Appellate Forfeiture of Suppression Grounds and Deferential Sentencing Review in Child‑Pornography Cases: Commentary on United States v. Alan Joseph Clark, Jr.

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. Alan Joseph Clark, Jr., No. 24‑13832 (11th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025), affirming both Clark’s convictions and his 240‑month sentence for serious child‑pornography offenses.

Although the decision is designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and thus non‑precedential under the Eleventh Circuit’s rules, it is a clear and instructive application of two important strands of federal appellate practice:

• the doctrine of appellate abandonment/forfeiture when a defendant fails to challenge all independent grounds supporting a district court’s ruling (here, a suppression ruling); and
• the highly deferential review of sentences for substantive reasonableness, especially in the context of child‑pornography cases where Guidelines ranges are extremely high.

The case arose from a Homeland Security investigation that linked Clark’s IP address to child pornography on a peer‑to‑peer file‑sharing network. A search warrant execution led to discovery of hidden cameras in his teenage daughter’s bedroom and bathroom and numerous sexually explicit images and videos of his daughter and other minors. Clark entered a conditional guilty plea to production and possession counts, preserving a challenge to the denial of his suppression motion and also contesting the length of his sentence on appeal.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full, holding that:

1. Clark forfeited his suppression challenge on appeal by failing to contest all of the district court’s alternative grounds for denying his motion; and
2. his below‑Guidelines, below‑statutory‑maximum sentence of 240 months was substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The opinion addresses two issues:

1. Suppression of Evidence Clark moved to suppress evidence obtained from hidden cameras discovered during execution of a search warrant at his home. The district court denied suppression on three independent grounds:
   • the cameras were seizable under the terms of the warrant itself;
   • they were seizable under the plain‑view doctrine; and
   • even if there were defects, officers relied on the warrant in good faith under the good‑faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
   On appeal, Clark primarily attacked the plain‑view rationale while only briefly referencing the warrant’s scope and saying nothing substantive about the good‑faith finding. Relying on United States v. King and Sapuppo v. Allstate, the Eleventh Circuit held that he had abandoned/forfeited any challenge to the remaining independent grounds. Because at least one unchallenged ground supported the district court’s judgment, affirmance was required without reaching the plain‑view issue.
2. Substantive Reasonableness of Sentence Clark’s total offense level was 43 (the maximum under the Guidelines) with criminal-history category I, producing an advisory range of life imprisonment. Statutorily, the cumulative maximum term was 2,400 months (200 years). The district court imposed a 240‑month (20‑year) term and lifetime supervised release, explicitly considering the § 3553(a) factors, victim‑impact statements, Clark’s allocution, his medical condition, his prior law‑enforcement career, and expert testimony about his risk of reoffending.
   
   On appeal, Clark argued that a 15‑year sentence (the mandatory minimum) would have been sufficient, and that the district court failed to give proper weight to mitigating factors such as:
   • his lack of hands‑on sexual contact with the victims;
   • his non‑distribution of the images;
   • his severe lung condition and difficulties obtaining medical care in custody;
   • his former law‑enforcement status (and attendant vulnerability in prison); and
   • a psychological opinion predicting low recidivism after 15 years.
   The Eleventh Circuit, applying Gall, Kimbrough, Rosales‑Bruno, and Irey, held that the district court acted within its wide discretion in giving greater weight to the seriousness and repeated nature of the conduct, the betrayal of parental trust, and the need for punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public. The court emphasized that the 240‑month sentence was:
   • far below the Guidelines’ recommendation (life); and
   • far below the aggregate statutory maximum (2,400 months),
   and thus fell well within the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

In May 2023, a Homeland Security Investigations task‑force officer traced child‑pornography images on a peer‑to‑peer network to Clark’s IP address. Agents obtained and executed a state or federal search warrant for Clark’s residence.

During the search, an officer in the attic observed wires leading into the ceiling and down into the bedroom closet of Clark’s teenage daughter. Following the wires, officers found:

• a false smoke detector in the daughter’s bedroom, containing a hidden camera capable of holding an SD card;
• a second false smoke detector and a cell‑phone charger with hidden cameras in the daughter’s bathroom; and
• a camera concealed in her alarm clock.

