Apparent Manufacturer Under the LPLA Requires Product-Specific Action: Brand Continuity Alone Is Not Enough

Introduction

In this Louisiana Supreme Court decision, the Court addressed a core threshold question under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA): when can an entity that did not actually make a product nevertheless be deemed a “manufacturer” because it labeled the product as its own or otherwise held itself out as the manufacturer? The case arose from the fatal fall of Carlos F. Pellecer from a Werner brand aluminum extension ladder. Plaintiffs sued, among others, Werner Co., a Delaware corporation, and its parent New Werner Holding Co., Inc. (collectively, the defendants), claiming the ladder was unreasonably dangerous and that defendants failed to warn in connection with a 2018 recall of different aluminum ladders.

The defendants had acquired assets, including the “Werner” name and trademarks, from the bankrupt Pennsylvania predecessor (formerly Werner Co., later renamed “Old Ladder”) in 2007 through a bankruptcy court-approved asset purchase. The pivotal issue was whether the post-bankruptcy asset purchasers qualified as “manufacturers” of the 1991 “Mark 9” ladder used by Mr. Pellecer under La. R.S. 9:2800.53(1)(a), which defines “manufacturer” to include a person who “labels a product as his own or otherwise holds himself out to be the manufacturer.”

The jury found the defendants to be manufacturers and awarded over $5 million, allocating 50% fault to defendants and 50% to Old Ladder (which was not a party). The trial court denied defense post-trial motions and the court of appeal affirmed. On certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, vacated the judgment on the jury verdict, and rendered judgment for defendants via JNOV, holding they are not manufacturers under the LPLA on the record presented.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice Guidry held that defendants were not “manufacturers” of the ladder within the meaning of the LPLA. Central to the Court’s reasoning was a clarified and constraining interpretation of the apparent manufacturer doctrine:

• The Court emphasized that to be deemed a manufacturer under La. R.S. 9:2800.53(1)(a) on an apparent manufacturer theory, the defendant must take product-specific action—“do something to or with the product that affects it in a meaningful way”—or have a level of engagement in manufacturing or distributing the product, or a level of control or influence over the product itself.
• The Court found no evidence that defendants labeled, manufactured, designed, distributed, sold, controlled, or influenced the 1991 Mark 9 ladder. Nor was there evidence that defendants had any input into its design, construction, or quality, or that the ladder was part of any recall they administered. The ladder model had ceased production by 2002—years before defendants existed.
• The Court underscored the absence of evidence about when or from whom Mr. Pellecer acquired the ladder, which was relevant to whether defendants “put out” the ladder as their own at the time of purchase.
• The Court relied in part on the bankruptcy court’s sale order findings showing no alter ego, no successor, and no continuity of enterprise between the bankrupt predecessor and defendants.

Concluding that “the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of” the defendants, the Court held the trial court erred in denying JNOV. It reversed the court of appeal, vacated the judgment on the jury verdict, and rendered judgment for defendants.

Justice Hughes dissented, criticizing the majority for adding extra-textual requirements to the statute. In his view, the statute requires only that the entity “labels” the product as its own or “otherwise holds himself out” as the manufacturer; he argued defendants’ continued use of the Werner name was “the actor’s actions” holding themselves out, and he would have deferred to the jury’s fact-finding.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

• Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400 (1965): “One who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer.” The Court invoked this historical foundation of the apparent manufacturer doctrine as the jurisprudential backdrop later codified in the LPLA.
• Penn v. Inferno Manufacturing Corp. (La. App. 1 Cir. 1967): Vendor affixed its label and boxed goods as its own; held liable as apparent manufacturer. Used by the Court to illustrate classic “labeling as own” conduct that justifies apparent manufacturer liability.
• Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (La. 1972): Domestic distributor’s exclusive marketing rights and consumer-facing materials positioned it as the manufacturer to American consumers. Cited to show how non-makers can, through market-facing actions, occupy the manufacturer’s position.
• Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (La. 1978): Product bore “Sears” and “Craftsman” marks without identifying actual maker; Sears liable as manufacturer. Reinforces that branding on the product that reasonably leads consumers to attribute manufacture to the seller triggers manufacturer-level responsibility.
• Peterson v. G.H. Bass & Co. (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998): Front labels in large print identified the seller; fine-print “manufactured for” did not negate apparent manufacturer status. Illustrates that consumer-facing labeling takes precedence.
• Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fred’s, Inc. (La. App. 2 Cir. 2010): “Distributed by Seller” labeling, alongside “Made in China,” left open the seller’s involvement; seller held as apparent manufacturer. Shows how even distribution indications can suggest responsibility for the product’s nature.
• Coulon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (La. App. 1 Cir. 1999): Walmart, by assembling or having assembled a bicycle without informing customers, held as manufacturer. Demonstrates product-specific involvement/assembly as sufficient action.
• Chevron USA, Inc. v. Aker Maritime, Inc. (5th Cir. 2010): Distributor of bolts—well-known as a bolt manufacturer—did not disclaim manufacture; packing slip possibly suggested manufacture; held liable. Highlights that market reputation and transaction documents can create apparent manufacturer impressions.
• Martin v. Pham Le Bros., LLC (La. App. 5 Cir. 2021): Catalog not seen at point of sale was irrelevant; focus is the purchasing public’s viewpoint and the circumstances at the time of purchase. The Court relies on Martin to stress that what matters is what the purchaser saw when acquiring the product—a critical gap in the Pellecer record.
• Pickard v. Amazon.com, Inc. (La. 2024): Amazon can be a “manufacturer” when it holds physical custody and controls transactions and delivery in its fulfillment program. The Court cites Pickard to underscore that control over distribution and the product’s path to the consumer can trigger manufacturer status under the LPLA.
• Statutory interpretation cases: Oubre v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan (La. 2011); Cleco Evangeline, LLC v. Louisiana Tax Commission (La. 2002); Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Jackel International Ltd. (La. 2020); Richard v. Hall (La. 2004). The Court employs these to ground its textual approach—start with the statute’s words, read the whole act, and adopt interpretations consistent with legislative intent.
• Fault principles: La. C.C. art. 2315; Landry v. Bellanger (La. 2003); Langlois v. Allied Chemical (La. 1971). Used to situate LPLA liability within Louisiana’s broad concept of “fault,” though the Court ultimately confines liability within the statute’s boundaries.
• Review and JNOV standards: Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (La. 2010); Ambrose v. NOPD Ambulance Service (La. 1994); Eastman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (La. 2024); Joseph v. Broussard Rice Mill, Inc. (La. 2000). These authorities justify overturning the jury’s verdict and granting JNOV when the evidence cannot support a reasonable contrary result.

Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Decision

• Statutory text and structure. The LPLA is the exclusive vehicle for manufacturer liability in Louisiana (La. R.S. 9:2800.52), and “manufacturer” includes one who “labels a product as his own or otherwise holds himself out to be the manufacturer” (La. R.S. 9:2800.53(1)(a)). Reading the statute in whole and in light of its purpose, the Court ties apparent manufacturer status to consumer-facing conduct that reasonably induces consumers to treat the defendant as responsible for the product’s nature.
• Doctrinal anchor: “puts out” as own. The Court links the LPLA to Restatement § 400 and Louisiana jurisprudence (Penn, Media Production, Chappuis) where the defendant’s market-facing actions—on-product branding, packaging, warranties, assembly, or transaction materials—made it reasonable to attribute the product to the defendant.
• Refinement and limitation of “holds out.” While acknowledging cases that extended apparent manufacturer beyond literal on-product labels (Peterson, Allstate, Coulon, Chevron), the Court expressly resists further expansion. It adopts a clarifying threshold:
  • “In order to be a manufacturer under the LPLA one must do something to or with the product that affects it in a meaningful way.”
  • Holding oneself out “necessarily includes a level of engagement in the process of manufacturing or distributing the product, or a level of control of or influence over the subject product.”
  This is the opinion’s most consequential interpretive gloss.
• Application to the facts. The record showed that:
  • The ladder was a Mark 9 model manufactured in 1991 by the Pennsylvania predecessor (Old Ladder). The Mark 9 line ended in 2002; defendants did not manufacture or sell it.
  • Defendants acquired certain assets (including the Werner name and goodwill) in 2007 via a bankruptcy sale. The bankruptcy court found no alter ego or successor relationship, no continuity of enterprise, and that defendants were not “a continuation” of the debtor.
  • There was no evidence defendants labeled the subject ladder, had custody of it, distributed it, sold it, or influenced its design/construction/quality; no evidence of any recall of the Mark 9; and no proof of the ladder’s date or source of purchase to ground a finding that defendants “put out” this ladder as their own at the time of acquisition.
  • Plaintiffs’ expert on marketing opined defendants “held themselves out,” pointing to continuity in the Werner logo and lack of notice to the public of ownership changes. The Court found brand continuity alone insufficient absent product-specific engagement.
• Result: Because the LPLA’s manufacturer definition was not met, there could be no LPLA liability. The jury’s contrary finding lacked a legal and evidentiary basis. Under La. C.C.P. art. 1811 and Eastman/Joseph, JNOV was warranted.

The Dissent: Points of Tension

Justice Hughes accused the majority of “judicial activism,” arguing it added extra words to the statute by requiring defendants to “do something to or with the product that affects it in a meaningful way.” The dissent emphasized the statute’s plain language—“labels” or “otherwise holds himself out”—and viewed defendants’ continued use of the Werner name as quintessential “holding out.” He would have respected the jury’s fact-finding that defendants were manufacturers and affirmed the judgment.

This highlights a key doctrinal tension: Does “otherwise holds himself out” require product-specific conduct, or can brand continuity and market presence suffice? The majority answers “product-specific conduct,” narrowing the doctrine; the dissent reads the text more broadly and defers to the jury’s application of that standard on the evidence.

