Automobiles as Per Se Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce for § 1201(a) Kidnapping Jurisdiction (Even When Used Intrastate)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Derick Irisha Brown (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2025) (unpublished, non-argument calendar), Derick Irisha Brown (also known as Quentesa Jackson) appealed her federal convictions for kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and (c). She received a life sentence because the kidnapping “resulted in the death of the victim.”

The appeal presented two core issues:

Federal jurisdiction under § 1201(a)(1): whether the statute’s jurisdictional element—use of “any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce”—is satisfied by use of an automobile solely within one state.
Evidentiary rulings under Rule 403: whether admitting (a) post-mortem photographs and (b) the full police interview video (including an officer’s “scolding” comments) was an abuse of discretion.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that § 1201(a)’s jurisdictional language is unambiguous and reaches the intrastate use of an automobile because automobiles are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce under binding circuit precedent, specifically United States v. Bryan. The court also held the district court acted within its broad discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 403 in admitting both the post-mortem photographs and the full interview video, emphasizing a strong presumption in favor of admissibility.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review framing the appeal

United States v. Spoerke: supplied the standard for reviewing constitutional challenges to statutes (de novo) and also supported abuse-of-discretion review for evidentiary rulings.
United States v. Dulcio: confirmed de novo review of the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal.

2. Textual clarity foreclosing avoidance and lenity

United States v. Davis: the doctrine of constitutional avoidance applies only when the statute is ambiguous; the panel invoked this to reject Brown’s attempt to narrow § 1201(a) via avoidance.
United States v. Garcon (abrogated in part on other grounds by Pulsifer v. United States): cited for the same limiting principle regarding the rule of lenity—lenity applies only where, after ordinary tools of interpretation, ambiguity remains.

3. Commerce Clause “fullest extent” reading of jurisdictional language

United States v. Ballinger: used to support the interpretive move that “unambiguous jurisdictional language” signals Congress’s intent to legislate to the full reach of its Commerce Clause authority, particularly regarding instrumentalities.

4. Binding precedent on automobiles as instrumentalities

United States v. Bryan: the controlling decision. It held that automobiles (including the truck there) are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce for § 1201(a), even when used wholly intrastate. The panel treated Brown’s Commerce Clause argument as foreclosed.

5. Rule 403 deference and the presumption of admissibility

United States v. Costa, United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, and United States v. Church: collectively emphasized that Rule 403 exclusion is an “extraordinary remedy,” that balancing is generally struck in favor of admissibility, and that trial judges have “broadest discretion.”
United States v. Graham and United States v. Frazier: reinforced the high bar for reversal under abuse-of-discretion review (the decision must fall outside the “range of possible conclusions”).
United States v. Macrina: supported reliance on limiting instructions as a tool to mitigate potential unfair prejudice.

6. Stipulations and graphic evidence: the limits of Old Chief

Old Chief v. United States: Brown relied on its principle that admitting the name/nature of a prior conviction can be an abuse of discretion in a § 922(g)(1) case if the defendant stipulates to status. The panel emphasized Old Chief’s own limitation—its logic does not generally force prosecutors to accept stipulations when evidence contributes to a coherent narrative.
United States v. Bowers, United States v. De Parias (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Kaplan), United States v. Brown (441 F.3d 1330), and United States v. Alfaro-Moncada: applied to uphold admission of graphic photos or charged-material images even where defendants offered to stipulate. These cases undercut Brown’s “stipulation eliminates probative value” theory.
Bonner v. City of Prichard: explained why the Fifth Circuit Unit B decision United States v. Bowers is binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

7. Defendant statements and intent/knowledge

United States v. Brown (53 F.3d 312): supported admission of Brown’s interview statements to prove subjective elements like intent or knowledge, and the principle that disbelieved exculpatory statements may be treated as substantive evidence of guilt.

8. Cumulative error

United States v. Joseph: foreclosed cumulative-error relief where no individual error is shown.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory interpretation: no ambiguity, no narrowing doctrines

Brown sought to narrow § 1201(a)(1) by arguing the phrase “uses . . . any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce” should apply to automobiles only when used in interstate travel or commercial activity. The panel rejected this through a straightforward textual approach: the language is “unambiguous,” and therefore neither constitutional avoidance (United States v. Davis) nor lenity (United States v. Garcon) comes into play.

