Asmelash v. State: Harmless-Error Review Governs Denial of Juror Requests to Replay Admitted Video; No Strickland Prejudice from Uncalled, Contradicted Alibi Witness

Introduction

In Asmelash v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia, Nov. 4, 2025), the Court affirmed the convictions of Abel Asmelash for malice murder and related offenses arising from the fatal shooting of Travis Ridley at the Avana Uptown Apartments in DeKalb County. The appeal presented two principal questions:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion—and, if so, cause reversible error—by denying a deliberating jury’s request to review an admitted surveillance video?
Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance by failing to call an alibi witness who had been present in the courtroom during trial?

The Court assumed, without deciding, that the trial court erred in its handling of the jury’s request and that the claim was preserved, and also assumed potential deficient performance by trial counsel. Nevertheless, the Court held that any error was harmless and any deficiency was non-prejudicial. The Court also rejected a cumulative-error argument. All Justices concurred.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed. Applying nonconstitutional harmless-error review, the Court concluded it was highly probable that denying the jury’s request to view the Avana Apartments surveillance video did not contribute to the verdict. The jury had already seen portions of the video and still images; the footage was ambiguous and largely cumulative. On the ineffective-assistance claim, the Court held that even if counsel should have sought to present the alibi witness (despite her presence during trial), there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome: her testimony contradicted objective cell-site and video timelines and even conflicted with the defendant’s own account. The Court further rejected cumulative prejudice, emphasizing the strong State’s case supported by eyewitness testimony and corroborative phone/cell-site evidence.

Case Background and Key Facts

The State’s theory was that Ridley came to purchase a large quantity of marijuana and was instead robbed by Asmelash and co-defendant Edward Tavarez, with Tavarez shooting Ridley. The principal eyewitness, Erica Shavers (Ridley’s on-and-off girlfriend), identified Asmelash as the person who took the money while Tavarez shot Ridley. Surveillance footage and phone/cell-site data corroborated her account.

Condensed Timeline from the Record

4:12 p.m.: Store video shows Asmelash (white t-shirt) arriving in a silver Mercedes.
4:50–4:59 p.m.: Silver Mercedes leaves the store; arrives at and then departs Chevron, followed by Ridley’s purple Challenger.
5:21 p.m.: Silver Mercedes (driven by Rafael Nin-Polanco) and the Challenger enter the Avana complex; a passenger appears to be present in the Mercedes, though the video is unclear.
5:28 p.m.: Silver Mercedes exits Avana. Shortly thereafter, at a nearby BP station, it is joined by a white Mercedes believed to be driven by Tavarez; timestamps in screenshots are blurry.
5:38–5:43 p.m.: White Mercedes enters and then exits Avana; tinting obscures whether a passenger is present. The 911 call is logged at approximately 5:44 p.m.
Cell-site pattern: Asmelash’s phone tracks from the store/Chevron to sectors overlapping the Avana area between approximately 5:22 and 5:45 p.m., consistent with Shavers’s account. The phone later converges near a Stone Mountain address associated with Tavarez and Gonzalez.

Defense strategy was alibi: Asmelash initially noticed being at Hanu Hookah Lounge; after receiving the State’s cell-site report, he filed a second notice stating he was at Desta Ethiopian Kitchen. At trial, he acknowledged being with the group at the store and Chevron but denied being at the apartment complex at the time of the shooting, claiming he was dropped at Desta and then briefly went to Hanu to pay a tab before returning to Desta and later heading to Snellville.

Detailed Analysis

1) The Jury’s Request to Review the Admitted Surveillance Video

During deliberations, the jury asked, “We would like to see the Avana surveillance video — can we get AV equipment to play this video?” The trial judge replied “No.” Although defense counsel asked the court to tell the jury they could view the video in the courtroom, the court declined. The Supreme Court assumed without deciding that this was an abuse of discretion and that the issue was preserved, but held the error harmless because:

The jury had seen portions of the video during trial and had still-frame screenshots in the jury room.
The Avana footage was “neither inculpatory nor exculpatory” on the pivotal question whether a passenger was visible; on the Court’s own review, that issue remained unclear.
The State’s case was strong: Shavers’s eyewitness account—made after multiple opportunities to observe the participants—was corroborated by phone and cell-site data.
The defense case was weakened by shifting alibi theories and misalignment with the objective timeline.

In short, replaying the video was unlikely to change the outcome because the footage did not clearly show what the defense suggested it would and because the jury already had access to substantially the same content in another form (screenshots).

