Bare Denials Are Not Enough: PSR Objections, Cash-to-Drug Conversions, and Sentencing Reasonableness in United States v. Taylor (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Antoniyo Taylor, No. 24‑4075 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 2025) (not recommended for publication), offers a detailed application of several recurring sentencing issues:

• How district courts may approximate drug quantity by converting seized cash into drug weight under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 comment note 5;
• When a sentencing court may adopt a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) without independent factfinding under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32;
• The high bar a defendant faces when challenging a within-Guidelines sentence as substantively unreasonable; and
• The operation of the law-of-the-case doctrine when a defendant re-raises a Fifth Amendment argument already rejected in a prior appellate proceeding.

Though unpublished, the opinion synthesizes and applies important Sixth Circuit precedents on evidentiary standards at sentencing, the sufficiency of PSR objections, the use of national sentencing statistics, and the weight a sentencing judge may place on criminal history. It is particularly instructive for practitioners litigating drug-quantity approximations based on cash seizures and for defense counsel crafting PSR objections that must go beyond “bare denials.”

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The underlying conduct and investigation

Taylor operated a cocaine trafficking business in Northeast Ohio. In May 2022, law enforcement executed search warrants at:

• His apartment – yielding 874.24 grams of powder cocaine, 3.57 grams of cocaine base, paraphernalia, and a loaded firearm magazine;
• His home in Medina – yielding $168,140 in cash and four cell phones; and
• Two storage units – containing several vehicles, at least two of which Taylor admitted he owned.

In interviews, Taylor:

• Admitted dealing drugs since 2014;
• Described himself as an “ounce man” who sold cocaine at approximately $900 per ounce;
• Admitted that the $168,140 in cash was drug money—his “savings” from the “hustle;” and
• Admitted ownership of two seized vehicles.

B. Plea agreement and initial Guidelines calculations

Taylor pleaded guilty to:

• Conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute; and
• Possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.

The plea agreement:

• Assumed a base offense level of 24 (for 500 to 2,000 grams of cocaine);
• Included a two-level enhancement for maintaining a drug premises; and
• Included a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, yielding an anticipated offense level of 23.

Crucially, the agreement also stated that:

• The sentencing recommendations of the parties were not binding on the court; and
• The court alone would determine the advisory Guidelines range and the sentence to impose.

C. The PSR’s cash-to-drug conversion and sentencing hearings

The PSR diverged sharply from the plea agreement’s drug-quantity calculation. It concluded that the drugs physically seized did not reflect the full “scale of the offense” and, applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 5, converted the $168,140 in cash into an equivalent drug quantity.

The PSR relied on:

• Taylor’s admission that the cash was drug proceeds;
• His admission that he sold cocaine at $900 per ounce; and
• Information from experienced probation officers and a DEA contact that $30,000 was a reasonable retail estimate for one kilogram of cocaine.

Using the $900/ounce figure (more favorable to Taylor than $30,000/kg), the PSR calculated that the cash equated to approximately 186.82 ounces of cocaine. This increased Taylor’s base offense level from 24 to 30—a six-level jump—resulting, after adjustments, in a total offense level of 29.

With criminal history category II (driven by multiple juvenile adjudications and adult convictions, including weapons and attempted felonious assault), Taylor’s advisory Guidelines range became 97–121 months.

Taylor filed two written objections to the PSR:

1. The seized 874.24 grams of powder and 3.57 grams of crack “accurately reflected” the scale of the offense as contemplated in the plea agreement; and
2. The PSR’s information supposedly lacked “sufficient indicia of reliability” to support the six-level increase.

He did not dispute specific factual assertions in the PSR (for example, that the cash was his, that it was drug proceeds, or that he sold cocaine for $900 per ounce), and he did not offer contrary evidence.

At the sentencing hearing, Taylor’s counsel objected “to any enhancements based on the amount of money seized” and again argued that the plea agreement’s quantity accurately reflected the offense. The government indicated willingness to abide by the plea agreement’s lower amount, but the district court declined, explaining that:

• Under § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 5, it had a duty to approximate drug quantity when the seized drugs underrepresented the scale of the offense;
• The PSR’s conversion was supported by a preponderance of the evidence; and
• It was not bound by the plea agreement’s non-binding recommendations, consistent with the agreement’s own terms.

The court chose the top of the Guidelines range, 121 months, but reduced it to 119 months to account for a loss of potential good-time credit stemming from the year Taylor had already spent in pre-sentence custody.

