Awareness and Proximity Are Not Enough:
State of Louisiana v. Gerald Manchip White and the Limits of Constructive Possession in Shared Residences

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Louisiana’s decision in State of Louisiana v. Gerald Manchip White, No. 2024-K-01588 (Dec. 11, 2025), is a significant articulation of the limits of “constructive possession” in felon-in-possession prosecutions under La. R.S. 14:95.1, particularly where a convicted felon resides with family members who lawfully own firearms.

The case arises from a common factual scenario: a parolee living with relatives in a modest, high-crime-area home, where other household members keep guns for protection. During a parole residence check, three firearms are found in different locations in the house. The State charges the parolee, a convicted felon, with possession of all three weapons. The critical questions become:

When does a felon who shares a home with armed relatives “constructively possess” their firearms?
What level of knowledge and control over the firearm is required?
How does the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard interact with Louisiana’s circumstantial evidence rule (La. R.S. 15:438)?

The Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Guidry, reverses the defendant’s convictions, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he constructively possessed two firearms found in his home or that he had the requisite criminal intent to possess them. The opinion carefully distinguishes mere awareness and proximity from the legally required “dominion and control” plus intent.

Chief Justice Weimer’s concurrence underscores the constitutional rights of non-felon household members to keep firearms and warns against forcing families into a choice between cohabitation and their right to bear arms. Justice Cole’s concurrence highlights the difference between the standard for parole revocation and that for a new criminal conviction. Justice Crain dissents, emphasizing deference to the jury’s inferences under Jackson and accusing the majority of impermissibly reweighing the evidence.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Home Invasion and Initial Parole Visit

Defendant Gerald Manchip White was on parole following a 2020 felony conviction for possession of methamphetamine under La. R.S. 40:967(C), an enumerated offense under La. R.S. 14:95.1. He lived in a small house in Bossier Parish with his wife (Kimberly), adult children (including Jordan and Erin), and his mother.

A few weeks before the events in question, there had been a violent home invasion. An intruder entered the home, robbed defendant’s son Jordan, and shot Jordan with Jordan’s own gun. Defendant himself was injured during the incident. Two days before the residence check that led to the charges, parole officer Ayleen Cook visited the home looking for another individual. Defendant told her about the home invasion and that Jordan was shot with his own gun.

When Officer Cook asked if “the gun” was still in the house, defendant replied that it was. Cook reminded him that, as a convicted felon, he could not have guns in the home and that the gun “must be removed.”

B. The Residence Check and Discovery of Firearms

Two days later, Officer Cook returned with other parole officers, including defendant’s parole officer, Erikka Smith, to conduct a residence check. They found three firearms:

Master Bedroom Gun (Count 1) – An EIG EI .22 revolver located in a dresser drawer in the master bedroom shared by defendant and Kimberly. The drawer contained only Kimberly’s clothing and personal items (including intimate apparel and a gaming device she said was hers).
Daughter’s Bedroom Gun (Count 2) – A Smith & Wesson 9mm handgun under the mattress in Erin’s bedroom. Erin testified the gun belonged to her boyfriend and had been brought to the house only hours before the search.
Living Room Couch Gun (Count 3) – A Taurus 9mm handgun located within the cushions of a living room couch. Jordan testified that this gun belonged to him; the couch was his bed because all bedrooms were occupied.

Each of the family witnesses — Kimberly (wife), Erin (daughter), and Jordan (son) — testified that:

They owned (or their boyfriend owned) the respective guns found in their areas.
They had placed and controlled those guns where they were found.
Defendant had no knowledge of the guns’ presence.

C. Trial, Verdicts, and Sentences

Defendant was charged with three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (La. R.S. 14:95.1). At trial:

On Count 1 (master bedroom revolver), the jury returned a lesser verdict: attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
On Count 2 (daughter’s bedroom gun), the jury found defendant not guilty.
On Count 3 (living room couch gun), the jury found defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

The trial court sentenced defendant to:

Seven years at hard labor and a $500 fine on Count 1 (attempted possession), and
Fourteen years at hard labor and a $1,000 fine on Count 3, concurrent.

