Antique and De Minimis Ivory Exceptions Do Not Negate Federal Duty to Declare: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Smuggling Mens Rea and Permits Use of Asking Prices to Value Wildlife Art Under § 2Q2.1

Introduction

In United States v. Eduardo Ulises Martinez, No. 23-10848 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2025) (published), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed smuggling and obstruction convictions and a 51-month sentence arising from an elaborate international scheme to buy, import, export, and sell bronze-and-ivory sculptures without declaring them as required under federal wildlife regulations implementing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).

The appeal raised four primary issues:

• Whether the district court properly excluded evidence and argument about ESA/CITES antique and de minimis exceptions as irrelevant to smuggling charges predicated on failure to declare;
• Whether the court erred under the rule of completeness (Fed. R. Evid. 106) by refusing to admit additional portions of the defendant’s recorded interview;
• Whether the evidence sufficed to support an obstruction of justice conviction based on attempts to procure a false invoice and coordinate testimony; and
• Whether the sentencing court violated due process or misapplied the Guidelines by using the defendant-dealer’s asking prices to determine “market value” under U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A)(ii).

The court’s opinion (Jordan, J.; joined by Brasher, J., and Covington, J., sitting by designation) breaks important doctrinal ground in two places. First, it holds that the existence or potential applicability of the ESA’s antique and de minimis exceptions does not excuse the independent federal duty to declare wildlife at the border; evidence of those exceptions is therefore irrelevant to the mens rea and elements of smuggling under 18 U.S.C. §§ 545 and 554. Second, in a detailed sentencing analysis, it approves the use of a defendant-dealer’s publicly listed asking prices as a reliable proxy for “market value” where the fair-market retail price is difficult to ascertain in a regulated and volatile market for wildlife art, thereby supporting a significant enhancement under § 2Q2.1.

Summary of the Opinion

• Smuggling convictions affirmed. The court held that smuggling under §§ 545 and 554 criminalizes the knowing, fraudulent failure to declare items, regardless of whether the goods might ultimately be “importable” or “exportable” under an ESA/CITES exception. The antique and de minimis exceptions do not erase the duty to declare, nor may a traveler self-certify exemptions.
• Exclusion of antique/de minimis evidence affirmed. The district court’s in limine ruling excluding evidence about antique and de minimis exceptions was a proper exercise of discretion under Rules 401/403, because such evidence did not make any material fact—i.e., failure to declare with knowledge—more or less probable.
• Rule 106 (completeness) claims rejected. While two excluded statements arguably met Rule 106’s fairness standard, any error was harmless; four others were properly excluded as neither explanatory of nor necessary to contextualize admitted portions.
• Obstruction conviction affirmed. The government presented sufficient evidence that the defendant endeavored to impede the due administration of justice by seeking to repurpose an inaccurate invoice to cover a seized ivory statue and by attempting to coordinate testimony.
• Prosecutorial-misconduct claim denied under plain-error review. The prosecutor’s statement in closing that the defendant was “no longer presumed innocent” was improper and plainly erroneous, but harmless in light of strong evidence and curative jury instructions. A further characterization of the defendant’s statements as an “admission” was permissible argument.
• Sentencing affirmed. No due-process violation occurred in declining live expert testimony where the report was admitted and the record was sufficient. The court did not err in valuing unsold sculptures by the dealer-defendant’s asking prices as a reasonable estimate of “market value” in a constrained and uncertain market, warranting a 14-level enhancement under § 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A)(ii).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s reasoning is anchored in prior circuit and cross-circuit authority across several domains—wildlife regulation, smuggling, evidentiary completeness, obstruction, prosecutorial error, and sentencing methodology.

