Barnes v. Guild Mortgage Company LLC: Limits on Dismissing Claims With Prejudice Against Unserved Defendants and Reaffirmation of the Shotgun Pleading Doctrine

I. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision arises from a pro se homeowner’s federal litigation to challenge a residential mortgage foreclosure and related conduct by her lender, the lender’s executive, the foreclosure law firm, and—later—the district and magistrate judges originally assigned to her case. The opinion touches on several recurring procedural themes in federal civil practice:

• How strictly courts enforce the shotgun pleading doctrine against pro se litigants.
• The limits on a district court’s authority to dismiss claims with prejudice against defendants who were never served and never appeared, in light of personal jurisdiction requirements.
• The waiver of defective service defenses by participating defendants.
• Standards governing consolidation of actions, discovery management, default judgments, and judicial recusal.

Although the opinion is non‑precedential, it provides a clear and instructive application of Eleventh Circuit doctrine in several areas, most notably the interaction between service of process, personal jurisdiction, and dismissal “with prejudice.” The court affirms dismissal with prejudice of claims against the private defendants but vacates the with‑prejudice dismissal as to the two judicial defendants—who were never served and never appeared—and remands with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Mortgage and Foreclosure

In June 2017, pro se plaintiff-appellant Nikita Lynette Barnes borrowed over $230,000 from Guild Mortgage Company LLC (“Guild”). The loan was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a security deed on her home in Douglasville, Georgia. Barnes later defaulted on her mortgage obligations, and Guild initiated foreclosure proceedings on the property.

B. First Federal Action and IFP Screening

In November 2023, facing imminent foreclosure, Barnes filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia against:

• Guild Mortgage Company LLC (the lender), and
• Desiree (Amber) Kramer (Guild’s Chief Financial Officer).

She purported to assert federal claims under the:

• “Truth and lending act” (understood as the Truth in Lending Act, “TILA”),
• “Consumer Rights,”
• “Federal reserve act,” and
• “Negotiable Instrument.”

Barnes sought extreme damages: “1% of all company assets” and “$5000 a day” for every day the matter was not “handled properly.”

Because Barnes filed in forma pauperis (IFP), the case was screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which requires dismissal at any time if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker found the complaint “woefully deficient”:

• The TILA reference did not identify any specific statutory provision allegedly violated, despite TILA’s many sections and extensive regulations.
• The references to “Consumer Rights,” “Federal reserve act,” and “Negotiable Instrument” were not recognizable as plausible causes of action.

Nevertheless, the magistrate judge recommended allowing Barnes to amend and specifically instructed her to:

• Identify which statutory provisions defendants allegedly violated, and
• Plead facts sufficient to support each claim.

C. First Amended Complaint, TRO, and Bankruptcy Filing

Barnes filed a first amended complaint, again naming Guild and Kramer. She recast her claims as:

• Breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure under Georgia law, and
• Violations of TILA, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).

She also moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to halt the foreclosure. The district court denied the TRO, finding Barnes had not met the standard for such extraordinary relief.

The day after the denial, Barnes filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, which she admitted was filed to delay foreclosure. Less than two months later, she voluntarily dismissed the bankruptcy case.

D. Motion to Dismiss and Attempted Piecemeal Amendments

Guild and Kramer moved to dismiss the first amended complaint, contending it:

• Failed to state a claim, and
• Constituted a shotgun pleading that did not meaningfully tie factual allegations to specific legal claims.

In opposing the motion, Barnes purported to add new claims for:

• Breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
• Violation of the “Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.”

She also:

• Moved to take discovery,
• Moved to recuse District Judge Victoria Calvert and Magistrate Judge Walker, and
• Filed, without leave of court, a second amended complaint reasserting contract, TILA, RESPA, and UCC claims.

E. Second State-Court Lawsuit and Removal

Parallel to the federal case, Barnes filed a second lawsuit in Georgia state court against:

• Guild, and
• McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce LLC (“McCalla”), the foreclosure law firm.

She sought:

• A declaration that she held “clear and unencumbered title” to the property despite foreclosure efforts, and
• Claims under RESPA, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and Georgia statutes.

