Anonymity Without Gag Orders: Second Department Clarifies Limits on Speech Restraints and Pleading Particularity for Multimedia Defamation

Introduction

In Doe v. Eliyas (2025 NY Slip Op 04876), the Appellate Division, Second Department, addressed a modern church dispute that migrated from the pews to social media. The plaintiffs—a priest and members of a church’s board of trustees—sued congregants for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), alleging a series of posts in a WhatsApp group chat and on Facebook. The case presented several key issues:

Whether plaintiffs could continue to litigate under pseudonyms.
Whether a court may impose a temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting defendants from discussing the case or disclosing plaintiffs’ identities.
What counts as actionable fact versus nonactionable opinion in defamation, especially on social media.
How strictly CPLR 3016(a) applies to alleged defamatory content that consists of images or videos.
Whether the IIED claim survives at the pleading stage.
Whether defenses premised on the First Amendment, ecclesiastical abstention, and Not-for-Profit Corporation Law § 720-a defeat the action at the threshold.

The Second Department affirmed pseudonymity, struck down an overbroad gag order as an unconstitutional prior restraint, dismissed certain defamation allegations as nonactionable opinion (and one for lack of particularity because the images were not attached), and rejected the IIED claim. It also clarified that neither the First Amendment nor ecclesiastical abstention nor N-PCL § 720-a warranted dismissal at this stage.

Summary of the Opinion

Pseudonymity: The court upheld the plaintiffs’ right to proceed under pseudonyms, applying the traditional balancing test and noting the lack of prejudice to defendants and the heightened risk of stigma in a close religious community.
Prior Restraint: The court vacated a TRO that barred defendants from disclosing plaintiffs’ identities, sharing statements about the case, or discussing the action. Such an order constituted an overbroad prior restraint on speech and was not narrowly tailored.
Defamation Pleading Particularity for Multimedia: The court held that where the alleged defamatory content consists of images or videos, the content must be set forth or attached. The allegation in paragraph 319 failed CPLR 3016(a) because the images/videos were not embedded or annexed.
Opinion vs. Fact: The court dismissed defamation claims based on statements alleged in paragraphs 171, 179, 259, 266, 274, 282, 290, 300, 309, 328, 337, 347, 357, 368, 400, 418, 428, 444, 454, and 522(D) as nonactionable opinion. Remaining statements survived because they were susceptible to a defamatory connotation.
Qualified Privilege: Dismissal based on qualified privilege was denied; plaintiffs pleaded malice sufficiently and defendants did not conclusively disprove malice with documentary evidence.
IIED: The IIED cause of action was dismissed. Even crediting plaintiffs’ allegations of months-long online postings, one disruption of Mass, and a posted video, the conduct did not meet New York’s “extreme and outrageous” standard.
First Amendment and Ecclesiastical Abstention: The court rejected dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(2). Defamation is not protected speech, and adjudication here requires no resort to religious doctrine.
N-PCL § 720-a Immunity: Defendants failed to show entitlement to the statute’s qualified immunity; in any event, plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability of gross negligence or intent for pleading purposes.
Renew/Reargue: The appeal from the denial of reargument was dismissed (no appeal lies), and the denial of renewal was affirmed for lack of new facts and justification.

Procedurally, the order of December 20, 2022, was modified to (1) deny the gag-order TRO, (2) dismiss the portions of the defamation claim based on paragraphs 171, 179, 259, 266, 274, 282, 290, 300, 309, 319, 328, 337, 347, 357, 368, 400, 418, 428, 444, 454, and 522(D), and (3) dismiss the IIED cause of action. As modified, it was otherwise affirmed. The June 12, 2023 order was affirmed insofar as reviewed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is grounded in a well-developed body of New York and federal law, applied to a modern social media fact pattern:

