Appeal Waivers Control: Seventh Circuit Dismisses Anders Appeal, Upholds Upward Variance, and Treats Declined Continuance as Waiver of Late Victim-Impact Notice Objections

Introduction

In a nonprecedential order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw under ANDERS v. CALIFORNIA and dismissed the appeal of Steven M. Stathas, Jr., who pleaded guilty to enticing a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The decision reinforces several well-settled principles: valid appellate waivers embedded in plea agreements are fully enforceable; challenges to the voluntariness of a plea undergo plain-error review when the defendant has reaffirmed the plea; agreeing to the Presentence Investigation Report’s calculations forecloses later Guidelines-calculation attacks; upward variances are sustainable when well-explained under § 3553(a); declining a continuance waives objections to late-disclosed victim-impact statements; and ineffective-assistance claims unrelated to plea negotiation or sentencing are reserved for collateral review.

The case arises from Stathas’s online grooming of a 15-year-old, interstate travel to engage in sexual activity, and a final episode culminating in his arrest after transporting the victim from Kentucky to Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty pursuant to a written agreement containing a broad appeal waiver with limited exceptions. The district court imposed a 180-month sentence, an upward variance from a Guidelines range of 121–151 months, followed by 10 years of supervised release. On appeal, counsel filed an Anders brief; the panel confined its review to the issues discussed by counsel and the defendant’s Rule 51(b) pro se submission and found no nonfrivolous basis to proceed.

Summary of the Opinion

Anders posture: Appointed counsel moved to withdraw, asserting no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. The Seventh Circuit conducted the limited review typical in Anders cases and agreed.
Plea validity: Because Stathas rescinded his earlier motion to withdraw his plea, the court reviewed the plea for plain error and found none. The Rule 11 colloquy was complete; the plea was knowing and voluntary.
Appeal waiver enforced: The court enforced the agreement’s appeal waiver, cabining the permissible issues to those carved out by the waiver (e.g., voluntariness, certain “sentencing errors,” and ineffectiveness limited to plea negotiation or sentencing).
Sentencing procedure: Any argument that the offense conduct did not fit the Guidelines or that specific enhancements were inapplicable was barred by the waiver; in any event, Stathas affirmatively accepted the PSR calculations, foreclosing such challenges.
Substantive reasonableness: The 29-month upward variance was adequately justified under § 3553(a) by the seriousness of the offense, criminal history, and failures in sex-offender treatment. The court would not reweigh mitigating evidence.
Victim-impact statements: Although disclosed shortly before sentencing, the district court offered a continuance; Stathas declined, thereby waiving notice complaints. The district court did not rely on misstatements.
Supervised release: Challenges to conditions were waived, any challenge to the 10-year term was forfeited, and there was no plain error; the statutory maximum is life and the Guidelines recommend life for sex offenses.
Suppression and ineffective assistance: Suppression challenges were expressly waived. Ineffective-assistance claims outside plea negotiation or sentencing are barred by the waiver and, in any case, belong in collateral review.
Disposition: Motion to withdraw granted; appeal dismissed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