In April 2024, the property was sold at foreclosure. Guild then removed the state action to federal court and moved to consolidate the two federal cases.

F. Consolidation, Denial of Recusal and Discovery, and Invitation to Replead

In August 2024, Magistrate Judge Walker:

• Denied discovery, noting that discovery had not yet opened.
• Recommended consolidation under Rule 42(a) given common facts and issues, and to promote judicial economy and avoid duplication.
• Recommended denying recusal, finding no valid grounds beyond Barnes’s dissatisfaction with rulings.
• Concluded that the first amended complaint—and Barnes’s attempted expansions via briefing and second amended complaint—still failed to state a claim.

Although the pleadings were deficient, the magistrate judge recommended denying the pending motion to dismiss as moot and giving Barnes a further opportunity to file a third amended complaint, particularly because:

• The two lawsuits had just been consolidated, and
• The foreclosure sale had materially changed the factual landscape.

Barnes was again warned that:

• Each claim must be set out in a separate count under the Federal Rules, and
• She must allege specific factual allegations, not just recite that defendants “breached” or “violated” laws.

The district court adopted the recommendations, consolidated the actions, denied recusal, denied the motion to dismiss as moot, and ordered Barnes to file a third amended complaint.

G. Third Amended Complaint and Addition of Judicial Defendants

Barnes’s third amended complaint added as defendants:

• Guild,
• Kramer,
• McCalla,
• District Judge Calvert, and
• Magistrate Judge Walker.

She alleged, among other things:

• She had “tendered an instrument” to Kramer as payment to “set off” the mortgage debt, allegedly supported by an IRS Form 1099‑A, but Kramer failed to apply it.
• She had revoked “any power of attorney” previously granted to Guild, yet Guild continued to act, allegedly raising issues under O.C.G.A. § 10-6-52 (Georgia agency statute).
• She transferred the property into a “private trust” in December 2023, but foreclosure continued.
• Guild failed to attend the creditors’ meeting in her Chapter 13 case.
• Defendants acted “in concert” to unlawfully foreclose, depriving her of “life, liberty, and property” without due process, in violation of “various statutory and common law protections.”
• Judges Calvert and Walker acted with “clear bias” in issuing orders against her.

The complaint purported to assert:

• Count One: Wrongful foreclosure under Georgia law (against Guild, Kramer, McCalla).
• Count Two: TILA violations (against Guild).
• Count Three: RESPA violations (against Guild).
• Count Four: “Judicial misconduct” and constitutional violations (against Judges Calvert and Walker).

Barnes sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. After she named them as defendants, both judges recused, and the case was reassigned to a new district judge and magistrate judge.

H. Motions to Dismiss, Default Motion, and District Court Judgment

Guild and Kramer moved to dismiss the third amended complaint as a shotgun pleading that also failed to state a claim. McCalla likewise filed a motion to dismiss, arguing failure to state a claim and requesting dismissal with prejudice. In describing the procedural history, McCalla noted that it had never been formally served, but it did not seek dismissal on that ground. Importantly, McCalla also filed an answer on the same day as its motion to dismiss, thereby actively joining the case.

Barnes responded with:

• A motion to strike McCalla’s answer, and
• A motion for default judgment against McCalla, claiming its response was untimely under the 21‑day rule.

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (R&R):

• Recommending denial of Barnes’s default‑related motions and granting the motions to dismiss.
• Concluding that the third amended complaint was a shotgun pleading filled with conclusory statements, legal arguments, and sparse factual content.
• Holding in the alternative that each count failed to state a claim, including Count Four against the judges, which also failed due to absolute judicial immunity.
• Recommending dismissal of the entire action with prejudice, given Barnes’s repeated opportunities to amend and prior warnings.

The district court adopted the R&R in full, denied Barnes’s motions (including default and discovery requests), granted the motions to dismiss, and entered judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice. Barnes appealed.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

The Eleventh Circuit’s per curiam opinion performs two main tasks:

1. It affirms the district court’s non-final orders, including:
   • Consolidation of the two cases under Rule 42(a).
   • Denial of default judgment against McCalla.
   • Refusal to allow discovery at the pleadings stage.
   • Denial of Barnes’s recusal motions against Judges Calvert and Walker.
2. It affirms in part and vacates in part the dismissal of the third amended complaint:
   • Affirming the dismissal with prejudice of Barnes’s claims against Guild, Kramer, and McCalla based on the shotgun pleading doctrine and failure to state a claim.
   • Vacating the dismissal with prejudice as to Judge Calvert and Judge Walker, because they were never served and never appeared, so the district court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a merits‑based dismissal against them.
   • Remanding with instructions to reenter judgment as a dismissal without prejudice as to those two judicial defendants.

