Aucacama-Azogue v. Bondi: Reaffirming the Nexus Parity and Government-Protection Thresholds in Asylum, Withholding, and CAT Claims

Aucacama-Azogue v. Bondi: Reaffirming the Nexus Parity and Government-Protection Thresholds in Asylum, Withholding, and CAT Claims

1. Introduction

Aucacama-Azogue v. Bondi is a 2025 summary order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit involving an Ecuadorian mother and her four minor children who sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). They alleged extortion, robbery, and threats in Ecuador purportedly connected to their Quechua heritage. Both an Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected the claims. The Second Circuit now denies their petition for review, concluding that the record fails to show that (1) the Ecuadorian government is unable or unwilling to protect them or (2) would acquiesce in their torture.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Key determinations by the Court:

  • Asylum / Withholding: Petitioners did not prove that the harm they fear would occur because of a protected ground and that the Ecuadorian government is unable or unwilling to offer protection. They also abandoned the “past persecution” argument on appeal.
  • CAT: They failed to show that any future torture would occur with government acquiescence, a distinct and higher threshold than the unable-or-unwilling standard.
  • Attorney Conduct: The panel refers counsel to the Court’s Grievance Panel for factual misstatements and for repeatedly advancing arguments already rejected by the Circuit, notably the claim that withholding of removal has a lower nexus requirement than asylum.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022)
    – Confirmed that the “one central reason” nexus standard applies equally to asylum and withholding of removal. Used here to reject counsel’s contrary contention.
  • Jagdeep Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2021)
    – Restated that persecution by non-state actors must be shown to occur with government inability or unwillingness to protect. Heavily relied upon for the dispositive finding that petitioners offered no proof of state abdication.
  • Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2020)
    – Quoted for the proposition that “unwilling-or-unable” requires more than government inaction on a single complaint—there must be evidence of systemic helplessness or condonation.
  • Castellanos-Ventura v. Garland, 118 F.4th 250 (2d Cir. 2024)
    – Reiterated that failure to report crimes can be considered, but the agency must also examine whether reporting would have been futile or dangerous. Here, the petitioners produced no evidence on futility or danger.
  • Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021)
    – Underscored that conflicting country-conditions evidence that merely could support relief does not compel reversal under the substantial-evidence standard.
  • BIA decision In re C-G-T-, 28 I.&N. Dec. 740 (BIA 2023)
    – Cited for the notion that failure to report is not automatically fatal if futility or danger can be demonstrated. No such demonstration was made.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Abandonment of Past-Persecution Claim. On appeal the petitioners did not challenge the IJ’s ruling that prior harm was insufficiently severe. Under Second Circuit precedent (Debique v. Garland), unbriefed issues are deemed abandoned—eliminating a presumption of future persecution.
  2. Unable-or-Unwilling Requirement. The Court held that some evidence must show government complicity or impotence. Petitioners never contacted the police, offered no testimony of official corruption specific to their locale, and country reports documented both crime and active prosecutions of crimes against Indigenous persons. That record did not compel the opposite conclusion.
  3. Nexus Analysis. Pursuant to Quituizaca, the “one central reason” test applies to both asylum and withholding, foreclosing counsel’s argument that withholding has a more lenient standard. The Court found no sufficiently “strong nexus” (Rodas Castro) between the feared harm and the protected ground (Indigenous ethnicity).
  4. CAT Distinction. CAT requires state acquiescence, meaning prior awareness plus breach of duty to intervene (8 C.F.R. §1208.18(a)(7); Khouzam v. Ashcroft). Petitioners argued that “unwilling or unable” suffices—an error the Court characterises as “mistaken and insufficiently argued.” The record lacked any indication officials would turn a blind eye.
  5. Standard of Review. The Court applied substantial-evidence review to factual findings and de novo review to legal questions. Under 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B), the agency’s findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the contrary result—a high bar not met here.
  6. Attorney Misconduct. The panel flags three recurring issues: (i) referencing non-existent facts, (ii) re-arguing the nexus standard, (iii) re-asserting that CAT lacks an acquiescence requirement. Referral to the Grievance Panel signals the Court’s limited tolerance for repetitive or misleading briefing.

3.3. Impact

  • Doctrinal Clarity (Though Non-Precedential). While a summary order is not binding precedent, it is citable. The decision consolidates recent Second Circuit pronouncements that: (a) the “one central reason” nexus applies equally to asylum and withholding; and (b) CAT relief demands proof of acquiescence, not merely inability/unwillingness.
  • Guidance on Failure to Report. The ruling reinforces that applicants must either (i) produce evidence of futile or dangerous reporting, or (ii) actually report and document lack of protection, when relying on an “unable or unwilling” theory.
  • Professional Responsibility Signal. By forwarding counsel to the Grievance Panel, the Court warns practitioners that factual accuracy, candor, and avoidance of frivolous repetition are professional obligations. This may spur higher briefing standards in immigration appeals.
  • Practical Effect on Ecuador-Based Claims. The Court’s reading of Ecuadorian country-conditions evidence suggests that generalized corruption or Indigenous discrimination, without individualized proof, may be insufficient to meet the protection or acquiescence thresholds.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Substantial-Evidence Review: The appellate court asks “Could any reasonable fact-finder have decided as the agency did?” If yes, the finding stands, even if the reviewing judges might have weighed the facts differently.
  • “One Central Reason” Nexus: The protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group) must be a primary—not minor—reason for the feared harm. It need not be the sole reason but must be more than incidental.
  • Unable or Unwilling to Protect: For private-actor persecution, an applicant must show that the government either (a) cannot control the persecutors, or (b) intentionally refuses to help. Mere lack of success in preventing crime is not enough; there must be proof of condonation or systemic helplessness.
  • CAT “Acquiescence”: Requires that a public official know of the torture beforehand and then fail to act—effectively consenting by inaction. It is not satisfied by proof that the state is generally weak or ineffective.
  • Abandonment on Appeal: If a litigant’s brief does not meaningfully challenge an IJ/BIA finding, the appellate court treats that point as waived.

5. Conclusion

Though issued as a non-precedential summary order, Aucacama-Azogue v. Bondi provides a robust reaffirmation of several critical principles in U.S. asylum jurisprudence: (1) the parity of the nexus requirement between asylum and withholding, (2) the distinct and higher bar of state acquiescence for CAT relief, and (3) the evidentiary burden on applicants to substantiate government inability or unwillingness to protect. The decision also signals heightened scrutiny of practitioner conduct. Going forward, asylum advocates within the Second Circuit must marshal concrete, individualized evidence of state complicity or impotence, and must not assume that a generalized climate of corruption or discrimination will suffice.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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