Pseudonymity: Roe v Harborfields Cent. Sch. Dist.; PB-7 Doe v Amherst Cent. Sch. Dist.; Twersky v Yeshiva Univ.; Anonymous v Lerner. These cases establish a balancing test weighing privacy interests, risks of harm, prejudice to defendants, and public access. The court relied on this framework to permit anonymity, emphasizing that defendants already knew the plaintiffs’ identities and failed to show prejudice or a countervailing public interest.
Prior Restraint: Karantinidis v Karantinidis; Porco v Lifetime Entertainment Servs., LLC; Ash v Bd. of Mgrs. of the 155 Condominium; Carroll v President and Comm’rs of Princess Anne. These authorities underscore the heavy presumption against prior restraints and the requirement that any speech-restrictive order in First Amendment territory be precisely tailored. The court found the TRO overbroad because it barred discussion with witnesses and disclosure necessary for investigation.
Pleading Standards and CPLR 3211: Tsamasiros v Jones; Sternberg v Wiederman; Whelan v Cuomo; Marinelli v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg. These define the generous standard on a motion to dismiss and the distinction between “has a cause of action” and “stated one” when evidentiary submissions are considered without conversion.
Defamation Elements and Particularity: Greenberg v Spitzer; Davis v Boeheim; Armstrong v Simon & Schuster; CPLR 3016(a); Abakporo v Daily News. The court used this line to assess whether statements are reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning and to enforce the requirement that the “particular words” be set forth—extended here to require annexation or embedding of images and videos alleged to be defamatory.
Opinion vs. Fact: Bowen v Van Bramer; Gross v New York Times Co.; Silverman v Daily News; Stolatis v Hernandez; Trump Vil. Section 4, Inc. v Bezvoleva; Holliswood Owners Corp. v Rivera. Applying the familiar three-factor test (precision of language, provability, and context signaling opinion), the court dismissed a swath of statements as pure opinion.
Qualified Privilege and Malice: Liberman v Gelstein; Porges v Weitz; Silber Inv. Props., Ltd. v BJG Islandia Realty, LLC. Plaintiffs adequately pleaded malice; defendants failed to negate it at the pleading stage with “documentary evidence” in the CPLR 3211(a)(1) sense.
IIED Threshold: Davydov v Youssefi; Klein v Metropolitan Child Servs., Inc.; Ratto v Oliva; Ajie Chen v Deliso; Eves v Ray; Joo Tae Yoo v Choi. The court’s dismissal reflects New York’s exacting standard requiring conduct “so outrageous in character” beyond insults and annoyances.
First Amendment and Jurisdiction: Counterman v Colorado; Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc. The court reiterated that defamation is unprotected speech and may be adjudicated without running afoul of the First Amendment.
Ecclesiastical Abstention: Laguerre v Maurice; New Hope Christian Church, Inc. v Parks; Russian Orthodox Convent Novo-Diveevo, Inc. v Sukharevskaya. Because liability can be resolved via neutral principles (without doctrinal inquiry), civil adjudication is proper.
N-PCL § 720-a Immunity: Kamchi v Weissman; Samide v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn; CPLR 3211(a)(11). The court refused dismissal because defendants neither established their status as covered actors nor negated a reasonable probability of gross negligence or intent.
Renew/Reargue Appellate Limits: Aloi v Tobal; Harway Terrace, Inc. v Shlivko; Mees v Buiter; Cholowsky v Civiletti; Wunderlich v Liberty Meadows, LLC; Glassman v ProHealth. These govern renewal requirements and the nonappealability of reargument denials and non-dispositive findings.

Legal Reasoning

1) Pseudonyms granted, but no speech gag

The court carefully separated two ideas often conflated in practice: anonymity and speech restraint. Using the Roe/Amherst/Twersky framework, it found that the priest faced community condemnation and that anonymizing co-plaintiffs was necessary to prevent backdoor identification. Defendants knew the identities, and no prejudice or countervailing public-access interest was shown. Hence, pseudonymity was proper.

But allowing anonymity did not authorize suppressing defendants’ speech. The TRO prevented defendants from disclosing identities, sharing case-related statements/documents, or “discussing the instant action.” That order swept too broadly because it chilled ordinary litigation conduct (witness outreach, investigation, evidence-gathering) and constituted a classic prior restraint. Under Karantinidis and Carroll, such restraints bear a heavy presumption of invalidity and must be narrowly tailored—this one was not. Result: anonymity survives; the gag does not.

2) Defamation—particularity and the opinion/fact divide

The court enforced CPLR 3016(a)’s “particular words” requirement robustly. Where the alleged libel consists of images or videos, plaintiffs must set out the content in the pleading or annex the content as an exhibit. Paragraph 319 failed because the images and videos were not embedded or attached, echoing Abakporo’s insistence on specificity.

On the substance, the court applied the three-factor opinion test. Statements in paragraphs 171, 179, 259, 266, 274, 282, 290, 300, 309, 328, 337, 347, 357, 368, 400, 418, 428, 444, 454, and 522(D) were nonactionable opinion—likely hyperbolic, value-laden, or contextually signaled as viewpoint rather than verifiable fact. The remaining statements survived because, read in context and given every favorable inference at the CPLR 3211 stage, they were at least susceptible to defamatory meaning.

3) Qualified privilege and malice

Even if some communications might otherwise be subject to a qualified privilege (e.g., within a shared-interest group), plaintiffs alleged malice adequately. Defendants’ submissions did not constitute “documentary evidence” that conclusively negated malice. At this stage, the privilege did not warrant dismissal.

