Anders Review, ACCA Enhancements, and Consecutive Revocation Sentences in the Tenth Circuit: Commentary on United States v. Coleman

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Tenth Circuit’s nonprecedential order and judgment in United States v. Coleman, Nos. 24-6253 & 24-6258 (10th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025), arising out of the Western District of Oklahoma. Although the panel expressly designated the decision as nonbinding (except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), it provides a compact illustration of several recurring federal criminal law issues:

The mechanics and consequences of an Anders brief and the court of appeals’ obligation to independently review the record.
Application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to a felon-in-possession-of-ammunition conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
The interaction between statutory minimums and the Sentencing Guidelines (USSG § 5G1.1(b)).
Appellate review of consecutive versus concurrent sentences, especially in the supervised release revocation context (USSG § 7B1.3(f)).
The limits on using rehabilitative programming as a reason to lengthen imprisonment, under Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).

Defendant–Appellant Jacoby Coleman appealed two judgments: (1) a supervised release revocation judgment from an earlier case, and (2) a new judgment of conviction following his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of ammunition. He received a 15-year prison term and five years of supervised release for the firearm offense, plus a consecutive 18-month sentence upon revocation of supervised release. His appellate counsel, concluding that no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal existed, proceeded under Anders v. California.

The Tenth Circuit, after conducting the independent review required by Anders and its own precedent in United States v. Calderon, agreed that the appeals were “wholly frivolous,” dismissed them, and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. In doing so, it reaffirmed several important principles regarding ACCA eligibility, guideline application where a statutory minimum controls, and reasonableness review of consecutive revocation sentences—all within the structure of an Anders appeal.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Conduct and Charges

At the time of the events giving rise to this appeal, Coleman was on supervised release from an earlier federal case. In a new federal prosecution, a superseding indictment charged him with one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), after having been convicted of seven prior felonies. Six of those prior felonies were for possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), a key fact for ACCA purposes.

In January 2024, Coleman pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession-of-ammunition charge. Because he was on supervised release when he committed the new offense, separate revocation proceedings were initiated based on the violation of supervised release conditions.

B. Sentencing in the District Court

At sentencing, the government sought an enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on a person convicted under § 922(g) who has at least three prior qualifying convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense,” committed on different occasions.

The probation office concluded that Coleman qualified as an armed career criminal based on his prior drug convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). It calculated:

For the firearm/ammunition offense:
- An advisory guideline range that, because of the ACCA mandatory minimum, effectively became 180 months (15 years) of incarceration,
- with a guidelines range of two to five years of supervised release.
For the supervised release revocation:
- A guideline imprisonment range of 18 to 24 months,
- and up to life on supervised release.

Coleman requested that the district court run the revocation sentence concurrently with the 15-year sentence for the firearm conviction. The district court declined, instead imposing:

180 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release on the § 922(g) ammunition conviction (the minimum allowed under ACCA), and
a consecutive 18-month term of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release (within the 18–24 month guideline range).

C. The Appeals and the Anders Brief

Coleman filed notices of appeal challenging both the new conviction/sentence and the revocation judgment. His appointed counsel, after reviewing the record, concluded that no nonfrivolous appellate issues existed and therefore filed an Anders brief, moving to withdraw from representation. The brief specifically analyzed two potential issues:

The application of the ACCA enhancement (including whether Coleman’s prior drug convictions qualified and were committed on separate occasions), and
The substantive reasonableness of the sentences, including the decision to run the revocation term consecutively rather than concurrently.

Consistent with Anders, Coleman was notified of his right to respond but did not do so. The government elected not to file a brief. The case was decided without oral argument, under Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

III. Summary of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision

The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and undertook the required “full examination of the record” to determine whether any nonfrivolous appellate issues existed. It concluded that Coleman’s appeals were wholly frivolous, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and dismissed both appeals.

In reaching that conclusion, the court found:

Plea validity: No error in the Rule 11 colloquy. The district court had properly advised Coleman of his rights, ensured his plea was voluntary, and established a factual basis.
ACCA enhancement: No error in categorizing Coleman’s prior § 841(a) convictions as “serious drug offenses” under ACCA, nor in concluding that they occurred on separate occasions, particularly given Coleman’s own admission on the record.
Guideline calculations: No procedural error in computing the applicable guideline ranges, including the effect of the ACCA mandatory minimum, the supervised release term for the firearm case, and the guideline range for the revocation sentence.
Substantive reasonableness: The within-guidelines sentences—including the decision to impose the revocation term consecutively—were presumptively reasonable, and nothing in the record rebutted that presumption.
Tapia concern: Although the district court mentioned Coleman’s need for correctional treatment and programming, it did so only as a mitigating factor and as a factual observation that programming might shorten his effective time in custody, not as a reason to lengthen his sentence. Thus, there was no violation of Tapia v. United States.