Impact: What This Decision Means Going Forward

• Narrowing of apparent manufacturer doctrine under Louisiana law. The Court’s insistence on product-specific action—engagement in making, distributing, controlling, or influencing the product—tightens the path to apparent manufacturer liability. Mere ownership of the brand name and continuity of trademark styling do not suffice.
• Asset purchasers and brand acquirers gain clarity and protection. Buyers of assets (especially post-bankruptcy) who maintain legacy branding but do not engage with legacy products will be better insulated from historical product claims, especially where a robust sale order negates successor or alter ego status and there is no product-specific involvement.
• Plaintiffs’ burden sharpened. Claimants now must:
  • Establish when and from whom the product was acquired.
  • Identify on-product labeling, packaging, transaction documents, warranties, assembly, or distribution steps tying the defendant to that product at the time of purchase.
  • Show the defendant’s control over or influence on design, construction, or quality, or that it physically handled or distributed the product (cf. Pickard v. Amazon).
  Absent such proof, apparent manufacturer claims will likely fail.
• Retail and e-commerce channels. The decision harmonizes with Pickard: where a platform or seller exercises custody and transaction control, LPLA manufacturer status can attach. Here, the lack of any such engagement doomed the claim. Sellers should expect courts to scrutinize their physical and transactional involvement with the product.
• Recall and warning obligations. Without manufacturer status, defendants had no LPLA duty to warn regarding the 2018 recall (which concerned different models). Companies should recognize that assuming or publicizing recall responsibilities for legacy products could evidence the requisite engagement and alter apparent manufacturer exposure.
• Jury verdicts and post-trial relief. The Court’s use of JNOV to overturn a substantial plaintiff’s verdict signals heightened scrutiny where the record lacks product-specific evidence of apparent manufacturer conduct. Trial courts may be more receptive to JNOVs in similar posture.
• Potential legislative attention. The dissent’s charge that the Court added to the statute’s text may spur legislative clarification on the breadth of “otherwise holds himself out,” particularly in successor and brand-continuity contexts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• LPLA basics. The Louisiana Products Liability Act is the exclusive framework for suing a “manufacturer” for harm caused by a product. To recover, a plaintiff must show an unreasonably dangerous product, a reasonably anticipated use, and proximate cause.
• Manufacturer defined. A “manufacturer” includes the actual maker and also:
  • One who labels a product as his own or otherwise holds himself out as the manufacturer.
  • A seller who controls or influences the design, construction, or quality that causes damage.
  • A manufacturer incorporating another’s component.
  • Certain sellers of alien manufacturers who are their alter egos.
• Apparent manufacturer doctrine. If a seller leads a reasonable consumer to believe it is the product’s manufacturer—traditionally via on-product branding, packaging, or other product-specific conduct—the seller is treated as the manufacturer. After this decision, Louisiana requires product-specific engagement, not mere brand continuity.
• Asset purchase vs. successor liability. Buying assets (including trademarks) in bankruptcy does not automatically make the buyer the legal successor for product liability. Sale orders often disclaim alter ego/successor status. Apparent manufacturer liability still turns on product-specific “holding out.”
• JNOV (Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict). A court may enter JNOV when the evidence points so strongly for the movant that reasonable jurors could not reach a different result. It is a potent remedy to correct verdicts that lack a legal or evidentiary foundation.

Conclusion

• The Louisiana Supreme Court has clarified and narrowed the apparent manufacturer pathway under the LPLA: a defendant must take product-specific actions—engaging in manufacturing, distribution, control, or influence—before being treated as a manufacturer. Brand continuity and trademark ownership, without more, are insufficient.
• On the record here, the ladder was made in 1991 by Old Ladder; the model was discontinued in 2002; defendants came into existence in 2007 via a bankruptcy asset purchase; there was no evidence that defendants labeled, sold, distributed, controlled, or influenced the subject ladder, nor any proof of the circumstances of Mr. Pellecer’s acquisition. These facts compelled judgment for defendants.
• The decision meaningfully shapes Louisiana products law at the intersection of apparent manufacturer doctrine, successor issues, and modern distribution channels. It underscores the importance of product-specific evidence and may prompt strategic adjustments by plaintiffs, sellers, and asset purchasers alike. While the dissent warns against judicially adding to the statute, unless and until the Legislature speaks, this opinion sets the controlling standard in Louisiana.

Case Timeline (for context)

• 1991: Subject Mark 9 ladder manufactured by Pennsylvania predecessor (Old Ladder).
• 2002: Mark 9 discontinued; Mark 10 begins shipping.
• 2006–2007: Old Ladder bankruptcy; defendants acquire assets (including the Werner brand) via court-approved sale; no successor/alter ego status.
• 2012: Werner logo slightly updated (per testimony).
• 2018: Recall of different Werner aluminum ladders (not the Mark 9).
• 2019: Mr. Pellecer’s accident and death in New Orleans.
• 2021–2024: Jury verdict for plaintiffs; post-trial motions denied; court of appeal affirms.
• 2025: Louisiana Supreme Court reverses, vacates, and renders JNOV for defendants.