• CITES/ESA framework and declaration duties:
  • United States v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806 (11th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Norris, 452 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2006), establish that CITES, implemented through the ESA, is enforced domestically and that import of Appendix I species requires permits. The court relies on this structure to confirm that wildlife (including African elephant ivory) is subject to mandatory declaration and clearance.
  • Safari Club International v. Zinke, 878 F.3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2017), provides background on elephant listings and the regulatory tightness relevant to ivory trade.
  • Regulatory citations (50 C.F.R. §§ 14.52, 14.61, 14.63; § 23.13(a); § 23.92(b); § 17.40(e)) reinforce the mandatory nature of declaration and clearance separate from ultimate permissibility.
• Smuggling as failure to declare:
  • United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2000), and United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310 (11th Cir. 2024), outline §§ 545 and 554 elements, focusing on knowing/fraudulent conduct.
  • United States v. Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1978), is adopted to emphasize that the legal or illegal status of importation does not eliminate the crime of smuggling via non-declaration. This cross-circuit alignment grounds the irrelevance of antique/de minimis exceptions to the declaration offense.
  • United States v. Ritterman, 273 U.S. 261 (1927), underscores the disclosure duty regardless of concealment method.
• Evidence and Rule 106:
  • United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938 (11th Cir. 1988), United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2011), United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011), and United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1992) define the completeness rule’s scope: only parts necessary to qualify, explain, or contextualize admitted statements are admissible, and completeness is not a gateway for unrelated, self-serving material.
  • The court notes the December 1, 2023 amendment to Rule 106 (allowing admission “over a hearsay objection”) but applies the version in effect at trial; the fairness necessity remains the touchstone.
• Obstruction of justice, § 1503:
  • United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Beach, 80 F.4th 1245 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995)) anchor the omnibus clause’s breadth and the required “nexus” to judicial or grand-jury proceedings.
  • United States v. Macari, 453 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Petzold, 788 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1986), support that attempts to induce false statements or create fabricated paper trails can constitute obstruction.
• Prosecutorial closing and presumption of innocence:
  • Fifth and Eleventh Circuit precedents (Bradford v. United States, 129 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1942); United States v. Harris, 703 F.2d 508 (11th Cir. 1983)) affirm the presumption’s endurance until a guilty verdict.
  • United States v. LaFontaine, 847 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2017), United States v. Marin, 31 F.4th 1049 (8th Cir. 2022), and United States v. Starks, 34 F.4th 1142 (10th Cir. 2022) are aligned: telling the jury the defendant is “no longer presumed innocent” before verdict is improper.
• Guidelines valuation under § 2Q2.1:
  • United States v. Butler, 694 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2012), and general interpretive principles (Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995)) support using the ordinary meaning of “fair market value”—what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller.
  • United States v. Oehlenschlager, 76 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1996) permits reliance on a defendant’s own price list as a reasonable proxy when market price is otherwise unavailable.
  • United States v. Koczuk, 252 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) clarifies that § 2Q2.1 focuses on market value, not ecological loss.
  • Standard of review authorities (e.g., United States v. Rogers, 989 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2021)) frame de novo review of methodology and clear-error review of the ultimate valuation finding.

Legal Reasoning

1) Smuggling convictions and exclusion of antique/de minimis evidence. The court’s central holding is conceptual: smuggling under §§ 545 and 554 is a declaration offense. The elements target the knowing, fraudulent act of not declaring regulated merchandise. Whether the goods were ultimately importable or exportable under an exception is legally beside the point. By regulation, even exempt items must be declared and cleared (50 C.F.R. § 23.92(b); §§ 14.52, 14.61, 14.63). Because the defendant admitted knowledge of the duty to declare and also admitted noncompliance, the district court properly found that evidence of the antique and de minimis exceptions had no tendency to make a material fact more or less probable as to the charged smuggling (Rule 401), and would risk confusion (Rule 403). The Eleventh Circuit embraced the Ninth Circuit’s Richardson rule: final importability does not absolve a failure-to-declare smuggling offense.

2) Rule 106 (completeness). The government introduced portions of the defendant’s recorded airport interview. The defense sought to add six segments. Two (Statements 1–2) arguably qualified under Rule 106 to contextualize the admitted “I know” and “I do” acknowledgments of the duty to declare, but any exclusion was harmless because they did not alter the basic admission that the duty existed and was violated (and because the exceptions are irrelevant to that duty). The other four (Statements 3–6) were not necessary to explain or qualify any admitted content; they were stand-alone assertions of legality and would have merely introduced self-serving legal conclusions or misunderstanding of law, which Rule 106 does not require a court to admit.