Having found no arguable basis for appeal, the panel dismissed the appeals and permitted counsel to withdraw, as envisioned in Anders.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Anders Framework and the Court’s Role

1. The Anders Doctrine

Under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), appointed counsel who finds an appeal “wholly frivolous” after a conscientious review of the record may request permission to withdraw, but must file a brief:

Identifying any issues that might arguably support the appeal; and
Providing the defendant an opportunity to respond.

The appellate court may not simply accept counsel’s conclusion. Instead, it must itself undertake a “full examination of all the proceedings” and determine independently whether the case is indeed frivolous. If nonfrivolous issues exist, the court must ensure they are briefed and argued; if not, it may grant counsel’s motion and dismiss.

2. Application in United States v. Coleman

The Tenth Circuit recited this obligation and cited United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005), which confirms that, in an Anders context, the court must “conduct a full examination of the record” to decide whether the defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous.

In Coleman’s case:

Defense counsel identified possible issues related to ACCA applicability and sentencing reasonableness (including consecutiveness).
Neither Coleman nor the government filed substantive briefs.
The panel nonetheless reviewed the entire record and the identified potential issues.

The decision highlights that the Tenth Circuit takes its independent review obligation seriously, even when neither side actively presses the appeal. It also shows that Anders review often reaches:

The validity of the guilty plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and
Both procedural and substantive aspects of sentencing.

B. Validity of the Guilty Plea (Rule 11 Analysis)

Before accepting a guilty plea, Rule 11(b) requires the district court to:

Inform the defendant of certain constitutional and trial rights being waived (e.g., right to jury trial, right to confront witnesses),
Explain the nature of the charge, possible penalties, and any mandatory minimums,
Ensure the plea is voluntary and not the product of force, threats, or improper promises, and
Determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.

The Tenth Circuit’s brief but clear statement—“We see nothing in the record to indicate an error in accepting Defendant’s guilty plea”—signals that:

The transcript of the plea colloquy complied with Rule 11(b), and
No arguable basis existed to attack the voluntariness or factual sufficiency of the plea on appeal.

This is typical in Anders cases: the court must confirm that the plea was valid because otherwise a key nonfrivolous issue would exist (e.g., seeking plea withdrawal).

C. Application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)

1. ACCA’s Legal Framework

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), a defendant convicted under § 922(g) (such as a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition) faces a 15-year mandatory minimum if:

He has three prior convictions,
For either a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” (or both),
Committed “on occasions different from one another.”

The statute further defines “serious drug offense” in § 924(e)(2)(A)(i) to include:

“an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) ... for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.”

Prior convictions that meet this definition can trigger the ACCA enhancement.

2. Coleman’s Prior Convictions as “Serious Drug Offenses”

Coleman had at least six prior federal convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Those offenses fall within the Controlled Substances Act and, as charged, carried sufficient maximum penalties to qualify as “serious drug offenses” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(i).

The panel noted explicitly:

“Those prior convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base are serious drug offenses under the ACCA, so the court correctly applied the enhancement.”

Importantly, the court did not need to (and did not purport to) decide whether any other prior convictions might support ACCA status, because the six § 841(a) convictions were sufficient on their own. ACCA requires only three qualifying priors; Coleman had more than enough qualifying drug offenses to meet that threshold.

3. The “Occasions Different from One Another” Requirement

A second ACCA requirement is that the qualifying prior convictions must have been “committed on occasions different from one another.” This prevents multiple convictions arising from a single criminal episode from automatically triggering the ACCA’s severe enhancement.

Here, the panel stressed that the district court applied ACCA “only after Defendant acknowledged that his six prior drug convictions specified in the superseding indictment ‘occurred on separate occasions.’” That admission, made on the record at sentencing, undercut any arguable appellate challenge to the “separate occasions” element.

The court therefore did not delve into more nuanced “occasions” analysis; the defendant’s own admission effectively resolved the issue, making any contrary argument frivolous in the context of an Anders review.

