Introduction

This appeal arises from a workplace fall at LaGuardia Airport’s Terminal C. The plaintiff, Rafal Blachowicz, a sheet metal worker employed by the Jobin Organization, alleges he fell while descending from the roof through a ladder/hatch assembly that had safety latches but no handrail. He claims the hatch door closed as he began his descent—forcing him to hold the top of the hatch for support—and he lost balance and fell. He sued the City of New York (owner), the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (lessee), and Delta Air Lines, Inc. (manager) for common‑law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6).

The Supreme Court, Queens County, granted the plaintiff summary judgment on Labor Law § 240(1) and struck a broad swath of the defendants’ affirmative defenses. On reargument, it also struck the fifth affirmative defense. The defendants appealed both orders.

The Second Department reverses. It holds that defendants raised a triable issue of fact under the “recalcitrant worker/sole proximate cause” framework by adducing evidence that adequate safety devices were available, the plaintiff knew about them, and he did not use them—precluding summary judgment on § 240(1). Separately, the Court reinstates all of the affirmative defenses at issue, finding the plaintiff’s striking motion was conclusory and did not meet the stringent burden required to eliminate defenses at the pleading stage.

Summary of the Opinion

• Labor Law § 240(1). Although the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that his fall was caused by inadequate access and safety devices associated with the roof hatch, the defendants raised a triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment by demonstrating the availability of safety devices to prevent elevation‑related injuries, the plaintiff’s knowledge of those devices, and his failure to use them. Result: Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on § 240(1) should have been denied.
• Affirmative defenses. The plaintiff failed to establish as a matter of law that the defendants’ first, sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty‑first affirmative defenses were meritless. On reargument, the trial court erred in striking the fifth affirmative defense. Result: All challenged affirmative defenses are reinstated.
• Costs. The Second Department awards one bill of costs to the defendants.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Thorpe v One Page Park, LLC, 208 AD3d 818 (2d Dept). Reaffirms that Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty on owners, contractors, and agents to provide proper protection from elevation hazards. The Court uses Thorpe to confirm the statutory framework and the owner/agent duty baseline applicable to the City, the Port Authority, and Delta.
• Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280. Clarifies § 240(1) is not an insurer of worker safety; liability requires a statutory violation that proximately causes the injury. The Court’s refusal to award summary judgment echoes Blake’s caution: a fall alone does not equal liability if the defense raises a triable issue that no statutory breach caused the injury.
• Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555 and Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513. These decisions underscore § 240(1)’s protective purpose and “ultimate responsibility” for elevation safety on owners/contractors. The panel acknowledges those principles while noting they coexist with viable defenses where facts are disputed.
• Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509; Ross v Curtis‑Palmer Hydro‑Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494; Wilinski v 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 18 NY3d 1. These cases define the statute’s limited reach to gravity‑related risks—falls from a height or being hit by falling objects—and supply the lens for evaluating roof‑hatch descent as an elevation risk. The Court accepts that the event falls within § 240(1)’s ambit.
• Barreto v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 25 NY3d 426 and Mushkudiani v Racanelli Constr. Group, Inc., 219 AD3d 613. Emphasize the proximate cause component: the statutory violation must cause the injury. These authorities also support the requirement that plaintiffs connect the absence/inadequacy of an enumerated safety device to the fall.
• Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335 and Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259. Ortiz is pivotal for summary judgment: a plaintiff must identify a safety device of the § 240(1) type that would have prevented the injury. Narducci limits the statute to its enumerated protections. The Court credits the plaintiff’s prima facie showing but finds defendants’ evidence creates a factual dispute under Ortiz about available devices and causation.
• Santiago v Hanley Group, Inc., 216 AD3d 833 and Biaca‑Neto v Boston Rd. II Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 34 NY3d 1166. These decisions articulate the elements by which defendants can defeat § 240(1) via recalcitrant worker/sole proximate cause: adequate devices were available; the worker knew they were available and expected to be used; the worker unreasonably chose not to use them; and the injury would not have occurred had they been used. The Second Department relies on these authorities to find a triable issue in Blachowicz.
• Muniz v SPO Rest., LLC, 227 AD3d 1002; Greco v Christoffersen, 70 AD3d 769; Gonzalez v Wingate at Beacon, 137 AD3d 747; Bank of N.Y. v Penalver, 125 AD3d 796; Chestnut Realty Corp. v Kaminski, 95 AD3d 1254. These cases govern motions to dismiss affirmative defenses: pleadings are liberally construed in favor of the party asserting the defense; any doubt counsels against dismissal; and the movant bears the burden to show the defense is meritless as a matter of law. Applying these rules, the panel reinstates all challenged defenses because the plaintiff’s motion was conclusory.

Legal Reasoning

1) The § 240(1) claim and the roof‑hatch fall. The Court treats a descent from a roof through a hatch lacking handrails as an elevation‑related hazard encompassed by § 240(1). The plaintiff met the initial burden by showing the access system (hatch/ladder configuration) offered inadequate protection—the hatch door closed and there was no handhold or guard to prevent a gravity‑related fall. This makes out a prima facie violation tied to the fall, satisfying Ortiz’s requirement that a proper safety device could have prevented the accident.

