Bank Fraud and PPP Loans: When Government-Backed Funds Are Still “Bank Property” — Commentary on United States v. Zsa Zsa Bouvier Couch (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. Zsa Zsa Bouvier Couch, No. 24‑10313 (11th Cir. Nov. 18, 2025) (non‑argument calendar, “Not for Publication”). The case arises out of fraud on the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”), a loan program created under the CARES Act to aid small businesses during the COVID‑19 pandemic.

A jury convicted Zsa Zsa Couch of:

Five counts of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1344(2));
Six counts of making false statements to a federally insured bank (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1014); and
Two counts of money laundering (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1957(a)).

The appeal focuses narrowly on:

Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the five bank fraud convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2); and
Consequently, whether the two money laundering convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 could stand.

The core legal question: when PPP loans are made by private, federally insured banks but guaranteed and ultimately reimbursed by the Small Business Administration (SBA), are the funds “moneys…under the custody or control of a financial institution” for purposes of federal bank fraud?

Couch argued that the Small Business Administration — not the banks — was the real victim and source of the funds, and because SBA is not a “financial institution” under 18 U.S.C. § 20, the government failed to prove the bank fraud and related money laundering charges. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this theory.

Although unpublished and therefore non‑precedential in the Eleventh Circuit, the opinion is significant as a clear, PPP-specific application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loughrin v. United States and the Eleventh Circuit’s own United States v. Martin. It reinforces the principle that:

Under § 1344(2), it is enough that the defendant’s scheme targets property “owned by or under the custody or control of” a bank, even if another entity ultimately bears the economic loss; and
No proof of actual loss, risk of loss, or specific intent to defraud a financial institution is required.

In turn, the opinion confirms that PPP‑based bank fraud can serve as the “specified unlawful activity” predicate for money laundering charges under § 1957.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

In response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, Congress enacted the CARES Act, creating the Paycheck Protection Program. Under PPP:

Private lenders, primarily banks, issued loans to small businesses.
The SBA guaranteed 100% of the loans—if borrowers complied with program rules, the loans were to be forgiven or the banks were to be reimbursed by SBA.
Loan amounts were tied to average payroll; funds were restricted to payroll and qualified business expenses.

Couch applied to Trustmark National Bank and Regions Bank for PPP loans on behalf of several entities, including:

Trinity Christian Ministries;
Kidz Academy Christian Child Care Center;
Slim Fit Weight Loss Medical Clinic; and
Bouvier Hair Boutique.

She obtained five PPP loans totaling $609,687.47 from Trustmark and Regions. The government alleged that she had:

Falsely inflated payroll and employee numbers;
Misrepresented tax information; and
Used the funds for impermissible purposes, including purchasing an Audi and a Mercedes‑Benz.

B. Procedural History

A federal grand jury indicted Couch on:

Counts 1–5: Bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1344(2);
Counts 6–11: False statements to a federally insured bank, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1014; and
Counts 12–13: Money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1957(a).

At trial, after the government rested, Couch moved for judgment of acquittal (Rule 29) on the bank fraud and money laundering counts. Her theory:

The PPP funds were really SBA’s money, not the banks’.
SBA is not a “financial institution” under 18 U.S.C. § 20.
Therefore, the “financial institution” element of § 1344(2) was not satisfied.
And because the § 1957 money laundering counts depended on bank fraud as the predicate “specified unlawful activity,” the money laundering counts must also fail.

The district court denied the motion, the jury convicted on all thirteen counts, and Couch received:

45 months’ imprisonment;
Three years of supervised release; and
Restitution of $690,687.47.

On appeal, she challenged only:

The five bank fraud convictions; and
The two money laundering convictions.

