Appellate Waiver Enforcement and Its Exceptions: Clarifying the Hahn Test in United States v. Vessell

Introduction

United States v. Vessell (10th Cir. June 4, 2025) addresses the enforceability of a direct-appeal waiver in a federal plea agreement. Kenyon Ray Vessell, an enrolled member of a Native American tribe, was charged in Indian Country with second-degree murder and assault resulting in serious bodily injury after driving under the influence of marijuana at 113 mph, causing a fatal collision and grievous harm. He pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and assault under a plea deal that included a broad waiver of his right to appeal. The government moved to enforce that waiver under the three-part framework established in United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004). Vessell raised several arguments—insisting he need not identify issues at this stage, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and contending his sentence was “illegal” due to constitutional questions about supervised release—but the panel unanimously granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit applied the three Hahn factors in sequence:

Scope of the Waiver: The court found Vessell’s claimed issues—ineffective assistance and constitutional challenges to supervised release—fell squarely within the unambiguous terms of his direct-appeal waiver, which excepted only “a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum.”
Knowing and Voluntary Nature: Vessell had initialed each page of the written plea agreement, signed it, and affirmed under oath that he understood its terms. The panel held that any loose oral statement by the district judge did not override the integrated, written agreement.
Miscarriage of Justice: None of Vessell’s contentions—lack of preliminary identification of issues, ineffective assistance claims, or “illegal sentence” arguments—demonstrated an impermissible factor, such as racial bias, or one of the narrow exceptions to enforcing a waiver.

Having found all three Hahn prongs satisfied, the court enforced the waiver and dismissed the appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004 en banc): Established the three-part test for enforcing appellate waivers—scope, voluntariness, and miscarriage of justice.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Governs counsel’s duty to file a brief explaining that an appeal is frivolous and to furnish the defendant a copy.
United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005): Held that a direct-appeal waiver’s narrow exception for sentences above the statutory maximum did not cover constitutional attacks on the Sentencing Guidelines.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005): Demonstrated that mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right, but such constitutional arguments did not escape Porter’s waiver enforcement.
United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634 (2019): Plurality and concurring opinions identifying potential constitutional issues with mandatory supervised-release minimums, but not controlling here.
United States v. Holzer, 32 F.4th 875 (10th Cir. 2022): Confirmed that sentencing errors or constitutional challenges to a sentence do not render an otherwise lawful appeal waiver “unlawful.”
United States v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., 124 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 1997) & United States v. Montano, 472 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2007): Reinforced that an integration clause in a written agreement controls over conflicting oral statements.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning closely tracked the Hahn framework:

1. Scope of the Waiver: The panel examined the plain language of the waiver, which preserved only the defendant’s right to appeal a sentence above the statutory maximum. Vessell’s arguments—ineffective assistance and constitutional attacks on supervised release—were not carved out. Relying on Porter, the court emphasized that direct-appeal waivers are enforced according to their written terms, even if constitutional issues are at stake.

2. Knowing and Voluntary Entry: Vessell had signed and initialed each page of the plea agreement, and the district court personally confirmed his understanding during the change-of-plea colloquy. An isolated, imprecise oral summary by the judge did not override the integration clause, which provided that only a subsequent written modification signed by all parties could alter the agreement.

3. Miscarriage of Justice: The court rejected any argument that requiring Vessell to identify his issues at the preliminary stage constituted a miscarriage of justice. It pointed to the exclusive four circumstances identified in Hahn—racial bias, deficient counsel in negotiating the waiver, sentence above the statutory maximum, or other unlawfulness of the waiver—and found none applied. In particular, constitutional or structural sentencing errors do not invalidate a waiver under Holzer.

Impact

United States v. Vessell reinforces the robust enforceability of direct-appeal waivers in federal plea agreements. Key effects include:

Defense counsel and district courts must ensure that defendants initial and sign clear, written waivers with explicit scope clauses.
Oral colloquies cannot contradict an integrated written agreement; an integration clause will prevail.
Defendants cannot circumvent a direct appeal waiver by labeling a claim as ineffective assistance or raising novel constitutional challenges to supervised release, jury rights, or the Guidelines.
Plaintiffs and prosecutors receive assurance that plea bargains containing broad waivers will be enforced, promoting judicial efficiency and finality.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Direct-Appeal Waiver: A contractual provision in a plea agreement where a defendant voluntarily gives up the right to challenge a conviction or sentence on appeal, subject to narrow exceptions.
Hahn Test: The three-part inquiry under United States v. Hahn: (1) whether the appeal falls within the written waiver’s scope; (2) whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A claim under Strickland v. Washington requiring (1) deficient performance by counsel and (2) resulting prejudice to the defendant. Such claims are normally pursued via collateral attack (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255), not direct appeal, unless the record is fully developed.
Anders Brief: A submission by defense counsel stating that, after diligent review, no nonfrivolous issues exist on appeal. The court then independently examines the record.
Integration Clause: A contractual provision declaring that the written agreement is the complete and exclusive statement of the parties’ terms and can be modified only in writing by all signatories.
Miscarriage of Justice: A narrow exception to enforcing an appeal waiver, limited to cases of racial bias, invalid negotiation of the waiver, sentence above the statutory maximum, or other unlawful waivers.

Conclusion

United States v. Vessell underscores the Tenth Circuit’s commitment to enforcing direct-appeal waivers according to their written terms and the Hahn framework. Defendants must carefully negotiate and understand the scope of any appeal waiver; once knowingly and voluntarily entered, only a sentence above the statutory maximum or other narrowly defined circumstances can avoid enforcement. This decision reaffirms predictability in plea bargaining, clarifies the limited role of collateral avenues for ineffective-assistance claims, and reinforces that oral colloquies cannot undermine an integrated written agreement.