On direct appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences (except remanding the fines for an ability-to-pay determination). The defendant then sought review in the Louisiana Supreme Court, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove both constructive possession and the requisite criminal intent. The Court granted certiorari.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed defendant’s convictions and sentences on both counts. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard and Louisiana’s circumstantial evidence rule, the Court held:

The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had constructive possession of the master bedroom gun or the couch gun.
The State also failed to establish that defendant had the requisite criminal intent to possess those firearms — general intent for possession, and specific intent for attempted possession.
The evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that:
- Kimberly alone owned and controlled the bedroom gun, without defendant’s knowledge, and
- Jordan alone owned and controlled the couch gun, again without any dominion or control by defendant.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the court of appeal erred in finding the evidence sufficient and reversed the convictions outright.

Chief Justice Weimer and Justice Cole filed concurring opinions, and Justice Crain dissented (joined by Justice McCallum). These separate opinions sharpen the doctrinal and policy stakes of the majority decision:

Weimer, C.J. (concurring): Emphasizes that awareness and proximity are not substitutes for dominion, control, and intent; stresses the Second Amendment and Louisiana constitutional rights of other family members to bear arms, and the unfairness of forcing families to choose between those rights and cohabiting with a parolee.
Cole, J. (concurring): Joins the majority and highlights that parole revocation is governed by a lower standard of proof than a new felony conviction; acknowledges that parole could have been validly revoked here even though the evidence does not meet Jackson’s standard for a conviction.
Crain, J. (dissenting): Argues that the jury reasonably inferred constructive possession and intent based on defendant’s admission that a gun remained in the house and his continued residence there; criticizes the majority for reweighing evidence and substituting its judgment for the jury’s under Jackson.

IV. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. Constitutional Sufficiency: Jackson v. Virginia and La. R.S. 15:438

Under the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions, a conviction cannot stand if it is based on insufficient evidence. The Court restates the Jackson v. Virginia standard:

“[T]he task of a reviewing court is to determine the legal question ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016), which itself quotes Jackson).

In Louisiana, when a conviction rests (in whole or part) on circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 adds that such evidence:

“… assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove … must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”

The Court underscores its own precedents:

State v. Ruffins, 24-01512 (La. 6/27/25), reaffirming the Jackson standard and its limits on reweighing evidence.
State v. Alexander, 22-01205 (La. 5/5/23): circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; verdicts cannot rest on speculation.
State v. Lubrano, 563 So. 2d 847 (La. 1990): a factfinder cannot be permitted to speculate where reasonable minds must have reasonable doubt.

These authorities frame the Court’s obligation: it must defer to the jury’s credibility choices and reasonable inferences, but it must also reject convictions built on speculation rather than evidence that rules out reasonable innocent explanations.

B. Elements of Felon-in-Possession: La. R.S. 14:95.1

Under La. R.S. 14:95.1, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:

Possession of a firearm;
A prior conviction for an enumerated felony;
An absence of the ten-year statutory limitation period (“cleansing period”); and
A general intent to commit the offense.

These elements are well established in State v. Ball, 99-0428 (La. 11/30/99), 756 So. 2d 275, 277. In White, elements (2) and (3) are undisputed; the controversy centers on possession and intent.

C. Attempt: La. R.S. 14:27

Louisiana’s attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27, provides that a person is guilty of an attempt when:

He has specific intent to commit a crime, and
He does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing that crime.

Thus, for attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State could prevail either by:

Proving defendant specifically intended to possess a firearm and took a direct step toward that possession, or
Proving the completed offense of actual or constructive possession (since an attempt conviction can stand even if the completed crime is shown).

The majority cites State ex rel. Elaire v. Blackburn, 424 So. 2d 246 (La. 1982), which approves “compromise verdicts” — situations where the jury returns a verdict on a lesser-included offense (here, attempted possession) though the evidence could support the greater offense (possession).

D. Constructive Possession

Because the State conceded that defendant was not in actual physical possession of any of the guns, the case turned on constructive possession.

Key precedents:

State v. Cann, 319 So. 2d 396 (La. 1975): “Constructive possession” is a legal term for situations where a person not in physical possession of a thing is nevertheless considered in legal possession.
State v. Day, 410 So. 2d 741 (La. 1982): Possession can be actual or constructive under La. R.S. 14:95.1.
State v. Johnson, 03-1228 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So. 2d 995: constructive possession occurs where the firearm is under the defendant’s “dominion and control,” even temporarily or jointly.
State v. Fisher, 19-01899 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So. 3d 400: constructive possession requires guilty knowledge and dominion and control.
State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517: guilty knowledge is essential for constructive possession of contraband.
State v. Walker, 369 So. 2d 1345 (La. 1979): constructive possession of drugs requires knowledge of their presence; absence of such evidence demands reversal.

