S.J. Jones, D.F. Warren, H.L. Moore and Homer Hall for appellants. (1) The court erred in refusing the peremptory instructions requested jointly and severally by the defendants at the close of all the evidence in the case directing the jury to find and return a verdict in favor of the defendants. Under all of the evidence in the case plaintiff failed to make a case for the jury. State ex rel. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Bland, 281 S.W. 690; State ex rel. v. Bland, 237 S.W. 1018; Sullivan v. Gideon Railroad Co., 271 S.W. 983; Betz v. Railroad, 253 S.W. 1089; Frie v. Ry. Co., 241 S.W. 671; George v. Railroad, 251 S.W. 729; Beals v. Ry. Co., 256 S.W. 733; Guyer v. Railroad, 174 Mo. 350; Monroe v. Railroad, 297 Mo. 653; Boyd v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 371; Kelsy v. Railroad, 129 Mo. 374; King v. Railroad, 211 Mo. 1; Kries v. Railroad, 148 Mo. 333; Mockowik v. Railroad, 196 Mo. 570; Burge v. Railroad, 244 Mo. 76; Kelle v. Railroad, 258 Mo. 78; Rollinson v. Railroad, 252 Mo. 525. Even under the last-chance doctrine, some allowance of time must be made for the human mind to grasp the situation in an emergency and to realize the danger, and to act. Degonia v. Railroad, 224 Mo. 596; Burge v. Railroad, 244 Mo. 102; McGee v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 543; White v. Railroad, 159 Mo. App. 509. (2) The court erred in not declaring as a matter of law that there could be no recovery on the first count of the petition, for the reason that it clearly appears that if Ernest Chawkley, the driver of the automobile, had driven the same in a careful and prudent manner and exercised the highest degree of care which the law enjoined upon him the collision would not have occurred and hence in no event under the evidence in the record could there be a recovery for his death. Laws 1921 (Ex. Sess.) 91, sec. 19; Monroe v. Railroad, 297 Mo. 633, 653; Threadgill v. United Railways Co., 279 Mo. 467; Jackson v. Bell Tel. Co., 281 Mo. 358. (3) The court erred in refusing and denying defendants' motions to discharge the jury and continue the cause because of the fact that plaintiff twice fainted in the court room in the presence of the jury during the trial and each time had to be carried from the court room in the view and presence of the jury. Gurley v. St. Louis Transit Co., 259 S.W. 895; Stutz v. Milligan, 223 S.W. 128; Ullom v. Griffith, 263 S.W. 876; Franklin v. Kansas City, 260 S.W. 503; Savings Bank v. Denker, 275 Mo. 607; Wray v. State, 154 Ala. 36, 16 Am. Eng. Ann. Cases, 364. (4) The plaintiff had no right to maintain the action under the second and third counts of the petition for the death of the minor children of plaintiff and Ernest Chawkley, for the reason that the father of said children survived them and whatever right of action, if any, was created by the death of said children passed to the plaintiff and Ernest Chawkley in equal shares, and upon the death of said Ernest Chawkley, after the death of said minors, the right of action, if any, for the death of said minors passed to and vested in the estate of Ernest Chawkley and the plaintiff in equal shares, and plaintiff had no right to maintain this action in her own name alone for said deaths. State ex rel. Thomas v. Daues, 283 S.W. 51; Betz v. Ry. Co., 284 S.W. 455; Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493. (5) The court erred in permitting Mrs. Jenkins, a witness for plaintiff, to testify, over defendants' objections, that defendant Long came to her after the accident while she was in the automobile and asked if she was hurt and said, "It is our fault." The question as to whose fault it was, was the very issue that was being tried by the jury and was for the jury to determine. It was prejudicial to both defendants and particularly to the Wabash Company. (6) The testimony of the plaintiff's medical witnesses in response to hypothetical