Electronic devices seized from the residence contained numerous explicit images and videos, including recordings of the daughter and five other minor victims, all obtained via these covert cameras.

A federal grand jury indicted Clark for:

• six counts of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e) (Counts 1–6);
• one count of receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), (b)(1) (Count 7);
• one count of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2) (Count 8); and
• one count of distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), (b)(1) (Count 9).

Clark moved to suppress the evidence from the hidden cameras. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court orally denied the motion on three independent grounds (warrant scope, plain view, and good‑faith reliance).

Clark then entered a conditional guilty plea to Counts 1–6 and 8, preserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated:

• Total offense level: 43 (the highest possible under the Guidelines);
• Criminal history category: I (no prior convictions);
• Guidelines range: life imprisonment (capped by the statutory maximum of 2,400 months).

Neither side objected to the Guidelines calculations.

At sentencing, Clark presented expert testimony from a forensic psychologist concluding that his risk of sexual‑reoffense would be low after serving the mandatory minimum of 15 years. Clark personally apologized, explained his prior law‑enforcement career and subsequent health‑related retirement, described his serious lung disease, and asserted that imprisonment had renewed his commitment to faith. Defense counsel asked for a 15‑year sentence, or in the alternative, “less than 20 years,” emphasizing:

• no sharing of the produced videos;
• no hands‑on physical abuse;
• serious medical issues and difficulties obtaining care in pretrial detention; and
• the enhanced risk associated with being a former law‑enforcement officer in custody.

The district court thoroughly canvassed the § 3553(a) factors, acknowledged Clark’s mitigation, yet focused on the repeated and intimate nature of the offenses (victimization of his own daughter and her friends). It ultimately imposed a 240‑month term of imprisonment and lifetime supervised release, calling 20 years “a very substantial sentence” but also “sufficient but not greater than necessary.” Clark appealed.

B. Suppression Issue: Appellate Forfeiture of Independent Grounds

1. District Court’s Three Independent Grounds

The district court denied the suppression motion on three distinct, fully independent rationales:

1. Within the Scope of the Warrant The court concluded that the hidden cameras were items that could be lawfully seized under the warrant’s terms. Although the warrant itself is not quoted in the appellate opinion, such warrants typically authorize seizure of computers, storage media, cameras, and any items capable of storing or producing child pornography. On that reading, the cameras connected to the exploitation would plainly fall within the warrant’s scope.
2. Plain‑View Doctrine The court also found that officers could seize the cameras under the plain‑view doctrine because:
   • they were lawfully present in the attic and daughter’s room pursuant to the warrant;
   • the discovery of unusual wiring and false smoke detectors led to the cameras; and
   • the incriminating nature of covert cameras in a minor’s private bedroom and bathroom, in the context of a child‑pornography investigation, was immediately apparent.
3. Good‑Faith Exception Finally, the district court held that, even assuming some defect in the warrant or its execution, the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable. Under the good‑faith exception, suppression would not be an appropriate remedy.

Each of these grounds, if valid, independently supports denial of the suppression motion. That structural feature is crucial because of how the Eleventh Circuit applies the abandonment doctrine on appeal.

2. The Abandonment / Forfeiture Rule on Appeal

The Eleventh Circuit’s abandonment/forfeiture doctrine is well‑developed and strict. The panel relies on three key precedents:

• United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) – among other things, reiterates that “issues not raised in the initial brief are deemed abandoned.”
• Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014) – explains that an appellant abandons an issue when he:
  • makes only passing references to it; or
  • raises it in a perfunctory way, without supporting argument and authority.
• United States v. King, 751 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2014) – articulates the rule that when a district court’s judgment rests on multiple independent grounds, an appellant must persuade the court that all those grounds are erroneous. If he fails to properly challenge even one, he has “abandoned an issue on which he had to prevail in order to obtain reversal,” and affirmance follows automatically.

The panel quotes King explicitly:

“When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.”

This is more than a technicality; it places a heavy burden on appellants to frame their opening briefs comprehensively. It is not enough to attack one rationale for a ruling if other rationales are left essentially untouched.

3. Application to Clark’s Suppression Challenge

Clark’s appellate briefing primarily targeted the plain‑view doctrine, arguing that officers lacked probable cause to seize the hidden cameras under that doctrine. The opinion notes:

• Clark made only passing reference to the scope of the search warrant; and
• he made no argument at all about the district court’s application of the good‑faith exception.