In explaining the sentence, the district court emphasized:

• Taylor’s extensive juvenile and adult criminal history (including firearms offenses and a crime of violence);
• His 10-year unemployment coupled with a “very comfortable lifestyle,” which the court inferred was supported by long-term drug dealing;
• The danger he posed to the community and his high risk of recidivism; and
• The need to deter, to protect the public, and to avoid unwarranted disparities, noting that for similarly situated defendants the average and median sentences were 97 and 107 months respectively.

The court conducted the Bostic inquiry at the end of sentencing, asking whether either party had any further objections. Taylor raised only a “safety valve” argument unrelated to this appeal.

D. The appeal

Taylor challenged his 119-month sentence on two broad grounds:

1. Procedural unreasonableness: The district court allegedly miscalculated the Guidelines range by using an “inflated” drug quantity derived from the cash conversion and by adopting the PSR’s findings without adequate independent factfinding.
2. Substantive unreasonableness:
   • The court supposedly overemphasized his criminal history;
   • His sentence was higher than the national average and median for his offense level and criminal history category; and
   • The court allegedly punished him for invoking the Fifth Amendment at an earlier sentencing hearing.

The Sixth Circuit rejected all these arguments and affirmed.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Decision

The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Bush, held:

1. No procedural error in drug-quantity calculation. The district court properly approximated drug quantity by converting Taylor’s admitted drug proceeds into cocaine weight under § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 5. It permissibly relied on the PSR because Taylor’s objections amounted to “bare denials” that did not contest specific factual assertions or present contrary evidence, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 and cases such as United States v. Small and United States v. Cover.
2. No procedural error in relying on the PSR’s methodology. Since Taylor did not dispute the factual premises for the conversion—ownership of the cash, its status as drug proceeds, or his stated price of $900 per ounce—the district court could adopt the PSR’s method without separate evidentiary hearings or findings.
3. No substantive unreasonableness.
   • A within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable, and Taylor failed to overcome that presumption.
   • The district court was entitled to heavily weigh his extensive criminal history, including juvenile and “unscored” offenses, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), consistent with Sixth Circuit precedents such as United States v. Dunnican and United States v. Johnson.
   • There is no requirement to sentence at or below national mean or median figures; nor may § 3553(a)(6) ordinarily be used to attack a within-Guidelines sentence, as emphasized in United States v. Hymes and United States v. Bradley.
   • The argument that the judge punished Taylor for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights was already rejected by another Sixth Circuit panel in In re Taylor, and the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded relitigation.

Accordingly, the court affirmed Taylor’s 119-month, within-Guidelines sentence.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Reasonableness and Drug-Quantity Approximation

1. Legal framework: approximating drug quantity from cash

The central procedural issue concerned whether the district court erred in converting Taylor’s $168,140 in cash into additional cocaine quantity. The governing provisions are:

• U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 & comment note 5. When the amount of drugs actually seized “does not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.” In making this approximation, a court may consider:
  • “the price generally obtained for the controlled substance;”
  • financial records; and
  • similar transactions in controlled substances by the defendant.
  This directive uses “shall,” underscoring that approximation is not discretionary once the court finds the seized quantity underrepresents the offense.
• Sixth Circuit sentencing law. In United States v. Baker, 858 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319 (6th Cir. 2008), the court recognized that, when exact drug amounts are uncertain, sentencing courts may estimate quantities if supported by “competent evidence” with “a minimal level of reliability” and must “err on the side of caution.”
• Standard of review. Drug-quantity determinations are factual findings reviewed for clear error. As reiterated in United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504, 524 (6th Cir. 2022), and United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 2009), a finding is clearly erroneous only if the appellate court is left with the “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made.

The Taylor panel faithfully applied this framework. Once the court found that the seized drugs did not accurately capture Taylor’s long-running trafficking conduct, it was required to approximate using available reliable indicators—which here included defendant’s own admissions and DEA-informed price data.

2. Rule 32 and reliance on the PSR: bare denials are insufficient

The more significant legal development lies in the court’s detailed discussion of when a district judge may adopt the PSR’s findings wholesale.

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3):

• Rule 32(i)(3)(A) allows the court to “accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact.”
• Rule 32(i)(3)(B) requires the court to “rule on” any disputed portion or to determine that a ruling is unnecessary because the matter will not affect sentencing.