2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Not Calling an Alibi Witness

The alibi witness, Seti Araya, sat through several days of trial, leading defense counsel to believe she could not testify due to the sequestration rule. The Supreme Court pretermitted whether that was deficient performance and resolved the claim on prejudice:

Araya’s proffered timeline (“around 5:00 p.m.” seeing Asmelash dine in at Desta) conflicted with admitted video and cell-site evidence (the Chevron departure around 4:59 p.m., several miles away; cell-site hits south of the Desta/Avana area through at least 5:18 p.m.).
Her account also contradicted Asmelash’s own trial testimony (he said he took food to go, whereas Araya said he was eating at a table).
Araya’s close friendship with Asmelash, coupled with the defense’s late shift from a Hanu Hookah Lounge alibi to a Desta alibi after receiving the State’s cell-site analysis, gave the jury reason to question her neutrality and the origins of her recollection.

Given these contradictions and credibility concerns, the Court held there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome had Araya testified. Indeed, her testimony “actually may have been detrimental to the defense.”

3) Cumulative Error

The Court assumed, arguendo, one trial error (the denial of the jury’s request) and one deficiency (failure to call the alibi witness), but found both harmless or non-prejudicial. Even under the “higher” cumulative prejudice conception noted in Park v. State, the combined effects did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The State’s evidence—eyewitness identification plus corroborative telecom data—remained robust, while the challenged video was cumulative and the alibi proffer conflicted with the objective record.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Johnson v. State, 301 Ga. 205 (2017): Establishes that whether to grant a jury’s request to review video evidence lies squarely within the trial court’s discretion. Here, the Supreme Court sidestepped a final ruling on abuse of discretion by assuming error and proceeding to harmlessness.
Tarver v. State, 319 Ga. 165 (2024): Provides the nonconstitutional harmless-error test—whether it is highly probable the error did not contribute to the verdict. The Court applied Tarver’s logic, emphasizing the cumulative nature of the video and the weakness of the defense’s theory relative to strong inculpatory evidence.
Wood v. State, 316 Ga. 811, 812 n.2 (2023): Clarifies that when addressing harmless error or Strickland prejudice, appellate courts may describe the evidence in detail rather than in the light most favorable to the verdict. The Court explicitly embraced that approach here.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Governs ineffective-assistance claims; the defendant must show deficient performance and prejudice. The Court resolved the claim on prejudice alone.
Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489 (2024): Restates Strickland’s twin prongs and the standard of review—deference to factual findings, de novo application of law to facts. The Court followed this framework.
Navarette v. State, 283 Ga. 156 (2008): Supports the conclusion that uncalled-witness testimony can be non-prejudicial—or even detrimental—when it contradicts the defense or the objective record. The Court analogized Araya’s testimony to this scenario.
Lane v. State, 308 Ga. 10 (2020); Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558 (2023); Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733 (2022): Address cumulative-error and cumulative-prejudice analysis. Park notes the Court has not resolved how different prejudice standards interact under cumulative review; the Court again found it unnecessary to decide the issue because the claims failed even under a more demanding approach.
Sinkfield v. State, 318 Ga. 531 (2024): Authorizes jurors to treat the defendant’s disbelieved testimony as substantive evidence of guilt. The Court cited Sinkfield to underscore the fragility of a defense that contradicts objective evidence.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and Tavarez v. State, 319 Ga. 480 (2024): Provide procedural backdrop (severance due to Bruton issues; co-defendant Tavarez’s conviction affirmed), but did not drive the substantive rulings.

Legal Reasoning Unpacked

Harmless Error for Denied Jury Replays of Admitted Video

The Court’s analysis is pragmatic: even if the trial judge’s one-word denial (“No”) was a problematic response to a jury requesting equipment to view an admitted exhibit, reversal is unwarranted where the same content was already before the jury in meaningful form (partial playback during trial and screenshots) and the footage is ambiguous. The Court examined the video itself and found it inconclusive on the central defense point (whether a front passenger was present). Because the State’s case did not hinge on a single frame of video and the remaining evidence was strong, the Court held it highly probable that the verdict would have been the same.

