Articulation, Not Hunch: Denial of Leave in People v. Duff Leaves COA Ruling Intact; Dissent Reasserts Particularized, Experience‑Based Reasonable Suspicion for Parked‑Vehicle Seizures

Introduction

On October 31, 2025, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in People of the State of Michigan v. Matthew Scott Duff (SC: 168148), thereby leaving undisturbed a split, unpublished Court of Appeals decision that had reversed the trial court’s suppression of evidence in Duff’s operating while intoxicated (OWI) case. Justice Hood dissented. The dissent would have reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s suppression order on the ground that the prosecution failed, at the suppression hearing, to carry its burden of proving reasonable suspicion for the initial seizure.

The case sits at the intersection of several bedrock Fourth Amendment doctrines: what counts as a “seizure” when officers block a parked vehicle, what constitutes reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop (a Terry stop), and what the prosecution must prove—through an officer’s testimony—at a suppression hearing. The dissent synthesizes Terry v. Ohio and Michigan precedents such as People v. LoCicero (After Remand), People v. Oliver, People v. Freeman, and People v. Prude to emphasize that officers must articulate how observed facts, in light of their training and experience, support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere presence in a “high‑crime” area, a late hour, and a parked vehicle at a closed school do not suffice without more.

Summary of the Opinion

Disposition: The Michigan Supreme Court denied Duff’s application for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals’ December 17, 2024 judgment. No majority opinion issued; only an order with a dissent by Justice Hood.
Dissent (Hood, J.): Would reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s suppression order. The dissent reasons that the prosecution did not meet its burden to show reasonable suspicion at the moment of the initial seizure. The officer failed to articulate how his training and experience connected the observed facts to criminal activity before the seizure occurred.
Key factual posture: Late at night, deputies positioned a marked patrol car roughly ten feet behind Duff’s parked vehicle in an empty elementary school parking lot, blocking him in. Only after approaching on foot did the officer observe indicia of intoxication. Under a prior Michigan Supreme Court decision in this same case (People v. Duff, 514 Mich 617 (2024)), Duff was “seized” when he was blocked in; thus, signs of intoxication observed afterward could not retroactively justify the initial detention.

Procedural Background

Trial court: Suppressed the evidence, finding a seizure occurred when officers blocked Duff’s vehicle, and that the State failed to establish reasonable suspicion at that time.
Court of Appeals: Reversed in a split, unpublished per curiam decision, concluding reasonable suspicion supported the initial seizure and not addressing the exclusionary rule.
Michigan Supreme Court (2024): In People v. Duff, 514 Mich 617, the Court held Duff was seized when the patrol car blocked him in (before intoxication cues were observed) and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that ruling.
Michigan Supreme Court (2025): Denied leave to review the Court of Appeals’ later decision; Justice Hood dissented, urging reinstatement of suppression.

Issues Presented

Whether the objective facts known to the officers before they blocked Duff’s vehicle (and thus seized him) established reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Whether an officer’s reference to a “high‑crime area,” late hour, and a lone parked vehicle at a closed school, without training- and experience-based explanation linking those facts to crime, satisfies the reasonable suspicion standard.
Whether the prosecution met its burden at the suppression hearing to articulate particularized reasons for suspecting criminal activity, as required by Michigan and federal caselaw.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968): Authorizes brief, on-the-scene investigatory detentions (Terry stops) based on reasonable suspicion, which must be articulable and specific—not a mere hunch. The dissent relies on Terry’s foundational standards.
Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491 (1983) (opinion of White, J.): Assigns to the prosecution the burden to justify a seizure at a suppression hearing. The dissent uses Royer to emphasize the State’s burden and the need for an articulable basis.
People v. Custer, 465 Mich 319 (2001) (opinion by Markman, J.): Confirms that brief detentions are permitted if officers can articulate reasonable suspicion. The dissent cites Custer as part of the Michigan articulation requirement lineage.
People v. Jenkins, 472 Mich 26 (2005): Reasonable suspicion is fact-specific and evaluated case by case; supports the dissent’s totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
People v. Oliver, 464 Mich 184 (2001): Courts must consider the totality of circumstances and give appropriate weight to specific reasonable inferences an officer may draw in light of his experience, not to inchoate hunches. Also notes that while fewer facts may justify stopping a car than entering a house, some minimum threshold must be met. The dissent invokes Oliver both for flexibility and for the threshold requirement.
People v. LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496 (1996): Requires officers who rely on training and experience to articulate how observed behavior supports an inference of crime; a conclusory “looked like a drug transaction” is insufficient. This case is the dissent’s centerpiece: it draws a direct analogy between the non-articulated inference there and the officer’s testimony here.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 US 119 (2000): Reasonable suspicion can rest on commonsense judgments; high‑crime area is a factor, but Wardlow itself involved unprovoked flight. The dissent uses Wardlow’s “commonsense” language while underscoring that commonsense still requires articulable links to criminality.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 US 266 (2002): Officers may draw on training and experience to make inferences from the cumulative information, but they must be able to explain the linkage. The dissent uses Arvizu to show what was missing from the record here.
People v. Freeman, 413 Mich 492 (1982): “A lone automobile idling in a darkened parking lot late at night does not, without more, support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” The dissent relies on Freeman to reject time-of-day and parked-vehicle generalities as standalone suspicion.
People v. Prude, 513 Mich 377 (2024): Being in a “high‑crime” area is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. The dissent applies Prude to foreclose reliance on the high‑crime label by itself.
People v. Duff, 514 Mich 617 (2024): In this very case, the Court previously held the seizure occurred when officers blocked Duff’s vehicle with their patrol car. That timing matters because anything learned after the seizure (e.g., indicia of intoxication) cannot bootstrap reasonable suspicion for the initial detention.