C. Holding

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions. In essence, the court held:

The government introduced sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that Regions Bank and Trustmark National Bank, both federally insured financial institutions, had “custody or control” over the PPP funds when Couch obtained them.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), the government did not have to prove that the banks suffered an actual or potential loss, nor that Couch specifically intended to defraud the banks.
Because the bank fraud convictions were valid, they properly served as “specified unlawful activity” predicates under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, and 1961, sustaining the money laundering convictions.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Issues Presented and Standard of Review

The sole substantive issue was whether, under the governing statutes, the evidence was sufficient to support the bank fraud and money laundering convictions. Formally, this arose from the denial of Couch’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

The court applied two key standards:

De novo review of the denial of judgment of acquittal and the sufficiency of the evidence
Citing United States v. Bowman, 302 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002), and United States v. Perez‑Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552 (11th Cir. 1994), the court reiterated that:
- Sufficiency challenges are reviewed de novo; and
- The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences drawn in its favor.
The court emphasized the familiar sufficiency standard: a conviction must stand if “any reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”, citing United States v. Schreck, 130 F.4th 1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Grow, 977 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2020).
De novo review of statutory interpretation
Because Couch’s sufficiency argument was intertwined with how § 1344 and related provisions should be interpreted, the court also applied de novo review to the statutory questions, citing Schreck and United States v. Shamsid‑Deen, 61 F.4th 935 (11th Cir. 2023).

The court clarified that when sufficiency arguments rest on a statutory interpretation theory — as here, where Couch contended that SBA was the “true victim” and not a “financial institution” — the court must interpret the statutory text and then evaluate the evidence in that interpretive framework.

B. Statutory Framework

1. Bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344

Section 1344 criminalizes:

“knowingly execut[ing], or attempt[ing] to execute, a scheme or artifice—
(1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”

The opinion stresses the well‑established distinction between the two subsections:

§ 1344(1): focuses on defrauding the financial institution itself (intent to defraud the bank).
§ 1344(2): focuses on obtaining property “owned by, or under the custody or control of” a financial institution through fraudulent means.

The indictment and the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis proceeded solely under § 1344(2).

2. Definition of “financial institution”

Title 18 defines “financial institution” in § 20:

§ 20(1) includes “an insured depository institution (as defined in section 3(c)(2) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).”
12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2) (FDIA) defines “insured depository institution” as any bank or savings association whose deposits are insured by the FDIC.

It is undisputed that Regions Bank and Trustmark National Bank fall within this definition as FDIC‑insured banks. By contrast, the SBA is not a “financial institution” for purposes of § 1344.

3. Money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957

Section 1957(a) makes it a crime to:

“knowingly engage or attempt to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity.”

Key definitions in § 1957:

§ 1957(f)(2): “criminally derived property” means any property “constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.”
§ 1957(f)(3): “‘specified unlawful activity’ and ‘proceeds’ shall have the same meaning given those terms in section 1956.”

Section 1956(c)(7)(A) in turn incorporates “specified unlawful activity” from 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (the RICO statute). Section 1961(1)(B) includes as a predicate offense:

“financial institution fraud” under 18 U.S.C. § 1344.

Therefore, bank fraud under § 1344 is an expressly enumerated “specified unlawful activity” for money laundering prosecutions under § 1957.

C. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Sufficiency of the evidence and standard of review

United States v. Bowman, 302 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) and United States v. Perez‑Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552 (11th Cir. 1994)
These cases are cited for the principle that the appellate court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on sufficiency of the evidence, and that it must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the government.
United States v. Schreck, 130 F.4th 1297 (11th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Grow, 977 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2020)
These reinforce the same point and articulate the “any reasonable construction of the evidence” standard, under which convictions are upheld if any rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Williams, 790 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2015)
Cited for the idea that when a sufficiency challenge is premised on an asserted “correct” interpretation of a criminal statute, the reviewing court must interpret the statute, then evaluate the evidence against that interpretation.

2. Statutory interpretation methodology

United States v. Chinchilla, 987 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2021)
Quoted for the interpretive approach that courts look to the “plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language as it was understood at the time the law was enacted.” This anchors the panel’s textual analysis of § 1344.
United States v. Shamsid‑Deen, 61 F.4th 935 (11th Cir. 2023)
Cited to reaffirm de novo review when questions of statutory interpretation are raised.

