As of 2017, No Clearly Established Law Barring SWAT Execution of No‑Knock Warrants: Eighth Circuit Affirms Qualified Immunity and Rejects Franks Challenge in Davis v. City of Little Rock

Introduction

In Davis v. City of Little Rock, No. 23-1636 (8th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024), the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City of Little Rock, its police chief, and three narcotics detectives in a Fourth Amendment suit arising from a SWAT-assisted, no-knock execution of a search warrant at Derrick A. Davis’s home. The decision, authored by Judge Benton and joined by Judges Arnold and Kobes, addresses four core issues:

Qualified immunity for detectives who used a SWAT team to execute a no-knock warrant.
A FRANKS v. DELAWARE challenge to the warrant affidavit, focusing on statements about the safety of no-knock entries, the reliability of a confidential informant (CI), and the pre-buy search of that CI.
Dismissal of a § 1983 conspiracy claim and the personal-involvement requirement for individual § 1983 liability.
Summary-judgment evidence handling (including hearsay and expert opinions) and appellate jurisdiction over an undetermined sanctions award.

The opinion’s principal contribution is to clarify that, within the Eighth Circuit, it was not clearly established as of September 2017 that deploying a SWAT team to execute a no-knock warrant—absent a specific necessity showing—violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also reinforces stringent Franks standards, underscores the necessity of personal involvement for § 1983 liability, and reiterates long-standing rules about summary-judgment evidence and appellate finality of sanctions.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the Eastern District of Arkansas’s grant of summary judgment on all claims:

Qualified immunity (SWAT/no-knock execution): Without deciding whether the Fourth Amendment was violated, the court held that, as of September 2017, it was not clearly established that using a SWAT team to execute a search warrant (even a no-knock warrant) without a specific necessity rationale violated the Constitution. Detectives Bell and Ison were therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
Franks challenge: Davis failed to show knowing falsehoods or reckless disregard for the truth in the affidavit. Statements that no-knock entries enhance safety were reasonably believed by the affiant; evidence questioning a CI’s reliability did not link to the affiant’s knowledge at the time; and speculation about an allegedly inadequate search of the CI could not sustain a Franks claim.
§ 1983 conspiracy and personal involvement: The derivative conspiracy claim failed once the underlying Fourth Amendment claims failed. Detective Hardman was properly dismissed for lack of personal involvement.
Evidence handling: The district court did not err by considering Detective Bell’s affidavit (no hearsay objection was made) or by disregarding expert opinions that merely recited facts and offered legal conclusions. Davis’s Monell theories were waived by omission from his opening brief.
Sanctions: The Eighth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review a sanctions order that determined entitlement but not the amount; such an order is nonfinal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

TORGERSON v. CITY OF ROCHESTER, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009); SCOTT v. HARRIS, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); ANDERSON v. LIBERTY LOBBY, INC., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Howard v. Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2004): These cases provide the summary-judgment framework: de novo review; genuine dispute/materiality; inferences in favor of the nonmovant only if reasonable and supported by specific facts; no reliance on speculation or unreasonable inferences.
Adams v. City of Cedar Rapids, 74 F.4th 935 (8th Cir. 2023); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011); HARLOW v. FITZGERALD, 457 U.S. 800 (1982): Articulate the two-prong qualified-immunity inquiry—(1) constitutional violation, and (2) clearly established law. The court adjudicated the “clearly established” prong without deciding any constitutional violation, a familiar approach endorsed by the Supreme Court.
Z.J. by & through Jones v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Commissioners, 931 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 2019): Pivotal precedent. Z.J. held that as of 2010 it was not clearly established that using a SWAT team to execute a search warrant absent necessity violated the Fourth Amendment. Davis extends that non-clarity at least to September 2017, supporting qualified immunity here.
FRANKS v. DELAWARE, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Schmitz, 181 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1995): Define a Franks violation: the affiant must have knowingly or recklessly included a false statement (or omitted material facts); and the corrected affidavit would lack probable cause. “Truthful” under Franks means reasonably believed by the affiant, not objectively infallible.
ASKEW v. MILLERD, 191 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1999); Riddle v. Riepe, 866 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2017): A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying constitutional violation; if the underlying claims fail, the conspiracy claim fails.
White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2017); Kingsley v. Lawrence County, 964 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 2020): § 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement. Absent evidence tying an officer to the alleged violation, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.
Walker v. Wayne County, 850 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1988): On summary judgment, courts may consider only evidence admissible at trial, but if no hearsay objection is made, the court does not err in considering the otherwise hearsay material.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986): The nonmovant must present specific facts creating a genuine issue; metaphysical doubt is insufficient.
Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222 (6th Cir. 1994): Cited for the proposition that absence-of-records can be probative only if the party shows such records are ordinarily kept; otherwise, a missing record is meaningless.
In re Acceptance Ins. Companies Sec. Litig., 423 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2005); Howard, 363 F.3d at 801: Expert opinions that state legal conclusions or merely repackage facts to tell the court how to rule are inadmissible on summary judgment.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); JENKINS v. WINTER, 540 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2008): Municipal liability requires a policy or custom causing the violation; issues not raised in the opening brief are waived.
Dieser v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 440 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2006); Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d 149 (8th Cir. 1995): A judgment resolving liability but not fixing the amount is nonfinal; only orders leaving purely ministerial tasks are final. The unquantified sanctions order here is nonfinal.