Barnes’s own motion in the appellate court to dismiss the appeal and declare the district court’s judgment “void” is denied.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and Pro Se Litigation

The court establishes at the outset that all issues raised are reviewed for abuse of discretion, citing:

• Rodriguez v. Burnside, 38 F.4th 1324 (11th Cir. 2022) – denial of discovery;
• Eghnayem v. Boston Scientific Corp., 873 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2017) – consolidation under Rule 42(a);
• Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015) – dismissal as shotgun pleading;
• Gwynn v. Walker, 532 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2008) – recusal denials; and
• Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169 (11th Cir. 1985) – denial of default judgment.

Abuse of discretion, as further explained in Savoia‑McHugh v. Glass, 95 F.4th 1337 (11th Cir. 2024), allows a “range of choice” to the district court, so long as it does not:

• Apply an incorrect legal standard,
• Apply the law unreasonably or incorrectly,
• Follow improper procedures, or
• Make clearly erroneous factual findings.

For pro se litigants:

• Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014), instructs courts to construe pro se pleadings liberally, holding them to less stringent standards than lawyer‑drafted pleadings.
• Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008), simultaneously emphasizes that pro se litigants abandon issues on appeal if they are not adequately briefed.

The Barnes panel adheres to this balance: it liberally construes Barnes’s filings, but still applies abandonment principles where she fails to challenge an independent ground supporting the district court’s ruling (notably on default judgment).

B. Consolidation Under Rule 42(a)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) allows consolidation of actions that involve a “common question of law or fact.” Citing Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1995), the panel reiterates that:

• Rule 42(a) is permissive, conferring broad discretion on the district court.
• The Eleventh Circuit has urged district courts to “make good use” of this rule to expedite trials and eliminate unnecessary repetition and confusion.

Barnes’s two cases—one initially federal, one removed from state court—both:

• Concerned the same mortgage loan and property;
• Targeted the same foreclosure and its aftermath; and
• Involved overlapping legal theories (TILA, RESPA, wrongful foreclosure, RESPA/FDCPA‑type issues).

On those facts, the appellate court had little difficulty concluding there was no abuse of discretion in consolidating the cases.

C. Default Judgment, Service of Process, and Abandonment on Appeal

Barnes challenged the denial of her motion for default judgment against McCalla. The district court had denied that motion on three independent grounds:

1. McCalla’s response was not untimely because its obligation to respond did not arise until it was properly served, and there was no indication it had been properly served.
2. Barnes had not obtained a clerk’s entry of default, a prerequisite to default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55.
3. The third amended complaint failed to state a claim, and default judgment is inappropriate on an insufficient pleading.

On appeal, Barnes did not challenge the second ground—failure to obtain a clerk’s entry of default. Under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014), when a district court’s judgment rests on multiple independent grounds, and the appellant fails to contest one, that unchallenged ground is deemed conceded, and the judgment must be affirmed.

Therefore, irrespective of the other issues, the Eleventh Circuit affirms the denial of default judgment based on Barnes’s abandonment of a dispositive ground on appeal.

D. Discovery Management and Chudasama

The panel next addresses Barnes’s argument that the district court erred in denying her discovery requests. Citing Rodriguez v. Burnside, the court notes that district courts have broad authority to manage discovery.

Quoting Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997), the panel reiterates a key procedural principle:

• Courts generally should resolve motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim before discovery begins, to prevent needless and burdensome discovery on claims that may not survive Rule 12(b)(6) review.

Because Barnes’s case remained at the pleadings stage, and the sufficiency of her complaints had not yet been established, it was within the court’s discretion to postpone discovery until viable claims, if any, were identified.