questions was erroneous. These questions were based upon assumptions not proved and upon plaintiff's physical condition shown to be the result of childbirth. They called for and elicited mere conclusions and speculation, and based one inference upon another, and invaded the province of the jury to determine the vital and essential facts. Jackmann v. Railroad, 187 S.W. 786; Castanie v. Railroad, 249 Mo. 192, 194; Roscoe v. Met. Street Ry. Co., 202 Mo. 576; Glasgow v. Railroad, 191 Mo. 347, 359; Mahany v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 286 Mo. 601. (7) The court erred in overruling defendants' objection to the testimony of Dr. Hass as to what he might attribute the displacement of the womb to and as to whether plaintiff's actions indicated to him a mental derangement, for the reason (a) the question assumed the accident caused the displacement; (b) that there was no evidence to show that the accident had caused any such condition or that it had not existed before the accident; (c) the witness testified that the birth of plaintiff's eight children had caused the condition; (d) because there was no relation between this condition and the death of plaintiff's husband and children, which reference was wholly immaterial and prejudicial, and (e) because the question called for a mere conclusion, guess and speculation by asking what you might attribute the cause of the displacement to. Cardinal v. Kemp, 309 Mo. 241, 274; Perkins v. Wilcox, 294 Mo. 700, 242 S.W. 978; Castanie v. United Rys., 249 Mo. 192; Magill v. Boatmen's Bank, 288 Mo. 489, 232 S.W. 448. (8) The court erred in overruling defendants' objections to the testimony of the medical witnesses for plaintiff to the effect that she was mentally deranged and crazy, had epilepsy, and might die as the result thereof, and in overruling defendant's verified motion to continue the case because testimony of such conditions were outside the scope of the petition and defendants were not prepared to meet that issue. Hall v. Coal Coke Co., 260 Mo. 351, 372; Hibbler v. Rys. Co., 292 Mo. 14, 237 S.W. 1017; Walquist v. Rys. Co., 292 Mo. 34, 237 S.W. 495; Connor v. Rys. Co., 298 Mo. 19, 250 S.W. 576. (9) The defendants were not liable for the mental condition of the plaintiff, and the court erred in admitting evidence of her mental condition and of the possible permanent duration of it and of the effects that might result from it. The defendants could not be liable for the mental condition of the plaintiff unless it was shown by the evidence to have been the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendants and directly connected with bodily injury received by the plaintiff as the result of such negligence. Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 405; Indianapolis St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Stables, 62 Ill. 313; Keyes v. Railway Co., 36 Minn. 290; Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U.S. 249; Haile v. Ry. Co., 60 F. 557, 9 C.C.A. 134; Derry v. Fletner, 118 Mass. 131; Hoag v. Railroad Co., 85 Pa. 293; C. St. P.M. O. Railroad Co. v. Elliott, 55 F. 950. The defendants are not liable for any mental suffering or derangement resulting from shock or grief produced by the death of plaintiff's husband and children. The admission of testimony of this kind and of the supposed future effect upon plaintiff was erroneous. Perkins v. Wilcox, 294 Mo. 700, 242 S.W. 974; Trigg v. Railroad, 74 Mo. 153; Connell v. Telegraph Co., 116 Mo. 34; McCardle v. Dry Goods Co., 271 Mo. 111. (10) The court erred in admitting the testimony of the witness Waters that if he had been in the engine he would have attempted to warn the persons in the automobile. This testimony invaded the province of the jury and set the judgment and conclusions of the witness as the test by which the action of the engineer and fireman was to be weighed and the liability of the defendants determined. Indianhoma