The Court reiterates a crucial point: mere presence where a firearm is found — even in one’s own home or car — is insufficient by itself to prove constructive possession. Dominion, control, and guilty knowledge must be proven from the circumstances.

E. Criminal Intent: General vs. Specific

Under La. R.S. 14:10:

Specific intent exists when circumstances show that the offender actively desired the criminal consequences to follow.
General intent exists when, in the ordinary course of human experience, the offender must have adverted to the criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act. Specific intent always includes general intent.

Prior cases:

State v. Godeaux, 378 So. 2d 941 (La. 1979): La. R.S. 14:95.1 is a general intent crime.
State v. Haddad, 99-1272 (La. 2/29/00), 767 So. 2d 682 n.2: when the State relies on constructive possession, it must prove the defendant was aware of the firearm in his presence and had the intent to possess it; intent to possess is more than acquiescing to its presence.
State v. Jones, 10-0762 (La. 9/7/11), 74 So. 3d 197: specific intent can be inferred from circumstances and conduct.

Awareness of a gun’s presence is thus necessary but not sufficient for constructive possession and for the intent element. As the opinion notes, awareness is an “overlapping” factor for both possession and intent (citing State v. Evans, 29,675 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997)).

V. Application to the Facts: Why the Evidence Was Insufficient

A. The Master Bedroom Gun (Count 1 – Attempted Possession)

1. Physical Layout and Evidence of Control

The gun in Count 1 was found in a dresser drawer in the master bedroom. The key factual points:

The drawer contained what appeared to be exclusively female clothing and personal items, including underwear, bras, a girdle, and Kimberly’s gaming device.
Kimberly testified that:
- The drawer was hers and used exclusively by her.
- She had put the gun there over a year before defendant moved into the home.
- Defendant did not know about the gun.
Officer Cook asserted that defendant’s parole paperwork was found “in the same dresser” as the gun. However, the State’s own color photographs (Exhibits S3-S6) showed:
- The gun was in a dark dresser with silver cup-shaped drawer pulls.
- The parole paperwork was in a different, golden-brown dresser with decorative, arch-shaped pulls.
- Kimberly corroborated that the parole paperwork was stored in a separate chest of drawers.
There was no testimony that defendant used that dresser drawer or had any occasion to access it. The only proven use of bedroom furniture by defendant was the bed itself.

The Court emphasizes the factual parallels with State v. Scott, 13-0321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2014), where a felon’s awareness that his partner owned a gun in their home was held insufficient to prove dominion and control when the gun was stored in her space and purchased before his release from prison.

2. The Scott Precedent and Shared Residences

In Scott, the Fourth Circuit held that La. R.S. 14:95.1 does not criminalize:

The mere fact that a felon lives in a residence where another household member lawfully possesses a firearm, or
The felon’s mere awareness of the firearm’s presence, or
The felon’s acquiescence to its presence.

The felon must exercise dominion and control — for example, by using, storing, or directing storage of the weapon in a way that shows it is under his legal power.

Here, just as in Scott:

The residence was acquired by the non-felon (Kimberly), and the felon moved in later (about three weeks before the search), while other family members had lived there longer.
The weapon was kept in an area apparently under another adult’s exclusive control (Kimberly’s drawer with only her belongings).

The Court therefore finds that:

There is no evidence that defendant exercised dominion or control over the bedroom gun.
The State’s principal effort to link defendant to that dresser (the parole paperwork claim) was affirmatively undermined by its own photographic exhibits.
The hypothesis that Kimberly alone owned and controlled the gun, without informing defendant, remains not only reasonable but unrefuted.

3. Intent Analysis for Attempted Possession

Because Count 1 was for attempted possession, the State had to prove:

Specific intent to possess the firearm, and
An act or omission directly tending toward possession — or, as a fallback, actual possession itself.

Yet:

No evidence showed defendant knew the gun was in the drawer.
No evidence showed any conduct by defendant indicating a plan or attempt to control or use that firearm.
Kimberly’s speculative statement that defendant would have used the gun in self-defense if he had known about it during the home invasion does not establish that he actually knew about it or desired to possess it at the time of the parole visit and search.

Citing Walker, the Court concludes that where there is no evidence that defendant knew or had reason to know of the gun’s presence, there can be no constructive possession and no criminal intent. Thus, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law on Count 1.

