Attempted Solicitation Suffices and NPS Jurisdiction Reaches Private Parcels Within Park Boundaries

Case: United States v. Rady Williams, Nos. 24-14167 & 24-14168 (11th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Panel: Jill Pryor, Luck, and Kidd, Circuit Judges

Introduction

In this unpublished per curiam decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed two misdemeanor convictions arising from the enforcement of National Park Service (NPS) regulations at the Martin Luther King, Jr. National Historical Park in Atlanta, Georgia. Following a bench trial before a magistrate judge, Rady Williams was convicted of (1) conducting commercial operations in a national park without a permit, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 5.3, and (2) resisting and intentionally interfering with a government employee engaged in official duties, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1). The district court affirmed; Williams then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds.

The appeal presented two core issues: whether evidence of attempted sales (without proof of completed transactions) is sufficient to prove “soliciting” under § 5.3, and whether NPS enforcement authority and the “interference” regulation under § 2.32 apply on privately owned parcels located within the park boundaries, as well as what mental state the “intentionally interferes” element requires. The Eleventh Circuit answered both questions in favor of the government, clarifying important aspects of regulatory enforcement in national park areas.

Summary of the Opinion

Sufficiency of evidence for solicitation (36 C.F.R. § 5.3): The court held that the government was not required to prove completed sales. Testimony and photographs showing Williams holding up t-shirts to passersby, coupled with the ranger’s familiarity distinguishing solicitation from other conduct (e.g., panhandling), sufficed to show an attempt to gain business—a form of “solicitation.”
Sufficiency of evidence for interference (36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1)): The court found that Williams’s refusal to remove an obstruction from the sidewalk within park boundaries and his resistance to arrest, documented by testimony and body-camera video, provided sufficient evidence of intentional interference with a government employee engaged in an official duty.
Jurisdiction within park boundaries: The interference regulation applies “regardless of land ownership” so long as the conduct occurs “within a park area.” Thus, NPS officers had jurisdiction to enforce the regulation on the private church driveway located inside the park’s mapped boundaries.
Mental state for interference: The regulation requires “intentional” interference; it does not impose a heightened “knowing and willful” standard or require proof that the defendant knew the officer’s jurisdictional status. The evidence here showed intentional conduct that interfered with official duties.
Disposition: Convictions affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

The Eleventh Circuit treated this as a “second tier” appeal from a magistrate judge’s bench conviction, applying the same sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard used by the district court. Citing United States v. Pilati (11th Cir. 2010), the court reviewed sufficiency de novo but viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, sustaining the verdict if a reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted its obligation, consistent with United States v. Daniels (11th Cir. 2024), to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict and to reverse only when no reasonable factfinder could convict.

Facts Material to the Rulings

Solicitation: Rangers observed Williams on park property with a bag of shirts, holding up shirts to passersby near the park’s visitor center. He was warned he could not sell in the park without a permit. Photographs corroborated the ranger’s account.
Interference: Approximately a year later, rangers and local police observed Williams selling drinks from a container placed on a public sidewalk, obstructing pedestrian movement. Days later, the chief ranger again found Williams with a drink container on the sidewalk, this time while Williams stood on a private church driveway that lies within the park’s boundaries. When ordered to remove the obstruction and submit to arrest, Williams refused and physically resisted, injuring the chief ranger in the process. Body-camera video supported the testimony.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

United States v. Pilati, 627 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 2010): Establishes that on appeal from a magistrate judge’s bench trial, appellate courts act as a second tier of review, applying the same standards as the district court.
United States v. Daniels, 91 F.4th 1083 (11th Cir. 2024): Articulates the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard: de novo review, evidence viewed in the government’s favor, verdict upheld if supported by reasonable inferences leading a rational factfinder to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
36 C.F.R. § 5.3: Prohibits “soliciting any business in park areas, except in accordance with the provisions of a permit.”
36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) and (b): Proscribes “threatening, resisting, intimidating, or intentionally interfering with a government employee or agent engaged in an official duty,” and applies such prohibitions “regardless of land ownership” for conduct “within a park area.”
36 C.F.R. § 2.31(a)(5): Forbids intentional or reckless obstruction of any sidewalk within park areas.
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024): Cited for the ordinary meaning of “solicitation” as an “attempt or effort to gain business.”

Legal Reasoning

1) Solicitation Without Proof of Completed Sales

The court embraced a text-and-ordinary-meaning approach to “soliciting” under § 5.3, relying on a standard dictionary definition. It held that the regulation does not require proof of consummated sales; an attempt or effort to sell in the park is enough. The ranger’s testimony that Williams was on park property, lacked a permit, and displayed shirts to passersby—supported by photographs—provided sufficient evidence of an attempt to gain business. The ranger’s distinction between solicitation and non-commercial activities such as begging or panhandling bolstered the inference that Williams was engaged in prohibited commercial solicitation rather than protected noncommercial speech.

