Authenticity vs. Authority: DiCenzo v. Mone (2025) Narrows the Forged-Deed Exception to the Fraud Statute of Limitations and Sets Parameters for Subpoenaing Non-Party Tax Returns

1. Introduction

DiCenzo v. Mone, 237 A.D.3d 1448 (3d Dept. 2025), arises out of a decades-long family-business dispute that spawned two parallel actions:

• Action No. 1 – William R. DiCenzo II, as guardian for his father, seeks corporate remedies (including appointment of a receiver) against Michael Mone and others over the management of Kirby Road Apartments LLC.
• Action No. 2 – DiCenzo Sr. and Allen Drive Realty Inc. attack a 2003 deed that transferred Allen Drive’s assets to Kirby Road, alleging the deed was “forged” and therefore void, which, if true, would invalidate a subsequent mortgage held by Sunmark Credit Union.

At stake were (i) whether a non-party corporation (Buenos Hill Inc.) could be compelled to turn over its confidential tax returns and minutes in aid of a receivership hearing, and (ii) whether the deed challenge was time-barred or exempt from any statute of limitations under the “forged-deed” doctrine recognized in Faison v. Lewis, 25 N.Y.3d 220 (2015).

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Subpoena Ruling (Action No. 1): The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s refusal to quash the subpoena duces tecum directed to Buenos Hill. The court held the requested documents were likely relevant to establish the plaintiffs’ “apparent interest” in Kirby Road—an issue central to the receivership application. However, because a trial subpoena (CPLR 2301) was used, production is limited to the court, and an in camera review with possible redactions is required, recognizing the heightened protection accorded to tax returns.
• Statute-of-Limitations Ruling (Action No. 2): The complaint was properly dismissed. The Appellate Division held that signing one’s own name to a deed—even while falsely claiming corporate authority—does not constitute forgery or “false pretenses.” Accordingly, the deed is merely voidable, subject to the six-year fraud period (CPLR 213[8]), which had long since expired.
• Sanctions and Other Relief: Requests for sanctions were denied; other arguments were deemed meritless or academic.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Third Department knitted together a line of decisions demarcating the difference between void and voidable deeds and defining the discovery rights against non-parties:

1. Faison v. Lewis, 25 N.Y.3d 220 (2015) — Established that a deed signed by an imposter (or procured by trick) is void ab initio and never gains legal vitality; therefore, no statute of limitations applies.
2. Marden v. Dorthy, 160 N.Y. 39 (1899) — Early articulation that absence of genuine assent renders an instrument void; distinguished between authenticity and authority.
3. People v. Cunningham, 2 N.Y.3d 593 (2004) — Clarified that exceeding the scope of authority is not forgery when the actor signs his own name.
4. LaSalle Bank v. Ally, 39 A.D.3d 597 (2d Dept 2007) and progeny — Reinforced the “own name” rule; no forgery when the signatory is the ostensible maker.
5. Rockwell v. Despart, 212 A.D.3d 27 (3d Dept 2022) — Applied Faison but distinguished voidable deeds.
6. Matter of Kapon v. Koch, 23 N.Y.3d 32 (2014) — Set the liberal standard for non-party subpoenas; nonetheless, privacy interests in tax returns justify a “heightened” burden (Cooke v. Greenhouse Hudson, 230 A.D.3d 841 [3d Dept 2024]).

These authorities shaped two analytic prongs: (i) whether the 2003 deed fell within the narrow “forged-deed” exception; and (ii) what showing is necessary to override the confidentiality of a non-party’s tax returns.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Forgery vs. Lack of Authority

• The court distilled the issue to “authenticity” (who actually signed) versus “authority” (whether the signer had power to convey).
• Because Michael Mone signed his own name and acknowledged the deed, authenticity was satisfied; any misdescription of his office (“President of Allen Drive Apartments, Inc.”) went only to authority, creating at most a voidable instrument.
• Voidable deeds are governed by the six-year fraud statute. Plaintiffs knew—or should have known—of the transfer well before the limitations period expired.

(b) Subpoena Standards for Non-Party Tax Returns

• While Kapon liberalized non-party discovery, tax returns remain “confidential and private.” The requesting party must show:
  (i) Relevance;
  (ii) Indispensability; and
  (iii) Unavailability from other sources.
• Buenos Hill bore the initial burden on a motion to quash to establish “futility” or “utter irrelevance.” It failed to do so.
• Because the subpoena was a trial subpoena, CPLR 2301/2302 apply: documents must be produced to the court, not the litigants. An in camera review will balance relevance against privacy, and protective measures (redaction, limited scope) are to be considered.

3.3 Impact on New York Law

Limiting the Forged-Deed Doctrine. After Faison, litigants increasingly labeled stale conveyances “forgeries” to avoid statutes of limitation. DiCenzo places a firm outer wall around that strategy—if the putative wrongdoer signs his or her own name, the deed is presumptively voidable, not void.
Discovery Guidance. The decision underscores that:

• Tax returns are obtainable, but only under strict “indispensability” scrutiny;
• Trial subpoenas tecum are not discovery devices; premature enforcement contradicts CPLR 2301;
• Courts should conduct in camera inspection to craft the narrowest disclosure order compatible with due process.

The precedent will likely temper future fraud suits over corporate real-estate transfers and shape motion practice where parties seek sensitive financial documents from neutral third parties.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Forgery (Civil Context)

Occurs when someone signs another person’s name (or a nonexistent identity) to a document, or when a genuine signature is later repurposed without assent—making the instrument void from inception.

Void vs. Voidable Deed

Void: Legally nonexistent; can be attacked at any time by anyone.
Voidable: Valid until annulled; subject to statutes of limitation and equitable defenses.

Subpoena Duces Tecum (Trial vs. Discovery)

Both compel documents, but a trial subpoena (CPLR 2301) is returnable to court and used for a hearing or trial; a discovery subpoena (CPLR 3120) delivers documents to the parties during pre-trial discovery.

In Camera Review

Judge privately examines documents to decide which portions, if any, should be disclosed, thereby protecting confidentiality while allowing relevant evidence in.

5. Conclusion

DiCenzo v. Mone provides two pivotal clarifications:

1. Signing one’s own name—no matter how misleading the claimed authority—does not invoke the timeless “forged-deed” exception; fraud claims are subject to the standard six-year period.
2. Non-party tax returns are discoverable only when indispensable and, when sought by trial subpoena, must be produced to the court for in camera filtering.

The ruling tightens the doctrinal boundaries of property-fraud litigation and supplies practical direction for litigants subpoenaing sensitive financial records. Practitioners should carefully plead deed challenges, ensuring genuine forgery allegations are substantiated, and tailor subpoenas to withstand heightened scrutiny when confidential tax materials are sought.