Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester: RSA 508:4-g Cannot Revive Pre-2020 Time-Barred Sexual-Assault Claims; Police-Power Balancing Limited to Contract-Impairment; Vested Limitations Defense Reaffirmed

Introduction

In Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester, 2025 N.H. 45 (Oct. 15, 2025), the New Hampshire Supreme Court confronted whether the Legislature’s 2020 amendment to RSA 508:4-g—eliminating the statute of limitations for civil actions arising from sexual assault and incest—may constitutionally revive civil claims that were already time-barred before the amendment’s effective date (September 18, 2020). The plaintiff, Randy Ball, alleged that he was sexually abused in the 1970s at a New Hampshire summer camp overseen by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester and Camp Bernadette and Camp Fatima, Inc. He sued in 2023, decades after the then-governing limitations period expired in 1986. The core issues were:

• Whether applying RSA 508:4-g (as amended in 2020 to remove the limitations period) to revive a time-barred claim is an unconstitutional retrospective application under Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution.
• Whether the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws yields to a “police power” balancing analysis (derived from Hayes v. LeBlanc) in contexts other than contract impairment.
• Whether the Court should abandon or limit its long-standing rule that a statute-of-limitations defense, once accrued by passage of the limitations period, is a vested right that cannot be abrogated retroactively by legislation.

The Court affirmed dismissal, holding that Part I, Article 23 forbids retroactively reviving time-barred civil claims. It also clarified that the Hayes police-power balancing applies only in contract-impairment cases, reaffirmed nearly two centuries of precedent recognizing a vested right in a limitations defense after the period has run, and declined to follow a recent contrary Maryland decision.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court assumed, without deciding, that the Legislature intended RSA 508:4-g to apply retroactively. It then held that retroactive application to revive Ball’s already time-barred claim would be unconstitutional under Part I, Article 23 because:

• Once a statute of limitations runs, defendants acquire a vested right to rely on the limitations defense.
• Legislation cannot constitutionally impair that vested defense by reviving a stale claim.

The Court further held that its prior statement in Hayes v. LeBlanc—that the police power can justify retrospective laws—applies only in the narrow context of contract-impairment (the State Contract Clause) and does not authorize reviving civil claims time-barred under ordinary statutes of limitations. The Court adhered to stare decisis, declining to overrule foundational cases such as Woart v. Winnick (1826), Willard v. Harvey (1852), Gould v. Concord Hospital (1985), and Maplevale Builders v. Town of Danville (2013).