2) Interference Under § 2.32 and the Scope of NPS Authority

On the interference charge, the court addressed two defense arguments:

Jurisdiction on Private Property Within Park Boundaries: The court relied on the regulation’s explicit statement that the interference prohibition applies “regardless of land ownership” to conclude that NPS officers could enforce the regulation on a privately owned church driveway located within the park’s mapped boundaries. The critical jurisdictional fact was location within the “park area,” not the underlying fee ownership.
Mens Rea—What “Intentionally” Requires: The regulation prohibits “intentionally interfering” with a government employee engaged in official duties. The court rejected the defense’s proposed heightened mental state (“knowingly and willfully”) and any requirement that the defendant know the officer’s specific jurisdictional authority. The evidence showed Williams intentionally refused to remove an obstruction from the sidewalk and actively resisted a lawful arrest—conduct that itself constituted intentional interference within the meaning of § 2.32(a)(1).

The court further linked the “official duty” element to the chief ranger’s enforcement of the separate sidewalk obstruction regulation (§ 2.31(a)(5)), which Williams violated by placing a drink container on the sidewalk, forcing pedestrians into the street. Body-camera footage and testimony provided a concrete evidentiary basis establishing both the duty and the interference.

Impact and Practical Significance

Clarifies Evidentiary Thresholds for § 5.3: Prosecutors need not prove a completed sale to secure a conviction for unpermitted solicitation. Evidence of an “attempt to gain business” (e.g., displaying goods to park visitors) can suffice. Defendants should anticipate that visual cues and ranger testimony distinguishing commercial solicitation from noncommercial conduct will be enough to support convictions.
Confirms NPS Enforcement Across Mixed Ownership: The court’s emphasis on “regardless of land ownership” cements the regulatory reach over private parcels situated within park boundaries for purposes of interference and related conduct. Property owners and vendors operating on such parcels cannot evade NPS rules by invoking private ownership if the parcel lies within the designated park area.
Defines “Intentional Interference” Without a Heightened Mens Rea: The ruling rejects a higher “knowing and willful” standard and knowledge-of-status requirements not found in the text. Intentional resistance and refusal to comply with lawful orders that implement park regulations can satisfy § 2.32’s intent element.
Operational Guidance for Rangers and Local Police: The decision validates joint enforcement actions and reliance on body-camera footage. It also underscores the importance of clearly articulating the underlying regulatory duty (e.g., sidewalk obstruction) to demonstrate the officer’s “official duty” at the time of the interference.
Limits of the Holding: As an unpublished decision, it is nonprecedential within the Eleventh Circuit. Nonetheless, it offers persuasive guidance on textual interpretation of NPS regulations, particularly the meaning of “solicitation,” the scope of jurisdiction within park boundaries, and how to prove “intentional interference.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review: On appeal, the court does not retry the case. It asks whether, taking the evidence in the government’s favor, a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If yes, the conviction stands.
“Solicitation” vs. “Sale”: Solicitation means trying to get business. You can violate the rule even if no one actually buys from you. Evidence of displaying goods and approaching passersby may suffice.
“Intentional interference”: This focuses on whether the person meant to do the acts that got in the officer’s way (e.g., refusing to move an obstruction, resisting arrest). It does not require proof that the person understood the officer’s legal authority in a technical sense.
“Regardless of land ownership” within a park area: If you are inside the official boundaries of a national park, NPS regulations can apply even on privately owned parcels located within those boundaries.
Bench trial before a magistrate judge: A judge, not a jury, decides guilt. On appeal, higher courts give deference to reasonable fact findings and review the legal sufficiency of the evidence de novo.

Practice Notes

For defense counsel: Challenges to solicitation charges must grapple with the ordinary-meaning focus on attempts. Absent text-based support, courts are unlikely to graft heightened mens rea requirements onto § 2.32. Fact-intensive arguments (e.g., that conduct is noncommercial or expressive) require concrete record development.
For prosecutors and rangers: Document the location relative to park boundaries and the absence of a permit. Distinguish commercial conduct from protected noncommercial behavior through specific observations. Tie interference to a clearly identified “official duty,” such as enforcing a separate regulation (e.g., sidewalk obstruction). Preserve video and photographic evidence.
For vendors and property owners inside park boundaries: Private ownership does not immunize conduct from NPS rules. Obtain necessary permits for commercial activity and avoid sidewalk obstructions. Noncompliance combined with resistance can escalate to interference charges.

Conclusion

United States v. Rady Williams delivers two clear clarifications for NPS regulatory enforcement in the Eleventh Circuit. First, “solicitation” under 36 C.F.R. § 5.3 encompasses attempts to obtain business; proof of a completed sale is unnecessary. Second, NPS enforcement of the interference regulation, 36 C.F.R. § 2.32, extends to all land within the park’s boundaries “regardless of land ownership,” and the provision’s “intentionally interferes” language does not import a heightened mens rea or knowledge-of-authority requirement. The opinion reinforces a text-forward approach to NPS regulations, offers practical guidance on evidentiary sufficiency (including the value of body-camera footage and ranger testimony), and confirms the agency’s ability to regulate conduct on mixed-ownership lands within national park areas. Although unpublished, the ruling is a meaningful roadmap for future enforcement and defense strategy in this recurring context.