The Sixth Circuit has long required more than conclusory disagreement to “dispute” the PSR:

• United States v. Small, 988 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 2021). A defendant must do more than “simply deny” the PSR’s truth; he must produce “some evidence” calling the reliability or correctness of the alleged facts into question.
• United States v. Cover, 800 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2015). Absent any evidence challenging a PSR factual allegation, the district court is permitted to rely on the PSR’s accuracy.
• United States v. Holt, 116 F.4th 599 (6th Cir. 2024). The defendant must identify the disputed fact with “specificity and clarity,” and vague assertions or bare denials are inadequate to trigger a duty for detailed findings.

Taylor reinforces this line of authority: even at sentencing, where evidentiary standards are relaxed, a defendant must provide more than generic assertions that a PSR conclusion is “unreliable.”

3. Application to Taylor’s objections

Taylor objected to the PSR’s six-level increase by claiming:

1. The physically seized drugs already reflected the scale of the offense and corresponded to the plea agreement’s drug quantity; and
2. The information in the PSR lacked “sufficient indicia of reliability” to justify the cash-to-drug conversion.

The Sixth Circuit deemed these “both bare and simple denials.” Specifically:

• He did not dispute that the $168,140 was found in his home;
• He did not deny that the cash was drug proceeds;
• He did not deny his statements that he had been dealing since 2014 and sold cocaine for $900 per ounce;
• He did not challenge the DEA and probation officers’ estimate that $30,000 per kilogram was a reasonable price; and
• He offered no contrary evidence—no legitimate source of the cash, no different prevailing price, no financial records to suggest alternative explanations.

At the sentencing hearing, his sole articulated objection was to “any enhancements based on the amount of money seized,” grounded again in the plea agreement. The appellate panel held that this was still only a generalized disagreement with the conclusion (that the cash should be converted) and not a factual rebuttal of the premises on which the conversion rested.

Because Taylor failed to “identify the disputed fact with specificity and clarity” or to submit evidence calling the PSR’s factual accuracy into question, Rule 32 allowed the district court to accept those PSR facts as findings and adopt the PSR’s methodology.

4. Use of Taylor’s admissions and DEA pricing; evidentiary standard

On the evidentiary side, the court found that the PSR’s approximation was supported by a preponderance of the evidence:

• The amount of cash was objectively verifiable: $168,140 seized from Taylor’s home.
• Taylor’s own statements directly linked that cash to drug dealing and set the relevant price point ($900 per ounce).
• DEA and probation personnel corroborated that $30,000 per kilogram fell within the reasonable price range, and choosing the $900-per-ounce figure was explicitly “more favorable” to Taylor.
• His lengthy unemployment and comfortable lifestyle further corroborated a sustained trafficking enterprise beyond the modest quantity seized.

Given this, and under the preponderance standard (i.e., more likely than not), the court held there was no clear error in finding that the cash represented additional cocaine quantity.

Put differently: when a defendant himself tells agents:

• “This cash is from my drug hustle,” and
• “I sell at $900 per ounce,”

the sentencing court may reasonably treat the resulting arithmetic as a reliable estimate of drug quantity, especially when corroborated by external law-enforcement pricing data.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

1. The deferential standard and presumption of reasonableness

Substantive reasonableness challenges ask whether the length of the sentence—here, 119 months—is greater than necessary under § 3553(a). The Sixth Circuit emphasized:

• Review is “highly deferential.” (United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018)).
• A within-Guidelines sentence is presumed substantively reasonable. (United States v. Libbey‑Tipton, 948 F.3d 694, 705 (6th Cir. 2020)).
• A defendant faces a “high bar” to show that the district court abused its “significant discretion.” (United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605, 613 (6th Cir. 2019)).

The panel reiterated the core point from Rayyan: substantive reasonableness claims generally boil down to an argument that the district court “placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others.” That disagreement with the district court’s weighing, without more, rarely suffices to show an abuse of discretion.

2. Weighting criminal history, including juvenile and unscored offenses

Taylor attacked the sentence as excessive because the court:

• Placed heavy emphasis on his criminal history; and
• Considered juvenile and “unscored” offenses (i.e., too old or otherwise not counted in the formal criminal history score).

The Sixth Circuit flatly rejected those arguments, reiterating that:

• A sentencing judge may consider a defendant’s prior criminal history as part of the § 3553(a) analysis (United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475, 482 (6th Cir. 2023)).
• This includes:
  • Juvenile offenses (United States v. Mitchell, 107 F.4th 534, 544 (6th Cir. 2024)); and
  • Unscored offenses (United States v. Cechini, 834 F. App’x 201, 205–06 (6th Cir. 2020>).
• Sentencing is a “judgment-driven exercise.” The district court has “plenty of deference” in assigning weight to different factors. (United States v. Johnson, 934 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2019)).
• It is not reversible error to attach “great weight” to one factor, so long as the reasoning is explained. (Dunnican, 961 F.3d at 881; United States v. Nixon, 664 F.3d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2011)).

