Autonomy in Firearm Regulation Under Georgia’s Constitution: Upholding Paragraph VIII’s “Manner Clause”

1. Introduction

Stephens v. State of Georgia, decided May 28, 2025 by the Supreme Court of Georgia, presents a narrow but significant challenge to Georgia’s statutory scheme regulating handgun carry by 18- to 20-year-olds. The plaintiff, Thomas Stephens, sought a weapons‐carry license at age 18 and, upon denial under OCGA § 16-11-126(g), sued the State alleging that the age‐based restriction violates Article I, Section I, Paragraph VIII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. Importantly, Stephens did not invoke the U.S. Second Amendment; he asked the court to overrule over a century of Georgia precedent and apply federal‐style tests instead. The State moved to dismiss, arguing that Georgia law presumes statutes constitutional, that the age cutoff is a reasonable exercise of the “police power” granted by the “manner clause” of Paragraph VIII, and that longstanding cases—beginning with Hill v. State (1874) and Strickland v. State (1911)—upheld similar regulations. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and Stephens appealed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. It held that:

1. State statutes are presumed constitutional, and a challenger bears the heavy burden of showing a “clear and palpable” conflict with the state Constitution.
2. Georgia’s Article I, Section I, Paragraph VIII—“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne”—has been consistently construed since 1874 to permit reasonable regulations of time, place, and circumstance so long as they do not amount to a de facto prohibition.
3. Stephens failed to demonstrate that this longstanding construction departs from the provision’s original public meaning, and offered no alternative construction grounded in Georgia’s own constitutional history.
4. The Court refused to import federal tests—whether strict scrutiny or the “history and tradition” inquiry of Bruen—as substitutes for Georgia’s original‐meaning approach to its own constitutional text.

Because Stephens did not meet his burden to show that the age‐based restriction is “clearly unconstitutional” under Georgia’s settled jurisprudence, his claim failed and the dismissal was affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning rests on a line of Georgia cases that began with:

• Nunn v. State (1846) – Interpreting the U.S. Second Amendment, this Court recognized a pre‐existing “natural right of self‐defense” and held that any regulation of arms must not “amount to a destruction of the right.”
• Hill v. State (1874) – First construing Georgia’s “manner clause,” the Court held that the legislature may regulate whether arms are borne “openly or secretly,” “loaded or unloaded,” as well as “the times and places” of bearing so long as regulations are not “unreasonable” or “arbitrary.”
• Strickland v. State (1911) – Reaffirmed Hill’s test and applied it to uphold a licensing requirement for carrying pistols, concluding that a law is constitutional if it does not, in effect, “prohibit the right to bear arms.”
• Carson v. State (1978), Landers v. State (1983), and Hertz v. Bennett (2013) – Each case applied the Hill/Strickland standard to uphold reasonable regulations on sawed‐off shotguns, felon disarmament, and licensing denials for applicants with disqualifying criminal history.

This unbroken chain of decisions constitutes the “consistent construction” of Paragraph VIII that Stephens was required to challenge and overcome.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis unfolds in three steps:

1. Presumption of Constitutionality. Georgia law presumes statutes constitutional. To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff must show a “clear and palpable” conflict with the state Constitution. The Court will not declare a statute invalid absent “clear satisfaction of its unconstitutionality.”
2. Original Public Meaning & Presumptions of Continuity. Georgia interprets its constitution by reference to the original public meaning of its text at ratification. Paragraph VIII’s “manner clause” first appeared in 1868 and has been carried forward unchanged into subsequent constitutions, including 1983. When readopted without material change, its original meaning—shaped by Hill and Strickland—carries forward under the “presumption of constitutional continuity” and the “presumption of consistent and definitive construction.”
3. Rejection of Federal Imports. Stephens urged adoption of strict scrutiny or Bruen’s “history and tradition” test from federal Second Amendment jurisprudence. The Court declined to import these tests into Georgia constitutional law, reaffirming that state constitutional provisions must be interpreted on their own terms, consistent with Georgia’s historical and textual context.

3.3 Impact

This decision has three significant effects:

• Affirmation of State Constitutional Autonomy. Georgia reasserts that its constitutional right to bear arms is governed by state precedent and original‐meaning construction, not federal analogues.
• Stability of Jurisprudence. By refusing to revisit Hill/Strickland, the Court entrenches a century of precedent, signaling that only a compelling constitutional argument—grounded in Georgia’s own text and history—will unsettle existing law.
• Guidance for Future Challenges. Prospective challengers must engage in detailed historical analysis of Georgia’s constitutional text, articulate how longstanding cases depart from original meaning, and offer an alternative construction before asking the Court to reconsider settled precedent.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Original Public Meaning: Understanding what constitutional words meant to the people who adopted them, based on contemporary dictionaries, legislative debates, and historical context.
• Manner Clause: The part of Georgia’s Constitution that says “the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne.” It authorizes the legislature to regulate how, when, and where firearms can be carried.
• Presumption of Constitutionality: A legal rule that assumes statutes are valid unless a challenger proves they clearly violate the Constitution.
• Presumption of Constitutional Continuity: When text is readopted in a new constitution without change, it is presumed to retain its previous judicially recognized meaning.
• Clear and Palpable Conflict: A heavy standard requiring unmistakable proof that a law contradicts a constitutional provision.

5. Conclusion

Stephens v. State of Georgia reaffirms the State’s authority—under Article I, Section I, Paragraph VIII—to regulate the manner in which arms are borne, so long as regulations are neither arbitrary nor tantamount to a prohibition. The Court held that Georgia’s age‐based restriction on handgun carry for 18- to 20-year-olds survives constitutional challenge under the “manner clause” and that longstanding precedents construing that clause remain controlling. Challengers to Georgia’s firearm laws must bear the heavy burden of demonstrating a “clear and palpable” conflict with the state Constitution, grounded in rigorous original‐meaning analysis of Georgia’s own text and history. By rejecting wholesale adoption of federal Second Amendment tests, the Court has reinforced Georgia’s independent constitutional identity in the area of firearms regulation.