I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Third Circuit’s non-precedential decision in Erich Smith, et al. v. President United States of America, et al., No. 24‑3007 (3d Cir. Dec. 8, 2025). Although designated “not precedential” under the court’s Internal Operating Procedures, the opinion offers a detailed application of Article III mootness doctrine to challenges against rescinded COVID‑19 vaccine mandates for federal employees and contractors.

The case arises from President Biden’s 2021 executive orders requiring COVID‑19 vaccination for certain federal employees and federal contractors (Executive Orders 14042 and 14043). Four individuals (three federal employees and one contractor) filed suit alleging violations of their Fifth Amendment rights to privacy and equal protection, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to block the mandates. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. While their initial appeal was pending, President Biden revoked the mandates in May 2023 via Executive Order 14099.

The Third Circuit previously dismissed the preliminary-injunction appeal as moot following the revocation. On remand, the district court dismissed the entire action as moot. Two plaintiffs, Dr. Daniel Donofrio and Maribel Lorenzo, appealed that final dismissal and also asked the Court of Appeals to vacate the district court’s earlier denial of a preliminary injunction.

The core issues before the Third Circuit in this appeal were:

• Whether the rescission of the federal COVID‑19 vaccine mandates rendered the entire case moot;
• Whether any exception to mootness applied, specifically:
  • the “voluntary cessation” doctrine, or
  • the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception;
• Whether the plaintiffs could keep the case alive by reframing their injury as one tied to alleged disclosure and retention of private medical information; and
• Whether the district court’s prior order denying a preliminary injunction should be vacated after the case became moot.

The opinion clarifies how the Third Circuit approaches mootness for now‑rescinded COVID‑related mandates, how carefully plaintiffs must plead and preserve privacy‑based claims to avoid dismissal, and how equitable considerations limit post‑hoc requests to vacate interlocutory orders.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Holding

The Third Circuit (Judge McKee writing, joined by Judges Restrepo and Rendell) held:

1. The challenge to the federal COVID‑19 vaccine mandates is moot because the mandates have been rescinded and the court can grant no “effectual relief” regarding them.
2. The plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain relief relating to alleged disclosure and retention of private medical data fails because:
   • their operative complaint contains no factual allegations that such information was disclosed, and
   • they did not preserve this argument on appeal.
3. The voluntary cessation exception to mootness does not apply: it is “absolutely clear” that the same legal controversy is not reasonably likely to recur.
4. The “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception also does not apply, for substantially the same reasons.
5. The request to vacate the district court’s prior denial of a preliminary injunction is denied. Vacatur is discretionary, and the equities—including the plaintiffs’ failure to seek vacatur earlier and the absence of identified legal consequences—do not support it.

B. Key Doctrinal Points

• Mootness is reviewed de novo (“plenary” review).
• To avoid mootness under Church of Scientology of California v. United States, a plaintiff must establish a factual basis for a partial remedy (such as ordering the destruction or return of information); pure conjecture is insufficient.
• The Third Circuit reaffirms its framework from Clark v. Governor of New Jersey for COVID‑related cases under the voluntary cessation doctrine: the focus is on whether “the same legal controversy” is reasonably likely to recur.
• Vacatur under United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. is equitable and not automatic; parties who “sleep on their rights” may be denied vacatur.

III. Precedents Cited and Their Role

A. Constitutional and Structural Framework

The court grounds its decision in Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement, citing Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 313 (3d Cir. 2001), which in turn relies on U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This sets the stage for the core proposition:

“If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,’ at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.”
—quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013), which itself quotes Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1990)

The standard formulation—“if it is impossible for us to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever’ to the prevailing party, then the case is moot”—is taken from Clark v. Governor of New Jersey, 53 F.4th 769, 775 (3d Cir. 2022), which in turn quotes the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell‑Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016).

B. Third Circuit COVID‑19 Mootness Precedents

1. County of Butler v. Governor of Pennsylvania, 8 F.4th 226 (3d Cir. 2021)

In County of Butler, the Third Circuit held that challenges to expired COVID‑19 orders—stay‑at‑home directives, business closures, and limits on secular gatherings—were moot because the orders had lapsed and there was “no relief that this Court c[ould] grant concerning them.”

The present case follows that logic: the federal vaccine mandates have been rescinded and thus no injunctive or declaratory relief could alter plaintiffs’ present legal position. The court explicitly cites County of Butler in a string citation, treating it as a settled template for COVID‑related mootness analysis.