D. Sentencing Guidelines and Statutory Minimums

1. Guidelines Calculation and ACCA Minimum

The panel next addressed whether any procedural error tainted the guideline calculations. It concluded that “there was no error in calculating the guideline range for Defendant's firearm conviction, considering the statutorily required factors, finding the facts, or explaining the sentence,” citing United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2014), which outlines what constitutes procedural reasonableness in sentencing.

A key feature of the case is the interplay between the ACCA statutory minimum and the guidelines: under USSG § 5G1.1(b), when a statutorily required minimum sentence exceeds the top of the otherwise applicable guideline range, the statutory minimum becomes the guideline sentence.

The panel applied this provision directly:

“Because the minimum sentence under the ACCA exceeded the guideline range that otherwise would have applied, the 15-year statutory minimum became Defendant's guideline sentence for the firearm conviction. See USSG § 5G1.1(b).”

Thus, even if the guideline range calculated without ACCA might have been lower, the statutory minimum of 180 months governed both as a matter of law and as the effective “guideline” term.

2. Supervised Release Term and Revocation Guidelines

For the firearm conviction, the probation office calculated, and the court agreed, that the guideline range for supervised release was two to five years. The court imposed a five-year term, which is within that range.

For the revocation proceeding, the guideline imprisonment range was 18 to 24 months, and supervised release could be reimposed up to life. The district court chose 18 months’ imprisonment (the low end of the range), and the appellate panel saw no error in that calculation.

Notably, the panel emphasized that “neither the Anders brief nor our review of the record suggests any error in the calculation of the guidelines range for the term of supervised release or the revocation sentence.”

E. Consecutive vs. Concurrent Sentences and Substantive Reasonableness

1. Standard of Review and Presumption of Reasonableness

The panel reviewed substantive reasonableness under the framework articulated in United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2013). Under that standard, the court:

Assesses whether the “length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
Applies the same test in reviewing a district court’s decision to make sentences run consecutively or concurrently.
Treats a within-guidelines sentence as presumptively reasonable.

The Tenth Circuit reiterated that this presumption applies to Coleman’s sentences, both the 180-month term for the firearm conviction (which, although controlled by ACCA, is treated as the guideline sentence under § 5G1.1(b)) and the 18-month revocation sentence (within the 18–24 month range).

2. Consecutive Revocation Sentence (USSG § 7B1.3(f))

The Guidelines policy statement at USSG § 7B1.3(f) provides that any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release should run consecutively to any sentence being served for the new criminal conduct that caused the revocation.

The district court followed that policy, imposing the 18-month revocation sentence consecutively to the 180-month ACCA sentence. The appellate court noted that this was within the guidelines and therefore presumptively reasonable.

The panel thus rejected any suggestion that the consecutive nature of the revocation term might form the basis for a nonfrivolous appeal. Instead, it reinforced the general principle that:

Consecutive revocation sentences that follow § 7B1.3(f) are typically upheld as reasonable, and
An appellant faces a steep uphill battle in arguing that such a sentence is substantively unreasonable, particularly when it is at the low end of the guideline range.

3. Overall Substantive Reasonableness

The district court explicitly considered all the § 3553(a) factors and articulated reasons for the sentence. The panel saw “nothing to rebut the presumptive reasonableness of these sentences.”

Given ACCA’s mandatory minimum, the court had no legal authority to go below 180 months on the firearm offense. Therefore, an appellate claim that the 15-year term was “too long” in the abstract would be inherently weak, and, in an Anders setting, frivolous.

F. Rehabilitation, Programming, and Tapia Concerns

1. The Rule in Tapia v. United States

In Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011), the Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge may not impose or lengthen a prison term in order to promote a defendant’s rehabilitation, including to enable participation in treatment or training programs.

Judges may:

Discuss rehabilitation and recommend specific programs,
Consider the defendant’s need for treatment among the § 3553(a) factors, and
Recognize that programming might affect how long the defendant actually remains in custody (e.g., through early release mechanisms, where available).

But they may not increase the term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitation.

2. The District Court’s Comments and the Panel’s Analysis

The Anders brief apparently raised a potential Tapia issue, noting that the district court had commented on Coleman’s need for correctional treatment and programming. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged this, quoting from the brief:

“The Anders brief also says that we may review the district court's comments regarding programming, which could be construed as impermissibly ‘lengthen[ing] a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program.’”

After reviewing the record, however, the panel concluded there was no Tapia error because:

The district court “did ‘take into account the possible need to provide correctional treatment,’” but
It did so only “as a potential mitigating circumstance” or as an acknowledgement that “some programming could reduce Defendant's overall sentence.”