3. Structure and reach of § 1344 (bank fraud)

United States v. Dennis, 237 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001)
Dennis is invoked for the proposition that § 1344 provides “two alternative methods” of committing bank fraud— under subsections (1) and (2). This frames the court’s focus on § 1344(2) as a distinct theory.
Shaw v. United States, 580 U.S. 63 (2016)
Shaw dealt primarily with § 1344(1), holding that the statute does not require proof of actual financial loss or risk of loss to the bank, and that a scheme can “defraud” a bank even if the immediate target appears to be someone else (e.g., the bank’s depositor). The panel uses Shaw to buttress the idea that in the bank fraud context, financial loss is not an element, and the statute covers schemes affecting bank property even if the harm may be indirect or ultimately felt elsewhere.
Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014)
This is the key Supreme Court case guiding the decision. Loughrin defined the elements of § 1344(2):
1. The defendant must intend “to obtain any of the moneys…or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution.”
2. The obtaining of bank property must occur “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”
Critically, Loughrin held:
- No specific intent to defraud a financial institution is required under § 1344(2) (unlike § 1344(1)).
- No showing of financial loss or risk of loss to the bank is required, and the broad “owned by or under the custody or control of” language was designed to avoid entanglement in technical questions of who bears the ultimate loss (bank vs. depositor vs. guarantor).
- A person violates § 1344(2) even when deceiving a non‑bank intermediary into handing over bank‑held funds.
The Eleventh Circuit relies heavily on these principles to dispose of Couch’s arguments.
United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 2015)
Martin applied Loughrin in a mortgage fraud context and held that a bank fraud conviction under § 1344(2) did not require proof that the bank suffered loss or risk of loss due to the fraud. The panel quotes Martin’s core holding that “the scheme to defraud is all that the government must prove,” emphasizing that the gravamen of § 1344(2) is the scheme itself, not a completed fraud that harms the bank financially.

D. The Court’s Legal Reasoning on the Bank Fraud Counts

1. Identifying the operative statutory theory: § 1344(2)

The court begins by confirming that Couch was charged and convicted under § 1344(2) (obtaining bank property by fraudulent means), not under § 1344(1) (schemes to defraud a financial institution). This matters because:

§ 1344(2) does not require proof of intent to defraud a financial institution; and
§ 1344(2) focuses on the status of the property (bank‑owned or bank‑controlled), not on who the ultimate victim may be.

2. Elements of § 1344(2) applied to PPP lending

Under Loughrin, the government had to show that:

Couch knowingly engaged in a scheme to obtain money or property “owned by, or under the custody or control of” Regions and Trustmark;
She accomplished this by means of false or fraudulent pretenses or representations.

The relevant questions, then, were:

Did Regions and Trustmark have “custody or control” of the PPP funds at the time Couch obtained them?
Did she obtain those funds by making false statements?

On the evidence, the court concludes the answer is clearly yes.

3. Evidence that the banks had “custody or control” over PPP funds

The government presented testimony from representatives of both banks:

Regions and Trustmark were the direct PPP lenders.
They processed and approved Couch’s PPP loan applications.
They disbursed the loan funds out of their own reserves, at least initially.

Even if:

The SBA later reimbursed the banks; and/or
The SBA ultimately bore the economic risk of default,

the key fact is that the funds that entered Couch’s accounts came from the banks’ coffers, over which the banks had custody or control when disbursed. The panel states that “she can’t get around the fact” that Regions and Trustmark:

“provided the initial program funds”; and
“deposited into Couch’s bank accounts money that had been in the banks’ custody or control.”

This brings the case squarely within § 1344(2)’s scope: the statute applies so long as the property obtained is bank‑owned or bank‑controlled at the moment the fraud succeeds, irrespective of who ultimately reimburses the bank.

4. False statements and fraudulent pretenses

Couch did not contest that she submitted materially false information in her PPP loan applications to Regions and Trustmark, including:

Inflated average monthly payroll expenses;
False employee counts; and
False or misleading tax documentation.