E. Recusal Standards and Adverse Rulings

Barnes sought recusal of Judges Calvert and Walker before naming them as defendants, and she argued on appeal that denial of recusal at that earlier stage was error.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), a judge must recuse when she has “personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” However, as the Eleventh Circuit emphasized in Ginsberg v. Evergreen Security, Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009):

• Adverse rulings alone are not a valid ground for recusal; they are properly addressed through appellate review, not disqualification.

Barnes’s recusal requests were grounded principally in her dissatisfaction with rulings in her case, not in extrajudicial bias or other recognized bases for disqualification. The panel therefore holds that the denial of recusal was well within the district court’s discretion.

F. Shotgun Pleadings, Rule 8/Rule 10, and the Third Amended Complaint

1. The Eleventh Circuit’s Shotgun Pleading Doctrine

The Eleventh Circuit has long policed “shotgun pleadings,” which violate the basic pleading requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b).

• Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and its factual basis (see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
• Rule 10(b) requires claims to be stated in numbered paragraphs, each “limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”

In Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, the Eleventh Circuit identified four common types of shotgun pleadings:

1. Complaints where each count incorporates all preceding allegations, causing each successive count to carry all previous factual and legal material.
2. Pleadings “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.”
3. Complaints that fail to separate into a distinct count each cause of action or claim for relief.
4. Pleadings that assert multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which defendant is responsible for which act or omission.

Shotgun pleadings are criticized for:

• Failing to give adequate notice of the precise claims and their factual bases;
• Wasting judicial resources and expanding discovery burdens; and
• Complicating appellate review (Vibe Micro Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018)).

In Vibe Micro, the court held that when faced with a shotgun pleading, a district court must:

• Identify how the complaint violates the shotgun pleading rules, and
• Give the plaintiff one chance to replead in compliance with Rules 8 and 10.

If the plaintiff again submits a shotgun pleading—particularly after being warned—the court may dismiss the action with prejudice, as recognized in Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1989).

2. Application to Barnes’s Third Amended Complaint

The panel agrees with the district court that Barnes’s third amended complaint qualifies as a shotgun pleading, primarily of the second and third Weiland types:

• It contains “few factual allegations” and is “replete with conclusory allegations, legal conclusions, and legal arguments.”
• It fails to adequately connect factual statements to specific elements of particular causes of action.
• It fails to properly separate distinct legal theories into separate counts. For instance, Count Four bundles together:
  • Claims of judicial misconduct, and
  • Constitutional due process violations,
  against the judicial defendants in a single count without clear delineation.

Additionally, Barnes had already been:

• Given multiple opportunities to amend (initial complaint, first amended complaint, attempted second amended complaint, and then ordered third amended complaint), and
• Expressly instructed how to comply with pleading rules and avoid conclusory assertions.

Under Vibe Micro and Moon, the district court thus acted within its discretion in dismissing the third amended complaint as a shotgun pleading and doing so with prejudice as to the defendants properly before the court (Guild, Kramer, and McCalla).

3. Alternative Failure to State a Claim

Although the panel’s central holding rests on the shotgun pleading ground, it notes that the magistrate judge also concluded—in the alternative—that:

• The wrongful foreclosure claim in Count One alleged only that a foreclosure sale occurred, but did not plead facts satisfying all elements of a wrongful foreclosure claim under Georgia law.
• The TILA and RESPA claims in Counts Two and Three did not identify:
  • Which specific statutory or regulatory provisions were violated, or
  • Specific factual conduct by Guild amounting to a violation.
• The claims against the judges in Count Four likewise lacked supporting facts and, in any event, were barred by absolute judicial immunity for acts taken in their judicial capacity.

Thus, even absent the shotgun pleading analysis, the third amended complaint failed under Rule 12(b)(6).

G. Dismissal With Prejudice vs. Without Prejudice for Unserved Defendants

1. Service of Process as a Jurisdictional Requirement

The most analytically significant part of the opinion concerns the judicial defendants, Judges Calvert and Walker. Barnes never served them with process in connection with the third amended complaint, and they never appeared in the action.

The panel invokes Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Center, 896 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that:

• Service of process is a jurisdictional requirement for personal jurisdiction.
• Absent proper service, a court lacks jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Consequently, when a court lacks personal jurisdiction, it cannot render a judgment on the meritsCitibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., 904 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1990), as a dismissal with prejudice, which carries full res judicata (claim-preclusive) effect.

