Arraignment as a Substitution Deadline: Pre‑Arraignment Motions to Substitute Are Timely in Montana Criminal Cases

1. Introduction

In S.L. v. MONTANA FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, MISSOULA COUNTY, 2026 MT 1, the Montana Supreme Court exercised supervisory control over a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to substitute judge under § 3-1-804, MCA.

The petitioner, S.L., a 16‑year‑old charged by Information in district court with aggravated burglary, assault on a peace officer, resisting arrest, and attempted possession of intoxicating substances while under 21, sought substitution before she was arraigned. The District Court denied substitution “without prejudice,” reasoning that substitution is barred in “Youth Court actions” and stating it would permit substitution only if the matter remained in district court after a transfer hearing under § 41-5-206, MCA.

The case presented two closely related issues: (1) whether the proceeding was a “criminal action” (permitting substitution) or a “Youth Court action” (prohibiting substitution); and (2) whether a substitution motion filed before arraignment is timely or “premature.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court granted the writ and set aside the order denying substitution, holding:

• Once the State files an Information in district court under § 41-5-206, MCA, the matter is a criminal case for purposes of substitution; the Youth Court’s jurisdiction is terminated “with respect to the acts alleged in the information.”
• Under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, arraignment is not the event that “opens” a ten‑day substitution window; rather, it is the point that marks when the substitution right expires. Therefore, a motion filed before arraignment is timely.
• The District Court’s “Order for Evaluation” was not void, because the court issued it before the substitution motion was filed; the later filing under the correct cause number was treated as correction of a clerical error rather than a post‑substitution merits act.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Innovative Contr., LLC v. Mont. Twentieth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. OP 23-0153, 411 Mont. 393 (Mar. 9, 2023)

The Court cited Innovative Contr., LLC for the baseline supervisory-control principle that the petitioner bears the burden of persuading the Court to issue the writ. This framed the proceeding as discretionary and extraordinary rather than a matter of right.

Collins v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2015 MT 125, 391 Mont. 378, 418 P.3d 672

Collins supplied two key building blocks. First, it reinforced that appeal is often inadequate where the right at stake is a litigant’s entitlement to a different judge—making supervisory control an appropriate vehicle. Second, it treated arraignment as a “definitive moment” connected to substitution timing, but S.L. clarifies that “definitive moment” as the deadline marker, not the earliest permissible filing moment.

Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 2002 MT 113, 309 Mont. 506, 48 P.3d 34

Mattson provided the Court’s stated purpose for substitution without cause: promoting judicial economy and expediency by requiring prompt removal early in litigation. S.L. uses Mattson’s efficiency rationale to reject the State’s “prematurity” argument—reasoning that important early rulings (here, transfer to Youth Court) are precisely the kind of “substantial matter” the rule is designed to precede.

Cushman v. Mont. Twentieth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2015 MT 311, 381 Mont. 324, 360 P.3d 492

Cushman was invoked for the proposition that where the issue concerns the construction of a Supreme Court rule and the threshold authority of a judge to proceed, it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to resolve it through extraordinary writ practice.

Lesage v. Twentieth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2021 MT 72, 403 Mont. 476, 483 P.3d 490

The State relied on Lesage to support the notion that a procedurally defective substitution effort can be void. While S.L. does not reject that general point, it distinguishes the State’s usage by holding that a pre‑arraignment filing is not defective; it is timely because the statutory language establishes a latest permissible time, not an earliest permissible time.

Caye v. Mont. Twentieth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2025 MT 246, 424 Mont. 411, 578 P.3d 628

Caye featured prominently in defining the policy behind substitution deadlines. S.L. adopts Caye’s emphasis on early exercise of the right (to avoid inefficiency and duplication) but extends it: if early resolution is the goal, a rule that forbids filing until arraignment would undermine judicial economy in cases where major pre‑arraignment decisions are expected.

In re Est. of Greene, 2013 MT 174, 370 Mont. 490, 305 P.3d 52

The State also invoked In re Est. of Greene for the “right result, wrong reason” principle and for the idea that a motion can be “premature.” The Court distinguished Est. of Greene on jurisdictional posture: informal probate was not a “civil action” under court supervision, so § 3-1-804 did not yet apply. In contrast, S.L.’s case was indisputably in district court on a filed Information; the substitution statute was already operational.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Criminal case vs. Youth Court action under § 41-5-206, MCA

The District Court treated the proceeding as effectively a Youth Court matter because the transfer hearing mechanism appears in Title 41, and because a decision remained pending whether the case would stay in district court.