Refining Co. v. Fire Ins. Co., 242 S.W. 712; Unrein v. Hide Co., 295 Mo. 353, 244 S.W. 928; Heberling v. Warrensburg, 133 Mo. App. 547; King v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 98 Mo. 235; Bowman v. Coal Mining Co., 168 Mo. App. 708; Eubank v. City of Edina, 88 Mo. 650; Disbrow v. Storage Fuel Co., 170 Mo. App. 585. (11) The evidence shows that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which directly contributed to her injury and for that reason she is not entitled to recover on the ground of failure to give the statutory signals, and the court erred in refusing to give defendants' instruction, withdrawing that issue from the jury and directing a verdict for defendants on that issue. Henderson v. Railroad, 284 S.W. 794; Authorities cited under point 1. Ed. M. Harber, A.G. Knight, Gerald Cross and Pross T. Cross for defendant. (1) Plaintiff made a case under each count of the petition, and the peremptory instructions requested were properly denied. The evidence in the case clearly showed that plaintiff was entitled to have her cause, on each count, submitted to the jury under the humanitarian doctrine. The evidence established her right to recover on account of a violation of the statute requiring the giving of the bell or whistle signal. However negligent the occupants of the automobile may have been, defendants will be liable under the humanitarian doctrine, if the fireman either saw, or by the use of ordinary care could have seen, the automobile approaching the crossing without checking its speed and apparently unmindful of the approach of the train, in time to have prevented the collision by either giving a warning, or stopping or checking the speed of the train. Allen v. Railway, 281 S.W. 737; Zumwalt v. Railway, 266 S.W. 717; Logan v. Railroad, 254 S.W. 705; State ex rel. Wabash v. Trimble, 260 S.W. 1000; Chapman v. Railway, 269 S.W. 688; Koontz v. Railroad, 253 S.W. 413; Conley v. Railroad, 253 S.W. 426; Tavis v. Bush, 280 Mo. 383, 217 S.W. 274; Stewart v. Railway, 188 S.W. 198; Ellis v. Railway, 234 Mo. 630; Hinzeman v. Railway, 199 Mo. 56; Wolf v. Railway, 251 S.W. 441; Murrell v. Railway, 279 Mo. 92, 213 S.W. 964; Maginnis v. Railway, 268 Mo. 667, 187 S.W. 1165; Eckhard v. Railway, 190 Mo. 593. (a) The danger zone is not the track itself, as defendant contends, but it extends to whatever distance from the track the enginemen can ascertain that the traveler is oblivious to the approach of the train, or is apparently intending to cross the track. And enginemen have no right to wait until the traveler places himself in a dangerous situation, but they should act as soon as the appearance of the traveler gives indication that he does not intend to stop. Stewart v. Railway, 188 S.W. 198; Ellis v. Railroad, 234 Mo. 656; Holden v. Railway, 177 Mo. 456; Bunyan v. Railway, 127 Mo. 12; Barrie v. Railway, 119 Mo. App. 38; Moore v. Railway, 194 Mo. 11; Cytron v. Railway, 205 Mo. 720; Echard v. Railway, 190 Mo. 693; Murray v. Railway, 108 Mo. App. 510; Murrell v. Railway, 279 Mo. 92; Maginnis v. Railway, 268 Mo. 667; Wolf v. Railway, 251 S.W. 441; State ex rel. Wabash v. Trimble, 260 S.W. 1000; Logan v. Railway, 254 S.W. 705; Zumwalt v. Railway, 266 S.W. 725; Tavis v. Bush, 280 Mo. 383. (b) It is as much the duty of those operating an engine to warn the traveler, by timely and proper signals, when in the exercise of ordinary care they can do so, as it is their duty to stop or check speed. And although a train cannot be stopped or the speed checked in time, after the discovery of the traveler's peril, to avoid injury thereby, yet the defendant will be liable if the injury could have been prevented by use of a warning signal. Logan v. Railway, 300 Mo. 611; State ex rel. Wabash v. Trimble, 260 S.W. 1000; Ross v. Davies, 228 S.W. 508; Wolf v. Railway, 251 S.W. 441; Rollison v. Railroad, 252 Mo. 538; Tavis v. Bush, 280 Mo. 383, 217 S.W. 