Appeal Waivers Are Enforced When the Plea Colloquy Ultimately Confirms Understanding, Despite Early Confusion

Introduction

In United States v. Jones (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 2026) (unpublished order and judgment), the Tenth Circuit enforced an appellate-rights waiver contained in a plea agreement and dismissed the appeal. The defendant, Edward Martin Jones (a/k/a Edward Brown), entered a negotiated guilty plea in the District of Colorado under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). The agreement included (1) a binding stipulated sentence of 10 years and (2) a stipulation that the parties would recommend credit for time served on a vacated state conviction, while acknowledging that the Bureau of Prisons would “ultimately calculate the sentence.”

Although Mr. Jones conceded his appeal fell within the scope of his waiver, he argued the waiver should not be enforced because he did not fully understand the plea agreement—pointing to moments of confusion during the plea hearing and alleging inadequate advice from plea counsel.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying the three-part test from United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc), the court focused on two disputed prongs: whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary and whether enforcement would cause a miscarriage of justice.

The court held that, even if Mr. Jones initially expressed confusion, the plea-hearing record showed that his questions were answered, he understood the agreement’s key terms—particularly the limits of any sentencing-credit recommendation—and he chose to proceed when offered an opportunity to withdraw. The court also rejected his “miscarriage of justice” argument, concluding that his ineffective-assistance allegations must be pursued in collateral proceedings rather than on direct appeal. The government’s motion to enforce the waiver was granted, and the appeal was dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
Role in the decision: Hahn supplies the governing framework for enforcing appellate waivers: (1) scope, (2) knowing and voluntary, and (3) miscarriage of justice. Mr. Jones conceded scope, so the panel applied Hahn primarily to the latter two prongs. The court also relied on Hahn’s articulation of what constitutes a miscarriage of justice—four narrow categories—then found none applicable.
United States v. Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2012)
Role in the decision: Salas-Garcia places the burden on the defendant to show the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. This allocation mattered because Mr. Jones’s argument rested on selective transcript excerpts; the court treated the complete record as rebutting his claim that confusion persisted through the end of the colloquy.
United States v. Rollings, 751 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2014)
Role in the decision: Rollings is cited for the proposition that if a plea is not knowing and voluntary, “the appellate waiver subsumed in the agreement also cannot stand.” The panel accepted Mr. Jones’s premise that the waiver’s validity rises or falls with the plea’s validity, but found the record established a knowing and voluntary plea (and therefore a valid waiver).
United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005)
Role in the decision: Porter supplies the procedural rule that ineffective-assistance claims are generally raised in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal—“even when the ineffective-assistance claim seeks to invalidate an appeal waiver.” This precedent was central to rejecting Mr. Jones’s attempt to use alleged deficient advice by plea counsel as both (a) a direct attack on the plea/waiver and (b) a Hahn “miscarriage of justice” argument on direct appeal.

Legal Reasoning

1) Knowing and voluntary waiver: transcript as a whole controls.
The panel applied the typical inquiry referenced in Hahn: whether the plea agreement states the waiver was knowing and voluntary and whether the district court conducted an adequate plea colloquy. The agreement itself expressly stated that Mr. Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived appeal rights.

The contested question was the plea hearing. The court acknowledged that early in the colloquy Mr. Jones said he needed to “clarify some things” and initially suggested not all questions had been answered. But the panel emphasized later portions of the hearing where Mr. Jones stated his questions had been answered (“You’ve answered them”) and where, after raising a “big problem” about whether the Bureau of Prisons must honor the credit recommendation, he engaged in a detailed back-and-forth with the judge and ultimately elected to proceed.

Critically, the district court explained the precise limitation that troubled Mr. Jones: acceptance of the 11(c)(1)(C) deal would bind the court to make the recommendation, but the court could not guarantee how the Bureau of Prisons would apply it. When given an opportunity to withdraw from the agreement after that clarification, Mr. Jones declined. From these features, the panel inferred not resignation or “helplessness,” but meaningful participation and ultimate understanding—enough to satisfy the knowing-and-voluntary requirement.

2) Miscarriage of justice: Hahn’s four categories are narrow and were not met.
Mr. Jones repackaged his plea-validity arguments as a claim that enforcement would be a miscarriage of justice. Under Hahn, that requires one of four circumstances: reliance on an impermissible factor, ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver, a sentence above the statutory maximum, or an otherwise unlawful waiver seriously affecting the fairness/integrity/public reputation of proceedings. The panel found none.

Most notably, while Hahn recognizes ineffective assistance in negotiating a waiver as a potential “miscarriage of justice” route, the panel used Porter to hold that such claims generally must be raised collaterally, not on direct appeal. With the ineffective-assistance theory procedurally unavailable and the “reluctance to ask questions” theory already rejected by the transcript, the miscarriage-of-justice prong failed.

Impact

Although designated nonprecedential, the order’s reasoning is likely to be cited persuasively in future Tenth Circuit waiver-enforcement motions for several practical propositions:

Momentary confusion does not defeat a waiver when the record shows the court answered questions, clarified key terms, and the defendant ultimately affirmed understanding and chose to proceed.
The “total record” approach to the plea colloquy is reinforced: later clarifications and explicit opportunities to withdraw can cure early ambiguity.
Ineffective-assistance allegations remain channeled to collateral review even when styled as an attack on the appeal waiver or as a Hahn miscarriage-of-justice argument, absent an articulated basis to depart from Porter.
Rule 11(c)(1)(C) terms must be distinguished from BOP administration: even where the parties describe a credit recommendation as part of a “binding” agreement, the BOP’s statutory role in calculating credit limits what a sentencing court can guarantee—an issue that can be dispositive for defendants weighing whether to plead.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Appeal waiver: A contractual term in a plea agreement where the defendant gives up some or all rights to appeal, usually in exchange for concessions by the government (e.g., charge reductions or sentencing recommendations).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C): A plea agreement that proposes a specific sentence (or sentencing range). If the judge accepts the agreement, the judge is generally bound to impose the agreed sentence.
Plea colloquy: The in-court questioning by the judge to ensure the defendant understands the plea’s terms, the rights being waived, and the consequences, and that the plea is voluntary.
Bureau of Prisons sentence credit: Even if a court recommends credit for time served, the BOP commonly has the final administrative role in calculating credit—so a court may not be able to guarantee the credit will be applied as the defendant expects.
Miscarriage of justice (Hahn): A narrow set of exceptions preventing enforcement of an appeal waiver, aimed at protecting core fairness concerns (e.g., illegal sentences, improper factors, certain waiver-negotiation defects).
Collateral proceedings: Post-conviction litigation (often under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) where factual development can occur; the Tenth Circuit generally requires ineffective-assistance claims to be brought this way rather than on direct appeal.

Conclusion

United States v. Jones underscores a practical rule of waiver enforcement in the Tenth Circuit: initial uncertainty expressed during a plea hearing will not invalidate an appeal waiver when the record shows the court addressed the defendant’s concerns, clarified disputed terms, and the defendant ultimately confirmed understanding and chose to proceed—especially after being offered the chance to withdraw. The decision also reiterates that ineffective-assistance challenges aimed at undoing waivers are ordinarily reserved for collateral proceedings under United States v. Porter, preserving direct appeal primarily for issues not foreclosed by the plea bargain itself.