Finally, the Court rejected the argument that a general balancing test between a plaintiff’s “right to recover” and a defendant’s vested limitations defense applies, distinguishing Sumner (a government-transparency case) and holding that, even if balancing were relevant, Part I, Article 23 would not yield on these facts.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 473 (1826)
  The bedrock New Hampshire decision establishing that once a statute of limitations runs, the limitations defense becomes a vested right protected by Part I, Article 23’s prohibition on retrospective laws. Ball leans on Woart’s core rationale about fairness, reliance, and preventing legislative overreach into existing defenses. The Court emphasized that Woart’s concern was not about the technology of evidence preservation, but about constitutional governance and individual rights.
• Willard v. Harvey, 24 N.H. 344 (1852)
  Reaffirmed that an established limitations bar is a vested right that cannot be legislatively disturbed retroactively. Ball cites Willard to demonstrate the deep historical roots of this rule.
• Gould v. Concord Hospital, 126 N.H. 405 (1985)
  Applied Part I, Article 23 to invalidate retrospective application of an amendment that would have impaired a vested limitations defense. Ball uses Gould as modern authority that the State Constitution forbids revival of time-barred civil claims.
• Maplevale Builders v. Town of Danville, 165 N.H. 99 (2013) and State v. Hamel, 138 N.H. 392 (1994)
  These decisions articulate the key distinction: the Legislature may extend or modify limitations periods for existing, not-yet-barred claims (a remedial change), but once a claim is time-barred, the defense is vested and cannot be withdrawn retroactively. Ball reaffirms this framework.
• State v. Fournier, 158 N.H. 214 (2009)
  Provides the two-step analysis for retrospective laws: (1) legislative intent to apply retroactively; and (2) constitutional permissibility. Ball assumed step (1) in the plaintiff’s favor and resolved the case at step (2), holding revival unconstitutional.
• Hayes v. LeBlanc, 114 N.H. 141 (1974) and the State Contract Clause line: Opinion of the Justices (Furlough), 135 N.H. 625 (1992); Tuttle v. N.H. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Assoc., 159 N.H. 627 (2010)
  The plaintiff urged a broad “police power” exception to Article 23 based on Hayes. Ball decisively narrows Hayes: its police-power balancing applies only to contract-impairment scenarios (the State analog to the Federal Contract Clause), not to revival of time-barred tort claims. This is a significant clarification that fences off Hayes from non-contract cases.
• Appeal of N.H. Dep’t of Transportation, 174 N.H. 610 (2021); Union Leader Corp. v. Town of Salem, 173 N.H. 345 (2020)
  Provide the Court’s modern stare decisis framework. Ball applies these factors to maintain the vested-right rule: it is workable, relied upon, not undermined by subsequent legal development, and not invalidated by changed facts.
• City of Rochester v. Marcel A. Payeur, Inc., 169 N.H. 502 (2016)
  Recognizes reliance interests in limitations defenses, including the reduced incentive to preserve old evidence once claims are time-barred—supporting the vested-right rationale.
• Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Doe, 330 A.3d 1069 (Md. 2025)
  The Maryland Supreme Court held no vested right in a statute-of-limitations defense in childhood sexual abuse claims. Ball distinguishes and declines to follow Maryland, emphasizing New Hampshire’s contrary, entrenched authority since the 19th century.
• Additional standards and context cases: Barufaldi v. City of Dover, 175 N.H. 424 (2022) (pleading standard); State v. Lake Winnipesaukee Resort, 159 N.H. 42 (2009) (motion to dismiss and limitations as an affirmative defense); Norton v. Patten, 125 N.H. 413 (1984) (limitations period for minors); State v. Mack, 173 N.H. 793 (2020) (constitutional structure); State v. Express Co., 60 N.H. 219 (1880) (judicial role); Monier v. Gallen, 122 N.H. 474 (1982) (separation of powers); State v. Besk, 138 N.H. 412 (1994) (vulnerability of child sex-abuse victims); Sumner v. N.H. Secretary of State, 168 N.H. 667 (2016) (inapposite balancing framework).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

• Constitutional framework (Part I, Article 23)
  Article 23 condemns retrospective laws “for the decision of civil causes.” The Court applied its two-part retrospective-law test but proceeded directly to constitutional permissibility, assuming arguendo that RSA 508:4-g was intended to apply retroactively. It held that retroactive application would be unconstitutional because it would destroy a vested defense.
• Vested-right rule for limitations defenses
  The Court reaffirmed that altering a limitations period is generally remedial and can apply retroactively only so long as the period has not yet run. But once the period expires, the defendant has a vested right to the defense. Reviving the plaintiff’s claim—barred since 1986—would impermissibly impair that vested right.
• Hayes limited to contract-impairment
  The plaintiff claimed that the State’s police power can justify retrospective application across the board. The Court rejected this reading, explaining that Hayes involved the State Contract Clause analogue and permits reasonable regulation of contracts, not wholesale relaxation of Article 23 in tort cases. Thus, Hayes’s police-power balancing does not apply to revival of time-barred tort claims.
• Stare decisis
  Applying the four-factor test, the Court found:
  • Workability: The vested-right rule is clear and has been applied for nearly 200 years.
  • Reliance: Defendants reasonably rely on the finality of time-barred claims and thus may not preserve old evidence.
  • Doctrinal development: No intervening New Hampshire authority undermines the rule.
  • Changed facts: Advances in understanding delayed disclosure of sexual abuse, and better evidence preservation technologies, do not negate the foundational constitutional concerns about fairness, reliance, and separation of powers that undergird the rule.
  The Court therefore refused to overrule or limit Woart and its progeny.
• Rejection of generalized balancing
  The Court declined to employ a balancing test pitting a plaintiff’s abstract “right to recover” against a defendant’s vested rights under Article 23. Sumner was distinguished as a right-of-access case with different constitutional interests. Even if balancing were conceivable, the Court indicated Article 23 would not yield here.

