"Any and All Damages" Does Not Expand a Limited Engagement: Sixth Circuit Affirms Scope-Limited Duty in Michigan Legal Malpractice

Introduction

This appeal from the Western District of Michigan presented a common but consequential question in attorney-malpractice litigation: when a client believes multiple claims should be pursued, can a lawyer’s duty be confined by a retainer agreement that references only a single claim? In a non-precedential opinion, the Sixth Circuit (Judges Griffin, Nalbandian, and Mathis; opinion by Judge Nalbandian) answered “yes” under Michigan law. The court held that a retainer agreement limiting representation to “an injury claim arising out of” a specified incident confined the attorney’s duty to that claim and did not obligate counsel to bring related medical-malpractice actions. The court also confirmed that a boilerplate promise to pursue “any and all damages” does not broaden the scope of representation beyond the claim described in the engagement letter.

Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Scott DeYoung, injured by a scooter in South Bend, Indiana, was treated first at an Indiana hospital and later at a Michigan hospital. Believing those providers misdiagnosed and mistreated him (including possible failure to identify compartment syndrome), he retained Sweeney Julian Personal Injury Trial Attorneys in Indiana. The firm filed only a negligence action against the scooter driver (later adding a UIM claim), declined to bring medical-malpractice claims, and withdrew. DeYoung then sued the firm and one of its attorneys for legal malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The decision turns on two holdings: first, the retainer’s plain language limited the duty of representation to a single personal-injury claim arising from the scooter incident; second, even if ambiguity existed, DeYoung failed to present timely expert testimony establishing the professional standard of care for his malpractice claim. Although unpublished, the opinion is a clear, practitioner-focused application of Michigan contract and malpractice law to scope-limited engagements.

Summary of the Opinion

• Scope governs duty: Under Michigan law, the attorney-client relationship is contractual. The retainer here limited representation to “an injury claim” arising out of the June 20, 2020 South Bend incident. That unambiguous limitation confined the lawyer’s duty and imposed no obligation to bring separate medical-malpractice claims against treating hospitals.
• “Any and all damages” clause is not a scope-expander: A promise to pursue “any and all damages” due to the client does not transmute a single-claim engagement into a multi-claim mandate. Claims and damages are distinct legal concepts; the damages clause operates within the scope of the agreed claim.
• No ambiguity requiring a jury: Because the retainer fairly admits of one interpretation, extrinsic evidence (such as alleged oral statements) cannot expand the scope. The rule of contra proferentem is a tiebreaker used only after conventional interpretive tools fail, which was not the case.
• Alternative ground—absence of expert proof: Even if scope were ambiguous, DeYoung’s malpractice claim would still fail because Michigan typically requires expert testimony to establish the standard of care in legal-malpractice cases. His untimely expert report was properly excluded under Federal Rules 26 and 37.
• Result: Summary judgment for the defendants is affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Elements of Michigan legal malpractice: Coleman v. Gurwin, 503 N.W.2d 435 (Mich. 1993) sets out the four elements: (1) attorney-client relationship; (2) negligence; (3) proximate cause; and (4) fact and extent of injury. The first element is pivotal because the attorney’s duty is defined by the scope of the relationship (Simko v. Blake, 532 N.W.2d 842 (Mich. 1995)).
• Attorney-client relationship as contract:
  • Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14 (1877) recognizes the implied duty to exercise reasonable skill in the cause for which the attorney is retained.
  • Macomb County Taxpayers Ass’n v. L’Anse Creuse Pub. Schs., 564 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1997) confirms the contractual foundation of the relationship.
  • Island Lake Arbors Condo. Ass’n v. Meisner & Assocs., PC, 837 N.W.2d 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) applies plain-meaning rules to retainer agreements.
  • Wasenko v. Auto Club Grp., 16 N.W.3d 557 (Mich. Ct. App. 2023) emphasizes parties’ freedom to contract, including limiting scope.
  • Law Offices of Jeffrey Sherbow, PC v. Fieger & Fieger, PC, 968 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. 2021) acknowledges scope-limiting language to a single claim.
  • D’Avanzo v. Wise & Marsac, P.C., 565 N.W.2d 915 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) and Mich. Twp. Participating Plan v. Pavolich, 591 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) hold that unambiguous contracts are construed as a matter of law, and inartful drafting does not create ambiguity.
  • Kendzierski v. Macomb County, 931 N.W.2d 604 (Mich. 2019) underscores that plain text—not subjective expectations—controls.
  • Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 251 (Mich. 2003) directs courts to enforce unambiguous contracts as written.
  • Patel v. FisherBroyles, LLP, 1 N.W.3d 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 2022) articulates the core rule: when the representation’s terms are expressly limited, the attorney’s malpractice duty is limited to that scope.
• Claims vs. damages: WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018) is invoked for a conceptual point: legal injury (and the claim that vindicates it) is distinct from the damages that flow from that injury. The Sixth Circuit uses this to reject the argument that a “pursue any and all damages” clause expands the kinds of claims the lawyer must file.
• Ambiguity and contra proferentem: Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2007) explains that ambiguity that needs extrinsic evidence creates a jury question. But Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2003) limits contra proferentem to a last-resort tiebreaker after interpretive tools and extrinsic evidence fail.
• Expert requirement in legal malpractice: Dean v. Tucker, 517 N.W.2d 835 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) generally requires expert testimony to establish the professional standard of care. The narrow “common knowledge” exception (Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockler, P.C. v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)) did not apply.
• Procedural standards:
  • Summary judgment: Cash-Darling v. Recycling Equip., Inc., 62 F.4th 969 (6th Cir. 2023); Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 971 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2020); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677 (6th Cir. 2017).
  • Expert disclosure and sanctions: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) and 37(c)(1) (untimely expert reports are excluded unless the failure is substantially justified or harmless).
  • Choice of law: The district court’s Michigan-law choice (not challenged) is noted, with Smith v. General Motors LLC, 988 F.3d 873, 879 n.5 (6th Cir. 2021) highlighting that choice-of-law can be waived.