The district court justified its heavy reliance on Taylor’s criminal record by noting:

• Multiple juvenile adjudications (assault, weapons possession, receiving stolen property, drug possession, driving without a license);
• Four adult misdemeanors for marijuana-related DUIs; and
• Six adult felonies, including attempted burglaries, vandalism, weapons offenses, attempted felonious assault (a crime of violence), and drug trafficking.

The judge also explained how this pattern, spanning decades and involving violence and weapons, showed a strong recidivism risk, minimal respect for the law, and a persistent danger to the community. These are central § 3553(a) considerations.

Taylor relied on United States v. Boucher, 937 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2019), arguing that courts may not rely “disproportionately” on prior convictions, especially old or unscored ones. The panel distinguished Boucher on two grounds:

1. Different posture. In Boucher, the district court had imposed a large downward variance from 21–27 months down to 30 days, heavily discounting the seriousness of the offense based on the defendant’s lack of criminal history. The Sixth Circuit reversed because the district court gave too much mitigating weight to a clean record. Here, by contrast, Taylor had an extensive criminal history, and the district court imposed a sentence within the Guidelines, not a variance.
2. Guidelines already account for criminal history, but may be underinclusive. While Boucher notes that criminal history is usually reflected in the Guidelines calculation, subsequent cases like Dunnican and Johnson permit courts to emphasize criminal history when explaining variances or high-end sentences, especially where the formal criminal history category does not fully capture the seriousness or pattern of offending.

The court reiterated that Taylor’s complaint was essentially that “the district court did not weigh the § 3553(a) factors as [he] hoped.” Citing Gardner, 32 F.4th at 531, the panel held that such disagreement is not enough to show an abuse of discretion.

3. National average/median sentencing data and § 3553(a)(6)

Taylor next argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it exceeded the national average (97 months) and median (107 months) for defendants with offense level 29 and criminal history category II. He framed this as an undue disregard of § 3553(a)(6), which instructs courts to consider:

“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”

The Sixth Circuit emphasized two key points:

1. Guidelines already address disparity. As stated in Hymes, 19 F.4th 928, 937 (6th Cir. 2021), because “the Guidelines address the statutory purpose of combatting disparity,” § 3553(a)(6) is ordinarily an improper vehicle for attacking a within-Guidelines sentence.
2. No obligation to consult or follow national data. In Hymes, the court “expressly rejected imposing” a requirement that sentencing judges consult national statistics. They are not obliged to:
   • Consult any national data at all; or
   • Align individual sentences with national averages or medians.

Here, the district court actually went beyond what is required by Hymes and Bradley by explicitly referencing the average and median for similarly situated defendants. Nevertheless, the panel held that giving Taylor a sentence above those statistics did not amount to an abuse of discretion—especially since:

• The sentence remained within the Guidelines range; and
• The court explained case-specific factors (criminal history, recidivism risk, long-term trafficking) justifying a high-end sentence.

As Bradley, 897 F.3d 779, 786 (6th Cir. 2018), underscored: “There is nothing ‘unwarranted’ about correct sentencing calculations.”

4. Fifth Amendment claim and law-of-the-case doctrine

Taylor also claimed that the judge imposed a near-maximum sentence to punish him for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege at his first sentencing hearing. A prior Sixth Circuit panel had already considered and rejected this accusation in In re Taylor, No. 23‑3957, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 26422 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 2024), where Taylor sought mandamus relief.

The panel here invoked the law-of-the-case doctrine, citing Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Board, 871 F.3d 420, 425–26 (6th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Rayborn, 495 F.3d 328, 337 (6th Cir. 2007):

• “The law-of-the-case doctrine precludes reconsideration of issues decided at an earlier stage of the case.”
• While not an absolute jurisdictional bar, the doctrine is generally followed as a matter of prudence unless exceptional circumstances are present:
  1. Materially different evidence;
  2. An intervening change in controlling law; or
  3. A prior decision that is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.

The court found none of those circumstances:

• The later 119-month sentence was not “materially different evidence” relevant to whether Taylor had in fact invoked the Fifth Amendment at the earlier hearing.
• No intervening change in law undermined the earlier panel’s ruling.
• The prior decision was not clearly erroneous; indeed, it concluded Taylor never invoked his Fifth Amendment right during the first hearing, so the judge could not have punished him for doing so.