274; Murrell v. Railroad, 279 Mo. 111, 213 S.W. 964; Eppstein v. Railroad, 197 Mo. 720; Maginnis v. Railroad, 268 Mo. 678, 187 S.W. 1165; Preston v. Railroad, 292 Mo. 453, 239 S.W. 1080; Dutcher v. Railroad, 241 Mo. 137; Hill v. Railways, 289 Mo. 204, 233 S.W. 205. (c) Enginemen should be so skilled in the management and operation of their engines, that when confronted by sudden peril and by emergency, they should be able to readily perceive and cope with such situations. And in any event, where the peril and emergency is caused by the negligence of the enginemen themselves, as is so palpably the case here, they cannot be heard to justify themselves and excuse themselves by an emergency which they themselves caused. Hall v. Ry., 240 S.W. 175; Zumwalt v. Railway, 266 S.W. 725; Moore v. Railway, 283 S.W. 732. (d) It is also a well established law that if the inability to give signal, or to stop or check speed, arises from some prior negligent act of defendant, then such inability is no defense, and defendant will be held liable. Mason v. Railway, 246 S.W. 318; Sullivan v. Railway, 117 Mo. 214; Goben v. Railway, 226 S.W. 631; Ruenzi v. Payne, 231 S.W. 294; Murrell v. Railway, 105 Mo. App. 88. (e) In cases involving the humanitarian doctrine, the courts exact speedy action, and will predicate a liability on even a second of time. Griggs v. Railway, 228 S.W. 508; Strutman v. Railway, 238 S.W. 817; Ross v. Davis, 248 S.W. 611; Wolf v. Railway, 251 S.W. 441; Moore v. Railway, 283 S.W. 732; Zumwalt v. Railway, 266 S.W. 725; Allen v. Railway, 281 S.W. 737. (f) The failure to either ring the bell continuously within eighty rods of the crossing, or to sound the whistle at intervals until it was passed, rendered defendants guilty of negligence per se; and the law presumes that such negligence was a proximate cause of the collision, and the burden is cast on defendant to overcome this presumption. Sec. 9943, R.S. 1919; Persinger v. Railway, 82 Mo. 196; Crumpley v. Railroad, 98 Mo. 34; Kenney v. Railway, 105 Mo. 270; Lamb v. Railway, 147 Mo. 171; Green v. Railway, 192 Mo. 131; Stotler v. Railway, 200 Mo. 107; McNulty v. Railway, 203 Mo. 475; McGee v. Railway, 214 Mo. 530; Monroe v. Railway, 280 Mo. 483, 219 S.W. 68; Midgett v. Railway, 124 Mo. App. 540; Day v. Railway, 132 Mo. App. 707; Byars v. Railway, 161 Mo. App. 692; Brown v. Railway, 166 Mo. App. 255; Welch v. Railway, 190 Mo. App. 213; Lloyd v. Railroad, 128 Mo. 595; Allen v. Railway, 281 S.W. 737. (g) A recovery was only sought on the first count under the humanitarian theory, and, however negligent Chawkley may have been, yet the defendant would still be liable for his death, if they did, or could have by use of ordinary care, seen the automobile in or going into a position of danger, in time to have prevented the collision, either by giving a warning, stopping the train or checking its speed. Authorities above cited. (2) The fainting and sobbing of plaintiff during the trial was a physical misfortune, over which she had no control; and the trial judge, in whose presence it occurred, was in a position to better judge of its effect on the jury, and the granting or refusing the motion to discharge the jury, was a matter peculiarly within his discretion: and the appellate court will defer to the action of the trial court on that question. Ullom v. Griffith, 263 S.W. 876; State v. Chick, 221 S.W. 10; Stutz v. Milligan, 223 S.W. 128; Bulware v. Mfg. Co., 152 Mo. App. 567; Cope v. Ins. Co., 191 Mo. App. 435; McCarty v. Transit Co., 192 Mo. 396; Franklin v. Kansas City, 260 S.W. 502. (3) The cause of action for the death of a minor child vests in the father and mother, or to the survivor of them at the time of judgment. It is personal right, and does not go to their estate. Senn v. Railway, 124 Mo. 621; Sec. 4217, R.S. 1919. (4) Appellant contends that the trial court erred in the admission of testimony. But this assignment of