2. Clark v. Governor of New Jersey, 53 F.4th 769 (3d Cir. 2022)

Clark concerned New Jersey executive orders that limited in‑person gatherings during COVID‑19, with certain secular exceptions but no parallel exception for religious services. The court in Clark held that after those orders were rescinded, the challenge was “facially moot,” because there was “no effectual relief whatsoever” that could be granted.

More importantly for Smith, Clark developed a framework for applying the voluntary cessation exception in the COVID context:

The chance of recurrence turns on: (1) whether the same precise situation—the pandemic as it presented itself in 2020 and 2021— will occur again; and (2) whether the government will respond with restrictions “similar enough” that the same legal controversy will recur.

In Smith, the panel imports this two‑factor test almost verbatim and applies it to federal vaccine mandates rather than state gathering limits. This continuity demonstrates that, even in a non‑precedential opinion, the Third Circuit intends to handle all COVID‑related “voluntary cessation” arguments through the analytic lens developed in Clark.

C. Supreme Court Precedents on Mootness and Remedies

1. Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992)

Plaintiffs relied heavily on Church of Scientology. In that case, the IRS obtained tape recordings under a district court order enforcing a summons; the Church appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the IRS obtained the tapes. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as moot. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that even if the disclosure had already occurred, the court could still provide “partial” relief by ordering the government to return or destroy the copies—thus the controversy was not moot.

In Smith, the plaintiffs analogized their alleged disclosure of medical information to the tapes in Church of Scientology. They argued that:

• their medical information had been collected under the vaccine mandates, and
• the court could grant relief by ordering an accounting, destruction of the data, and removal of non‑compliance notations from personnel records.

The Third Circuit did not reject the legal theory that such relief could prevent mootness; instead, it held that this record did not support that theory. Two independent reasons are given:

1. Pleading deficiency. The operative complaint is “devoid of any factual allegations” that private medical information was actually disclosed to employers. A later declaration merely states that plaintiffs filed or attempted to file exemption requests; it does not aver that any medical information was provided.
2. Waiver on appeal. Plaintiffs failed to challenge the district court’s finding on this point in their opening brief. Under Third Circuit law (e.g., Barna v. Board of School Directors of Panther Valley School District, 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017)), issues not adequately raised in the opening brief are deemed forfeited.

Thus, while Church of Scientology supports the concept that partial remedial relief (like an order to destroy information) may prevent mootness, the Third Circuit insists that such a theory must be grounded in actual factual allegations and properly preserved.

2. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)

Laidlaw supplies the key test for voluntary cessation:

Voluntary cessation will moot a case only if it is “absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”

The Third Circuit applies this standard via Clark to assess the likelihood of renewed vaccine mandates, emphasizing the defendant’s “heavy burden” to show non‑recurrence. Here, the federal government meets that burden.

3. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950)

Munsingwear is the foundational case on vacatur when a case becomes moot before appellate review is completed. The usual practice, where equity so requires, is to vacate the lower‑court judgment and remand with directions to dismiss, so that an unreviewable decision does not spawn legal consequences.

However, Munsingwear also recognizes that vacatur is not automatic, especially when the party seeking vacatur could have raised the issue earlier:

A party who “slept on his rights” cannot later demand vacatur as a matter of course.

The Third Circuit relies on this aspect of Munsingwear, emphasizing that the plaintiffs never asked for vacatur during the original appeal of the preliminary injunction denial, nor on remand when the government moved to dismiss the case as moot. They now seek vacatur too late, without showing any concrete adverse consequences from leaving the preliminary‑injunction decision in place.

4. Azar v. Garza, 584 U.S. 726 (2018)

Cited for the proposition that vacatur is a discretionary equitable remedy whose application “turns on ‘the conditions and circumstances of the particular case.’” The Third Circuit uses this to underscore that even in cases rendered moot, vacatur is not automatic; equity may disfavor it, especially when the requesting party contributed to the posture.

D. Pleading Standards and Preservation

1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)

The opinion cites Iqbal’s familiar standard—that a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to state a facially plausible claim—rooted in Twombly. This is used to reject plaintiffs’ attempt to rely on bare assertions of privacy harms not actually pleaded in the Third Amended Complaint. The court refuses to credit “conclusory allegations—not raised in the pleadings—as true.”

2. Barna v. Board of School Directors of Panther Valley School District, 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017)

Barna is invoked to emphasize that an appellant’s opening brief must adequately present each argument they wish to pursue. The Third Circuit has “consistently refused to consider ill‑developed arguments or those not properly raised and discussed in the appellate briefing.”

