Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v. Ahmed: Prejudice, Repose, and Discretion in Applying 22 NYCRR 202.48 to Foreclosure Judgments

I. Introduction

Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. v. Ahmed, 2025 NY Slip Op 06588 (App Div 2d Dept, Nov. 26, 2025), is a significant mortgage foreclosure decision clarifying how strictly New York courts will enforce the 60‑day “abandonment” rule in 22 NYCRR 202.48 when a prevailing party delays in submitting proposed orders and judgments for signature.

The case arises from a residential mortgage foreclosure in Queens County. The plaintiff, Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. (“the Bank”), sought to foreclose a mortgage executed by defendant Ripa Ahmed. At some point after the mortgage was recorded, Mahammad A. Huda (“the defendant” or “Huda”) acquired an ownership interest in the property and was named as a defendant. Huda defaulted by failing to answer or appear, but later participated in the proceedings and ultimately sought to undo an order of reference and the final order and judgment of foreclosure and sale (“JFS”) on the ground that the Bank had not complied with 22 NYCRR 202.48.

The central issues addressed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, were:

• Whether the Bank’s failure to strictly comply with the timing and service requirements of 22 NYCRR 202.48 rendered its motions abandoned, thereby requiring vacatur of the order of reference and the judgment of foreclosure and sale;
• Whether Huda was procedurally barred from raising those abandonment arguments at this stage of the litigation; and
• Whether he could obtain relief under CPLR 5015(a)(5), which allows vacatur of a judgment when a prior underlying order has been reversed, modified, or vacated.

The decision reinforces a now‑emerging line of authority in foreclosure and civil practice: violations of the technical requirements of 22 NYCRR 202.48 will not automatically result in abandonment or vacatur of judgments where there is no prejudice and where vacatur would undermine the goal of finality and efficient use of judicial resources.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Foreclosure

• Defendant Ripa Ahmed executed a note and mortgage in favor of the Bank’s predecessor, secured by real property in Woodside, Queens.
• At some later point, Mahammad A. Huda acquired an ownership interest in the mortgaged property.
• In 2013, the Bank commenced a foreclosure action against Ahmed, Huda, and others.
• Huda did not answer or appear, thereby defaulting in the action.

B. Motion for Default Judgment and Order of Reference

• In June 2015, the Bank moved for:
  • Leave to enter a default judgment against, among others, Huda; and
  • An order of reference (appointment of a referee to compute the amount due).
• In response, Huda’s then‑counsel filed a notice of appearance and cross‑moved, among other things, to vacate Huda’s default.
• In a decision dated March 7, 2016, the Supreme Court indicated that it was granting the Bank’s motion and directed the Bank to “settle order”—i.e., submit a proposed order, on notice, for the court to sign.

C. The 2016 Order of Reference

• The Bank served a notice of settlement of the proposed order on Huda personally, but not on his counsel of record.
• On September 21, 2016 (more than six months after the decision), the court entered an order of reference:
  • Granting the Bank leave to enter a default judgment against Huda; and
  • Appointing a referee to compute the amount due under the mortgage.

D. Proceedings Before the Referee and Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale

• A hearing was held before the referee, at which Huda and his counsel appeared.
• The referee issued a report computing the amount due.
• The Bank then moved to confirm the referee’s report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale.
• Huda opposed that motion.
• In a decision dated March 21, 2019, the Supreme Court indicated that it would grant the Bank’s motion and directed the Bank to “settle a judgment of foreclosure and sale” consistent with the decision, by mailing the proposed judgment—supported by, among other things, an affidavit of service—to the court.
• On April 12, 2019, the Bank served a notice of settlement of the proposed judgment on Huda’s counsel of record. However:
  • The notice of settlement bore a settlement date of April 6, 2019—six days before the date of service.
• On August 19, 2019, the Bank filed the proposed order and judgment of foreclosure and sale, which the court executed and which was entered that same day.