2. Waiver of Service Defenses by Appearing Defendants

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) and 12(h), a defendant waives defenses based on insufficient service of process by:

• Failing to include them in a Rule 12(b) motion, or
• Failing to raise them in the first responsive pleading (e.g., an answer) if no Rule 12(b) motion is filed.

The panel notes, citing Pardazi and Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consolidated Investments, 553 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2008), that objections to personal jurisdiction— including defective service—can be waived just like any other personal jurisdiction defense.

• Judges Calvert and Walker never appeared in the case, never filed a Rule 12(b) motion, and never answered. As such, they did not waive the service‑of‑process requirement; rather, there was simply no personal jurisdiction over them at all.
• McCalla, by contrast, did appear and file both a motion to dismiss and an answer. Though it mentioned in passing that it had not been properly served, it did not seek dismissal on that basis and instead chose to attack the complaint on substantive grounds. Under Rule 12(g) and 12(h), and as interpreted in Hemispherx, McCalla thereby waived any defective service defense.

Accordingly:

• The district court could properly dismiss McCalla with prejudice—because McCalla had submitted itself to the court’s personal jurisdiction and asked for a merits-based dismissal.
• But the district court could not dismiss Judges Calvert and Walker with prejudice, because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them entirely.

This is the core correction made by the Eleventh Circuit: even where the district court correctly determines that claims against such unserved defendants would fail on the merits (e.g., due to judicial immunity or failure to state a claim), it may not enter a dismissal with prejudice against them in the absence of personal jurisdiction.

3. Practical Consequence: Without Prejudice as the Proper Form of Dismissal

Recognizing that lack of service deprived the district court of personal jurisdiction over Judges Calvert and Walker, the Eleventh Circuit holds that the dismissal as to them must be without prejudice. This avoids labeling the judgment as a “final judgment on the merits” and preserves the conceptual link between personal jurisdiction and preclusive effect.

The court therefore:

• Vacates the portion of the judgment dismissing claims against the two judicial defendants with prejudice, and
• Remands with instructions to reenter judgment dismissing those claims without prejudice.

In doing so, the panel harmonizes:

• The requirement that courts screen IFP filings and dismiss frivolous or meritless claims, and
• The jurisdictional limit that an unserved, non-appearing defendant cannot be bound by a merits judgment.

V. Key Legal Concepts Explained

1. Shotgun Pleading

A shotgun pleading is a complaint that violates the basic clarity and organization requirements of the Federal Rules. It typically:

• Lumps numerous legal theories together without clear separation.
• Injects large amounts of vague, conclusory, or irrelevant material.
• Fails to specify which facts support which claims.

Courts disfavor shotgun pleadings because they:

• Obscure the issues and make it difficult for defendants to respond.
• Force courts to guess which facts match which legal theories.
• Drive unnecessary discovery and complicate appellate review.

In Barnes, the third amended complaint was deemed a shotgun pleading because it leaned heavily on conclusory legal statements, did not clearly articulate factual support for each specific claim, and bundled multiple legal theories (especially in Count Four).

2. Dismissal “With Prejudice” vs. “Without Prejudice”

• A dismissal with prejudice is a final decision on the merits and typically bars the plaintiff from bringing the same claim again. It has res judicata effect.
• A dismissal without prejudice is not on the merits and generally leaves the plaintiff free to refile (subject to statutes of limitation or other defenses).

Because a court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to enter a binding merits judgment, dismissals with prejudice cannot lawfully be entered against unserved, non-appearing defendants. That is why the Eleventh Circuit required the dismissal of claims against Judges Calvert and Walker to be converted to without prejudice.

3. Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Process

Personal jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority over a particular defendant. In civil cases, this typically depends on:

• Proper service of process (delivery of the summons and complaint), and
• The defendant’s sufficient connection to the forum (e.g., via residence, contacts, or consent).

Without proper service (or a waiver of service), the court lacks personal jurisdiction, and cannot enter a binding judgment against the defendant. A defendant can waive service-related objections by appearing and defending on the merits without raising them as a defense at the first opportunity.