This becomes a second, independent basis to reject the plaintiffs’ medical‑privacy‑based remedial theory: even if the complaint were adequate (it was not), the plaintiffs failed to preserve the argument in their opening brief.

E. Sister-Circuit COVID Vaccine Cases

The opinion cites the First Circuit’s decision in Lowe v. Gagné-Holmes, 126 F.4th 747 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2795 (2025), noting that other circuits have similarly held that challenges to COVID‑19 vaccine requirements become moot when the requirements are rescinded. Although details are not elaborated, the citation is used to show that the Third Circuit’s approach is consistent with a broad national trend.

Additional First Circuit decisions—Boston Bit Labs, Inc. v. Baker, 11 F.4th 3 (1st Cir. 2021) and Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 52 F.4th 40 (1st Cir. 2022)—are cited for the proposition that the mere fact that an executive retains the power to reimpose orders cannot itself defeat mootness; otherwise, “no suit against the government would ever be moot.”

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The Core Mootness Determination

The court begins from first principles: federal courts may only hear “live disputes” in which both sides have a personal stake. Once President Biden revoked the vaccine mandates through Executive Order 14099 in May 2023, plaintiffs’ requests to enjoin and declare unconstitutional those mandates no longer implicated any ongoing legal obligation. The mandates “no longer exist,” so an injunction or declaration now “would not provide Plaintiffs with any cognizable relief.”

The panel emphasizes:

“We agree with the District Court that Appellants’ challenge to the COVID‑19 vaccine Mandates is moot because there is no effectual relief from the now‑rescinded Mandates that we can provide.”

This conclusion is reinforced by prior Third Circuit COVID‑19 decisions (Clark, County of Butler), which had already treated expired or rescinded restrictions as moot once no practical relief remained.

B. Attempted Shift to Privacy-Based Relief

To avoid mootness, plaintiffs argued that the mandates not only forced vaccination but also compelled them to disclose private medical information. From that angle, they sought:

• a declaration that the mandates were unconstitutional, and
• an order requiring the government to:
  • account for what had happened to their medical information,
  • prove that such information had been destroyed, and
  • ensure that personnel files no longer reflected medical information or non‑compliance.

Conceptually, this theory parallels Church of Scientology. But the Third Circuit identifies two fatal obstacles:

1. No Factual Allegations of Information Disclosure

The Third Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiffs actually provided private medical information to their employers. At most, a declaration submitted later showed that plaintiffs filed or attempted to file requests for exceptions. The declaration did not assert that these requests contained medical details.

Applying Twombly/Iqbal, the court refuses to credit bare, post‑hoc assertions of privacy harm when the operative pleading is silent on the factual predicate:

“[W]e cannot provide this form of relief to Appellants because their operative complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that they disclosed private medical information to their employers.”

Hence, there is no basis in the record to order an accounting, destruction, or correction of records. Without such a factual predicate, the requested relief would be speculative and therefore not “effectual relief” under Article III.

2. Argument Forfeiture on Appeal

Independently, the panel holds that plaintiffs waived this argument by failing to contest the district court’s finding on this point in their opening appellate brief. Citing Barna, the court reiterates that arguments not properly raised and developed in the opening brief are deemed forfeited.

As a result, even if the pleadings could support a privacy‑based remedy, the court would decline to reach that theory because it was not preserved.

C. Doctrinally Framed Exceptions to Mootness

1. Voluntary Cessation

Plaintiffs argued that the case remained justiciable because the vaccine mandates were rescinded voluntarily by the President, raising the specter that similar mandates could be reimposed. Invoking Laidlaw, they urged the voluntary cessation exception.

The Third Circuit, however, applies its COVID‑specific framework from Clark:

We consider (1) whether the same precise situation—the pandemic as it appeared in 2021‑2023—will recur; and (2) whether the President will respond to that situation with mandates “similar enough” to present “substantially the same legal controversy.”

Applying these factors, the court concludes:

• It is “hard to imagine” that the same pandemic circumstances will recur in the same way. The “public health outlook has changed dramatically.”
• It is unlikely that the President will again impose comparable federal vaccine mandates in response to COVID‑19 or similar conditions. The rescission was motivated by changed circumstances—not litigation pressure— which makes recurrence less likely.
• Subsequent executive policy (e.g., Executive Order 14214, “Keeping Education Accessible and Ending COVID‑19 Vaccine Mandates”) suggests a governmental stance against compulsory vaccination as a condition for certain benefits, further undercutting any reasonable likelihood of reinstatement.