Legal Reasoning in the Dissent

Justice Hood’s analysis proceeds in two steps: (1) identify when the seizure occurred; (2) assess what facts were known before that moment and whether the State articulated a particularized, experience‑based reason to suspect criminal activity at that time.

Timing of the seizure. The 2024 Michigan Supreme Court decision in People v. Duff already decided that Duff was seized when the patrol car blocked him in, such that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. This sets the temporal cutoff: the only facts that can justify the stop are those known before the blocking maneuver.
Reasonable suspicion analysis focused on pre‑seizure facts. Before the block‑in, officers observed:
- a lone, occupied vehicle in an empty elementary school parking lot;
- a late hour (about 10 p.m. on a Sunday);
- a location characterized by the officer as high‑crime; and
- no observed unlawful conduct.
The dissent accepts that such facts could amount to reasonable suspicion if the officer explained, by reference to training and experience, why they signaled criminal activity (for example, a known OWI pattern of pulling into empty school lots). But the officer did not make that showing. When the prosecutor asked what kind of criminal activity he suspected, a defense objection was sustained and the prosecution never elicited particularized testimony connecting the facts to a crime. The reasons offered—late hour, closed school, high‑crime area, an occupied parked car—are, under Freeman and Prude, insufficient standing alone. And the observations of intoxication occurred only after the seizure and thus cannot retroactively justify it.

In short, under Royer and LoCicero, the State bore the burden to present testimony articulating how these facts, in light of the officer’s training and experience, reasonably indicated criminal activity. That articulation was missing from the record, so the dissent would find the stop unconstitutional and suppress its fruits.

Why Precedents Compelled the Dissent’s Result

LoCicero’s articulation requirement was not met. As in LoCicero, the officer provided only generalized suspicions without explaining how his experience informed those suspicions in this specific setting. A generic “high‑crime area + late hour” does not close the gap.
Oliver and Jenkins demand a totality assessment, but the “totality” here, absent an experience‑based linkage, consists of factors the Michigan Supreme Court has already warned are insufficient: a late hour (Freeman) and a high‑crime area label (Prude).
Arvizu and Wardlow allow training‑based inferences, but only when the officer can explain them. The record here was bereft of that explanation before the seizure occurred.
Royer allocates the burden to the State, a burden the dissent finds unfulfilled on this record.

Impact and Significance

Because the Court denied leave, the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the suppression order remains in place for this case. As an unpublished opinion, it is not precedentially binding statewide. The controlling piece of law that does emerge from the Michigan Supreme Court in the Duff litigation remains the 2024 published decision confirming that blocking in a parked vehicle constitutes a seizure when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.