4) IIED’s high bar not met

New York’s IIED standard is notably stringent. The court held that the alleged series of social media posts, a single disruption of Mass, and posting a video—even taken as true—did not rise to conduct “so outrageous in character” as to qualify. This follows a steady line rejecting IIED claims for online vitriol absent egregious, targeted, and extreme conduct.

5) First Amendment, ecclesiastical abstention, and neutral principles

The court rejected the argument that the defamation claims were categorically protected speech or beyond civil adjudication because of their religious context. False statements of fact are not protected by the First Amendment, and determining falsity and fault here does not require doctrinal adjudication. Under neutral-principles doctrine, courts may decide such disputes.

6) Not-for-Profit Corporation Law § 720-a and CPLR 3211(a)(11)

The defendants neither proved they were uncompensated directors/officers/trustees or “key persons” within N-PCL § 102(a)(25), nor did they defeat the complaint’s reasonable probability of gross negligence or intent. Accordingly, § 720-a did not supply a threshold immunity at the pleading stage.

7) Renewal/reargument

Renewal requires new facts and a reasonable justification for not offering them earlier; neither was shown. The portion of the appeal targeting the denial of reargument was dismissed because such denials are not appealable.

Impact and Practical Consequences

Anonymity orders are distinct from speech restraints. Courts may permit pseudonyms without gagging defendants’ speech. Litigants seeking protective orders should narrowly craft any confidentiality provisions to preserve essential litigation functions (e.g., communications with counsel, witnesses, and investigators).
Multimedia defamation must be pleaded with specificity. If the actionable content is an image or video, attach it or embed it in the pleading or exhibits, with any necessary translations and certifications. General descriptions are insufficient.
Online church disputes can be adjudicated. Defamation claims arising in religious communities are not barred by ecclesiastical abstention where adjudication proceeds via neutral principles without doctrinal entanglement.
Opinion remains a durable defense for social media rhetoric. Hyperbole, value judgments, and contextually signaled opinions will continue to be dismissed early. Drafters should isolate and plead the factual assertions—who, what, when, where—with clarity.
IIED add-ons rarely survive. Absent truly egregious conduct, IIED will continue to be dismissed as duplicative or insufficiently outrageous when tied to speech-based grievances.
N-PCL § 720-a is not self-executing. Defendants must establish their covered status and overcome the “reasonable probability” standard; plaintiffs can defeat early dismissal by plausibly alleging gross negligence or intent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prior restraint: A court order that prohibits speech before it occurs, based on its content. Such orders are presumptively unconstitutional and must be narrowly tailored to compelling needs.
Pseudonymous litigation: Allowing a party to proceed as “John/Jane Doe.” Courts balance privacy, risk of harm, prejudice to the other side, and public access. Anonymity protects identity in public filings but does not automatically bar all disclosure in litigation.
CPLR 3016(a) particularity: In libel/slander, the complaint must set out the specific words complained of. For images/videos, the content must be included or annexed so the court can evaluate it.
Pure opinion vs. fact: Opinions are not actionable because they cannot be proven true or false. Courts assess language precision, verifiability, and context to decide if a statement is opinion or fact.
Qualified privilege and malice: Some communications are privileged (e.g., among those sharing a common interest). The privilege is lost if the speaker acted with malice—knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth, or spite/ill will in some contexts.
IIED: Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all bounds of decency. Routine insults, threats, and annoyances do not qualify.
Neutral principles and ecclesiastical abstention: Courts avoid doctrinal disputes but may decide cases involving religious entities by applying secular legal standards.
N-PCL § 720-a immunity: Provides qualified immunity for certain uncompensated leaders of not-for-profits, but it can be overcome where there’s a reasonable probability of gross negligence or intentional harm.

Conclusion

Doe v. Eliyas provides a clear blueprint for handling defamation disputes arising in tight-knit communities and playing out on social media. The Second Department reaffirmed that:

Courts can protect plaintiffs’ identities through pseudonymity without imposing unconstitutional speech restraints.
Defamation claims premised on multimedia content must satisfy CPLR 3016(a) by attaching or embedding the actual images or videos.
Online rhetoric often constitutes nonactionable opinion, but where statements are susceptible to a defamatory meaning, claims should proceed past the pleading stage.
IIED remains a narrow, rarely available tort in speech-centric disputes.
Neither the First Amendment nor ecclesiastical abstention nor not-for-profit immunity bars well-pleaded defamation claims at the threshold when adjudication can proceed via neutral principles.

The decision’s central contribution is its crisp separation of anonymity from prior restraint: anonymity protects identity, not silence. For practitioners, the case is a reminder to narrowly tailor protective orders, to plead multimedia defamation with exacting particularity, and to focus defamation claims on verifiable factual assertions rather than emotive or hyperbolic commentary.