error cannot be reviewed in this court for the reason that appellant did not call the attention of the trial court to any of these assignments of errors in its motion for a new trial. When error is charged in the admission or rejection of evidence, the trial court is entitled to have the evidence complained of specifically pointed out and called to his attention in the motion for a new trial. And if this is not done, the alleged errors cannot be reviewed on appeal. Sec. 1267, R.S. 1919; Bartner v. Darst, 285 S.W. 499; State v. Knight, 278 S.W. 1039; Sec. 1454, R.S. 1919. (5) Plaintiff can recover for shock, fright and mental impairment. Where there is a physical injury, the injured person can recover for shock, nervous and mental, and for fright, terror, mental impairment and any other disease of body or mind which the jury may find to be a direct and proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act. 17 C.J. 838, 843; McArdle v. Dry Goods Co., 271 Mo. 111, 191 Mo. App. 263; Lowe v. Railway, 145 Mo. App. 248; Heiberger v. Tel. Co., 133 Mo. App. 452; Weissman v. Wells, 267 S.W. 400; Mollman v. Light Co., 227 S.W. 264; Porter v. Railroad, 73 N.J.L. 405; Conley v. Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238; Shay v. Railway, 66 N.J.L. 334. (6) The doctrine of "imputed negligence" has long since been uprooted and rejected in this State, and it is the well settled law that the negligence of the husband is not to be imputed to the wife, nor is the negligence of the father to be imputed to his minor children. Even if his negligence was a contributing cause of such death, still his negligent act would not bind or bar the mother. She is in no wise accountable or responsible for his negligent acts, and she is the sole plaintiff in this action. If she were guilty of negligence, it might present a different situation. But she is not. And any act of negligence on his part cannot extinguish her right under the law to recover for the deaths of her two babies. (7) Statement of defendant Long was admissible: At the time of the collision the automobile was carried on the front of the engine until the engine came to a stop, and the witness, Mrs. Jenkins, remained in the car. The engine was brought to a stop in about 500 feet from the time of the collision, and just as soon as it stopped the fireman ran to Mrs. Jenkins, she being only about twenty-five feet from him. As soon as he reached her she said: "Oh, isn't this terrible?" and Long replied: "Yes, but it is our fault." This evidence was entirely competent for two reasons. First, because it was an admission made by a party to the suit against his interest, Long being a party defendant; second, it was a part of the res gestae, the statement having been made within a few seconds of the happening of the main event. Friedman v. Railways, 293 Mo. 235, 238 S.W. 1074; Adair v. Railroad, 282 Mo. 133; Mitchell v. Violette, 221 S.W. 777; Vest v. Kresge, 213 S.W. 165; Luzzadder v. Call, 198 S.W. 1144; Lareau v. Lareau, 208 S.W. 241; Atkinson v. Osteopathy, 202 S.W. 452, 1912 C, Ann. Cas. 307, 318; Giles v. Mo. Pac. Railroad, 169 Mo. App. 35. The statement made by plaintiff, within two minutes of the injury, and while still under the car, that "if they had not stopped so soon, this would not have happened." held res gestae. Wilson v. Railway, 13 Utah, 52, 44 P. 1040, 57 Am. St. 766; Pryor v. Payne, 263 S.W. 982; State v. Galbreath, 267 S.W. 880. (8) As to injuries to plaintiff's mental condition, the allegations were abundant to admit evidence of mental condition, epilepsy, etc. No complaint was made thereof as required in motion for new trial. Secs. 1267, 1454, R.S. 1919; State v. Ackerman, 285 S.W. 739. (9) The testimony of the expert witnesses was proper, and the cases which defendant cites in support of its contention, have been expressly overruled. O'Learly v. Steel Co., 260 S.W. 55; Kinchlow v. Railway, 264 S.W. 416.