E. The 2021 Motion to Vacate

• In August 2021, roughly two years after entry of the JFS, Huda moved:
  • Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48 to vacate the 2016 order of reference, and
  • Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48 and CPLR 5015(a)(5) to vacate the 2019 order and judgment of foreclosure and sale.
• On March 7, 2023, the Supreme Court (Evans, J.) denied Huda’s motion.
• Huda appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division affirmed the order denying Huda’s motion to vacate the order of reference and the judgment of foreclosure and sale.

The court held:

1. No procedural bar to raising abandonment. Huda was not precluded from raising the argument that the Bank had abandoned its motions under 22 NYCRR 202.48, notwithstanding earlier actions in the case (including the entry of the JFS and appeals taken by co‑defendants). Nor was he barred for failure to have raised the argument before the alleged abandonment occurred.
2. Noncompliance with 22 NYCRR 202.48 found, but not dispositive. The record did not show that the Bank had “settled” the orders and judgments in strict compliance with 22 NYCRR 202.48(a), yet the court held that this did not require vacatur.
3. Discretionary application of 22 NYCRR 202.48(b). Under 22 NYCRR 202.48(b), failure to timely submit a proposed order or judgment is “deemed an abandonment” of the motion “unless for good cause shown.” The court emphasized that this rule is not to be applied mechanically. Relying on U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Rahman and related cases, the court concluded that where vacatur would not advance the rule’s purpose of bringing repose to litigation, and where the defendant suffers no prejudice, a court may properly decline to deem the motion abandoned and may refuse to vacate longstanding orders or judgments.
4. No prejudice and strong interest in repose. Huda was not prejudiced by the Bank’s failure to strictly comply with the settlement and timing requirements of 22 NYCRR 202.48, and maintaining the orders brought “repose to the proceedings and preserved judicial resources.” Accordingly, denial of vacatur was a provident exercise of discretion.
5. CPLR 5015(a)(5) relief unavailable. Vacatur of a judgment under CPLR 5015(a)(5) is available only where there has been a “reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior judgment or order upon which [the judgment] was based.” Because Huda failed to establish a basis to vacate the order of reference, the condition for relief under 5015(a)(5)—vacatur of the underlying order—was not satisfied. Therefore, the motion to vacate the JFS under that provision was properly denied.

In practical terms, the decision signals that mortgage foreclosure judgments will generally be protected from collateral attack on purely technical grounds under 22 NYCRR 202.48, especially where defendants have actively participated in the litigation and cannot show substantive prejudice.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Core Legal Issues

The case presents three intertwined procedural issues:

1. Scope of 22 NYCRR 202.48 in foreclosure practice: How strictly should courts enforce the 60‑day rule for submitting proposed orders and judgments after a decision is issued?
2. Timing and waiver of abandonment arguments: Can a litigant be barred from invoking abandonment if he did not raise it at the earliest possible point, or if co‑defendants previously litigated or appealed?
3. Interaction with CPLR 5015(a)(5): When, if ever, can a party leverage a 22 NYCRR 202.48 violation to vacate a final judgment under the “prior order reversed/vacated” ground?

B. Interpretation and Application of 22 NYCRR 202.48

1. Text and Purpose of the Rule

22 NYCRR 202.48 is a Uniform Rule for the New York trial courts addressing the submission of proposed orders and judgments following a court decision. The key provisions cited are:

• Subdivision (a): “Proposed orders or judgments, with proof of service on all parties where the order is directed to be settled or submitted on notice, must be submitted for signature, unless otherwise directed by the court, within 60 days after the signing and filing of the decision directing that the order be settled or submitted.”
• Subdivision (b): “Failure to submit the order or judgment timely shall be deemed an abandonment of the motion or action, unless for good cause shown.”
• Subdivision (c)(1): “When settlement of an order or judgment is directed by the court, a copy of the proposed order or judgment with notice of settlement … shall be served on all parties.”

The rule serves two principal purposes:

• To prevent stale litigation by forcing prevailing parties to promptly “reduce” favorable decisions to signed orders or judgments; and
• To provide a clear procedural opportunity for the losing party to review, object to, or propose modifications to the form of the order or judgment via the notice‑of‑settlement process.