Legal Reasoning

1) Qualified Immunity: SWAT Execution of a No‑Knock Warrant

The court chose to resolve qualified immunity on the “clearly established” prong without determining whether detectives violated the Fourth Amendment. Relying on Z.J., which found no clearly established prohibition as of 2010 against using SWAT to execute a warrant absent necessity, the panel held that Davis identified no authority that would have clearly established by September 2017 that employing a SWAT team for a no-knock execution was unconstitutional. Thus, Detectives Bell and Ison were entitled to qualified immunity.

Importantly, the court did not reach the underlying constitutional question whether the SWAT/no-knock execution itself was reasonable; it held only that the law did not put the detectives on fair notice in 2017 that such conduct was unlawful.

2) FRANKS v. DELAWARE Challenge to the Warrant Affidavit

Davis attacked three sets of statements in Detective Bell’s affidavit:

“No-knock entries reduce risk and increase safety”: Davis offered a 2003 SWAT treatise and a 2014 training document to argue that the statement was false or at least disputed. The court found these materials acknowledged that explosive breaching/no‑knock tactics can promote safety in certain circumstances and warned of risks when officers enter unknown environments. At most, they showed professional disagreement, not knowing falsehood or recklessness. Because Franks measures “truthful” by whether the affiant reasonably believed the statements, the court held Bell’s statement was “truthful” in the Franks sense.
CI reliability: Evidence that the CI had a history of untruthfulness and was terminated two years after the affidavit did not show Bell knew or recklessly disregarded such issues at the time. Absent proof that Bell had reason to doubt the CI contemporaneously, no Franks violation lies.
Search of the CI: Davis argued Bell inadequately searched the CI before the controlled buy, but he pointed to no misrepresentation in the affidavit about what Bell did, and provided no evidence of what an “adequate” search required. Speculation cannot support a Franks claim.

Because Davis failed to show knowing falsehood or reckless disregard on any of these points, the Franks challenge failed at step one; the court did not need to reach whether a corrected affidavit would lack probable cause.

3) § 1983 Conspiracy and Personal Involvement

The conspiracy claim against Detectives Bell, Ison, and Hardman failed because the underlying Fourth Amendment claims failed. Independently, Detective Hardman was entitled to dismissal for lack of personal involvement: the record contained no evidence tying him to the investigation or execution of the warrant, and § 1983 liability is personal, not vicarious or collective.

4) Summary-Judgment Evidence: Hearsay, Inferences, and Expert Opinions

Hearsay affidavit not objected to: Because Davis did not object to Detective Bell’s affidavit as hearsay, the district court could consider it.
Inferences from absent records: Davis urged an inference that neighbor conversations never occurred because they were not documented in the file. The court rejected this as speculative. Without evidence that the police ordinarily document such conversations, the absence of records is “meaningless” (citing Wiley). Inferences must be reasonable and grounded in evidence, not “metaphysical doubt.”
Expert opinions: The court properly disregarded the police-practices expert’s report because it merely repeated the factual record and stated legal conclusions—functions reserved to the court. A declaration from a former chief of police was immaterial because Davis had waived any Monell claim.

