Anderson v. Divris: Successive Habeas Petitions and Ineffective-Assistance Claims Against Prior Counsel

Introduction

This case arises on Bruce Anderson’s federal habeas challenge to his Massachusetts murder conviction. Anderson was convicted of first-degree murder in 1989 and sentenced to life without parole. After losing on direct appeal and on his first federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (concluding in 1994), Anderson waited until 2019 to file a second petition. In that petition he alleged that his longtime attorney, Stephen Hrones—who had represented him at trial, on direct appeal, and in the first federal habeas proceeding—was constitutionally ineffective both at trial and on appeal. The central question before the First Circuit was whether this 2019 petition qualified as a “second or successive habeas corpus application” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), thereby triggering AEDPA’s strict limitations and requiring dismissal unless one of two narrow exceptions applied.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Aframe, held:

Anderson’s 2019 petition is indeed a “second or successive” petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), notwithstanding that his ineffective-assistance claim targets the same counsel who represented him throughout earlier proceedings.
Pre-AEDPA practice classified petitions like Anderson’s as successive and subject to the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine; AEDPA codified and tightened those restrictions but did not redefine which petitions qualify as successive.
Exempting such petitions from AEDPA’s successive-petition bar would conflict with Congress’s goals of finality, conserving judicial resources, and avoiding piecemeal litigation.
The district court’s dismissal of the petition on successive-petition grounds was correct, and its alternative ruling—construing Anderson’s application as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion—was not an abuse of discretion because it was untimely.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (AEDPA): Bars “a claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application” unless it rests on a newly recognized retroactive constitutional rule (2244(b)(2)(A)) or newly discoverable factual predicates proving actual innocence (2244(b)(2)(B)).
Magwood v. Patterson (561 U.S. 320, 2010): Defined “second or successive” as a term of art, not merely chronological, and distinguished between the threshold inquiry (is the petition successive?) and the merits inquiry (does it satisfy (b)(2) exceptions?).
Banister v. Davis (590 U.S. 504, 2020): Confirmed that “second or successive” must be informed by historical habeas practice and AEDPA’s objectives; chronological order alone is insufficient.
Slack v. McDaniel (529 U.S. 473, 2000): Held that petitions dismissed for non-merits reasons are not successive; introduced the distinction between “successive” and “second in time.”
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal (523 U.S. 637, 1998) and Panetti v. Quarterman (551 U.S. 930, 2007): Held that newly ripened claims of incompetency to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright are not successive.
McCleskey v. Zant (499 U.S. 467, 1991): Outlined the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine requiring “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to excuse a failure to raise claims in an earlier petition.
Circuits’ pre-AEDPA decisions (e.g., Booker, Moran, Sinn, Shriner): Uniformly treated second-filed petitions asserting ineffective-assistance claims against the same counsel as successive and applied abuse-of-the-writ screening.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court applied a two-pronged approach to identify a “second or successive” petition:

Historical Practice: Pre-AEDPA, federal courts used the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine to screen second or subsequent petitions. They first determined whether the petition was successive and, if so, then asked whether the new claims were abusive (i.e., raised without cause or resulting in prejudice). Decisions involving the same attorney at trial, direct appeal, and first habeas all treated subsequent ineffective-assistance claims as successive.
AEDPA’s Purposes: AEDPA’s successive-petition bar promotes finality, avoids piecemeal litigation, and conserves judicial resources. Exempting petitions like Anderson’s would undermine these goals by granting “two bites at the post-conviction apple” to any inmate represented by the same attorney throughout earlier proceedings.

The court rejected Anderson’s argument—that AEDPA’s “core principle” of providing a “meaningful opportunity” to raise constitutional claims requires exempting his petition—on three grounds:

Slack and Stewart do not broadly exempt all claims that were practically unavailable in an earlier petition; they apply only to unripe or unexhausted claims within their specific contexts.
Magwood and circuit precedent confirm that AEDPA’s exceptions are the exclusive avenues to bring claims in a successive petition; if Anderson’s petition does not satisfy § 2244(b)(2)’s exceptions, it must be dismissed.
Allowing a blanket exception for counsel-conflict-based ineffective-assistance claims would contradict AEDPA’s text and purpose, inviting multiple rounds of habeas litigation and eroding finality.

3. Impact on Future Cases

This decision clarifies that a petitioner who is represented by the same lawyer at trial, on direct appeal, and in a first federal habeas proceeding cannot escape the strictures of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) when later alleging that that lawyer gave constitutionally deficient representation. The ruling:

Reinforces the concept that AEDPA’s two exceptions are exclusive gateways for successive petitions, even when the omitted claims stem from alleged attorney conflict.
Discourages strategies of retaining counsel across all phases in order to preserve later “new” ineffective-assistance claims.
Signals to district courts that any habeas petition filed after a merits decision on an earlier petition, regardless of the ground, must first clear the threshold “second or successive” inquiry.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Second or successive” petition

Not just “filed second in time,” but any habeas filing after a prior petition that received a merits ruling on the same conviction. Such petitions are automatically barred unless they meet strict statutory exceptions.

Abuse of the writ (pre-AEDPA)

A judge-made doctrine that barred new claims in subsequent petitions unless the prisoner showed “cause” for not raising them earlier and “prejudice” from that failure, or demonstrated a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

AEDPA’s § 2244(b)(2) exceptions

New Rule Exception: A claim based on a new constitutional rule made retroactive by the Supreme Court.
New-Factual-Predicate Exception: A claim based on newly discovered facts that would, if proven, establish actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.

Rule 60(b) Motion

A procedural vehicle to ask a federal court to relieve a party from a final judgment for reasons such as mistake or newly discovered evidence. Here, the district court found any such motion untimely.

Conclusion

Anderson v. Divris confirms that AEDPA’s bar on “second or successive” habeas applications applies even when a petitioner’s newly asserted claims target the same attorney who handled every prior phase of litigation. Historical practice under the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine and AEDPA’s objectives of finality, comity, and judicial economy both counsel in favor of treating Anderson’s petition as successive. Because he does not invoke one of § 2244(b)(2)’s narrow exceptions, his 2019 petition must be dismissed. The decision underscores that federal habeas relief is largely limited to one comprehensive opportunity, absent truly extraordinary circumstances fitting AEDPA’s text.