However, subdivision (b) expressly introduces flexibility—“unless for good cause shown”—signaling that the 60‑day abandonment rule is not jurisdictional and may be relaxed.

2. The Court’s Application to the Order of Reference and the JFS

The Appellate Division acknowledged that:

• The record did not demonstrate that the Bank had settled the orders in strict conformity with 22 NYCRR 202.48(a), particularly in terms of proper and timely service and submission; and
• There were obvious irregularities—such as the back‑dated notice of settlement indicating a settlement date that had already passed when the notice was served, and the failure to serve Huda’s counsel (rather than Huda individually) with the earlier proposed order of reference.

But instead of treating these defects as automatically fatal, the court focused on:

• Absence of Prejudice: Huda participated (with counsel) in later stages of the litigation, including the referee hearing and opposition to confirmation of the referee’s report. The court expressly found that he was “not prejudiced” by the Bank’s noncompliance with 22 NYCRR 202.48.
• Judicial Economy and Repose: The litigation had advanced through a full referee accounting and a final foreclosure judgment. Vacating the order of reference and JFS at that late stage would have wasted judicial resources and undermined the repose that 22 NYCRR 202.48 is ultimately intended to promote.

Relying on U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Rahman, the court emphasized:

“A court should not deem an action or judgment abandoned where the result would not bring the repose to court proceedings that 22 NYCRR 202.48 was designed to effectuate, and would waste judicial resources.”

Thus, even though the literal requirements of 202.48(a) and (c)(1) were not satisfied, the court held that the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in refusing to deem the motions abandoned and in denying vacatur under 202.48(b).

C. Interaction with CPLR 5015(a)(5)

CPLR 5015(a)(5) authorizes a court to relieve a party from a judgment or order on the ground of:

“reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior judgment or order upon which it is based.”

In foreclosure practice, this typically arises where:

• An order of reference (appointing a referee and determining liability or default) is later vacated or reversed, and
• The defendant then seeks to vacate the downstream judgment of foreclosure and sale that was built upon that order.

Here, Huda attempted to use 22 NYCRR 202.48 to first attack the order of reference, and then to use CPLR 5015(a)(5) to attack the JFS as dependent on that order.

The Appellate Division’s reasoning is structurally straightforward:

1. To obtain relief under 5015(a)(5), Huda needed to show that the underlying order of reference was vacated, reversed, or modified.
2. He attempted to achieve this by arguing that the order of reference had been abandoned under 22 NYCRR 202.48, and therefore should be vacated.
3. The court, however, held that no vacatur of the order of reference was warranted, for the reasons discussed above (no prejudice, judicial economy, and discretion under 202.48(b)).
4. Because the order of reference remained intact, the condition precedent to relief under 5015(a)(5) was not met. Therefore, there was no basis to vacate the JFS.

The court cited Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v Area Plumbing Supply, Inc., 207 AD3d 596, 597–598, to confirm this understanding of 5015(a)(5) as a derivative remedy.

D. Ability to Raise 22 NYCRR 202.48 Arguments Later in the Case

The Bank argued that Huda should be barred from raising abandonment arguments under doctrines such as waiver, law of the case, res judicata, or because prior appeals in the action (by co‑defendants) did not include this issue.

The Appellate Division rejected this position:

• Citing Rokina Opt. Co. v Camera King, 63 NY2d 728, 730, and U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Rahman, 218 AD3d 626, 628, the court stated that earlier litigation steps, including the entry of the JFS and appeals by co‑defendants, did not bar Huda from later moving to vacate under 22 NYCRR 202.48.
• The court also relied on Schultz v United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 201 NY 230, 234, and West Val. Fire Dist. No. 1 v Village of Springville, 294 AD2d 949, 949, for the proposition that a party cannot be required to challenge an “abandonment” before it occurs. Huda’s failure to raise the issue earlier could not preclude him from raising it once the factual predicate for abandonment had arguably materialized.

Thus, the court confirmed an important procedural principle: even a defaulting defendant who later appears is not procedurally barred from invoking 22 NYCRR 202.48 at a later point in the life of the case. Instead, such motions will be decided on the merits, including an assessment of prejudice and the goals of repose and judicial economy.

E. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Rahman (218 AD3d 626)

Rahman is the key modern Second Department authority on 22 NYCRR 202.48 in foreclosure cases. The court in Ahmed quoted Rahman for the proposition that:

“[A] court should not deem an action or judgment abandoned where the result would not bring the repose to court proceedings that 22 NYCRR 202.48 was designed to effectuate, and would waste judicial resources.”

In Rahman, as here, the foreclosure plaintiff failed to strictly comply with the 60‑day requirement for submitting proposed orders. Yet the court declined to vacate the resulting foreclosure judgment, emphasizing that:

• The defendant had not suffered prejudice from the delay or irregularities; and
• Vacating the judgment would not advance the rule’s purposes but would instead prolong litigation and increase the burden on the courts.

Ahmed builds on Rahman by reaffirming that 22 NYCRR 202.48 is not a mechanical forfeiture rule but a flexible tool guided by fairness and judicial economy.

2. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Yogev (194 AD3d 994)

The court cited Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Yogev, 194 AD3d 994, 995–996, in stating that the record did not show that the plaintiff had settled the order in accordance with 22 NYCRR 202.48(a).

Yogev illustrates that where the record affirmatively shows a violation of 22 NYCRR 202.48—or at least fails to show compliance—courts will take that violation seriously. However, unlike more rigid applications of the rule, Ahmed uses Yogev as a stepping stone to a nuanced conclusion: noncompliance is recognized, but not automatically fatal.

3. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v Ahmed (241 AD3d 1326)

In Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v Ahmed, 241 AD3d 1326, 1329, the Appellate Division took a flexible approach to 22 NYCRR 202.48, declining to vacate notwithstanding certain technical noncompliance, in part because:

• The party opposing enforcement had not shown prejudice, and
• Maintaining the judgment furthered repose and conserved judicial resources.

The Ahmed court relies on this case for the propositions that:

• Strict compliance with 22 NYCRR 202.48 can sometimes be excused; and
• Courts may uphold orders and judgments where vacatur would serve no meaningful purpose other than to restart already lengthy proceedings.

4. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Atedgi (162 AD3d 756)

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Atedgi, 162 AD3d 756, 758, similarly supported the court’s view that noncompliance with 22 NYCRR 202.48 does not require automatic dismissal or vacatur. Rather, courts retain discretion to excuse noncompliance where appropriate, especially absent prejudice to the opposing party.

5. Lola Roberts Beauty Salon, Inc. v Able Motor Cars Corp. (213 AD3d 751)

Lola Roberts Beauty Salon, Inc. v Able Motor Cars Corp., 213 AD3d 751, 753, also supports the notion that lack of demonstrable prejudice weighs heavily against granting vacatur on 22 NYCRR 202.48 grounds. The Ahmed court relies on this line of cases to conclude that Huda’s mere invocation of technical deficiencies, without proof of substantive harm, did not justify undoing the order of reference or JFS.

6. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Quinn (186 AD3d 561)

The court quotes Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Quinn, 186 AD3d 561, 563, for the idea that denying vacatur under these circumstances:

“[B]rought ‘repose to the proceedings and preserved judicial resources.’”

Quinn is part of a broader foreclosure jurisprudence in which the Second Department emphasizes the importance of finality and the avoidance of repetitive or dilatory attempts to reopen long‑running foreclosure actions.

7. Rokina Opt. Co. v Camera King (63 NY2d 728)

Rokina Opt. Co. v Camera King, 63 NY2d 728, 730, is cited to support the proposition that participation in litigation (including appeals) does not necessarily foreclose a party from later raising distinct procedural objections, particularly where those objections could not have been raised earlier or were not adjudicated on the merits previously.

In Ahmed, this authority helps rebut the suggestion that Huda was procedurally “locked out” of raising 22 NYCRR 202.48 arguments simply because of the case’s advanced posture.