4. Default vs. Default Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55:

1. The plaintiff must first obtain a clerk’s entry of default when a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend.
2. Only then may the plaintiff seek a default judgment from the court.

Moreover, default judgment is only appropriate when the complaint itself states a viable claim. A defendant’s failure to respond does not cure substantive pleading deficiencies.

5. Judicial Recusal and Judicial Immunity

Recusal (disqualification) is governed primarily by 28 U.S.C. § 455. Section 455(b)(1) mandates recusal when the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. However, dissatisfaction with judicial rulings does not amount to personal bias.

Judicial immunity is a related but distinct doctrine: judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages for acts taken in their judicial capacity and within their jurisdiction, even if those acts are alleged to be erroneous or malicious. Barnes’s claims of “judicial misconduct” ran headlong into this doctrine.

VI. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For District Courts

The decision reinforces several operational points for district judges in the Eleventh Circuit:

• Shotgun pleadings should be policed early. Courts must instruct the plaintiff on defects and allow one meaningful chance to replead; if the plaintiff persists, dismissal with prejudice is permissible—even for pro se litigants—after clear warning.
• Courts may screen and dismiss claims early under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) without launching full discovery, particularly when the pleading is fundamentally deficient.
• When dismissing claims against unserved, non-appearing defendants, courts should take care to make such dismissals without prejudice to avoid jurisdictional and preclusion problems.
• When a defendant appears and defends on the merits (as McCalla did), any defective service defense may be deemed waived if not properly raised under Rule 12.

B. For Litigants, Especially Pro Se Plaintiffs

For pro se plaintiffs, particularly in foreclosure-related litigation, Barnes underscores:

• The necessity of grounding claims in specific statutes or legal theories and clearly explaining how defendants violated them.
• The danger of relying on opaque or pseudo‑legal concepts (e.g., vaguely referencing “1099‑A instruments,” “revoking power of attorney,” or moving property into a “private trust” without legal effect) to defeat foreclosure.
• The fact that suing judges for their rulings is almost always futile due to judicial immunity, and that adverse decisions are properly addressed through appeals, not new claims against the presiding judge.
• Even with liberal construction, pro se plaintiffs must still comply with basic procedural rules on:
  • Pleading structure (separate counts, factual specificity),
  • Service of process,
  • Default procedures, and
  • Respecting court orders on amendment.

C. Doctrinal Clarification: Service, Jurisdiction, and Prejudice

While non‑precedential, the opinion provides persuasive clarification on an under‑discussed but important point: the form of dismissal (with vs. without prejudice) when defendants have not been served and have never appeared.

By tying:

• Pardazi (service as a jurisdictional requirement), with
• Citibank (dismissal with prejudice as a merits judgment), and
• Rule 12’s waiver provisions (as applied through Hemispherx),

the panel reinforces that:

• Non‑appearing, unserved defendants remain outside the court’s jurisdictional reach for purposes of merits judgments;
• Courts may still choose to dismiss claims against such defendants (e.g., under § 1915(e)(2)), but the dismissal must be without prejudice absent personal jurisdiction; and
• Appearing defendants can and do waive service defects by failing to timely and properly assert them.

VII. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Barnes v. Guild Mortgage Company LLC offers a multi‑faceted procedural lesson. It reaffirms the robust enforcement of the shotgun pleading doctrine, particularly where a plaintiff—pro se or not—has been afforded multiple opportunities and clear instructions to cure deficiencies. It also illustrates key appellate practice principles, such as abandonment when an appellant fails to challenge each independent basis for a ruling.

Most significantly, the decision underscores a structural limitation on federal judicial power: a court cannot enter a merits-based dismissal with prejudice against unserved, non-appearing defendants because it lacks personal jurisdiction over them. The panel corrects this error by converting the dismissal of claims against the two judicial defendants to be without prejudice, while affirming with prejudice as to the defendants who had submitted to the court’s jurisdiction and moved on the merits.

In the broader legal context, the case serves as a cautionary tale for pro se litigants seeking to challenge foreclosures in federal court, and a practical guide for district courts managing complex procedural histories, multiple amendments, and a mix of served and unserved defendants. It harmonizes the requirements of fair notice pleading, personal jurisdiction, and the efficient administration of justice.