Under Campbell and Sapuppo, bare or perfunctory references do not preserve an issue; they constitute abandonment. And under King, failure to challenge all independent grounds supporting the judgment is dispositive.

Accordingly, the panel holds that Clark has:

• forfeited any challenge to the scope‑of‑warrant and good‑faith holdings; and thus
• abandoned issues on which he had to prevail to obtain reversal of the suppression ruling.

The court therefore affirms the denial of the suppression motion without reaching the merits of the plain‑view analysis. This is significant in two ways:

1. It underscores the procedural nature of the affirmance: the panel does not decide whether the plain‑view doctrine was correctly applied.
2. It re‑emphasizes the primacy of proper appellate briefing—even when a conditional guilty plea has preserved the right to appeal, that right can be effectively lost through inadequate briefing.

C. Sentencing Issue: Substantive Reasonableness and Deference

1. The Governing Framework: § 3553(a) and Deferential Review

The panel reviews Clark’s 240‑month sentence for substantive reasonableness under the deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard established by:

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) – district courts must consider the advisory Guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors, but are not bound to follow the Guidelines; appellate courts review for abuse of discretion, not de novo.
• Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) – affirms that the Guidelines are advisory and that courts may vary based on policy disagreements with certain Guidelines (there, crack‑cocaine disparities), but must still impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to serve the statutory purposes.

The statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) include:

• the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
• the need for the sentence imposed to:
  • reflect the seriousness of the offense,
  • promote respect for the law,
  • provide just punishment,
  • afford adequate deterrence, and
  • protect the public from further crimes;
• the kinds of sentences available;
• the advisory Guidelines range;
• pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements;
• the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and
• the need to provide restitution to victims.

The Eleventh Circuit also cites:

• United States v. Rosales‑Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) – emphasizes that district courts have broad discretion to assign different weights to different § 3553(a) factors; an appellate court will not reweigh them.
• United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007) – holds that a court is not required to discuss every mitigating argument expressly; failure to mention a factor does not mean it was ignored if the record shows the court considered the relevant information.
• United States v. Muho, 978 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2020) – notes that sentences within the Guidelines range or below the statutory maximum are “generally reasonable.”
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) – requires the appellate court to affirm unless it is left with a “definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.”

This framework strongly favors affirmance unless the sentence is extreme in relation to the facts or the judge’s reasoning is plainly unsound.

2. The District Court’s Weighing of Factors

The district court explicitly stated that it considered:

• the Presentence Investigation Report and the advisory Guidelines;
• the § 3553(a) factors;
• statements from victims and their parents; and
• Clark’s allocution and supporting materials (including the psychological evaluation).

At the same time, the court cautioned those in the courtroom not to assume that everything it considered was fully aired in the sentencing hearing—for example, it likely reviewed written submissions and the PSI in detail.

In explaining its decision, the court:

• acknowledged that Clark “spoke honestly from the heart” in expressing remorse;
• emphasized that the offense was not a one‑time lapse but a pattern of consciously repeated wrongdoing;
• found it “significant” that the victims were his own daughter and her friends, highlighting a deep betrayal of trust and serious emotional harm; and
• observed that his conduct left the victims less able “to trust people close to them or people in authority as they once did.”

The court also expressly recognized the presence of some mitigating elements:

• Clark did not have physical contact with the victims;
• he did not distribute the images he produced; and
• his prior law‑enforcement career suggested a history of otherwise law‑abiding behavior.

Yet it found these factors to be “not as bad as it could be” rather than strongly mitigating. Likewise, the court:

• listened “carefully” to Dr. Harrison‑Spoerl’s testimony about recidivism risk, but concluded that it did not “move the needle very far either way”; and
• gave only limited weight to Clark’s medical condition, stating that the Bureau of Prisons often provides effective care and that his health did not change its view of the proper sentence.

Balancing all of this, the court determined that a 20‑year sentence, though above the 15‑year mandatory minimum, was “sufficient but not greater than necessary” to serve the statutory aims, particularly:

• punishment commensurate with the seriousness of the offense;
• deterrence of similar conduct; and
• protection of the public.