8. Schultz v United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (201 NY 230) and West Val. Fire Dist. No. 1 v Village of Springville (294 AD2d 949)

Schultz (201 NY 230) and West Val. Fire Dist. No. 1 (294 AD2d 949) stand for the common‑sense but important principle that:

• A party cannot be faulted for failing to raise an argument about an event (such as “abandonment”) before that event occurs.

Applying these cases, the court holds that Huda’s failure to previously claim that the Bank had abandoned its motions (before the alleged abandonment occurred) did not preclude him from raising the argument when he did.

9. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v Area Plumbing Supply, Inc. (207 AD3d 596)

Finally, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v Area Plumbing Supply, Inc., 207 AD3d 596, 597–598, is cited for the settled understanding of CPLR 5015(a)(5):

• Relief is available only when a later decision reverses, modifies, or vacates a prior judgment or order upon which the challenged judgment is based.

Since the order of reference in Ahmed was not vacated, Huda’s attempt to invoke 5015(a)(5) to undo the JFS necessarily failed.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several procedural concepts in this decision can be opaque to non-specialists. The following brief explanations may help:

1. “Order of Reference” in a Foreclosure Action

In New York foreclosure practice, an order of reference is an intermediate order:

• It typically follows a finding of default or liability;
• The court appoints a referee to compute the precise amount owed by the borrower (principal, interest, fees, etc.); and
• The referee issues a report, which the court later reviews when entering a judgment of foreclosure and sale.

The order of reference thus forms an important building block for the ultimate foreclosure judgment.

2. “Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale” (JFS)

The judgment of foreclosure and sale is the final judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action. It:

• Confirms the referee’s computation (if not objected to or if objections are rejected);
• Fixes the amount due;
• Authorizes a foreclosure sale of the property at public auction; and
• Directs how sale proceeds are to be distributed.

Once a JFS is entered, the matter is typically on a short path to a foreclosure sale unless stayed or vacated.

3. “Notice of Settlement” and “Settle Order”

When a judge issues a decision ruling on a motion but does not sign a final order or judgment, the judge may direct a party to “settle order”. This means:

• The prevailing party must prepare a draft order or judgment that reflects the decision;
• That party must serve the draft on the other side with a “notice of settlement”, which sets a date by which the order will be presented to the court;
• The opposing party has an opportunity to:
  • Propose changes to the wording, or
  • Submit a competing version if they believe the proposed order inaccurately reflects the decision.

22 NYCRR 202.48 requires this process to be completed—including submission to the court—within 60 days of the decision, absent good cause.

4. “Abandonment” Under 22 NYCRR 202.48(b)

Under 22 NYCRR 202.48(b), if a party fails to timely submit a proposed order or judgment after a decision, that failure:

• “Shall be deemed an abandonment of the motion or action, unless for good cause shown.”

In plain terms:

• If you win a motion but do not promptly present a proposed order or judgment for the court to sign, the court may treat your win as forfeited, as though you had abandoned the relief awarded.
• However, the rule gives the court flexibility (“good cause”) to excuse delay or technical defaults if fairness and efficiency justify doing so.

Ahmed is important because it demonstrates that:

• “Abandonment” is not automatic in every case of noncompliance;
• Courts will look at the overall context, including litigation history, prejudice, and the goal of finality, in deciding whether to deem a motion abandoned.

5. CPLR 5015(a)(5) – Vacatur Based on Prior Order or Judgment

CPLR 5015 sets out several grounds for vacating a judgment (e.g., excusable default, newly discovered evidence, fraud, etc.). Subdivision (a)(5) is more specialized. It applies where:

• A later court decision (often on appeal) reverses, modifies, or vacates an earlier order or judgment, and
• The current judgment rests upon that earlier order.

In such a scenario, the party can go back to the court that issued the later judgment and ask it to be vacated, because its foundation has been undermined.

In Ahmed, Huda tried to use abandonment under 22 NYCRR 202.48 as a way to effectively “vacate” the order of reference, which would then (in his view) permit vacatur of the JFS under 5015(a)(5). The court short‑circuited this approach by holding that the order of reference should not be vacated; therefore, 5015(a)(5) never came into play in his favor.

