Balderas Galvan v. Bondi: Second Circuit Reaffirms Asylum Applicant’s Burden to Prove Unreasonableness of Internal Relocation When Persecution Is Attributed to Private Actors

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit  |  Summary Order Filed July 25, 2025  |  Docket No. 23-6938

1. Introduction

In Balderas Galvan v. Bondi, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision that denied asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection to Mexican national M. Casiana Balderas Galvan. The petitioner alleged persecution by drug cartels after her son was murdered for refusing extortion, arguing that she and her family were thereafter threatened, culminating in a kidnapping of her grandchild.

The central issues were:

• Whether isolated threats and harm to relatives constituted past persecution to trigger the presumption of future persecution.
• Whether the petitioner established an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.
• Who bears the burden of proving that internal relocation within the home country is unreasonable when the alleged persecutors are private actors.

The Second Circuit ultimately denied the petition, reinforcing several doctrines in asylum jurisprudence—most notably, that when persecution is attributable to non-state actors, the applicant (and not the Government) carries the burden of proving that relocation within the home country is not viable.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court adopted the IJ’s findings (as supplemented by the BIA) that the petitioner did not suffer past persecution: a single anonymous text demanding money was insufficient, and the murders/kidnapping of relatives, though tragic, did not constitute persecution of the petitioner herself.
• Absent past persecution, the petitioner bore the burden of establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Court found her fear speculative and lacking “solid support” in the record.
• Because the alleged persecutors were drug cartels (private actors), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i) placed the burden on the petitioner to demonstrate that internal relocation in Mexico would be unreasonable. She offered no persuasive evidence or argument to that effect.
• Failure to satisfy the asylum standard necessarily defeated the higher standards for withholding of removal and CAT relief.
• The petition for review was therefore denied, and all interim motions were vacated.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel relied on a line of Second Circuit and Supreme Court cases clarifying what constitutes persecution, how fear is assessed, and who bears burdens under varying circumstances:

• Besko­vic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2006) – Confirmed that non-life-threatening violence can qualify as persecution, but only when its severity crosses a qualitative threshold.
• Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2007) – Held that harm to family members is not automatically persecution of the applicant; additional targeting or proximity factors must be present.
• Huo Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396 (2d Cir. 2014) – Clarified that threats alone rarely meet the persecution threshold absent imminent or concrete danger.
• Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005) – Introduced the “solid support” test, requiring evidentiary backing for fears of future harm.
• K.C. v. Garland, 108 F.4th 130 (2d Cir. 2024) – Reiterated that threats must cause actual suffering or present imminent danger to constitute persecution.
• Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510 (2d Cir. 2009) – Provided the standard of review: questions of law de novo, factual findings for substantial evidence.

These precedents collectively supplied the doctrinal scaffolding for the panel’s determination that:

1. The petitioner’s experiences did not suffice as past persecution.
2. Her projection of future harm was speculative without further evidentiary grounding.
3. The burden of disproving the feasibility of relocation remained with her under the regulations governing private-actor claims.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning followed a structured path:

1. No Presumption of Future Persecution.
   Because the petitioner failed to show past persecution, she was not entitled to the regulatory presumption that her fear of future persecution was well-founded (8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)).
2. Objective Reasonableness Standard.
   Drawing from Jian Xing Huang, the panel required “solid support” that a reasonable person similarly situated would fear persecution. The absence of continuing threats, the safe condition of other family members, and a four-month incident-free period after the lone text message undermined the claim.
3. Burden of Internal Relocation.
   Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i), when feared persecution is by non-government actors, the applicant must show that relocating within the country would not mitigate the risk. The petitioner mistakenly asserted that DHS bore this burden; the panel corrected the misunderstanding and found no evidence that Mexico, a large country, offered her no safe haven.
4. Consequential Denial of Withholding and CAT.
   By failing to meet the lower asylum threshold, the petitioner necessarily failed the more stringent tests for withholding of removal and CAT protection (Lecaj v. Holder).

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

Although issued as a Summary Order—and therefore not precedential in the ordinary sense—the decision is still citable under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. Its practical influence lies in its crystallisation of two recurring asylum themes:

• Clarified Burden Allocation. Practitioners cannot rely on DHS to disprove internal relocation viability when the persecutor is a gang, cartel, or other private entity. Applicants must marshal country-conditions evidence or expert testimony showing that relocation is futile or dangerous.
• Elevated Evidentiary Expectations. Single, isolated threats—especially historical ones—rarely suffice to establish either past persecution or future risk unless they are accompanied by imminent danger, repeated contact, or state involvement.

The decision is likely to be cited (albeit as a persuasive authority) in BIA briefs and by IJs within the Second Circuit to:

• Reject asylum claims grounded primarily in harm to relatives without direct targeting of the applicant.
• Enforce the applicant’s obligation to present relocation analysis in private-actor cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Past vs. Future Persecution – Demonstrating serious harm in the past carries a legal presumption that it will recur. Without past persecution, the applicant must affirmatively prove future danger.
• Private-Actor vs. State-Actor Persecution – When government officials are the persecutors, courts presume relocation may not help because the state’s reach is nationwide. But with gangs or cartels, relocation might avert danger, shifting the proof burden to the applicant.
• “Zone of Risk” Doctrine (Tao Jiang) – Harm to relatives can support an asylum claim only if the applicant was physically or emotionally exposed to the incident (in the “zone of risk”) or was independently targeted.
• Substantial Evidence Review – The appellate court will uphold factual findings so long as they are reasonable; the petitioner must show that any rational fact-finder would reach the opposite conclusion.
• CAT Relief Standard – Requires a showing that the applicant would “more likely than not” be tortured with the acquiescence of a public official—a higher bar than asylum’s “reasonable possibility.”

5. Conclusion

Balderas Galvan v. Bondi underscores the evidentiary discipline demanded of asylum applicants, particularly where the alleged persecutors are private actors such as drug cartels or gangs. Key takeaways include:

• A single, unfulfilled threat—without further violence or direct targeting—does not rise to past persecution.
• Harm to relatives, standing alone, seldom satisfies the persecution requirement unless the applicant was specifically targeted or within the “zone of risk.”
• Applicants, not the Government, must establish that internal relocation is unreasonable when persecution stems from non-state actors.
• Failure to clear the asylum threshold automatically defeats withholding of removal and CAT claims.

By reaffirming these principles, the Second Circuit provides a concise yet impactful reminder of the rigorous standards governing humanitarian protection in U.S. immigration law.