3) Obstruction of justice (§ 1503). The court underscored that the omnibus clause penalizes any corrupt endeavor that has a nexus to a judicial or grand jury proceeding. The attempt to repurpose an inaccurate 2020 invoice to cover a seized ivory sculpture, and to coordinate statements with a gallery owner, satisfied the nexus and corrupt endeavor elements—even though the attempt failed. No proof of success is required; the “endeavor” suffices when the natural and probable effect would be interference with the due administration of justice.

4) Prosecutor’s “no longer presumed innocent” remark. On plain-error review, the court deemed the comment erroneous and plainly so because the presumption endures through deliberations. Nonetheless, there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome. The court emphasized strong independent evidence and repeated jury instructions that the burden never shifts.

5) Sentencing: due process and valuation under § 2Q2.1. The Guidelines require a market-value-based enhancement. Where the fair-market retail price is “difficult to ascertain,” the court may make a “reasonable estimate using any reliable information” (Application Note 4). The panel recognized that valuing art containing ivory is unusually complex, with a constrained and volatile lawful market for ivory in the United States, and that comparable sales for identical works are often scarce. In that setting, the district court permissibly treated the defendant’s own asking prices for unsold pieces as reliable indicators of market value, given his decades of experience, his role as the price setter, and the evidentiary record showing sales at listed prices in other instances. The court rejected a categorical rule that unsold asking prices are too speculative; instead it endorsed a context-sensitive approach that turns on reliability. Due process was satisfied by admitting the defense expert report, entertaining argument on reliability, and sentencing on an adequately developed record; live testimony was not constitutionally required.

6) Unresolved question noted but not decided. In a footnote, the panel explicitly declined to address whether the ESA/CITES declaration regulations are “laws” for purposes of the “contrary to law” clause in § 545—an issue implicated by United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2013). That open question remains for a case that squarely presents it.

Impact

The opinion’s practical and doctrinal effects are substantial across criminal enforcement of wildlife trade rules, evidence practice, trial advocacy, and federal sentencing.