B. The Couch Gun (Count 3 – Possession)

1. Ownership and Use of the Couch and Gun

For Count 3, the State relied on the Taurus 9mm handgun found in the living room couch. The pertinent facts:

Jordan, defendant’s adult son, testified:
- The gun belonged to him.
- He obtained it following the home invasion (after his earlier gun had been taken by investigating officers).
- He lived in the home but did not have a bedroom; the couch was his designated bed.
- He typically kept the gun either in his truck or in the couch he slept on.
At the time officers arrived (around 10 a.m.), Jordan was found alone in the living room, having been asleep on the couch.
Defendant and Kimberly were asleep in the master bedroom; Erin and her boyfriend were in Erin’s room; the grandmother’s room was locked and unoccupied (she was in the hospital).
Jordan testified that he told Officer Cook the couch gun belonged to him. Officers, however, testified that no one claimed ownership of any guns at the time, though their accounts conflicted as to where each person was when statements were made (living room vs. porch).

The Court again emphasizes that none of the State’s witnesses testified to seeing defendant near the couch or in the living room before being detained. There was no evidence that defendant used the couch, slept on it, or accessed it in a way that would demonstrate shared control over the gun.

2. Comparison to Fisher and Johnson

Two significant precedents guide the analysis:

State v. Fisher, 94-2255 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995):
- Defendant was driving his sister’s car; a pistol was found in her purse on the passenger floorboard.
- A clip for the pistol was found in defendant’s pocket.
- The court held that the mere fact defendant could have reached for the gun and had the clip in his pocket did not establish dominion and control; the evidence showed that the sister owned the gun and kept it in her purse.
- Awareness and physical reachability were insufficient for constructive possession.
State v. Johnson, 24-462 (La. App. 3d Cir. 5/8/25):
- Defendant was found undressed in a hotel bathroom; guns and drugs were found in a room rented by a female friend.
- A pistol was in plain view; a rifle and drugs were in the female friend’s bag.
- The friend testified that everything belonged to her.
- The Third Circuit reversed the weapons and drug convictions, holding that the State failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the friend alone possessed and controlled the contraband, despite defendant’s awareness of at least some of it.

In White, Jordan’s testimony plays a role analogous to the sister’s testimony in Fisher and the friend’s testimony in Johnson: he affirmatively claims ownership and control, and the State offers no contrary evidence other than the gun’s location in a common area.

3. Awareness vs. Dominion and Control

The State relied heavily on defendant’s earlier statement to Officer Cook that “the gun” used in the home invasion was still in the house. The Court accepts, for argument’s sake, that this supports an inference that defendant knew his son still had a gun in the home at the time of the residence check.

However, the Court makes a critical doctrinal point:

Awareness of a gun’s presence, standing alone, does not equal constructive possession.
The State still must prove that defendant exercised, or intended to exercise, dominion and control over the firearm — that he treated it as his to use, access, or manage.
Here, Jordan’s uncontradicted testimony established his dominion and control; there was no evidence tying defendant to any actual use, storage decision, or access to the couch gun.

Because none of the officers testified that defendant was in or near the living room before being corralled, and no physical or behavioral evidence linked him to handling or controlling the couch gun, the Court finds the State failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the weapon was solely under Jordan’s control.

4. Intent with Respect to the Couch Gun

For Count 3 (completed possession), the crime is of general intent. Yet the Court reiterates that:

Intent to possess requires more than passively tolerating the fact that a relative owns a gun in the same home.
Citing Fisher and Scott, the Court emphasizes that awareness and acquiescence do not show an intent to exercise dominion and control.
Defendant never expressed any desire or plan to arm himself in response to the prior home invasion or the neighborhood’s high crime, despite having an obvious reason to do so if that had been his goal.

Thus, defendant’s statement that “the gun” remained in the house “without more, was insufficient to prove [he] had the requisite intent to possess the gun belonging to Jordan.”