Thus, the “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises” element is straightforwardly satisfied. The dispute was not about whether the applications were fraudulent, but about whether the PPP loan funds qualified as “bank property” under § 1344(2).

5. Rejecting the “SBA as true victim” argument

Couch argued that SBA, as the ultimate guarantor and reimburser of PPP loans, was the real victim, and because SBA is not a “financial institution,” there was no bank fraud. The court rejected this argument in two principal ways:

The statutory focus is on bank property, not the identity of the ultimate loss‑bearer.
Relying on Loughrin and its own Martin decision, the court reiterates that:
- Section 1344(2) is satisfied if the defendant seeks to obtain property “owned by or under the custody or control of” a financial institution.
- The statute does not require proof that the bank suffered any loss or even risk of loss.
The court quotes Loughrin’s footnote 9, observing that the broad language (“owned by or under the custody or control of”) was chosen “to avoid entangling courts in technical issues of banking law about whether the financial institution or, alternatively, a depositor would suffer the loss from a successful fraud.”

By parity of reasoning, the statute does not require courts to parse whether, in an SBA‑guaranteed loan structure, the bank or SBA is the ultimate loss‑bearer. Once the property is bank‑controlled and obtained by fraud, § 1344(2) is triggered.
Specific intent to defraud a “financial institution” is not an element of § 1344(2).
Couch also tried to invoke older, pre‑Loughrin authority from the First Circuit to argue that:
- She lacked a specific intent to defraud the banks; and
- The government needed to show some risk of loss to the financial institution.
The panel dismisses this line of reasoning based on Loughrin’s clear holding that:
- Section 1344(2) does not require specific intent to defraud a bank; and
- Section 1344(2) does not require proof of loss or risk of loss to a financial institution.
Thus, the fact that the SBA may be the primary economic loser, or the fact that Couch may have subjectively targeted “government money,” does not insulate her from liability where her route to the money was through bank‑controlled funds.

6. Conclusion on bank fraud

Given:

Uncontested evidence that Trustmark and Regions are federally insured financial institutions under § 20 and FDIA;
Trial testimony that they were the direct lenders who disbursed PPP funds from their own reserves;
Evidence that Couch knowingly submitted false information in order to obtain those funds;

the court holds that a reasonable jury could find all elements of § 1344(2) proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court therefore did not err in denying Couch’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the bank fraud counts.

E. The Court’s Reasoning on the Money Laundering Counts

1. Elements of § 1957 applied

To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), the government needed to show that Couch:

Knowingly engaged or attempted to engage in a monetary transaction (e.g., vehicle purchases);
In criminally derived property (defined as proceeds from a criminal offense);
Of a value greater than $10,000;
Where the property was derived from a “specified unlawful activity”.

“Specified unlawful activity” includes “financial institution fraud” under § 1344.

2. Dependency on the bank fraud convictions

Couch’s challenge to the money laundering convictions was expressly derivative of her bank fraud argument:

She did not argue that she had not purchased the Audi or Mercedes or that these transactions were under $10,000.
Nor did she argue that she was unaware the funds were criminally derived.
Instead, she claimed that because the bank fraud counts should fail for lack of a “financial institution” victim, there was no “specified unlawful activity” to support a § 1957 predicate.

The Eleventh Circuit’s response is straightforward:

Section 1961(1)(B) lists “financial institution fraud” (§ 1344) as an enumerated SUA.
Sections 1956(c)(7)(A) and 1957(f)(3) incorporate that definition.
Because the court upheld the bank fraud convictions, those counts validly supply the required “specified unlawful activity.”

Thus, the district court also did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on the money laundering counts, and the money laundering convictions are affirmed.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is a “judgment of acquittal” based on insufficiency of the evidence?

At trial, after the government presents its case, the defendant can move for a judgment of acquittal (often under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). This motion asks the judge to take the case away from the jury on the ground that:

Even if all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government;
No reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

If the judge grants the motion, the case ends in an acquittal on the affected counts. Here, the trial judge denied the motion, and the jury’s guilty verdicts stood. On appeal, Couch asked the Eleventh Circuit to say that denial was legally wrong.