Strickland Prejudice and the Uncalled, Contradicted Alibi Witness

The Court focused on prejudice. It appraised how Araya’s testimony would have landed with a jury already presented with:

Telecom data placing Asmelash’s phone in overlapping sectors covering the Avana area between 5:22 and 5:45 p.m.
Video evidence showing the Chevron departure only at 4:59 p.m. (several miles from Desta/Avana), undermining a “5:00 p.m. dining in at Desta” account.
Inconsistencies between Araya’s version (dine-in) and the defendant’s version (takeout), plus the late shift from a Hanu alibi to a Desta alibi.

This constellation of contradictions made it unlikely that Araya would help the defense—and possible she would harm it. Under Strickland, such a witness cannot create a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

Cumulative Prejudice

The Court reaffirmed that even aggregating assumed errors and deficiencies, a strong record of guilt (eyewitness identification, corroborative phone/cell-site evidence, and a weak, shifting alibi) defeats a claim that the trial was fundamentally unfair. The Court again noted it has not decided how different prejudice standards interact in cumulative review, but found the claims insufficient even under a more defense-friendly articulation.

Impact and Practical Implications

For Trial Courts

Juror access to admitted exhibits during deliberations remains within the court’s discretion. However, this case highlights the risks of narrowly construing juror requests and responding with a bare “No.” A clarifying instruction that the jury may review exhibits in open court with the court’s assistance can avoid unnecessary appellate issues.
Appellate courts will closely examine whether the requested material would likely have altered the verdict—ambiguity and cumulativeness often point to harmlessness.

For Defense Counsel

Preservation matters. The Court assumed preservation here but noted a dispute. Counsel should make explicit, contemporaneous requests (e.g., “We ask the Court to bring the jury into the courtroom to replay Exhibit X in their presence”).
Do not assume a sequestration violation forecloses testimony. Trial courts typically retain discretion to permit testimony with appropriate safeguards. If a critical alibi witness has been present, ask the court to exercise its discretion and be prepared to address credibility and scope.
Alibi strategies must align with objective data. Shifting alibis after disclosure of cell-site analysis undermines credibility. Corroboration (receipts, location data, contemporaneous communications) is essential.
Recognize the “disbelief as evidence” dynamic (Sinkfield). When a defendant’s testimony contradicts objective records, jurors may treat that disbelief as substantive proof of guilt.

For Prosecutors

Combine eyewitness testimony with telecom forensics to bolster identification—this synergy played a decisive role here.
When video is of limited clarity, ensure the jury has screenshots and narrative testimony tying the timeline together; ambiguity can still be supportive if consistent with the State’s overall theory.

The Law Going Forward

Harmless-error framework: Denials of juror requests to replay admitted video will be reviewed for harm. Where the footage is cumulative or ambiguous and the State’s case is strong, affirmance is likely.
Strickland prejudice: Failure to call an alibi witness who is contradicted by objective data, or who conflicts with the defendant’s own testimony, generally will not demonstrate prejudice.
Cumulative error: The Supreme Court of Georgia continues to reserve judgment on how multiple prejudice standards interact; defendants must show the combined effect rendered the trial fundamentally unfair—a high bar unmet here.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Harmless error (nonconstitutional): An error is “harmless” if it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict. The focus is on the likely impact of the error given the whole record.
Strickland ineffective assistance: Two prongs—deficiency (performance below reasonable professional norms) and prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for the deficiency). Courts may resolve on either prong.
Rule of sequestration: Witnesses are typically excluded from the courtroom so they do not tailor testimony. A violation does not automatically bar testimony; trial courts have discretion to fashion remedies, admit testimony, and allow impeachment.
Cumulative error: Even if individual errors are harmless, a defendant may argue that their combined effect deprived him of a fair trial. Georgia’s high court has not finalized how different prejudice standards interact in this analysis, but the defendant must show fundamental unfairness.
Cell-site sector analysis: Phones connect to specific sectors of nearby towers. Repeated connections to overlapping sectors can suggest a phone’s general vicinity. It is not GPS-precise but can corroborate or undermine alibi timelines.

Conclusion

Asmelash v. State reinforces two practical principles. First, even if denying a jury’s request to replay an admitted surveillance video is erroneous, reversal will be rare where the footage is cumulative or ambiguous and the State’s case is otherwise strong. Second, ineffective-assistance claims premised on uncalled alibi witnesses will falter where the proffered testimony contradicts objective forensics or the defendant’s own story, creating no reasonable probability of a different verdict. The Court’s cumulative-error discussion underscores that robust corroborative evidence—here, an eyewitness aligned with detailed telecom data—can insulate a verdict despite arguable trial-level missteps. The judgment was affirmed; all Justices concurred.