3. The Eleventh Circuit’s Deferential Review

On appeal, Clark argued that the district court mis‑weighed the mitigation and should have imposed the 15‑year minimum, chiefly because:

• he was assessed as low risk after 15 years;
• he had not shared or used the material to escalate to physical abuse; and
• his health and prior law‑enforcement service would make incarceration significantly harder for him than for the “average person.”

The Eleventh Circuit rejected these arguments, grounding its reasoning in three key propositions:

1. Weight of Factors Is for the District Court Citing Rosales‑Bruno, the panel reiterates that “the weight allocated to each § 3553(a) factor is left to the sound discretion of the district court.” An appellate court does not re‑weigh the factors or substitute its judgment for the district court’s.
2. Mitigating Arguments Were Considered The court recognized that the district judge “considered and rejected many of Clark’s mitigating arguments.” Under Amedeo, the judge need not address each mitigating argument in detail to demonstrate consideration. The transcript here goes beyond the minimum; it expressly addresses several of the principal points (recidivism risk, law‑enforcement background, health issues).
3. Sentence Far Below Guidelines and Statutory Maximum The court emphasizes that the advisory Guidelines range was life imprisonment, and the cumulative statutory maximum was 2,400 months. Clark’s 240‑month sentence is well below both. Citing Muho, the panel notes that such below‑Guidelines or below‑maximum sentences are “generally reasonable.” That does not create a formal presumption of reasonableness, but it is an important indicator under circuit practice.

Finally, invoking Irey, the panel asks whether it is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors. Given the facts—repeated production of sexually explicit material, surreptitious recording of a child in private spaces, and multiple minor victims—the court is not left with such a conviction.

The result is an affirmance of the 240‑month sentence as substantively reasonable.

D. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion relies largely on well‑established precedent, applying rather than redefining Eleventh Circuit law. Each citation plays a specific role:

1. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc)

Though Campbell is best known for its Fourth Amendment analysis of traffic‑stop extensions, it is cited here purely for a procedural point: “issues not raised in the initial brief are deemed abandoned.” The panel invokes Campbell as a recent, en banc reaffirmation of that black‑letter rule.

2. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014)

explains how an appellant abandons issues by:

• making only “passing references” to them; or
• raising them “in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”

The panel uses this to characterize Clark’s cursory references to the warrant’s scope as insufficient to preserve a challenge.

3. United States v. King, 751 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2014)

King is central to the abandonment holding. It establishes:

“[A]n appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”

“When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.”

The panel directly applies this framework to conclude that Clark’s failure to meaningfully contest the good‑faith exception (and only perfunctory mention of the warrant’s scope) requires affirmance of the denial of his suppression motion without reaching the merits.

4. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)

Gall is the Supreme Court’s leading sentencing‑reasonableness case. It provides:

• the abuse‑of‑discretion standard of review for all sentencing challenges; and
• recognition that district courts may vary from the Guidelines so long as they consider § 3553(a) and explain their reasoning.

The Eleventh Circuit cites Gall for the proposition that substantive reasonableness review is highly deferential.

5. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)

Kimbrough reiterates the statutory “parsimony principle”: a sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish the goals in § 3553(a)(2). The panel quotes this as the “overarching” instruction to sentencing courts.

6. United States v. Rosales‑Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015)

Rosales‑Bruno is cited for the proposition that the allocation of weight among § 3553(a) factors rests with the district court. This undercuts Clark’s argument that the sentencing judge erred by not giving more weight to mitigating factors (health, prior law enforcement, expert risk assessment) relative to the gravity of the crime and harm to victims.

7. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007)

Amedeo is invoked to reinforce that failure to expressly discuss every piece of mitigation does not imply the court ignored it. This insulates the sentencing statement from attack even if Clark could identify particular mitigating facts not expressly mentioned on the record.

8. United States v. Muho, 978 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2020)

Muho stands for the recurring Eleventh Circuit observation that sentences within the Guidelines range, or below the statutory maximum, are “generally reasonable.” Here, the sentence is below both the Guidelines recommendation (life) and the statutory maximum (2,400 months), strongly suggesting reasonableness.

9. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

is an en banc decision also involving extraordinarily serious child‑sexual‑exploitation conduct. In Irey, the Eleventh Circuit vacated a downward‑variance sentence as substantively unreasonable, emphasizing the enormous gravity of such offenses and articulating a robust standard of review:

Appellate courts will vacate a sentence only when left with the “definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.”

That standard sets a high bar for defendants in child‑pornography cases seeking relief from within‑ or below‑Guidelines sentences. The panel applies this framework and finds no such clear error of judgment here.

E. Impact and Practical Implications

1. For Appellate Practice: The Importance of Challenging All Independent Grounds

The clearest doctrinal message from Clark is procedural: a defendant who wants to overturn a district court’s ruling—especially a suppression ruling—must meaningfully address every independent ground the district court offered to support that ruling.

Practical implications:

• Defense counsel must:
  • obtain the district court’s oral or written reasoning in full;
  • identify each distinct basis for the ruling (scope of warrant, plain view, good faith, etc.); and
  • devote sufficient argument, legal authority, and record citation to challenging each one in the opening brief.
• Conditional guilty pleas do not relax briefing requirements. They preserve the legal issue only if properly presented on appeal; they do not override abandonment or forfeiture doctrines.
• Government counsel can strategically emphasize alternative holdings. If an appellant attacks only some, the government can invoke King, Sapuppo, and Campbell to argue for affirmance on abandonment grounds.

Although Clark is unpublished, it firmly reflects and applies binding, published Eleventh Circuit precedent. Future panels and litigants can cite it as persuasive authority reinforcing the need to challenge all independent bases for a ruling.

2. For Search and Seizure Law: Emphasis on Good‑Faith and Warrant Scope

Because of the abandonment holding, the panel does not refine or expand the law of:

• the plain‑view doctrine; or
• the scope of digital‑evidence warrants.

Instead, the case highlights an increasingly common pattern: when officers execute a warrant and then discover additional, related evidence (here, hidden cameras), courts will frequently uphold seizures under:

• a broad reading of the warrant’s language (e.g., seizure of cameras and storage devices involved in child pornography); and/or
• the good‑faith exception, even if a technical defect exists.

The lesson for defense practice is dual:

• where possible, challenge the validity and scope of the warrant early, not just the execution; and
• on appeal, devote full argument to defeating the government’s good‑faith contentions, since good faith will often be the government’s strongest fallback.

3. For Sentencing in Child‑Pornography Cases

The case sits within a larger Eleventh Circuit pattern of:

• viewing child‑pornography and exploitation offenses as extremely serious, often justifying very long terms of imprisonment; and
• rarely finding below‑Guidelines sentences substantively unreasonable in this context.

Clark underscores that even substantial mitigation—such as:

• expert testimony predicting low recidivism after a mandatory‑minimum term;
• serious health issues; and
• lack of prior criminal record—

may not significantly reduce a sentence where the offense involves:

• production of sexually explicit images;
• multiple victims; and
• especially, abuse of a parent‑child relationship and filming in intimate spaces like bedrooms and bathrooms.

Sentencing judges in such cases are afforded wide discretion to emphasize:

• the repeated, deliberate nature of the conduct; and
• the long‑term psychological harm and breach of trust.

In practice, Clark sends the message that:

• defendants should not assume that compliance with the minimum suffices simply because a psychologist predicts low risk after that period; and
• to have a realistic chance at a lower sentence, counsel must present a compelling, fact‑rich narrative that directly addresses not only risk and history, but also the moral gravity and victim impact as the court perceives them.

4. Non‑Precedential but Illustrative

The opinion is explicitly marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” meaning:

• It is not binding precedent under Eleventh Circuit Rule 36‑2.
• However, it may be cited as persuasive authority, and it accurately reflects the way the Eleventh Circuit applies longstanding doctrines in practice.

Therefore, while Clark does not change the law, it is a useful practical guide to how the court treats:

• appellate abandonment of suppression issues; and
• substantive reasonableness review in serious child‑pornography cases.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Plain‑View Doctrine

The plain‑view doctrine allows officers lawfully present in a place to seize items without a separate warrant if:

1. they are in a place where they have a right to be (e.g., executing a valid warrant);
2. they see an item in plain view; and
3. the item’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent (officers have probable cause to believe it is evidence or contraband).

In Clark, the district court found that hidden cameras in a child’s private spaces were plainly incriminating in the context of a child‑pornography search.