5) Appellate Jurisdiction over Sanctions

The district court sanctioned Davis for failing to attend a deposition but did not set the amount. Because the order determined entitlement but not the quantum, it was nonfinal and unreviewable under § 1291. The court contrasted orders leaving only “ministerial” tasks (final) with those, like this one, requiring further substantive determination (nonfinal).

Impact

Qualified immunity in SWAT/no‑knock contexts: The decision confirms that, at least through September 2017, the Eighth Circuit had not clearly established a constitutional violation for deploying SWAT to execute a no-knock warrant absent special necessity. Plaintiffs challenging similar conduct from that period (and possibly later, depending on subsequent case law) will face a steep qualified immunity hurdle unless they can cite controlling or robust consensus authority specifically on point.
Affidavit challenges under Franks: The opinion illustrates the difficulty of attacking generalized, experience-based assertions (e.g., “safety” rationales) in warrant affidavits. Unless plaintiffs can show that the affiant knew or had obvious reasons to doubt such assertions at the time, disagreement in training materials is unlikely to suffice. Post hoc evidence of a CI’s unreliability, absent proof of the affiant’s contemporaneous knowledge or recklessness, will not support Franks relief.
Personal involvement and unit-wide liability theories: Assertions that “all unit members work on all cases” cannot substitute for evidence of an individual defendant’s actual involvement. Plaintiffs should develop concrete proof tying each defendant to specific acts.
Summary-judgment practice: Litigants must timely object to hearsay, avoid speculative inferences, and offer expert testimony that aids—rather than supplants—the court’s legal judgment. Record-building on agency practices (e.g., documenting interviews) can be critical to support absence-of-record inferences.
Appellate timing for sanctions: Parties seeking review of sanctions must ensure the order is final—i.e., the amount is fixed—before appealing, or else appellate jurisdiction will be lacking.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: Shields government officials from civil damages unless they violate a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time, meaning every reasonable official would know the conduct was unlawful in the specific context.
Clearly established law: Requires precedent—controlling or a clear consensus—putting the constitutional question beyond debate for the particular situation. Broad generalities do not suffice.
No-knock warrant: A warrant authorizing entry without announcing presence. Whether its execution is reasonable can depend on exigency, safety, and destruction-of-evidence considerations.
Franks challenge: A mechanism to invalidate a warrant if the affiant intentionally or recklessly included false statements (or omitted material facts) and the corrected affidavit would lack probable cause. “Truthful” means reasonably believed by the affiant when sworn, not necessarily correct in hindsight.
§ 1983 conspiracy: Requires an agreement to violate a constitutional right and an actual deprivation of that right. If the underlying constitutional claim fails, the conspiracy claim fails.
Personal involvement: § 1983 imposes individual liability only on those personally involved in the alleged violation; supervisory status or membership in a unit is not enough.
Monell liability: A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if an official policy or widespread custom caused the constitutional violation. Failing to raise Monell arguments in the opening appellate brief waives them.
Summary judgment evidence: Courts consider only admissible evidence. Failure to object to hearsay may permit the court to consider it. Inferences must be reasonable and supported by evidence, not speculation.
Finality of sanctions orders: An order awarding sanctions is not appealable until the amount is set; otherwise, it is nonfinal and outside appellate jurisdiction.

Conclusion

Davis v. City of Little Rock reaffirms and extends a critical qualified immunity principle in the Eighth Circuit: as of September 2017, it was not clearly established that using a SWAT team to execute a no-knock warrant without a particularized necessity showing violated the Fourth Amendment. The decision also underscores the rigor of Franks challenges, emphasizing that generalized safety assertions and post hoc CI reliability issues do not, without more, demonstrate knowing falsehood or recklessness by the affiant. Additionally, the opinion reinforces the personal-involvement requirement for § 1983 liability, the necessity of proper evidentiary objections and non-speculative proof at summary judgment, the waiver risks inherent in appellate briefing, and the nonfinal nature of sanctions orders that reserve the determination of amount.

Together, these holdings provide a detailed roadmap for litigants and courts confronting no-knock/SWAT execution claims, affidavit-based challenges, and the evidentiary and procedural safeguards that govern § 1983 litigation in federal court.