Awareness of Discrete Agency Actions as Accrual Trigger for §1983 Due Process Claims in Land-Use Disputes

Introduction

Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach is an appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, decided April 10, 2025. Plaintiff-Appellant Philip G. Potter challenged various actions taken by the Village of Ocean Beach—primarily the revocation of his certificate of occupancy (CO), criminal citations for alleged building code violations, and the denial of seasonal rental permits. He alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as Monell liability against the Village and several individual municipal officers.

Key Issues:

When do § 1983 due process claims accrue for statute-of-limitations purposes?
Did the Village’s actions—revoking a CO in 2011, issuing citations in 2012, and denying rental permits between 2016–2018—give rise to timely claims?
Can a summary dismissal be upheld when a § 1983 claim appears time-barred on the face of the complaint?

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Potter’s claims accrued when he knew or should have known of the Village’s definitive position against him, and thus fell outside the three-year limitations window.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals applied a de novo review of the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. It held:

42 U.S.C. § 1983 borrows New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions (N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5)).
Federal law determines accrual: A § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action” or when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.”
Potter’s criminal citations in “early 2012” and the denial of permit applications in 2016–2018 accrued beyond the limitations cutoff of August 29, 2020; those discrete acts were plainly time-barred.
Even the CO-revocation claim accrued no later than Potter’s third denied permit application in 2018, since by then he “knew enough of the critical facts of injury and causation to protect himself by seeking legal advice.”
The district court’s dismissal was affirmed in all respects; no exceptions (continuing violation or equitable estoppel) applied to rescue Potter’s untimely claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Second Circuit relied on a robust body of Supreme Court and circuit authority to define accrual and limitations in § 1983 actions:

Owens v. Okure (488 U.S. 235): § 1983 adopts state statutes of limitations for personal injury.
Pearl v. City of Long Beach (296 F.3d 76): Confirmed application of New York’s three-year period.
Wallace v. Kato (549 U.S. 384): Accrual occurs when “a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.”
Veal v. Geraci (23 F.3d 722): A claim accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury.”
Kronisch v. United States (150 F.3d 112): “Knowledge of critical facts” triggers the need to seek legal advice.
Whiteside v. Hover-Davis (995 F.3d 315) and Staehr v. Hartford (547 F.3d 406): Affirm defenses on Rule 12(b)(6) where limitations are clear on the complaint’s face.

In addition, standard pleading and dismissal principles from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal guided the Court’s review.

Legal Reasoning

1. Statute of Limitations Inquiry: The Court first confirmed that § 1983 borrows a three-year limitations period from New York law. Then it undertook a federal accrual analysis:

Accrual is governed by federal common-law tort principles, not state law.
A cause of action is complete when the plaintiff “can file suit and obtain relief.”
Knowledge of injury and causation need not be perfect—once a plaintiff is on notice of wrongdoing, the clock starts.

2. Discrete Acts vs. Continuing Violations: Each criminal citation in 2012 and each permit denial in 2016–2018 were treated as separate accrual events. The continuing violation doctrine does not revive stale discrete acts.

3. CO Revocation Claim: Though the Village Board never formally voted to revoke Potter’s CO (it tabled the matter in 2015), repeated permit denials post-2015 signaled a final determination. By the third denial, Potter “knew enough” that the CO was treated as null. His § 1983 claim accrued by then—well before August 2020.

4. No Equitable Tolling or Estoppel: The Court found no basis to toll or estop the limitations period. Potter did challenge the CO in state court in 2019, but that effort did not delay his federal claim beyond the deadline.

Impact

Although this is a non-precedential summary order, it reinforces several important takeaways for § 1983 land-use litigation:

Landowners must act promptly once a municipality’s de facto position is clear—even absent a formal final vote.
Discrete adverse actions (e.g., citations or permit denials) constitute separate accrual events and cannot be lumped into an open-ended continuing violation.
Seeking state-court relief does not automatically toll the federal limitations period absent express equitable grounds.
Counsel should monitor agency correspondence and post-decision behavior closely, because repeated enforcement steps can crystalize an “injury” for accrual purposes.

Future litigants should view this decision as a practical guide to timing challenges in § 1983 due process claims, especially in the land-use context where “de facto finality” suffices to ripen and to trigger the limitations clock.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Accrual: The moment a legal claim “solidifies”—when the plaintiff could have sued successfully.
§ 1983 Claim: A suit alleging a state actor violated federal rights—here, due process.
Procedural vs. Substantive Due Process: Procedural—fair procedures before deprivation; substantive—protection against arbitrary government action.
Monell Liability: Holding a municipality responsible when its own policies or customs cause a constitutional violation.
Summary Order: A shorter, non-precedential opinion deciding an appeal without full briefing or oral argument.
Continuing Violation: A legal theory that treats repeated or ongoing misconduct as a single extended wrong—unavailable for isolated acts.

Conclusion

Potter v. Ocean Beach underscores that in § 1983 actions, the accrual clock runs when plaintiffs know—factually—the government has taken final adverse steps against them. Even in the absence of a formal board decision, de facto conduct such as repeated denials of permits can trigger accrual. Landowners and their counsel must remain vigilant: once knowledge of injury and causation exists, the three-year limitations period begins, and stale claims cannot be resuscitated by belated challenges. This decision serves as a cautionary guide to the timing of federal due process suits in the land-use arena.