VI. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For Foreclosure Plaintiffs (Lenders and Servicers)

Ahmed offers some reassurance to foreclosure plaintiffs:

• While lenders should still strive for strict compliance with 22 NYCRR 202.48’s timing and service requirements, the decision makes clear that technical missteps are not automatically fatal to orders of reference and foreclosure judgments, especially where:
  • The defendant has actively participated in the litigation;
  • The action has progressed through multiple stages (e.g., referee proceedings); and
  • The defendant cannot show concrete prejudice from the delay or irregularity.
• Lenders can argue, consistent with Ahmed and Rahman, that vacating long‑standing judgments based solely on rule‑based technicalities would:
  • Undermine the goal of repose; and
  • Waste already expended judicial and party resources.

B. For Borrowers and Property Owners

For defendants in foreclosure (like Huda), the decision sends a cautionary message:

• 22 NYCRR 202.48 remains a valid ground of attack—courts will examine whether the prevailing party complied with the rule—but:
  • A showing of prejudice is critical; merely pointing to a technically defective or late notice of settlement is unlikely to suffice once the case has advanced substantially.
  • Courts are inclined to protect final foreclosure judgments where the equities and judicial economy favor finality.
• Defendants should raise 22 NYCRR 202.48 issues as early as possible, rather than holding them in reserve for post‑judgment collateral attacks.
• That said, the case also confirms that defendants are not barred from raising such arguments later merely because:
  • They did not foresee abandonment before it occurred, or
  • Co‑defendants previously took appeals without raising the issue.

C. For Trial Courts

Ahmed buttresses a line of authority granting trial courts significant discretion in applying 22 NYCRR 202.48:

• Trial courts remain free to deem motions abandoned where the prevailing party’s inattention or delay genuinely suggests desuetude of the relief granted.
• But courts may—and often should—decline to find abandonment where:
  • The litigation has continued in reliance on the order or judgment;
  • Parties have expended significant effort (e.g., referee proceedings, motion practice, hearings) premised on the validity of those orders; and
  • Vacatur would serve only to reset the clock without yielding any offsetting benefits in fairness or efficiency.

The decision encourages trial courts to focus on:

• Actual prejudice to the party invoking 22 NYCRR 202.48;
• The stage of the litigation at which the rule is invoked; and
• The overarching goal of bringing cases to a final, stable resolution.

D. Broader Procedural Significance

Beyond the foreclosure context, Ahmed reinforces a general theme in New York procedure:

• Court rules—such as 22 NYCRR 202.48—are important and generally mandatory, but they are not always applied with maximal rigidity when:
  • No substantive right has been compromised;
  • The opponent has had a fair opportunity to participate; and
  • Undoing the proceedings would primarily serve delay or gamesmanship rather than justice.
• CPLR 5015(a)(5) remains a narrowly tailored remedy tied directly to changes in the status of underlying orders or judgments. Parties cannot bootstrap technical arguments into 5015(a)(5) relief unless they first succeed in vacating those foundational orders.

VII. Conclusion

Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Ahmed confirms and refines a key procedural principle in New York foreclosure law: technical noncompliance with 22 NYCRR 202.48’s timing and notice requirements will not automatically result in abandonment or vacatur of orders and judgments, especially absent prejudice and where finality and judicial economy are at stake.

The decision:

• Affirms that defendants may raise 22 NYCRR 202.48 arguments even at a later stage, without being precluded for not having anticipated “abandonment” earlier;
• Clarifies that trial courts enjoy substantial discretion under 202.48(b) to excuse noncompliance when justice and efficiency so require;
• Confirms that CPLR 5015(a)(5) relief is unavailable unless the party first establishes a basis to vacate the prior order upon which the judgment is based; and
• Reinforces a policy preference for repose, finality, and conservation of judicial resources in long‑running foreclosure cases.

Practitioners should view Ahmed not as a license to disregard 22 NYCRR 202.48, but as a warning that post‑judgment technical attacks will face a high bar. Courts will demand a showing of real prejudice and will be reluctant to disturb foreclosure judgments that have already passed through the full procedural pipeline, from order of reference to referee’s report to judgment of foreclosure and sale.