In other words, the judge referred to treatment and programming in a permissible way—as part of a holistic evaluation of the defendant’s circumstances, and possibly as justification for not imposing a higher sentence—not as a reason to lengthen Coleman’s imprisonment.

The panel’s approach underscores an important practical point for sentencing judges and appellate practitioners:

References to rehabilitation are not categorically forbidden; they become problematic only when they appear to drive the decision to increase the prison term.
Explicitly framing such considerations as mitigating or as independent of the term chosen helps insulate the sentence from Tapia-based challenges.

G. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

Anders established the framework for counsel’s withdrawal when an appeal is believed to be frivolous:

Counsel must file a brief pointing to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
The defendant must be notified and allowed to respond.
The appellate court must independently review the record to ensure there are no nonfrivolous issues.

The Coleman panel applied this framework as controlling law for appointed counsel’s obligations and the court’s review duties.

2. United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2005)

Calderon is the Tenth Circuit’s leading case fleshing out Anders procedures in federal appeals. It confirms that the court itself must examine the record fully and not rely solely on counsel’s assessment. In Coleman, the court cited Calderon as reiterating this obligation and found, after such review, that the appeals were wholly frivolous.

3. United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2014)

Sanchez-Leon concerns procedural reasonableness in sentencing: accurate guideline calculations, correct consideration of § 3553(a) factors, fact-finding, and explanation of the sentence. The Coleman panel cited this case in concluding there was no procedural error in sentencing, signaling adherence to standard Tenth Circuit methodology for procedural review.

4. United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2013)

Chavez provides the framework for reviewing substantive reasonableness, including:

Assessing the overall length of the sentence against the § 3553(a) factors, and
Applying the same test to the choice between concurrent and consecutive sentences.

The panel in Coleman cited Chavez for both propositions, confirming that:

Within-guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable, and
Consecutive sentencing is reviewed under the same deferential standard, especially when it aligns with guideline policy statements like § 7B1.3(f).

5. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011)

As discussed above, Tapia forbids imposing or lengthening imprisonment for rehabilitative purposes. The Coleman panel applied Tapia to reject a potential argument that the district court improperly relied on programming as a reason to lengthen Coleman’s sentence. It concluded that any references to treatment were permissible and did not drive the sentence length.

6. Sentencing Guidelines Provisions

USSG § 5G1.1(b): When a statutory minimum exceeds the top of the otherwise applicable guideline range, the statutory minimum becomes the guideline sentence. This was crucial in Coleman because ACCA’s 15-year minimum superseded the lower, pre-ACCA guideline range.
USSG § 7B1.3(f): Provides that a revocation sentence normally should run consecutively to any sentence for the new offense causing the violation. The district court’s adherence to this policy supported the reasonableness of Coleman’s consecutive 18-month revocation sentence.

V. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

1. Anders Appeals

An “Anders appeal” occurs when appointed counsel believes there are no legitimate (nonfrivolous) issues to raise on appeal. Rather than filing a normal brief, counsel:

Files an Anders brief explaining why the appeal is frivolous but pointing to anything that might arguably support it, and
Asks the court for permission to withdraw.

The court then independently reviews the record. If it agrees that the appeal is frivolous, it can dismiss the appeal and allow counsel to withdraw.

2. ACCA and “Serious Drug Offenses”

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is a federal law that greatly increases the minimum prison sentence (to 15 years) for certain felons who illegally possess firearms or ammunition and who have at least three prior convictions for either:

Violent felonies, or
Serious drug offenses.

A “serious drug offense” includes many higher-level drug trafficking crimes under the federal drug laws, like possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. Coleman’s multiple § 841(a) convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base fell into this category, making him eligible for the ACCA enhancement.

3. “Occasions Different from One Another”

ACCA doesn’t count multiple convictions from a single criminal episode as separate strikes. The prior offenses must have been committed at different times or in distinct events. In Coleman’s case, he acknowledged that his six drug-trafficking convictions occurred on separate occasions, so there was no viable argument that ACCA’s “different occasions” requirement was not met.

4. Supervised Release and Revocation

Supervised release is a period of federal supervision after prison. If the person violates conditions of supervised release (for example, by committing a new crime), the court can:

Revoke supervised release, and
Impose additional prison time based on the violation (the “revocation sentence”).

Federal guidelines (Chapter 7) give recommended ranges for these revocation sentences and generally advise that they be served in addition to any sentence for the new crime, i.e., consecutively.

