Assisted Living Facility Statutory Exclusivity: Clarifying Liability under Public Health Law

Introduction

In the case of Thomas C. Kingston, as Executor of the Estate of Marcella Kingston v. Tennyson Court, Tennyson Court, LLC, Salem Buffalo, LLC, and James T. Hands (2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 1522), the New York Supreme Court, Fourth Department, examined the liability of an assisted living facility under conflicting statutory schemes. The plaintiff, acting as executor of the decedent’s estate, alleged negligence, gross negligence, carelessness, and recklessness against the defendants after the decedent suffered a series of injuries and ultimately died while residing at an assisted living facility.

The key issues centered on the appropriate application of Public Health Law articles 46‐B and 28, and whether an assisted living facility could be liable under the provisions meant for residential health care facilities. A significant motion to dismiss that challenged the viability of two statutory causes of action (based on Public Health Law §§ 2801-d and 2803-c) was the focal point for the judicial analysis.

Summary of the Judgment

The court’s decision modified an earlier order by granting the defendants’ motion in part: dismissing the second and third causes of action while preserving the first cause of action related to negligence. The dismissal was premised on the finding that Tennyson Court, registered as an assisted living facility under Public Health Law article 46-B, could not be held liable under Public Health Law article 28. The majority opinion upheld the principle that the clear statutory language precludes an assisted living facility from simultaneously being considered a residential health care facility subject to the additional statutory liability.

Concurring opinions, however, presented a different statutory interpretation. While agreeing with the result – the dismissal of the causes of action based on Public Health Law article 28 – some judges argued that the earlier decision in Cunningham should be overruled altogether. Despite this, the majority maintained adherence to stare decisis, emphasizing that any departure from established precedent requires compelling justification that was absent in this case.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment discusses several critical precedents:

• Cunningham v. Mary Agnes Manor Mgt., L.L.C. (2020): This case held that an assisted living facility licensed under Public Health Law article 46-B might operate de facto as a residential health care facility subject to liability under Public Health Law article 28 if it provided health-related services. This precedent was central to the defendants’ argument in the appeal.
• DeRusso v. Church Aid of the Prot. Episcopal Church in the Town of Saratoga Springs, Inc. (2025): Frequently cited in close conjunction with Cunningham, this decision supports the view that statutory language should control any interpretation regarding the licensure and classification of facilities.
• Broderick v. Amber Ct. Assisted Living (2021): This decision similarly stressed the incompatibility between the statutory definitions for assisted living and residential health care facilities, reinforcing that a facility licensed under article 46-B cannot be reclassified as a residential health care facility.
• Eastern Consol. Props. v. Adelaide Realty Corp. (2000) and People v. Barboni (2013): These cases were referenced to underline the judicious application of the doctrine of stare decisis when faced with apparent conflicts between statutory language and case law precedent.

These precedents have heavily influenced the court’s decision, with the majority opinion upholding Cunningham to the extent necessary to rule that Tennyson Court, by virtue of its licensure, cannot be subject to liability under Public Health Law article 28.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s decision draws on three main lines of reasoning:

1. Statutory Interpretation: The court closely examined Public Health Law § 4651(1)(a), which distinctly separates "assisted living" facilities from "residential health care facilities." The language used is unequivocal regarding the mutual exclusivity of these classifications. Consequently, the court determined that a facility licensed under article 46-B cannot transform into a de facto residential health care facility subject to article 28 simply because it provides certain health-related services.
2. Application of Stare Decisis: The opinion emphasizes the importance of adhering to precedent unless a compelling reason to depart exists. The majority was cautious about overruling Cunningham since the statutory text – which the defendants argue is unambiguous – did not necessitate such a radical shift. This careful balancing act reflects the court’s respect for the stability of judicial decisions.
3. Procedural Sufficiency of the Complaint: Although the lawsuit’s first cause of action was deemed sufficiently particular, the second and third causes of action under the Public Health Law were dismissed because they failed to overcome the statutory barrier erected by the clear definitions of assisted living versus residential health care facility.

Impact on Future Cases

This judgment sets a significant precedent for similar cases involving alleged negligence at assisted living facilities. The clear demarcation between assisted living facilities and residential health care facilities solidifies the understanding that, under Public Health Law, a facility licensed under article 46-B will not be exposed to liability under article 28. Future cases will likely cite this judgment when addressing:

• The statutory limitations on liability for assisted living facilities.
• The appropriate application of Public Health Law when multiple facility categories are implicated.
• The continuing role of stare decisis in statutory interpretation, particularly when earlier rulings conflict with the clear text of legislation.

As such, lower courts and litigants will find guidance in this ruling when contending with the dual aspect of facility classifications and the jurisdictional questions that follow.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Assisted Living vs. Residential Health Care Facility: At the heart of the judgment is the statutory definition contained in Public Health Law § 4651(1)(a). In simple terms, if a facility is licensed as an "assisted living" facility, it is put into one legal category. If it were a "residential health care" facility, it would belong to a different category with distinct liability provisions. The statute clearly rules out the possibility of overlap between these two categories.

Doctrine of Stare Decisis: This legal principle means that courts generally adhere to prior decisions to ensure stability in the law. However, the judgment shows that while stare decisis is important, courts are not bound to follow established rulings if they believe a prior decision is unsound when weighed against the plain text of the statute.

Motion to Dismiss: The defendants argued for dismissing parts of the complaint that claimed liability under a statute supposedly covering residential health care facilities. Since Tennyson Court was clearly an assisted living facility, the court modified the earlier order and dismissed those specific claims, focusing only on the portion of the complaint that alleged negligent behavior under general tort principles.

Conclusion

The judgment in Kingston v. Tennyson Court has significant implications for the classification and liability of assisted living facilities. The court clarified that the unambiguous text of Public Health Law § 4651(1)(a) prevents an assisted living facility from being held liable under provisions intended for residential health care facilities. While the case reaffirms established precedent to some extent, it also highlights tension in the legal landscape regarding statutory interpretation and the willingness of courts to reconsider past decisions when statutory language is clear.

For legal practitioners and future litigants, the key takeaways are: (1) the importance of recognizing the categorical boundaries set by statutory language; (2) the careful deference that must be afforded to prior decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis, and the conditions under which such deference may be reconsidered; and (3) the need for precise allegations in complaints to overcome statutory defenses related to licensing classifications.

In summary, this decision provides clear guidance on the statutory exclusivity of assisted living facilities under New York’s Public Health Law and will undoubtedly influence both legal strategy and judicial reasoning in cases involving similar issues in the future.