Legal Reasoning Applied

1) Scope of representation is a duty-defining term. The court begins at the first malpractice element—existence and scope of the attorney-client relationship—which defines the duty owed. The retainer stated that the firm was engaged “for an injury claim arising out of an incident which occurred in South Bend, Indiana on [June 20, 2020].” The court reads this as plainly referring to a single personal-injury claim tied to the scooter collision. The agreement did not mention hospital defendants, malpractice, or any parallel claim.

2) “Any and all damages” means breadth of recovery within the chosen claim, not breadth of claims. DeYoung argued that the promise to pursue “any and all damages due” rendered the agreement ambiguous and arguably expansive enough to include malpractice claims. The court rejects the premise, emphasizing that “legal claims for relief are distinct from damages.” WesternGeco supplies the analytic lens: a damages clause does not create new causes of action; it describes the remedies sought within the boundaries of the identified claim.

3) No ambiguity, so no jury question. The interpretive task ended at the text: the engagement fairly admitted of one interpretation. Because the contract was unambiguous, extrinsic evidence about pre-retention discussions or the client’s expectations could not alter scope. Contra proferentem, a tie-breaking tool, never came into play because there was no tie to break.

4) Alternative basis—failure of proof on negligence. Even if a trier of fact could consider extrinsic evidence to expand scope, the claim independently failed on the second malpractice element: breach of the standard of care. Michigan generally requires expert testimony to establish what a reasonably prudent lawyer would do under similar circumstances; the “obvious negligence” exception did not apply. DeYoung’s expert report was untimely and properly excluded under Rule 37(c)(1), leaving no admissible expert evidence. Without a standard-of-care benchmark, a jury could not find negligence.

5) Ancillary points:

• The court notes that the plaintiff’s web-based impression that the firm handled medical malpractice came from a different firm’s website (Sweeney Law Firm, not Sweeney Julian). In any event, marketing materials cannot supersede the signed engagement’s plain terms.
• The court clarifies that, although the district court analyzed scope under the “negligence” element, the cleaner doctrinal path is to treat limited scope as limiting duty under the “relationship” element—but the outcome is the same.