2. Good‑Faith Exception

The good‑faith exception to the exclusionary rule (from United States v. Leon) says that even if a warrant is later found defective, evidence will not be suppressed if:

• officers relied on the warrant in objective good faith—that is, reasonably; and
• certain narrow exceptions (such as knowingly false affidavits or facially deficient warrants) do not apply.

In Clark, the district court concluded that, at a minimum, officers acted in good faith in seizing the cameras under the warrant.

3. Forfeiture / Abandonment on Appeal

In appellate practice:

• Forfeiture/abandonment means that a party fails to properly raise or argue an issue on appeal—typically by:
  • omitting it from the opening brief; or
  • mentioning it only vaguely without legal authority or analysis.
• Once forfeited, the appellate court generally will not consider the issue at all.

In Clark, this doctrine ended the suppression dispute: because Clark did not challenge all the district court’s grounds, the court did not reach the plain‑view merits.

4. Conditional Guilty Plea

A conditional guilty plea (under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2)) lets a defendant:

• plead guilty while preserving the right to appeal specific pretrial rulings (such as denial of a suppression motion); and
• withdraw the plea if the appeal succeeds.

However, it does not exempt the defendant from normal appellate rules. If issues are procedurally defaulted or abandoned in the brief, the preserved right is effectively lost.

5. Mandatory Minimum vs. Statutory Maximum vs. Guidelines

• Mandatory minimum: the shortest sentence a judge may lawfully impose. In some of Clark’s counts, it was 15 years.
• Statutory maximum: the longest sentence allowed by statute for each count or in total. Here, the combined maximum for all counts was 2,400 months.
• Guidelines range: an advisory range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on offense seriousness and criminal history. Clark’s range was life imprisonment, limited by the statutory maximum.

Judges must respect minimums and maximums but are otherwise free to vary from the advisory Guidelines after considering § 3553(a).

6. Substantive Reasonableness and Abuse‑of‑Discretion Review

A sentence is substantively unreasonable if, considering all the circumstances, it is outside the range of reasonable sentences given the § 3553(a) factors. The standard is not “Was this the best possible sentence?” but “Was this sentence a clear error of judgment?”

Under abuse‑of‑discretion review:

• the appellate court gives great deference to the sentencing judge’s decision;
• it does not reweigh evidence or factors; and
• it will reverse only if firmly convinced the judge seriously misbalanced the relevant considerations.

7. Non‑Argument Calendar and Per Curiam Decisions

• Non‑Argument Calendar: The case was decided without oral argument, based solely on the written briefs and record. This is common when the issues are well‑settled.
• Per curiam: The opinion is issued in the name of the court (here, “PER CURIAM”) rather than a specific judge. It suggests the decision is straightforward and not contentious within the panel.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Alan Joseph Clark, Jr. is not a path‑breaking opinion, but it is a clear, concrete illustration of two important features of federal criminal appeals in the Eleventh Circuit:

1. Appellate forfeiture is outcome‑determinative. When a district court denies suppression (or any motion) on multiple independent grounds, an appellant must challenge each ground with developed argument and authority. Failure to do so, as King, Sapuppo, and Campbell confirm, results in abandonment and affirmance—even where a substantive issue (like the scope of the plain‑view doctrine) is otherwise debatable.
2. Sentencing review is extremely deferential, particularly in child‑pornography cases. Under Gall, Kimbrough, Rosales‑Bruno, and Irey, the Eleventh Circuit will rarely disturb a sentence that is:
   • below the advisory Guidelines range;
   • below the statutory maximum; and
   • supported by a record showing thoughtful consideration of § 3553(a).
   In Clark, even strong mitigation—low predicted recidivism, serious health issues, and a lack of prior convictions—could not outweigh the egregious nature of the offense: repeated production of sexual images of a child in private spaces, involving the defendant’s own daughter and her friends.

Although unpublished, Clark is a useful guidepost. It reminds practitioners that successful criminal appeals in the Eleventh Circuit require meticulous issue preservation and powerful, fact‑driven sentencing arguments. It also reinforces the court’s continuing view that child‑exploitation offenses warrant very substantial terms of imprisonment, and that such sentences will almost always be sustained on substantive‑reasonableness review when properly justified by the district court.