VI. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

A. Chief Justice Weimer’s Additional Concurrence

Chief Justice Weimer agrees with the majority but highlights two important points:

Confusion between awareness/proximity and dominion/control and intent
He criticizes the court of appeal for conflating evidence that defendant knew guns were in the house or was near them with proof that he possessed them or intended to do so, contrary to both the statute and controlling jurisprudence such as State v. Johnson, 404 So. 2d 239 (La. 1981).
Rights of other family members to bear arms
The concurrence turns to the broader constitutional backdrop:
- The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and La. Const. art. I, § 11 protect the right to keep and bear arms.
- There was no evidence that any other family member had forfeited that right.
- The family lived in a high-crime area, had recently suffered a home invasion, and the son had been shot — circumstances that underscore their need for self-protection.
He warns that:
“A contrary decision in this matter would adversely impact the rights of the other family members in the household and force on them the choice of exercising their constitutional rights or requiring a father/husband to live off the premises.”
In other words, if the law treated mere co-residence with armed relatives as constructive possession, it would effectively penalize both the felon and his family for exercising their lawful gun rights.

B. Justice Cole’s Concurrence

Justice Cole joins the majority and writes separately to stress:

The importance of recognizing the Second Amendment and Louisiana constitutional rights of other residents (echoing Chief Justice Weimer).
The different standards governing parole revocation versus a new criminal conviction:
- At oral argument, both sides agreed that defendant’s parole could have been validly revoked under the more lenient standard applicable to revocation proceedings.
- Yet that same evidence does not satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for a felony conviction under Jackson and La. R.S. 15:438.

This concurrence sharply draws a doctrinal line: the presence of guns in a parolee’s residence may justify revoking parole but does not automatically establish criminal liability under La. R.S. 14:95.1.

C. Justice Crain’s Dissent (Joined by McCallum, J.)

Justice Crain dissents, arguing that the majority improperly displaces the jury’s role. He emphasizes:

Defendant admitted to Officer Cook two days before the search that a gun was still in the house.
He had an opportunity — and a warning — to ensure that no guns remained in the residence or to leave, but he remained living there while guns were stored in locations “easily accessible to him.”

In his view:

It was reasonable for the jury to infer from these facts that defendant had constructive possession of the guns and the requisite criminal intent.
Under Jackson and cases like Musacchio and State v. Toby, juries have “vast discretion” in drawing inferences; appellate courts should not reweigh evidence or substitute their own judgments.
Because the evidence was sufficient to convict of the charged offense (possession) on both counts, it was necessarily sufficient for the lesser verdict of attempted possession on Count 1 under Elaire.

Justice Crain thus accuses the majority of crossing the line from reviewing for legal sufficiency into reassessing witness credibility and factual inferences, which he views as the exclusive domain of the jury.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Actual vs. Constructive Possession

Actual possession: You are physically holding or carrying the item (e.g., gun in your hand, waistband, or pocket).
Constructive possession: You are not physically holding the item, but you still have:
- Knowledge of where it is, and
- Dominion and control over it (you can use it, move it, direct where it is kept, or treat it as yours, even jointly with others).

B. Dominion and Control

“Dominion and control” means the practical power to use or manage an item. Signs include:

The item is in your room, bag, or vehicle that you control.
You decide where the item is stored.
You alone or jointly with others handle or use it.
Others recognize it as your item.

It is more than just being around the item or able to reach it.

C. Guilty Knowledge

“Guilty knowledge” means you know that the contraband (here, a firearm you are not allowed to have) is present. Without knowledge, there can be no constructive possession or intent to possess.

D. General vs. Specific Intent

General intent: You did an act (or failed to act) knowing, in the normal course of events, that a criminal result was reasonably certain. Example: You knowingly keep a gun in your closet even though you know you are a convicted felon.
Specific intent: You actually intended and desired the criminal result. Example: You actively decide, “I am going to take control of this gun,” and then take steps to do so.

Felon-in-possession (La. R.S. 14:95.1) is a general intent crime, but attempted felon-in-possession requires specific intent, because all attempts require specific intent under La. R.S. 14:27.

E. Jackson v. Virginia Sufficiency Standard

On appeal, the question is not whether the appellate judges personally believe the defendant is guilty. Instead, they ask:

If we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could any rational juror have found every element of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt?

But in Louisiana, when the State relies on circumstantial evidence, the evidence must also reasonably exclude any innocent explanation that fits the facts.

F. “Compromise Verdict”

A “compromise verdict” occurs when a jury, presented with a serious charge (e.g., possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), chooses to convict on a lesser offense (e.g., attempted possession). The law permits this, but the evidence must still be legally sufficient for that lesser offense.

G. Parole Revocation vs. New Conviction

Parole revocation: Administrative process; lower standard of proof (often a “preponderance of the evidence”); the question is whether the parolee violated conditions (e.g., no guns in the residence).
Criminal conviction: Full criminal trial protections; the State must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

In White, the evidence may well have justified revoking parole because guns were present in the home, but that is a different question from whether defendant committed a new felony under La. R.S. 14:95.1.