2. “Financial institution” and why SBA is different

A “financial institution” in this context essentially means:

A bank or savings association, whose deposits are FDIC‑insured, or other similar regulated entities listed in § 20.

The SBA is a federal agency; it is not a bank and is not FDIC‑insured. Therefore:

SBA is not a “financial institution” under § 20; and
Funds ascribed solely to SBA, with no bank custody or control, would not by themselves trigger § 1344(2).

But here, the critical point is that the money Couch obtained was:

Initially disbursed by banks from their own reserves;
Held in bank accounts under bank custody and control at the time of disbursement.

Thus, for § 1344(2) purposes, it is “bank property,” even if SBA later reimburses the bank.

3. “Scheme to obtain bank property” vs. “scheme to defraud a bank”

A key conceptual distinction:

§ 1344(1) is about cheating the bank itself—a scheme to defraud a financial institution.
§ 1344(2) is broader—a scheme to obtain bank‑owned or bank‑controlled money or property by fraud, even if the primary victim is someone else (e.g., depositors, guarantors, or government agencies).

Under § 1344(2), what matters is:

Is the property bank property (owned, or under custody or control of a bank)?
Is it obtained by false pretenses or fraudulent representations?

It does not matter:

Whether the bank ultimately loses money;
Whether a third party (like SBA) reimburses the bank; or
Whether the defendant subjectively intended to harm the bank versus the government.

4. “Specified unlawful activity” and “criminally derived property” in money laundering law

Money laundering statutes target the movement of money that has already been obtained from crime. In § 1957:

“Criminally derived property” means property that comes from a crime (e.g., fraud proceeds).
“Specified unlawful activity (SUA)” is a list of certain crimes Congress has designated as predicates for money laundering, including bank fraud (§ 1344).

So, if someone:

Commits bank fraud and receives $100,000; and
Uses $50,000 of that to buy a luxury car or real estate;

that purchase can be charged as money laundering under § 1957 because:

The transaction involves more than $10,000;
The money is “criminally derived” from bank fraud;
Bank fraud is a “specified unlawful activity.”

That is essentially what happened with Couch’s purchases of the Audi and Mercedes‑Benz.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

A. PPP and similar government‑backed lending programs

This opinion matters especially in the context of PPP fraud prosecutions and, by analogy, other government‑backed lending programs (e.g., SBA 7(a) loans, federally guaranteed student loans, FHA‑insured mortgages).

The decision communicates that:

Where a federally insured bank originates, funds, and disburses a loan—even if fully backed by a government guarantee—those funds count as “moneys…under the custody or control of” a financial institution.
A defendant cannot avoid bank fraud liability simply by arguing that “it was really the government’s money” because the government guaranteed or reimbursed the bank.

In practice, this:

Reinforces prosecutorial charging strategies that treat PPP loan fraud as bank fraud where private lenders are involved.
Closes off a potential defense argument in PPP cases—that, because the federal government ultimately bore the loss, the bank fraud statute does not apply.

B. Clarification of § 1344(2) after Loughrin, in the Eleventh Circuit

While Loughrin and Martin already established that loss or intent to defraud a bank is not required under § 1344(2), Couch applies those principles in a modern, government‑backed loan context. The opinion:

Confirms that PPP structures do not alter the core Loughrin analysis—the critical inquiry remains whether the funds were in a bank’s custody or control at the time of the fraud.
Signals that the Eleventh Circuit will not entertain technical, post‑hoc parsing of who ultimately bore the loss when applying § 1344(2).

This is doctrinally consistent with the Supreme Court’s view that § 1344(2) is drafted to avoid such technicalities.

C. Money laundering as an add‑on in PPP fraud schemes

Because bank fraud under § 1344 is a “specified unlawful activity,” prosecutors can, and often do, add money laundering counts under §§ 1956 and 1957 when defendants spend fraud proceeds in significant transactions.