ANDERS v. CALIFORNIA, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Establishes the protocol for counsel to withdraw when an appeal would be frivolous. Here, counsel submitted an Anders brief addressing anticipated issues; the court accepted that analysis and limited its review accordingly.
United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014): In Anders cases, review is generally restricted to the issues counsel identifies plus those the defendant raises in a permitted pro se submission. The panel followed this approach, also considering Stathas’s Rule 51(b) arguments.
Doe v. United States, 51 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1995): Withdrawing a motion to set aside a plea operates as a reaffirmation of the plea. This triggered plain-error review of the plea’s validity.
United States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2020): Clarifies plain-error review for Rule 11 challenges where objections were not preserved.
United States v. Moody, 770 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2014): Defendants are bound by their sworn statements at the plea colloquy absent a compelling reason to disregard them; a core principle guiding the court’s rejection of plea-validity attacks.
United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2020): Appeal waivers are enforced like any other term of a plea agreement, so long as the plea is valid; the panel enforced Stathas’s waiver.
United States v. Fuentes, 858 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 2017): A defendant who affirmatively accepts PSR calculations waives challenges to them on appeal. The court cited this in concluding that any Guidelines-calculation attack was foreclosed.
United States v. Ingram, 40 F.4th 791 (7th Cir. 2022): An above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court offers a sufficient, case-specific § 3553(a) rationale. The panel applied this framework to sustain the upward variance.
United States v. Moultrie, 975 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Ferguson, 889 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 2018): Recognize that underrepresentation of criminal history and offense seriousness can justify an upward variance. The district court’s reasoning fit squarely within these precedents.
United States v. Modjewski, 783 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2015): Confirms that courts must consider mitigation but need not give it dispositive weight. The district court expressly did both: it weighed and explained.
United States v. Harris, 102 F.4th 847 (7th Cir. 2024): A defendant who declines a continuance cannot later complain about inadequate notice; applied here to the late disclosed victim-impact statements.
United States v. Williams, 106 F.4th 639 (7th Cir. 2024): Sentences cannot rest on materially false information; however, a defendant must show reliance. The court found no reliance on alleged inaccuracies in victim statements.
United States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2016): Failure to object to supervised-release terms at sentencing forfeits appellate review absent plain error.
United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2016): The same § 3553(a) considerations supporting imprisonment can support the term of supervised release.
United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 2020) and Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003): Ineffective-assistance claims typically should be raised on collateral review to allow fact development; direct appeals are usually not the proper vehicle.
United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348 (7th Cir. 2012): Counsel should consult the defendant about whether to challenge the plea; counsel did so here, but found no nonfrivolous grounds.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeded in the structured sequence typical of an Anders disposition. First, it verified the adequacy of counsel’s Anders submission. Finding it thorough, the court limited its review accordingly, while also considering Stathas’s pro se arguments under Circuit Rule 51(b).

On the plea’s validity, the court applied plain-error review because Stathas had rescinded a previously filed motion to withdraw the plea, thereby reaffirming it. The district court’s Rule 11 colloquy ticked each box: explanation of charges and penalties, advisement of rights, confirmation of voluntariness, and opportunities for consultation when the defendant expressed hesitation. The defendant’s sworn affirmations bound him. No plain error appeared.

Because the plea stood, the court enforced the appeal waiver according to its terms. The waiver broadly foreclosed appeals and collateral attacks except for three carve-outs: voluntariness of the plea, “sentencing errors,” and ineffective assistance limited to the negotiation of the plea or sentencing. The waiver also specifically disallowed arguments that § 2422(b), or the Guidelines themselves, were unconstitutional or inapplicable to his conduct.

On sentencing procedure, any claim that specific offense characteristics did not apply was barred by the agreement’s “applicability” waiver. The only potential opening—pure “error” in arithmetic or criminal history scoring—was foreclosed because the defendant affirmatively accepted the PSR’s computations before the court adopted them, a classic waiver under Fuentes.

On substantive reasonableness, an issue preserved by the waiver’s “sentencing errors” carve-out, the court applied deferential review. The district judge articulated case-specific reasons: prior similar misconduct, failures in sex-offender treatment (indicating risk and poor rehabilitation prospects), and a view that both offense level and criminal history category underrepresented the seriousness of the instant offense and his overall record. Mitigators—his own childhood victimization and work history—were acknowledged but found outweighed. Under Ingram, Ferguson, and Moultrie, such an explanation sustains an upward variance; appellate courts do not reweigh § 3553(a) factors.

Regarding victim-impact statements, any complaint about late disclosure was waived when the defendant declined the court’s offer of a continuance, per Harris. Moreover, the record contained no reliance on factual inaccuracies; the court referenced only the general harm to the victim and family, which is a typical and proper consideration. Without reliance on specific falsehoods, Williams forecloses a due-process challenge.

As to supervised release, the defendant affirmatively waived objections to conditions and forfeited any challenge to length by not objecting. On plain-error review, none existed: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) authorizes a term up to life for sex offenses, and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b) (policy statement) recommends the maximum. The district court’s same public-protection and deterrence rationale supported the 10-year term, consistent with Bickart.

Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s pro se suppression and ineffective-assistance arguments. Suppression issues were expressly waived in the plea agreement. The agreement preserved ineffectiveness only as to plea negotiation or sentencing, not trial-stage suppression strategy; and in any event, such claims belong on collateral review under Cates and Massaro.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although labeled nonprecedential, the order powerfully illustrates several recurring dynamics in federal criminal practice:

Strength of appeal waivers: A properly conducted Rule 11 colloquy makes waivers difficult to circumvent. Defendants and counsel should assume waivers will be enforced as written.
Preserving sentencing issues: If a plea agreement carves out “sentencing errors,” defendants must still object at sentencing. Accepting the PSR’s calculations forecloses later challenges to offense level or criminal history scoring.
Upward variances in sex-offense cases: Prior similar conduct and failed treatment often support variance; mitigation such as personal victimization is considered but will not necessarily control the outcome.
Victim-impact practice: Late disclosure can be remediated by a continuance. Declining that remedy generally waives objections. Defense counsel should request time if needed to investigate perceived inaccuracies.
Ineffective-assistance channeling: Claims unrelated to the plea’s negotiation or sentencing are typically barred by appeal waivers and, regardless, should proceed via collateral review to develop a factual record.
Anders gatekeeping: The decision underscores the Seventh Circuit’s adherence to the Anders framework: thorough counsel submissions, limited appellate scrutiny, and dismissal when no nonfrivolous issues exist.

For future cases, the order signals that upward variances justified by underrepresentation of criminal history and offense seriousness will generally withstand review, particularly where the court has detailed a defendant’s repeated sex-offense behavior and treatment failures. It also highlights that the combination of a comprehensive appeal waiver and a clean Rule 11 colloquy can make appeals functionally unavailable, leaving only narrow pathways for relief.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Appeal waiver: A clause in a plea agreement where the defendant gives up the right to appeal most issues. Courts enforce these waivers if the plea is knowing and voluntary.
Anders brief: When an appointed lawyer believes an appeal is frivolous, they file a brief explaining potential issues and why they lack merit, and ask to withdraw. The court independently verifies before dismissing.
Plain-error review: A more stringent appellate standard applied when an issue was not preserved below. The defendant must show an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness of proceedings.
Rule 11 colloquy: The judge’s in-court questioning to ensure a guilty plea is voluntary and informed. A proper colloquy makes later challenges to plea validity difficult.
Substantive reasonableness: Appellate review of whether the sentence length is justified under § 3553(a). Deferential: if the judge gave a reasoned, case-specific explanation, the sentence usually stands.
Upward variance: A sentence above the advisory Guidelines range based on statutory factors, often justified by offense severity or criminal history not fully captured by the Guidelines.
Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right (e.g., expressly accepting PSR calculations or declining a continuance), which extinguishes review. Forfeiture is failing to object, triggering plain-error review.
Victim-impact statement: A statement describing harm suffered, considered at sentencing. If disclosed late, a continuance can cure prejudice; declining one waives timing objections.
Collateral review: Post-conviction proceedings (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255) outside the direct appeal. Ineffective-assistance claims usually go here to allow fact development.

Conclusion

United States v. Stathas (7th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024) exemplifies the practical force of appeal waivers and the discipline of Anders review. The court found the guilty plea valid under rigorous Rule 11 scrutiny, enforced the waiver to bar suppression and Guidelines-applicability challenges, and concluded that the district court’s explanation supported an upward variance and a substantial term of supervised release. Objections to late-disclosed victim-impact statements were waived when the defendant declined a continuance, and the record showed no reliance on inaccuracies. Ineffective-assistance claims beyond plea negotiation or sentencing remain for collateral review.

The key takeaway is straightforward: a carefully negotiated and explained plea agreement—with an appeal waiver—will sharply confine appellate options. Defendants wishing to preserve sentencing or evidentiary issues must do so explicitly and contemporaneously at sentencing. Otherwise, absent a clear Rule 11 defect or an egregious sentencing error, dismissal under Anders will be the predictable result.

Case and Procedural Snapshot

Case: United States v. Steven M. Stathas, Jr., No. 24-1001
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Panel: Judges Easterbrook, St. Eve, Maldonado
Date: December 3, 2024
Disposition: Counsel’s Anders motion granted; appeal dismissed
Offense: Enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)
Sentence: 180 months’ imprisonment (upward variance), 10 years’ supervised release
Key holdings: Valid plea and enforceable appeal waiver; no procedural or substantive sentencing error; waiver of notice objections to victim statements; supervised-release term and conditions unassailable on this record; suppression and most IAC claims foreclosed