Plaintiffs’ attempt to recast the controversy in broad terms—whether any President may mandate medical procedures for federal employees and contractors—does not persuade the court. That framing abstracts away the concrete factual and public‑health circumstances that underlay the original mandates. The court insists the relevant question is whether this legal controversy—these mandates, in these pandemic circumstances—is likely to recur, not whether the President generally has authority over health‑related employment conditions.

Finally, the panel rejects the notion that the President’s continuing power to issue executive orders prevents mootness:

“[T]he President’s ‘power to issue executive orders cannot itself be enough to skirt mootness, because then no suit against the government would ever be moot. And we know some are.’”

—quoting Boston Bit Labs and echoing Calvary Chapel of Bangor

Given this record, the government meets its “heavy burden” to show that recurrence of the same legal controversy is not reasonably expected. The voluntary cessation exception does not apply.

2. Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review

Plaintiffs also invoked the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception. That narrow doctrine requires:

1. The challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated before it ceases or expires; and
2. There is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.

Even assuming arguendo that the first prong could be satisfied (given how quickly public‑health mandates can change), the court holds that the second prong fails for essentially the same reasons the voluntary cessation argument fails: there is no reasonable expectation that these plaintiffs will be subjected to the same or a substantially similar mandate again.

Citing cases like Lowe and Resurrection School v. Hertel (6th Cir.), the Third Circuit treats the two exceptions—voluntary cessation and capable of repetition—as largely rising or falling together in the COVID‑mandate context.

D. Denial of Vacatur of the Preliminary Injunction Decision

Finally, plaintiffs requested that the Third Circuit vacate the district court’s earlier order denying a preliminary injunction. Ordinarily, when a case becomes moot on appeal through no fault of the parties, vacatur of the lower court’s judgment may be appropriate to prevent unreviewable decisions from having continuing legal consequences (Munsingwear).

Here, however, the panel declines to vacate:

• The preliminary injunction order was already on appeal when the case became moot two years earlier, and the Third Circuit dismissed that appeal as moot. Plaintiffs did not request vacatur then.
• Plaintiffs did not ask the district court for vacatur when the government moved to dismiss the case as moot on remand.
• They now seek vacatur without identifying any concrete legal consequences that the preliminary‑injunction order might produce going forward (for example, preclusive effects).

Applying Munsingwear and Azar v. Garza, the court emphasizes that vacatur is an “exercise of discretion” based on equity. Parties who “slept on [their] rights” cannot later demand vacatur as of right. The equities here do not justify disturbing the district court’s interlocutory order.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Practical Lessons for Future COVID-Related and Emergency Mandate Litigation

1. Rescinded COVID‑19 mandates will almost always be moot absent damages or concrete ongoing harms.
   The Third Circuit continues a consistent line—from County of Butler through Clark to Smith—holding that purely forward‑looking challenges (injunctions and declarations) to expired or rescinded COVID measures are moot. Plaintiffs who anticipate policy volatility must consider pleading damages or carefully alleging continuing collateral consequences if they wish their cases to survive policy changes.
2. Partial‑remedy mootness arguments require robust factual allegations.
   While Church of Scientology remains good law, Smith shows that courts will require:
   • concrete allegations that information was in fact disclosed or retained, and
   • timely, preserved arguments that such information can still be meaningfully remedied (e.g., destruction, return, or correction).
   Blanket assertions that data must have been collected, unsupported by specific facts, are insufficient to maintain a live controversy.
3. Generalized concerns about executive power do not keep cases alive.
   Plaintiffs sought to reframe their case as a broad challenge to presidential authority to impose medical requirements on federal workers and contractors. The Third Circuit rejects that approach: mootness analysis remains tethered to whether this legal controversy is likely to recur in substantially similar form, not whether the executive branch generally retains the power to regulate in the field.
4. Executive rescission driven by changed circumstances is potent evidence against recurrence.
   Where the government rescinds emergency measures based on evolving facts (e.g., improved public health outlook), and not in response to litigation loss, courts are more likely to credit its claim that the same measures will not be reimposed. The opinion confirms that the defendant’s stated reasons for rescission are “often probative” in voluntary‑cessation analysis.
5. Strategic timing matters for vacatur.
   Litigants who want lower‑court orders vacated when a case becomes moot must raise that request promptly on appeal. Waiting through prior appeals and remands, then attempting to retroactively erase an adverse interlocutory ruling, is disfavored and may be deemed a forfeiture of the right to seek vacatur.