Taylor did not meaningfully challenge these conclusions on appeal. Accordingly, the panel declined to revisit the Fifth Amendment issue and emphasized that its review of substantive reasonableness focuses on whether the sentence is reasonable, “not whether we would have imposed the same sentence in the first instance.” (Gardner, 32 F.4th at 532).

C. Plea Agreements and the Sentencing Court’s Independence

Another important, though less controversial, point is the court’s reaffirmation that plea agreements do not bind sentencing judges on offense-level calculations unless specifically structured to do so (e.g., under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which was not the case here).

Relying on United States v. Warren, 8 F.4th 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2021), the panel noted that plea agreements are enforced “according to their literal terms.” Taylor’s agreement expressly:

• Disclaimed any binding effect of the parties’ Guidelines estimates on the court; and
• Recognized that the court retained sole authority to determine the advisory range and sentence.

Thus, the district court not only could deviate from the plea’s stipulated drug quantity, but arguably had a Guidelines-imposed duty to do so where the plea quantity undercounted relevant conduct and seized proceeds.

D. Standards of Review and Preservation of Error

A subtle but practical point in the opinion concerns the standard of review. The government argued that Taylor’s challenge to the base offense level calculation should be reviewed only for plain error because he purportedly did not object to the “adequacy of the court’s explanation” of the drug-quantity calculation.

The panel disagreed, holding that Taylor’s objection to “any enhancements based on the amount of money seized” sufficed to preserve a challenge to:

• The use of the cash-to-drug conversion itself; and
• The adequacy of the court’s explanation of that methodology.

Therefore, the court applied clear-error review to the factual findings and de novo review to the legal framework, which is more favorable to defendants than plain-error review.

This underscores that:

• Even relatively terse objections, if they clearly target the factual and methodological basis for a sentencing enhancement, can preserve an issue for appellate review; but
• To defeat reliance on the PSR’s facts, defendants must still do more than assert generic “unreliability”—they must specifically dispute facts and offer contrary evidence.

V. Practical Implications and Future Impact

A. For defense counsel: crafting effective PSR objections

Taylor is a cautionary tale for defense practitioners:

• Merely saying “the PSR is wrong” or “the conversion is unreliable” is not enough.
• To force the court to hold a hearing or reject a PSR conclusion, counsel must:
  • Identify precisely which factual statement is contested (e.g., “the money was not drug proceeds,” or “the price of $900 per ounce is incorrect”); and
  • Offer some contrary evidence or at least a plausible factual basis (e.g., records showing legitimate income, an alternative market price supported by expert testimony or reports).
• If the defendant’s own prior statements are being used against him, counsel should consider:
  • Whether those statements were adequately documented, accurate, or limited to certain time periods; and
  • Whether there is competent evidence suggesting that the cash seized at the time of arrest may not correspond 1:1 with the prior stated price or with drug activity alone.

Without such specificity and evidentiary support, the PSR’s factual narrative is likely to be adopted wholesale—often to the defendant’s detriment.

B. For prosecutors and probation officers

The opinion validates a frequently used approach in drug cases:

• Linking seized cash to drug proceeds using the defendant’s own admissions and prevailing market prices substantiated by investigative agencies; and
• Reducing approximations in the defendant’s favor when multiple plausible price points exist (e.g., using a lower-per-ounce figure instead of a higher-per-kilogram one) to demonstrate that the court is “erring on the side of caution.”

Probation officers preparing PSRs should note that:

• When they clearly articulate the factual basis and methodology for a cash-to-drug conversion, courts are likely to adopt those findings if the defendant does not marshal specific factual challenges.
• Consultation with experienced agents or DEA intelligence regarding reasonable price estimates can be critical to satisfying the “minimal level of reliability” standard.

C. For district judges

Taylor confirms and reinforces several best practices:

• Make explicit Rule 32 findings. Even when adopting PSR findings, articulating the factual bases and referencing the preponderance standard, as the sentencing judge did here, strengthens the record against later procedural attacks.
• Explain weighting of § 3553(a) factors. When giving a high-end sentence, judges should:
  • Explain the connection between the defendant’s history, risk of recidivism, and the need to protect the public;
  • Address mitigating circumstances; and
  • Clarify how the sentence fits within the broader need to avoid unwarranted disparities, even if not using national statistics.
• Consider—but are not bound by—national data. Judges may, as here, note average/median sentences as one reference point but remain free to impose a sentence above or below those figures based on individualized facts.