VIII. Impact and Future Implications

A. Clarifying the Limits of Constructive Possession in Shared Homes

White reinforces and sharpens a key principle in Louisiana law: a convicted felon does not automatically constructively possess firearms owned and controlled by other lawful occupants of a shared residence. The State must do more than show:

Co-residence;
Awareness that guns are somewhere in the dwelling; or
Physical proximity to guns kept by others.

Instead, prosecutors must produce evidence that:

The felon knew where the gun was specifically kept, and
The felon exercised or intended to exercise some measure of dominion and control over it.

This decision will likely influence charging decisions and trial strategies in cases involving:

Guns found in common spaces (living rooms, kitchens) of multi-occupant homes;
Guns found in shared vehicles with multiple occupants;
Weapons in hotel rooms with multiple guests.

B. Evidentiary Demands on the Prosecution

White implicitly signals to law enforcement and prosecutors that they must develop stronger, more particularized evidence when alleging constructive possession, such as:

Statements by the defendant indicating ownership, control, or intended use of the weapon;
Evidence that the defendant regularly uses, stores, or accesses the area where the gun is found;
Physical evidence (e.g., fingerprints, DNA, personal effects) tying the defendant to the specific gun or its storage location;
Testimony showing that other occupants deferred to the defendant regarding the weapon or that he directed its placement.

Absent such evidence, the State risks reversal on insufficiency when the weapon is plausibly attributable solely to another resident or guest.

C. Protection of Family Members’ Gun Rights

Chief Justice Weimer’s concurrence, reinforced by Justice Cole, places this case within a broader constitutional context: families in high-crime areas preserving their right to self-defense. White helps ensure that:

Law-abiding family members do not lose their Second Amendment and state constitutional rights simply because they live with a parolee or felon.
Criminal liability is not imposed based solely on cohabitation with armed relatives.

However, the decision does not eliminate risk for parolees. Their parole conditions may still prohibit any firearms in the home, so they must navigate:

Compliance with parole rules, which may require gun-free households, versus
Relatives’ rights to keep firearms for protection.

This tension is real, but White ensures it is addressed at the parole level, not by stretching criminal liability beyond what the statutes and due process permit.

D. Appellate Review and the Line Between Deference and Speculation

Finally, White illustrates a recurring tension in sufficiency review:

The dissent’s view: Jackson requires deference to juries so long as their inferences are reasonable; here, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant’s knowledge of the gun’s presence and continued residence with easily accessible guns sufficed for constructive possession.
The majority’s view: While deference is required, courts must reject verdicts based on speculation, especially when the State’s case is circumstantial and does not exclude reasonable innocent hypotheses, such as exclusive control by other residents.

Going forward, White will likely be cited by defendants arguing that the State’s case rests on mere proximity, co-residence, or generalized awareness, and by appellate courts scrutinizing whether juries have been allowed to speculate beyond the evidence.

IX. Conclusion

State v. White marks an important clarification in Louisiana felon-in-possession jurisprudence. It draws a firm doctrinal line:

Knowledge and proximity are not enough. To convict a felon of illegally possessing a firearm found in a shared residence, the State must prove constructive possession — dominion and control plus guilty knowledge — and, where applicable, specific intent.
Mere cohabitation with armed relatives is not a crime. The right of family members to keep lawful firearms, especially in high-crime settings and after a violent home invasion, cannot be converted into automatic criminal liability for a resident felon.
Circumstantial evidence must exclude reasonable innocent explanations. Where the evidence is equally consistent with exclusive control by another household member, Jackson and La. R.S. 15:438 require acquittal.

At the same time, the concurring opinions remind us that parole conditions and criminal liability are distinct. The State may legitimately revoke parole based on guns in the home under a lower evidentiary standard, even though due process bars a felony conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of possession and intent.

In sum, White strengthens the principle that criminal liability for constructive possession in Louisiana must rest on evidence of actual control and intent, not on conjecture built from residence, proximity, or knowledge alone. It thus simultaneously protects due process, clarifies the contours of La. R.S. 14:95.1, and respects the constitutional rights of non-felon residents to keep and bear arms in their own homes.

Awareness and Proximity Are Not Enough: State of Louisiana v. Gerald Manchip White and the Limits of Constructive Possession in Shared Residences