The court then connected this unambiguous jurisdictional hook to Commerce Clause intent: under United States v. Ballinger, such language reflects Congress’s intent to legislate to the full extent of its Commerce Clause power over instrumentalities.

2. Commerce Clause application: automobiles treated as instrumentalities

The central constitutional move is categorical: if an automobile is a per se instrumentality of interstate commerce, Congress may regulate its use (including intrastate use) under the Commerce Clause. The panel held the case was controlled by United States v. Bryan, which had already rejected the argument that intrastate-only use of a truck fails § 1201(a)’s jurisdictional element.

On the facts, Brown did not dispute that the indictment and proof showed use of a car (a Toyota Sequoia) in the kidnapping’s commission, which satisfied § 1201(a)(1)’s jurisdictional element as construed by Bryan.

3. Evidence: Rule 403 balancing with strong deference to the trial court

Post-mortem photographs: Even with Brown’s willingness to stipulate to death, the panel held the photos had high probative value for (i) establishing death and (ii) supporting the government’s narrative about timing and location. Relying on Old Chief v. United States’s limitation and Eleventh Circuit (and binding former Fifth Circuit) precedent—United States v. Bowers, United States v. De Parias, and United States v. Brown (441 F.3d 1330)—the court reaffirmed that prosecutors generally may present probative narrative evidence rather than be forced to accept stipulations. The balancing was upheld under the “broadest discretion” framework of United States v. Costa and related Rule 403 cases.

Interview video (including “scolding”): Brown’s statements were relevant to knowledge and intent, tracked by United States v. Brown (53 F.3d 312). The district court admitted the full video for context, and the panel held that decision fell within permissible discretion under United States v. Graham and United States v. Frazier. The panel also credited the jury instruction on “knowingly and willfully” as a mitigator of unfair prejudice under United States v. Macrina.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the opinion illustrates the practical force of United States v. Bryan in the Eleventh Circuit: for § 1201(a)(1), the government can satisfy the interstate-commerce jurisdictional element by proving the defendant used an automobile in committing or furthering the kidnapping, even if the vehicle never crossed state lines. This stabilizes federal kidnapping jurisdiction in cases where the interstate hook is a vehicle rather than victim transport across state boundaries.

On evidence, the decision reinforces a recurring trial dynamic: defendants cannot reliably neutralize graphic or emotionally charged evidence through stipulations, particularly where the government plausibly ties the evidence to narrative coherence (timing, location, sequence of events). It also supports admitting “contextual” portions of interviews—including accusatory police remarks—when necessary to understand the defendant’s responses, with limiting instructions used to manage prejudice.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Jurisdictional element (in a federal criminal statute): a statutory requirement that connects the crime to a source of federal power—here, the Commerce Clause—so the case can be prosecuted federally.
Instrumentality of interstate commerce: a thing used to carry out interstate commerce or that is treated as inherently tied to interstate movement (e.g., vehicles). Under United States v. Bryan, automobiles are treated as such instrumentalities categorically.
Doctrine of constitutional avoidance: when a statute is ambiguous, courts prefer a reasonable interpretation that avoids serious constitutional problems; it does not apply when the text is unambiguous (United States v. Davis).
Rule of lenity: genuine ambiguity in a criminal statute is resolved in the defendant’s favor, but only after normal interpretive tools fail to resolve the meaning (United States v. Garcon).
Rule 403 (“unfair prejudice”): relevant evidence may be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers like unfair prejudice; appellate courts give trial judges substantial leeway in this balancing (United States v. Costa; United States v. Alfaro-Moncada; United States v. Church).
Abuse of discretion: a highly deferential review standard; reversal is warranted only when the trial court’s decision falls outside a permissible range (United States v. Frazier).

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Brown’s kidnapping convictions by applying a clear jurisdictional rule: under § 1201(a)(1) and binding precedent United States v. Bryan, an automobile is a per se instrumentality of interstate commerce, so intrastate-only vehicle use satisfies the statute’s commerce hook. The court also reaffirmed a prosecution-friendly Rule 403 framework—graphic post-mortem photos and a complete interview video (including accusatory context) are admissible when they materially support narrative and mens rea issues, and stipulations do not automatically displace probative evidence.