B. Persuasive (Though Non-Precedential) Clarification of Third Circuit Doctrine

Although the opinion is designated “not precedential” and therefore does not bind future panels, it is nonetheless instructive as persuasive authority in several ways:

• It applies and reinforces Clark’s two‑factor test for voluntary cessation in COVID‑related cases.
• It illustrates how Church of Scientology will be narrowly construed and strictly conditioned on the record.
• It demonstrates the Third Circuit’s practical approach to post‑pandemic litigation: courts will not entertain abstract, generalized disputes over executive power divorced from concrete, ongoing harms.
• It signals that the court will strictly enforce both pleading standards and appellate preservation requirements in the emotionally and politically charged context of COVID‑related litigation.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Mootness in Plain Terms

Mootness is the idea that federal courts can only decide real, ongoing disputes. If the problem you sued about has disappeared or been fully resolved, and the court cannot do anything that would change your legal situation, your case is “moot” and must be dismissed.

Here, once the vaccine mandates were revoked, the plaintiffs were no longer subject to them. They had asked only for orders stopping and declaring invalid those mandates. Because those orders no longer existed, the court could not give them anything useful—no matter how the court ruled, plaintiffs would not face the mandates again. Thus, the case was moot unless an exception applied.

B. Voluntary Cessation

Sometimes a defendant stops doing the challenged thing while a lawsuit is pending, hoping to escape judicial review and later resume the conduct. Courts are wary of this and have developed the voluntary cessation exception. Under this doctrine:

• A case is not moot if the defendant voluntarily stops but might reasonably start again.
• The defendant has a “heavy burden” to show it is “absolutely clear” the challenged behavior will not return.

In this case, the government argued that the vaccine mandates were revoked due to changed public‑health conditions, not as a litigation tactic, and that there was no indication of plans to bring them back. The court agreed that the same situation and the same type of mandates were highly unlikely to recur, so voluntary cessation did not prevent mootness.

C. Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review

This exception keeps courts from being permanently shut out of reviewing actions that:

1. are very short‑lived and always end before a case can finish (like certain elections or pregnancies), and
2. are likely to happen to the same person again.

Plaintiffs here said vaccine mandates fall into this category. But the court found no reasonable expectation that these particular plaintiffs would again face the same or similar mandates, given both the changed health landscape and the government’s shift away from such requirements.

D. Partial Remedy and Church of Scientology

In Church of Scientology, the Supreme Court held that even if sensitive information has already been turned over to the government, a court can still order the government to destroy or return it. Because that kind of order changes the parties’ positions, the case is not moot.

Plaintiffs in Smith tried to use this idea. They claimed that even if the mandates were gone, the government still had their medical information, and a court could order its destruction. But they never actually alleged, in their complaint, that such information had been disclosed. Without that factual foundation, the court cannot assume the existence of information to be destroyed; thus, there is no “partial remedy” to save the case from mootness.

E. Vacatur under Munsingwear

Vacatur is when an appellate court wipes out a lower court’s judgment, as if it never happened. Under Munsingwear, vacatur is sometimes appropriate when a case becomes moot through no fault of the parties before the appellate court can rule on the merits, preventing an unreviewable decision from affecting future cases.

However, vacatur is not automatic. Courts consider fairness and timing. If a party could have asked for vacatur earlier but did not, and cannot show concrete harm from letting the lower‑court ruling stand, a court may refuse vacatur. That is what happened here: plaintiffs waited years and never showed why the preliminary‑injunction order would hurt them going forward.

VII. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in Smith v. President United States of America, although non‑precedential, reinforces and refines the court’s approach to mootness in the wake of rescinded COVID‑19 measures.

Key takeaways include:

• Once time‑limited emergency mandates are rescinded, challenges seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief will almost always be moot in the absence of concrete ongoing harms or damages claims.
• Efforts to preserve such cases through privacy‑based theories must be properly pleaded and supported by specific factual allegations and must be timely and clearly argued on appeal.
• The voluntary cessation and capable‑of‑repetition exceptions are narrowly applied, particularly where rescission is driven by changed circumstances rather than litigation pressure and where comparable measures are unlikely to recur.
• Vacatur of lower‑court rulings after mootness remains a discretionary, equitable remedy; parties must move promptly and show concrete legal consequences to justify it.

In the broader legal landscape, Smith signals the judiciary’s transition from active supervision of pandemic‑era measures to a more retrospective posture that emphasizes Article III limits, pleading rigor, and respect for institutional boundaries once emergency conditions have dissipated.