D. For future litigation: law-of-the-case and repeated constitutional claims

Where an earlier appellate panel has already rejected a constitutional challenge arising from the same criminal case (for example, in a mandamus petition), defendants should expect:

• That the law-of-the-case doctrine will presumptively bar relitigation on direct appeal; and
• That they must demonstrate one of the narrow exceptions (materially different evidence, intervening law, or clear error causing manifest injustice) to re-open the issue.

Taylor concretely illustrates that simply reasserting the same Fifth Amendment theory, dressed in slightly different procedural clothing, will not suffice.

VI. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

1. Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness

• Procedural reasonableness asks: Did the judge follow the right steps?
  • Correctly calculate the Guidelines range;
  • Treat the Guidelines as advisory;
  • Consider the § 3553(a) factors; and
  • Base the sentence on accurate facts and provide an adequate explanation.
• Substantive reasonableness asks: Is the sentence itself too long or too short in light of all the circumstances? It focuses on the judge’s judgment call in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.

2. Preponderance of the evidence

At sentencing, the government usually must prove facts (like drug quantity) by a “preponderance of the evidence”—that it is more likely than not that the fact is true. This is much lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which applies at trial.

3. Clear-error review

When reviewing factual findings (such as drug quantity), the appellate court asks whether it is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made. If reasonable minds could differ, the finding stands—even if the appellate panel might have decided it differently in the first instance.

4. Presentence reports and Rule 32 objections

A PSR is a detailed report prepared by probation that sets out:

• The guideline calculations;
• The defendant’s background and criminal history; and
• Factual narratives of the offense and relevant conduct.

Under Rule 32:

• If the defendant does not specifically dispute a PSR fact, the judge may accept it as true.
• If the defendant does dispute a PSR fact, he must:
  • Identify exactly which fact is wrong; and
  • Offer at least some evidence or concrete reason to question its reliability.

Without that, objections are considered “bare denials” and do not prevent the judge from relying on the PSR.

5. Relevant conduct and cash-to-drug conversions

Under the Guidelines’ “relevant conduct” rules, a court may consider more than just what was found at the time of the arrest. When the physical drugs seized are low compared to the actual scale of commerce, courts can:

• Treat seized cash as drug proceeds; and
• Convert that cash into an estimated drug quantity by using typical street prices, including those supplied or confirmed by DEA or the defendant’s own admissions.

6. Law-of-the-case doctrine

If an appellate court has already decided an issue in the same case (e.g., on an earlier appeal or a mandamus petition), the “law-of-the-case” doctrine ordinarily prevents that issue from being re-argued later, unless:

• New, materially different evidence emerges;
• The law changes in the meantime; or
• The prior decision was clearly wrong and would cause a serious injustice if followed.

7. Within-Guidelines presumption and § 3553(a) factors

The Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, but a sentence that falls within the correctly calculated range is presumed reasonable on appeal. Judges must still consider the § 3553(a) factors, including:

• Nature and circumstances of the offense;
• History and characteristics of the defendant;
• Need for deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation;
• Guidelines range and policy statements; and
• Need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.

But appellate courts are very reluctant to disturb a within-Guidelines sentence unless there is a clear misapplication of law or a truly extreme imbalance in the judge’s weighing of these considerations.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Taylor reinforces several important sentencing principles within the Sixth Circuit:

• When seized drugs understate the true scale of trafficking, courts not only may but must approximate drug quantity, including by converting seized cash into drug weight using reliable price evidence and the defendant’s own admissions.
• Defendants who wish to contest PSR factual assertions must go beyond bare, generalized denials and offer specific, evidentiary challenges; otherwise, those assertions may be adopted wholesale.
• A within-Guidelines sentence—especially one thoroughly explained in terms of criminal history, recidivism risk, and offense characteristics—is highly likely to be upheld as substantively reasonable, even if it exceeds national averages or medians.
• The law-of-the-case doctrine will bar defendants from re-litigating constitutional or procedural issues already resolved by a prior appellate panel absent narrow, exceptional circumstances.

Although unpublished, Taylor provides a clear and practical roadmap for how the Sixth Circuit expects district courts to handle cash-based drug approximations, PSR objections, and § 3553(a) sentencing analyses. For lawyers and judges alike, it is a pointed reminder that sentencing is evidence-driven, that plea stipulations do not substitute for independent Guidelines analysis, and that failure to challenge PSR facts with specificity can have significant consequences for a defendant’s ultimate sentence.