Impact and Practical Implications

• For lawyers: precision in engagement letters matters. This case reinforces that Michigan courts will enforce clear, scope-limiting engagements according to their plain text. If counsel intends to handle only the automobile negligence claim and not potential medical malpractice, the engagement should say so explicitly—and ideally disclaim responsibility for other potential claims unless separately retained.
• “Any and all damages” is not a catchall for claims. Practitioners should understand and explain to clients that damages language pertains to the remedies pursued within the defined claim. It does not import additional causes of action (e.g., hospital malpractice) into a single-incident engagement.
• Communications vs. contract. Oral assurances or preliminary discussions will not trump an unambiguous retainer. If a lawyer discusses evaluating additional claims, that should be documented as either included or excluded. A separate non-engagement letter regarding excluded matters (with limitation periods noted) is a prudent risk-management tool.
• Expert testimony remains essential in legal-malpractice suits. Absent obvious, lay-understandable error, plaintiffs must present timely expert testimony on standard of care and breach. Missing Rule 26 deadlines can be fatal under Rule 37(c)(1)’s automatic exclusion.
• Choice of law and multistate facts. Even with injuries and care spanning multiple states (Indiana and Michigan), Michigan law controlled here. Attorneys handling cross-border matters should harmonize scope language with the client’s multi-claim expectations and state-specific requirements (e.g., pre-suit notice rules for medical malpractice).
• Non-precedential but persuasive. Although not recommended for publication, the opinion is consistent with—and underscores—Michigan authorities like Patel and Sherbow. Expect Michigan state and federal courts to treat this reasoning as persuasive in similar disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Limited-scope representation: A lawyer and client can agree that the lawyer will handle only certain matters (e.g., a single personal-injury claim) and not others (e.g., separate medical-malpractice claims). That limitation, if clearly written, limits the lawyer’s malpractice duty.
• Claim vs. damages: A “claim” is the legal cause of action (e.g., negligence against a driver, medical malpractice against a hospital). “Damages” are the money or relief sought because of that claim. Promising to pursue “all damages” does not create new claims.
• Ambiguity and extrinsic evidence: If a contract is unclear, courts may consider outside evidence (like emails or conversations) to determine meaning, and a jury may decide. If the contract is clear, courts enforce it as written and do not rely on extrinsic evidence.
• Contra proferentem: A rule that, if a contract remains ambiguous after normal interpretation, it is construed against the drafter. It is a last resort, not a primary interpretive tool.
• Expert testimony in legal malpractice: Typically required to show what a reasonably careful lawyer would have done and whether the defendant lawyer fell below that standard. Without an expert, most malpractice claims fail unless the negligence is obvious to a layperson.
• Summary judgment: A way to end a case without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant but will enforce unambiguous contracts as a matter of law.
• Rule 26 and Rule 37: Federal rules governing expert disclosures and sanctions. If a party fails to timely disclose expert reports, Rule 37(c)(1) generally bars use of that expert unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.
• Non-precedential opinion: “Not recommended for publication” means the opinion is not binding precedent, though it can still be cited for its persuasive reasoning.

Conclusion

DeYoung v. Sweeney Julian squarely reaffirms a central tenet of Michigan malpractice law: the attorney’s duty is defined—and may be limited—by the plain terms of the engagement contract. A generic commitment to seek “any and all damages” does not broaden a single-claim engagement into a multi-claim mandate. The court’s alternative holding also highlights a recurring procedural lesson: legal-malpractice plaintiffs usually need timely expert testimony to establish breach of the standard of care.

For practitioners, the message is straightforward: draft engagement letters with precision; expressly include or exclude collateral claims; consider issuing non-engagement notices for excluded matters; and maintain clear client communications that mirror the written scope. For clients, the case underscores the importance of ensuring that all intended claims are expressly included in the retainer—or that separate counsel is engaged—well before limitations periods run. Even as a non-precedential ruling, the opinion is a clear and practical application of Michigan law and will likely be persuasive in future scope-of-representation disputes.