthew’s former counsel for inadequate conflict screening after hiring staff from opposing counsel’s firm is a reminder of the duty to implement effective ethical screens to protect client interests and avoid midstream disruptions.

In short, Basque reinforces the functional primacy of stability and judicial familiarity in parenting plan enforcement, and it signals that convenience-based venue shifts late in a case will face an uphill battle.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Venue vs. jurisdiction:
    • Jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear a type of case and bind the parties. Under Billings, once a district court obtains jurisdiction over dissolution and child custody, it retains continuing jurisdiction for custody matters.
    • Venue addresses the appropriate county where a case should be heard. General venue changes can be granted for convenience or the ends of justice, but specific parenting-plan statutes may control where proceedings begin, and continuing jurisdiction can weigh heavily against moving post-judgment matters.
  • Ends of justice:
    • A statutory factor under § 25-2-201(3), MCA, allowing a court to consider fairness, efficiency, judicial economy, and the integrity of the process—not just witness travel time—when deciding whether to change venue.
  • Abuse of discretion:
    • A deferential appellate standard. The question is not whether the appellate court would have decided differently, but whether the trial court acted arbitrarily, beyond the bounds of reason, or based on a mistake of law. Venue decisions and trial-management rulings (like remote appearances) are reviewed under this standard.
  • Interlocutory appeal:
    • An appeal taken before the case fully concludes. Montana generally does not allow interlocutory appeals from discretionary venue decisions under § 25-2-201(3). The narrow rule-based allowance in M. R. App. P. 6(3)(f) pertains to orders declaring the designated county improper—not convenience/ends-of-justice decisions.
  • Parenting plan and contempt:
    • A parenting plan is a court-approved arrangement for custody, parenting time, and decision-making. Contempt arises when a party disobeys the court’s orders in the plan; the issuing court is typically best situated to assess compliance and enforce its directives.
  • Invited error/self-inflicted prejudice:
    • A party cannot complain on appeal about an error that the party induced or to which the party consented. In Basque, objecting to Zoom and later blaming the lack of remote access for witness unavailability exemplifies self-inflicted prejudice.

Conclusion

Basque is a noncitable memorandum opinion, but its message aligns with Montana’s settled family-law jurisprudence: continuity and judicial familiarity carry significant weight in post-dissolution parenting disputes, particularly enforcement via contempt. Whether viewed through Billings’s continuing-jurisdiction doctrine (as the concurrence would) or through the § 25-2-201(3) “ends of justice” lens (as the majority analyzed because that was the statute argued), the District Court acted within its discretion by denying a venue change late in the case for a single remaining contempt motion.

The opinion offers practical guidance. Litigants should (1) raise and preserve parenting-specific statutes and Billings-based arguments; (2) recognize that counsel convenience alone rarely justifies moving a mature parenting case; (3) make timely, consistent requests for remote appearances; and (4) appreciate that appellate courts defer to a trial court’s management of its own orders and proceedings. Ultimately, the decision underscores a core family-law value: stability serves the best interests of children, and the court that knows the family’s history is usually best positioned to enforce its own parenting plan.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Montana

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