2) The defendants’ triable issue: Available but unused safety devices. The defendants came forward with evidence that the plaintiff was provided with safety devices designed to prevent elevation injuries, that he may have known of those devices and the expectation that they be used, and that he failed to use them. Under Santiago and Biaca‑Neto, that showing raises a jury question whether the plaintiff’s non‑use of an adequate, available device was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. Notably, the panel’s phrasing—“may have known”—underscores that the knowledge/expectation element is disputed; but on summary judgment, disputed facts must be resolved by a factfinder. Because § 240(1) liability is contingent on the failure to provide or the inadequacy of an enumerated device, evidence that an adequate device was provided but not used can defeat a plaintiff’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

3) Striking affirmative defenses. The Court reaffirms the high bar for eliminating defenses at the pleading stage. The plaintiff’s motion to strike numerous defenses largely asserted that a § 240(1) determination would render them inapplicable. That global, categorical approach is insufficient under Muniz and related precedent. Each defense must be addressed and shown meritless as a matter of law. Given the disputed § 240(1) liability and the continued presence of § 200, § 241(6), and common‑law negligence claims (to which comparative negligence and other defenses may still apply), the Court reinstates the first, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty‑first defenses.

Impact and Practical Implications

For § 240(1) roof‑hatch and egress cases: This decision makes clear that even where the means of access/egress (like a hatch without a handrail) appears inadequate, owners and their agents can defeat summary judgment by offering competent proof that:

• Enumerated safety devices (e.g., harnesses, lanyards, lifelines, anchor points, guardrails) were available;
• The worker knew about the devices and was expected to use them; and
• The non‑use was without good reason and the injury would have been avoided had the device been used.

This aligns roof‑hatch accidents with the broader “sole proximate cause” line of cases: a plaintiff’s fall does not automatically translate to § 240(1) liability where there is a factual dispute about the availability and adequacy of safety devices and the worker’s decision not to use them.

For motion practice on affirmative defenses: The opinion warns against “mass” motions to strike defenses without particularized legal and factual showings. Even in a § 240(1) case, defenses may remain relevant to other causes of action (e.g., § 200 negligence claims), and doubts must be resolved in favor of the party asserting the defense. Plaintiffs should tailor their motions to each defense with record citations and applicable law.

For owners, lessees, and managing agents: The nondelegable duty under § 240(1) persists, but thorough safety programs, documentation of training, clear rules requiring device use, and proof of available, adequate devices can create jury issues that forestall summary judgments. Practically:

• Maintain logs showing distribution and inspection of harnesses/lanyards;
• Document anchor point locations and proximity to egress points like hatches;
• Train and retrain on tie‑off protocols during access/egress;
• Preserve incident‑scene evidence (photos of hatch, latches, absence/presence of handrails, signage);
• Record worker acknowledgments of safety expectations.

For plaintiffs: To secure summary judgment in similar cases, develop an evidentiary record that:

• Identifies the specific enumerated device that was required (e.g., a guardrail or self‑closing, self‑locking hatch with integrated handholds) and shows it was absent or inadequate;
• Demonstrates that any harness/anchor configuration at the site was unavailable, impractical, or would not have prevented the fall while transitioning through the hatch;
• Addresses the Santiago/Biaca‑Neto elements directly to negate the “sole proximate cause” narrative.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Labor Law § 240(1) (the “Scaffold Law”). A New York statute that requires owners, contractors, and their agents to provide proper safety devices to protect workers from gravity‑related risks (falls from heights and falling objects). It imposes a nondelegable duty, meaning responsibility cannot be shifted to others.
• Enumerated safety devices. Items like scaffolds, ladders, hoists, blocks, braces, irons, ropes, harnesses, lifelines, and similar protections designed to prevent gravity‑related injuries. Liability typically turns on whether such a device was absent, inadequate, or failed.
• Prima facie case on summary judgment. The initial showing a moving party must make to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, before the burden shifts to the opponent. In § 240(1), plaintiffs must show a statutory violation and that an appropriate device would have prevented the accident.
• Recalcitrant worker / Sole proximate cause defense. If adequate safety devices were available; the worker knew they were available and expected to use them; the worker unreasonably chose not to use them; and the accident would have been prevented had they been used—then the worker’s conduct may be deemed the sole cause of the accident, defeating § 240(1) liability. Appellate decisions sometimes use “recalcitrant worker” to describe this framework.
• Comparative negligence vs. § 240(1). A worker’s ordinary negligence does not reduce § 240(1) liability once a violation is established; however, if the worker’s non‑use of available, adequate devices is the sole proximate cause of the injury, there is no § 240(1) liability at all.
• Motion to strike affirmative defenses. A procedural device to eliminate defenses that are legally insufficient. The movant must show each targeted defense is meritless as a matter of law. Courts construe doubts in favor of the party asserting the defense.

Conclusion

Blachowicz v. City of New York clarifies two important points in New York construction law litigation. First, in roof‑hatch fall cases, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie § 240(1) violation based on inadequate access/egress protections; but summary judgment is not automatic. Evidence that adequate safety devices were available, known to the worker, and not used will raise triable issues under the recalcitrant worker/sole proximate cause doctrine, precluding judgment as a matter of law. Second, plaintiffs cannot eliminate a broad array of affirmative defenses by relying on generalized § 240(1) propositions; a defense will stand unless the movant demonstrates its legal insufficiency with specificity.

The decision meaningfully shapes both trial strategy and motion practice. It underscores the premium on concrete, site‑specific proof about the availability and practicality of enumerated safety devices—especially at transition points like roof hatches—and it reaffirms the judiciary’s reluctance to strike defenses absent a targeted, defense‑by‑defense showing of legal infirmity. Owners, contractors, and their agents remain bound by a nondelegable duty to protect against gravity‑related risks, but thorough safety programs and documentation can create jury questions that make summary judgment for plaintiffs inappropriate. Conversely, plaintiffs seeking early judgment must develop records that foreclose the “sole proximate cause” route and demonstrate, device‑by‑device, why the statutory violation was the true cause of the accident.