Nonetheless, Justice Hood’s dissent is significant for several reasons:

Signals strict adherence to articulation requirements. The dissent offers a roadmap of what Michigan courts should expect: the State must present testimony that connects objective facts to suspected crimes through the officer’s training and experience, not through conclusory labels.
Clarifies insufficiency of “high‑crime area” and “late hour” standing alone. Relying on Prude and Freeman, the dissent reiterates that these ubiquitous factors cannot carry the day by themselves, particularly for seizures of parked vehicles.
Emphasizes the temporal boundary created by seizure timing. Observations made after a seizure cannot retroactively justify it. Practitioners must establish reasonable suspicion before the block‑in or other show of authority that restrains movement.
Highlights the underdeveloped “welfare check” rationale. Although the officer referenced a possible medical emergency, the State did not build a record to justify a community‑caretaking or emergency‑aid seizure, distinct from a criminal-investigation Terry stop. The dissent implicitly underscores the importance of choosing and proving the correct doctrinal path.
Practical training implications for law enforcement and prosecutors. Officers should be trained to preserve consensual encounters (e.g., approach without blocking) when investigating ambiguous circumstances, or, if a seizure is necessary, to articulate specific, experience‑based reasons. Prosecutors should elicit detailed testimony about officers’ training and how it leads to particularized inferences before the seizure occurred.
Unresolved questions on remedy in the COA opinion. The dissent notes the Court of Appeals did not address the exclusionary rule. If a stop lacks reasonable suspicion at inception, suppression of its fruits is generally required absent an exception (attenuation, independent source, inevitable discovery). The lack of analysis leaves future guidance on remedies underdeveloped.

Complex Concepts, Simplified

Seizure: A person is “seized” when, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or terminate the encounter with police. Blocking a vehicle so it cannot leave generally constitutes a seizure.
Terry stop: A brief detention by police to investigate possible criminal activity. It requires “reasonable suspicion,” which is less than probable cause but must be more than a mere hunch.
Reasonable suspicion: Specific and articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that criminal activity is afoot. Courts look at the totality of the circumstances and what trained officers can reasonably infer—but officers must explain those inferences.
Articulation requirement: If officers rely on their “training and experience,” they must describe how that training connects the observed facts to suspected crime; conclusory statements are not enough.
High‑crime area and late hour: These can be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances but cannot, by themselves, justify a seizure.
Exclusionary rule: If a seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, evidence obtained as a result is typically suppressed, unless an exception applies.
Consensual encounter vs. seizure: Police may approach and talk to someone without any suspicion so long as a reasonable person would feel free to end the conversation and leave. The encounter becomes a seizure when the officer’s show of authority or physical restraint would make a reasonable person feel not free to go.

Practice Pointers

For law enforcement:
- When circumstances are ambiguous, consider a consensual approach on foot without blocking the vehicle or activating authority signals, unless safety concerns require otherwise.
- If a seizure is necessary, be prepared to explain—concretely and specifically—how your training and experience link the observed facts to suspected criminal conduct.
- Document any indicators of medical distress or emergency that may justify a community‑caretaking or emergency‑aid intervention, which is analytically distinct from a Terry stop.
For prosecutors:
- At suppression hearings, build a record establishing the officer’s training and experience and walk the officer through how each observed fact supports an inference of criminal activity.
- Do not rely solely on “high‑crime area” or “late hour.” Add particularized details and explain their significance.
- Address the timing of the seizure and ensure that all justifying facts predate that moment. If applicable, develop alternative doctrines (community caretaking, emergency aid) with their own elements.
For defense counsel:
- Pin down the precise moment of seizure and challenge any post‑seizure observations used to justify the initial stop.
- Object to conclusory testimony; insist on particularized articulation of training and experience or argue for suppression under LoCicero, Oliver, Freeman, and Prude.
- If the State fails to establish reasonable suspicion, press the exclusionary rule and address potential exceptions.

Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s denial of leave in People v. Duff leaves the Court of Appeals’ reversal of suppression intact, but it does not create new precedent. The most consequential piece of binding law in the Duff litigation remains the Court’s 2024 holding that a block‑in is a seizure when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Justice Hood’s 2025 dissent, however, is an important signal: under Terry, Royer, LoCicero, Oliver, Freeman, and Prude, the State must do more than point to a high‑crime area and a late hour to justify seizing a parked vehicle. Officers must articulate—clearly and specifically—how their training and experience transform objective facts into reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the moment the seizure occurs. Without that articulation, a stop rests on a hunch, and the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of the evidence it yields.