5. Substantive Reasonableness and the § 3553(a) Factors

When reviewing a sentence, appellate courts look at whether it is:

Procedurally reasonable (correctly calculated guidelines, proper consideration of factors, adequate explanation) and
Substantively reasonable (not “too long” or “too short” in light of the facts and statutory factors).

The statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) include the seriousness of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the need to deter crime, protect the public, and provide correctional treatment, among others.

A sentence that falls within the guideline range is presumed reasonable on appeal. To overturn it, a defendant must show something unusual or unjust about the sentence that outweighs that presumption.

6. The Tapia Rule

Under Tapia, a judge:

May not lengthen a prison sentence just to help the defendant get into or complete a treatment or rehabilitation program.
May consider the need for rehabilitation as part of the broader sentencing analysis and recommend programming.
Must separate the decision about how long to imprison from the desire to promote rehabilitation.

In Coleman’s case, the sentencing judge’s references to programming were treated by the Tenth Circuit as lawful, because they did not drive an increase in the term of imprisonment.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Limited Precedential Force but Persuasive Guidance

The order explicitly states that it is “not binding precedent,” except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may, however, be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

While it does not create new law, it consolidates and illustrates several established principles in a clear, fact-specific context, providing useful guidance on:

How the Tenth Circuit conducts Anders review in ACCA and revocation cases.
How it evaluates ACCA enhancements when the defendant has multiple § 841(a) convictions and concedes separate occasions.
The strength of the presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines and ACCA-minimum sentences.
The treatment of Tapia-related arguments when district courts mention rehabilitative programming.

B. Implications for Defense Counsel

For appointed counsel, Coleman underscores:

The need for a thorough record review and identification of any arguable issues—even if, ultimately, counsel concludes they are frivolous.
The importance of addressing ACCA eligibility and sentencing reasonableness in cases involving multiple drug-trafficking priors.
The difficulty of mounting successful appeals where ACCA applies, the defendant has clearly qualifying priors, and the sentence matches the statutory minimum.

It also signals that the Tenth Circuit will examine not only the issues identified in the Anders brief but the entire record, including plea validity and sentencing remarks.

C. Implications for ACCA Litigation

Coleman offers a straightforward illustration of ACCA in a drug-trafficking context:

Multiple § 841(a) convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base are “serious drug offenses” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(i).
Defendants’ on-the-record admissions that prior offenses occurred on “separate occasions” are powerful evidence, making later challenges to the “occasions” element essentially foreclosed.
Once the ACCA minimum applies, appellate arguments that the resulting sentence is too long face a high bar, especially when the district court has carefully considered § 3553(a).

D. Implications for Sentencing and Revocation Practice

For district judges and probation officers, the decision reinforces:

The routine use of USSG § 5G1.1(b) when a statutory minimum exceeds the otherwise applicable guideline range.
The presumption in favor of consecutive revocation sentences under USSG § 7B1.3(f) and the appellate deference to such decisions.
Best practices for mentioning rehabilitative programming without triggering Tapia concerns, namely, describing programming as a mitigating or collateral factor rather than a justification for lengthening imprisonment.

For supervised release practice, Coleman confirms that revocation sentences within the guideline range, imposed consecutively in line with § 7B1.3(f), will almost always be upheld, absent unusual circumstances.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Coleman is a concise but instructive order illustrating how the Tenth Circuit applies a cluster of well-established doctrines in a single case: Anders review, ACCA enhancement for multiple serious drug offenses, guideline application under statutory minimums, reasonableness review of consecutive revocation sentences, and the constraints of Tapia.

While nonprecedential, the decision:

Reaffirms that § 841(a) drug-trafficking convictions readily qualify as ACCA “serious drug offenses,” especially when a defendant admits they occurred on separate occasions.
Shows that within-guidelines sentences—including those anchored by statutory minimums—are presumptively reasonable and difficult to overturn on appeal.
Clarifies that judicial references to rehabilitative programming are not inherently problematic if they are framed as mitigating or descriptive rather than as reasons to lengthen custody.
Demonstrates the Tenth Circuit’s adherence to the rigorous independent review required by Anders, while also illustrating the practical limits of appellate relief when statutory minimums and guideline policy statements align.

In the broader federal criminal law landscape, Coleman functions less as a source of new doctrine and more as a practical template: it shows how entrenched sentencing and appellate standards operate in a common but legally complex fact pattern—an ACCA-enhanced felon-in-possession case overlapping with supervised release revocation.