• Wildlife smuggling prosecutions:
  • Clear rule: Antique and de minimis exceptions do not excuse the separate, mandatory duty to declare and clear wildlife, including items that may ultimately qualify for those exceptions. Defendants cannot “self-diagnose” exemptions to bypass declaration.
  • Evidence: Trial courts in the Eleventh Circuit may exclude exception-related evidence as irrelevant to smuggling counts that turn on failure to declare, simplifying trials and narrowing issues.
  • Compliance signal: Importers and exporters—even of antiques—must file Form 3-177 and obtain FWS clearance at designated ports. Failure to do so risks smuggling liability regardless of the item’s eventual permissibility.
• Rule 106 practice:
  • Completeness remains tightly focused on fairness and context. Defendants cannot use Rule 106 to introduce legal arguments or self-exculpatory assertions unless they are necessary to prevent a misleading impression created by admitted excerpts.
  • Even under the amended Rule 106 (effective Dec. 1, 2023), which allows overcoming hearsay objections, the threshold “in fairness ought to be considered at the same time” requirement persists and will limit admission to genuinely contextual material.
• Obstruction:
  • Efforts to fabricate documentation (e.g., retrofitting invoices) or to coordinate testimony can satisfy § 1503’s “endeavor” requirement even absent success, provided the acts have a logical nexus to a proceeding.
• Prosecutorial argument:
  • The court puts prosecutors on notice that stating a defendant is “no longer presumed innocent” prior to verdict is plainly improper. While curative instructions may avert reversal on plain error where evidence is strong, the risk of mistrial or reversal remains if prejudice can be shown.
• Sentencing under § 2Q2.1:
  • Valuation methodology: District courts may rely on a defendant-dealer’s own asking prices for unsold wildlife-containing art when fair-market retail price is difficult to ascertain—especially in regulated, opaque markets—as a “reliable” estimate of market value.
  • Defense strategy implications: High public listing prices can drive substantial enhancements. Defense teams should marshal recent identical-sales data when available, or rigorously support any downward valuation with credible comparables and market analysis.
• Open issue preserved:
  • Whether regulatory violations alone constitute importation “contrary to law” under § 545 remains unresolved in this circuit. Future cases may revisit the scope of “law” in § 545 in light of Izurieta.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• CITES and ESA: CITES is an international treaty regulating trade in endangered species. The ESA implements CITES in U.S. law. African elephant ivory is tightly regulated. Even if an item is ultimately importable (e.g., an antique), it must be declared and cleared by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) before entry or exit.
• Form 3-177 and Clearance: To import/export wildlife or items containing wildlife parts, a traveler or broker must file Form 3-177 and obtain FWS clearance at a designated port (50 C.F.R. §§ 14.52, 14.61, 14.63).
• Antique exception: Under 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e)(9), certain antiques (meeting criteria in 16 U.S.C. § 1539(h)) may be traded without a threatened-species permit, but they still must be declared and cleared.
• De minimis exception: Under 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e)(3), some items containing only small, qualifying amounts of ivory may be traded, subject to strict conditions; again, declaration and clearance remain mandatory.
• Smuggling under §§ 545 and 554: These crimes focus on knowingly and fraudulently importing/exporting items “contrary to law” or facilitating their movement without proper declaration. The offense is complete upon the knowing failure to declare, regardless of the item’s ultimate legality.
• Rule 106 (completeness): If one party introduces part of a recorded statement, the other may require contemporaneous admission of additional parts that in fairness must be heard together to avoid misleading the factfinder. It is not a general license to add unrelated or self-serving material.
• Obstruction “endeavor” and “nexus”: Under § 1503, a corrupt attempt (even if unsuccessful) to influence, obstruct, or impede justice is sufficient if it bears a logical, temporal, or causal relationship to a judicial or grand-jury proceeding.
• Plain error: An appellate standard used when a defendant failed to object in the trial court. The error must be clear and affect substantial rights; courts correct it only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
• Market value under § 2Q2.1: The Guidelines enhance sentences based on the “market value” of wildlife; ordinarily the fair-market retail price. If that price is hard to determine, courts may reasonably estimate using reliable information, which can include a knowledgeable dealer’s asking prices in context.

Conclusion

United States v. Martinez crystallizes two key principles in the Eleventh Circuit’s criminal wildlife jurisprudence. First, the ESA’s antique and de minimis exceptions do not excuse, diminish, or otherwise affect the independent federal duty to declare and clear CITES-regulated items. As a result, defense efforts to inject exception-based evidence into smuggling trials will meet firm resistance under Rules 401 and 403 when the offense is the knowing failure to declare. Second, in sentencing under § 2Q2.1, where fair-market retail prices are elusive in a regulated, opaque, and volatile market for wildlife art, district courts may reasonably rely on a dealer-defendant’s asking prices as reliable indicators of market value—especially when corroborated by experience and sales patterns—supporting significant enhancements.

The court also offers useful guidance on evidentiary completeness (limiting Rule 106 to truly contextual material), obstruction (affirming that attempts to fabricate documents can satisfy § 1503’s “endeavor”), and prosecutorial argument (plain error to tell jurors the presumption of innocence has evaporated before verdict). Finally, the panel leaves open an important statutory question about the breadth of “contrary to law” in § 545 that may resurface in future cases.

For practitioners, Martinez underscores the primacy of declaration/clearance compliance in any cross-border movement of wildlife or wildlife-derived art. For litigators, it tightens the relevance lens at trial and broadens the toolkit for valuation at sentencing. And for agencies and the regulated community alike, it clarifies that “self-diagnosed” exemptions are no defense to a failure-to-declare smuggling charge.