The Supreme Court focused on the statutory text: under § 41-5-206(4), MCA, “The filing of an information in district court terminates the jurisdiction of the youth court over the youth with respect to the acts alleged in the information.” From this, the Court reasoned that when the Information is filed, the Youth Court is no longer the court of jurisdiction for those acts, and the proceeding is therefore a criminal case now—even if a later transfer hearing could move it to Youth Court.

This classification mattered because § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA authorizes substitution in criminal actions, while § 3-1-804(1)(c), MCA prohibits substitution in Youth Court actions. The Court held the prohibition did not apply at the time S.L. filed.

2) Timeliness: arraignment as “deadline,” not “start date”

The principal doctrinal development is the Court’s interpretation of § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA: a defendant must file “within 10 calendar days after the defendant’s arraignment.”

The State argued the phrase implies that filing is authorized only “after” arraignment and that earlier motions are void. The Court rejected this reading as inconsistent with the substitution rule’s purpose (as articulated in Mattson and Caye): substitution is meant to be exercised at or near the beginning of a case before substantial decisions occur and before judicial resources are invested.

Applying that purpose to the procedural posture here, the Court reasoned that a transfer decision is a “substantial matter,” and a rule that forces a defendant to wait until arraignment could allow the presiding judge to decide transfer before the substitution right can be exercised. Accordingly, the Court held that arraignment marks when the time to move expires, not when the right first becomes exercisable.

3) Supervisory control and the voidness risk under § 3-1-804(5), MCA

The Court accepted supervisory control under M. R. App. P. 14(3)(c) because the case involved the denial of substitution in a criminal case, and because an erroneous denial risks having a judge act without authority. The Court emphasized that § 3-1-804(5), MCA restricts a substituted judge from acting on merits/legal issues after a timely substitution motion is filed (subject to limited exceptions).

On S.L.’s request to vacate the “Order for Evaluation,” the Court declined because the order was issued prior to the substitution motion; the later filing in the correct cause number was treated as correction of a clerical mistake rather than an impermissible post‑substitution merits act.

C. Impact

• Clear rule on “prematurity”: Defendants may file a substitution motion before arraignment and it is timely so long as the case is a criminal action and the statutory deadline has not passed. This prevents courts from treating early filings as void merely because the statutory deadline is keyed to arraignment.
• Juvenile-transfer practice: When the State files an Information in district court under § 41-5-206, MCA, defendants gain the procedural incidents of a criminal case—including substitution—before the transfer decision is made. This could materially affect which judge presides over transfer hearings and other early-stage determinations.
• Writ practice and case management: By reaffirming that wrongful substitution denials can render subsequent actions void, the Opinion incentivizes prompt resolution of substitution issues and may increase early writ petitions where a district court declines to honor a filing.
• Administrative guidance: Courts and clerks may treat mis-filed orders as clerical errors where the judicial act occurred earlier, reducing collateral challenges that try to convert filing mistakes into jurisdictional defects.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervisory control: An extraordinary procedure allowing the Montana Supreme Court to intervene immediately in an ongoing case when waiting for a normal appeal would be inadequate—commonly used when a party claims a judge is acting without authority.
• Substitution of judge “without cause”: A one-time right (in many cases) to replace the assigned judge without proving bias or misconduct, subject to strict timing and categorical limits (such as Youth Court actions).
• Arraignment: The formal stage where the defendant is informed of the charges and enters a plea. Here, the Court treats arraignment as the event that sets the latest date for filing a substitution motion, not the earliest.
• Youth Court jurisdiction vs. district court criminal jurisdiction: Youth Court ordinarily handles juvenile matters, but § 41-5-206, MCA allows the State to proceed first by Information in district court. Once that Information is filed, Youth Court jurisdiction over the charged acts ends unless a transfer sends the case back.
• Void act / lack of authority: If a judge acts after a timely substitution motion has been filed (beyond limited routine exceptions), those actions can be treated as legally ineffective because the judge lacked power to decide merits issues.

5. Conclusion

S.L. establishes two practical clarifications with immediate procedural consequences in Montana criminal practice: (1) a case initiated by Information in district court under § 41-5-206, MCA is a criminal case at that point for substitution purposes, notwithstanding the possibility of later transfer to Youth Court; and (2) under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, a substitution motion filed before arraignment is timely—arraignment marks the deadline’s reference point, not the opening of a permissible filing window.

By aligning statutory timing with the substitution rule’s efficiency rationale (as developed in Mattson and Caye), the Court reduces the risk that substantial early rulings will occur before a litigant can exercise the substitution right, and it provides a clear answer to “prematurity” arguments that had not been squarely resolved in prior substitution cases.