3) Impact

Ball will have substantial and immediate effects on New Hampshire litigation involving sexual-assault-related civil claims:

• No revival of pre-September 18, 2020 time-barred claims
  Survivors whose claims were already time-barred before RSA 508:4-g’s 2020 amendment cannot rely on that amendment to resurrect their suits—whether against alleged abusers or institutions (e.g., negligent hiring/supervision claims).
• Prospective reach for non-expired claims remains viable
  Ball does not prevent application of RSA 508:4-g to claims that were still alive on September 18, 2020. As the Court reiterated, extending or removing deadlines can constitutionally apply to existing, not-yet-barred claims because such alterations affect remedial mechanisms, not vested rights.
• Legislative constraints: constitutional, not statutory
  The decision makes clear the limitation is constitutional. Absent constitutional amendment, the Legislature cannot open revival “windows” for time-barred civil claims without running afoul of Part I, Article 23 (outside the contract-impairment context).
• Institutional reliance and litigation strategy
  Defendants may continue to assert statute-of-limitations defenses with strong constitutional backing once the limitations period has run. Evidence-preservation practices and litigation strategies may continue to assume that truly stale claims cannot be revived by later legislative changes.
• Doctrinal clarification limits Hayes
  The Court’s narrowing of Hayes avoids a broad police-power exception to Article 23 outside contracts. This clarification will channel future constitutional arguments: plaintiffs cannot invoke Hayes to justify retrospective application in tort revival settings.
• Divergence from other states
  Ball underscores interstate divergence. New Hampshire adheres to a vested-right view; some jurisdictions (e.g., Maryland in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington) take a different approach. Forum selection and choice-of-law considerations will be particularly consequential in multistate abuse cases.

4) What Ball Does Not Decide

• Whether RSA 508:4-g expressly or implicitly applies retroactively in the first place—the Court assumed retroactivity and resolved the case as a matter of constitutional permissibility.
• Whether RSA 508:4-g applies to claims that were unexpired on September 18, 2020 (though existing doctrine indicates that remedial changes can apply to not-yet-barred claims).
• The availability of case-specific tolling doctrines in particular cases. Ball addresses only whether a statute can revive a claim already barred before the amendment’s effective date.
• Any federal constitutional claims. The holding rests squarely on the New Hampshire Constitution’s Part I, Article 23.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Retrospective law: A statute that looks backward by changing the legal effect of past events or transactions. New Hampshire’s Constitution disfavors such laws, especially when they impair vested rights or impose new duties regarding past conduct.
• Statute of limitations vs. vested right: A limitations statute sets a deadline for filing suit. Before the deadline expires, the Legislature may change the deadline and even apply the new rule retroactively as a remedial adjustment. But once the deadline expires, New Hampshire law treats the defense as a vested right—akin to a shield that the government cannot remove retroactively.
• Police power: The State’s inherent authority to enact laws promoting public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. In New Hampshire, the police-power rationale permits some impairments of contracts when reasonable. Ball clarifies that this contract-impairment context is the proper scope of Hayes; it does not broadly authorize reviving time-barred tort claims.
• State Contract Clause analogue: Although Part I, Article 23 does not mention contracts, New Hampshire treats part of it as equivalent to the Federal Contract Clause. In that niche, courts balance contractual rights against reasonable exercises of the police power. Ball confirms that this balancing is not a general escape hatch from Article 23 for non-contract cases.
• Stare decisis: The doctrine of adhering to precedent for stability and predictability. The Court uses a four-factor test (workability, reliance, doctrinal evolution, changed facts) before overruling precedent. Ball finds none of the factors justify abandoning the vested-right rule.

Conclusion

Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester reaffirms a core principle of New Hampshire constitutional law: once a civil claim is time-barred, the statute-of-limitations defense is a vested right that the Legislature cannot retroactively abrogate. Accordingly, RSA 508:4-g’s elimination of a limitations period for sexual-assault-related civil actions cannot revive claims that expired before September 18, 2020. The Court also clarifies that the police-power balancing articulated in Hayes v. LeBlanc is limited to contract-impairment cases and does not justify revival of time-barred tort claims. In declining to follow Maryland’s contrary view and in invoking strong stare decisis considerations, the Court signals continuity: stability in retroactivity doctrine, fidelity to Part I, Article 23’s textual protections, and deference to constitutional structure over policy preferences, however compelling. The practical result is that New Hampshire’s 2020 reform meaningfully benefits only those sexual-assault-related claims that were still timely on its effective date; previously barred claims remain closed absent a constitutional amendment or a fact-specific doctrine (not at issue here) that independently delays expiration. As a constitutional decision with immediate consequences for victims, institutions, and lawmakers, Ball both cements a long-standing limitation on retroactive civil revival and refines the doctrinal boundaries that will govern future statutory reform efforts.