Couch underscores that, in PPP cases:

Once bank fraud is established, major purchases made with PPP proceeds (e.g., vehicles, luxury goods, real estate) are natural targets for § 1957 charges.
Defendants cannot avoid those additional charges by recasting the PPP loans as purely “government funds” outside the ambit of bank fraud.

This amplifies criminal exposure in PPP fraud cases:

Each laundering transaction can constitute a separate count.
Sentencing can be affected by money laundering guidelines, which are often more severe.

D. Strategic implications for defense and prosecution

1. For prosecutors

This decision supports charging PPP fraud as bank fraud plus money laundering wherever federally insured lenders were involved.
Prosecutors will likely emphasize:
- The bank’s role as an originator and disburser of loan funds;
- The bank’s initial outlay of its own reserves; and
- Evidence that the defendant lied directly to the bank.

2. For defense counsel

This case warns that arguments focusing on the identity of the ultimate victim (government vs. bank) are unlikely to succeed under § 1344(2).
Defenses will need to pivot to:
- Challenging whether the funds truly ever belonged to or were controlled by a bank (e.g., if paid directly by a government agency without bank intermediation);
- Attacking the evidence of knowing falsity or fraudulent intent;
- Disputing whether particular transactions qualify as § 1957 monetary transactions in criminally derived property.

E. Precedential weight: Unpublished but revealing

The opinion is explicitly marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and is an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision. Under Eleventh Circuit rules:

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, though they may be cited as persuasive authority.

Even so, Couch is important because:

It reveals how this panel of the Eleventh Circuit applies Loughrin and Martin in the PPP context;
Its reasoning is tightly anchored to Supreme Court and published Eleventh Circuit precedent, suggesting that future published cases would likely follow a similar path;
It serves as a roadmap for district courts in the circuit dealing with similar PPP or government‑backed loan fraud cases.

VI. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

United States v. Couch offers a focused, PPP‑specific application of long‑standing principles of federal bank fraud and money laundering law. The Eleventh Circuit’s core messages are:

PPP loans funded and disbursed by FDIC‑insured banks are “bank property” for § 1344(2) purposes.
Even though the SBA guarantees and reimburses PPP loans, the funds that the banks initially disburse from their own reserves remain “moneys…under the custody or control” of a financial institution at the time of disbursement. Fraudulently obtained PPP funds thus fall squarely within the bank fraud statute when obtained through bank intermediaries.
Under § 1344(2), neither loss nor risk of loss to a bank, nor specific intent to defraud a bank, is required.
Echoing Loughrin and Martin, the court reaffirms that:
- The statute’s focus is on the fraudulent scheme to obtain bank‑held property, not on who ultimately bears the economic loss.
- The broad “owned by or under the custody or control of” language intentionally sidesteps technical questions about final financial responsibility.
Bank fraud under § 1344 is a valid “specified unlawful activity” predicate for money laundering under § 1957.
Once the bank fraud convictions stand, money laundering convictions for transactions over $10,000 using the fraud proceeds are firmly grounded. In Couch, the purchases of an Audi and a Mercedes‑Benz with PPP proceeds are classic § 1957 transactions.
PPP fraud is prosecutable not only as government fraud but also as bank fraud and money laundering.
This has real sentencing and strategic implications: defendants in PPP cases cannot safely argue that the presence of a 100% SBA guarantee removes their conduct from the ambit of bank fraud statutes.
Unpublished but instructive.
While Couch is not binding precedent, it provides a clear, reasoned example of how the Eleventh Circuit analyzes PPP fraud under § 1344(2), and will likely be persuasive in future district court proceedings and in DOJ charging decisions.

In the broader legal landscape, Couch reinforces a consistent principle: federal bank fraud law follows the money through the banks. When a defendant lies to banks to obtain funds they control, the fact that a government program stands behind those banks does not provide a safe harbor. This alignment of PPP fraud enforcement with traditional bank fraud doctrine ensures that emergency relief programs administered through banks are fully protected by the federal criminal code.