Ancillary Evidence Does Not Reset the Rule 3.851 Clock: Florida Supreme Court Clarifies “Predicate Facts,” Due Diligence, and Third‑Party Confession Standards in Suggs v. State

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in Ernest D. Suggs v. State of Florida (Nos. SC2024-0660 and SC2024-0702, Sept. 4, 2025), authored by Justice Grosshans. Suggs, a death‑sentenced prisoner, appealed the summary denial of his third and fourth successive motions for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. He asserted multiple claims—predominantly framed as newly discovered evidence under Jones v. State—alongside Brady, Giglio, and Massiah violations, and a standalone due process challenge to the Florida Supreme Court’s handling of a prior appeal.

The case consolidates and sharpens three practical rules in Florida postconviction practice: (1) the one‑year time bar in Rule 3.851 is not reset by “new support” for an old claim (i.e., ancillary evidence), because the clock runs from discovery of the predicate facts, not subsequent corroborative material; (2) third‑party confessions proffered as newly discovered evidence must be both admissible (over hearsay rules) and sufficiently trustworthy to make an acquittal probable on retrial; and (3) recantations and pattern‑and‑practice evidence from unrelated proceedings do not revive or repackage claims that were or could have been litigated earlier. The Court also reaffirms that circuit courts cannot grant relief from a Florida Supreme Court decision in a later postconviction proceeding.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court affirmed the circuit court’s summary denial of Suggs’ third and fourth successive Rule 3.851 motions.
Most claims were untimely and procedurally barred. The Court emphasized that the “newly discovered evidence” exception requires due diligence and filing within one year of when the predicate facts could have been discovered.
On the merits, the Court held that proffered third‑party confessions by serial killer Mark Riebe were inadmissible hearsay (and untrustworthy) and, even if admitted, would not likely produce an acquittal given overwhelming trial evidence against Suggs.
Brady claims failed as time‑barred and, substantively, because there was no showing the State knew of any confessions before trial (Brady does not extend to post‑trial confessions).
Giglio and Massiah claims were untimely and independently barred because they had been litigated and rejected in prior proceedings.
The standalone due process claim—asking the circuit court to grant relief from the Florida Supreme Court’s prior decision—was “utterly meritless,” as lower courts are bound by the Supreme Court and cannot grant such relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998): The controlling framework for newly discovered evidence claims. The two‑prong test requires (1) evidence not discoverable through due diligence at trial and (2) a probability of acquittal on retrial. The Court reiterated that admissibility is an antecedent step in the second prong.
Rogers v. State, 327 So. 3d 784 (Fla. 2021) and Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 2016): Cited for the Jones standard and evidentiary prerequisites.
Sliney v. State, 362 So. 3d 186 (Fla. 2023): Central to the Court’s timeliness analysis; it draws the crucial distinction between the “facts on which the claim is predicated” and the “evidence used to prove those facts.” The Suggs Court applies Sliney to hold that new supporting material (e.g., a later deposition from an unrelated case) does not reset the Rule 3.851 clock for a previously known claim.
Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 2008), Rivera v. State, 187 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 2015), Mungin v. State, 320 So. 3d 624 (Fla. 2020), Stein v. State, 406 So. 3d 171 (Fla. 2024): These decisions emphasize the defendant’s burden to show due diligence in discovering and presenting claims, and to demonstrate timeliness in successive postconviction proceedings.
Bogle v. State, 322 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 2021), Reynolds v. State, 373 So. 3d 1124 (Fla. 2023), Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025‑0517, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S71 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025): These cases bar relitigation of claims that were or could have been raised earlier in postconviction proceedings.
Sparre v. State, 391 So. 3d 404 (Fla. 2024), Owen v. State, 364 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. 2023): Establish the standard for affirming summary denials and the de novo review standard for such denials.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964): The touchstones for the due process claims (suppression of material favorable evidence; knowing use of false testimony; post‑indictment deliberate elicitation by state agents). In Suggs, these claims are held time‑barred and/or previously rejected.
In re Bolin, 811 F.3d 403 (11th Cir. 2016): Cited to clarify that Brady does not extend to post‑trial confessions.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973): While it stands for admitting reliable third‑party confessions in some due process scenarios, the Court reiterates that Chambers applies only to “trustworthy evidence,” which was lacking given Riebe’s history of confessing and recanting.
Florida Evidence Code: Section 90.802 (hearsay rule), Section 90.804(2)(c) (statement against penal interest with corroboration and unavailability), Section 90.608 (impeachment), all invoked to assess admissibility of the proffered declarations and deposition testimony.
State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1973), State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1976), Reiter v. Gross, 599 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1992): Emphasize the binding nature of Florida Supreme Court decisions on lower courts—directly defeating Suggs’ effort to have the circuit court undo a Supreme Court ruling.

Legal Reasoning

1) Newly Discovered Evidence (Jones) — Third‑Party Confessions

Suggs offered declarations claiming that serial killer Mark Riebe confessed to killing the victim, Pauline Casey (or a woman with similar characteristics). The Court held:

Untimely for lack of due diligence: Given Suggs’ decades‑long theory that either Alex Wells or Riebe was the true killer, he should have interviewed Riebe’s mother, Patsy Wells, and witness Randy Sheheane years earlier (both were known and relevant to those theories). He provided no timeline or diligence explanation regarding a third declarant (Randy Chapman). Rule 3.851’s one‑year exception for newly discovered evidence was therefore unavailable.
Inadmissible hearsay: The declarations were hearsay. The statement‑against‑interest exception (Section 90.804(2)(c)) failed because (1) Riebe’s unavailability was not shown and (2) the required corroborating circumstances were not provided. Chambers did not help because the confessions were not trustworthy (Riebe had confessed and recanted multiple times).
No probability of acquittal: Even if admitted, the confessions would not probably produce an acquittal given the “significant physical evidence” linking Suggs to the crime (victim’s prints in and on Suggs’ vehicle, the victim’s blood on Suggs’ shirt, tire tracks consistent with his vehicle, bar keys and a beer glass near his home, and eyewitness testimony placing the victim with Suggs). Two confessions did not even name Casey.

2) Newly Discovered Evidence (Jones) — Alleged False Inmate Testimony

Suggs claimed “new” evidence that inmates James Taylor and Wallace Byars lied at trial and that law enforcement coerced such testimony. He relied on (a) Taylor’s purported willingness to recant now, (b) a 2021 deposition by Jake Ozio in an unrelated case suggesting systemic pressure on inmates, and (c) Deputy Timothy Crenshaw’s statements.

Taylor’s “willingness to recant” is not new: Suggs knew as far back as 1996 that Taylor claimed he and Byars lied, but Taylor refused to sign an affidavit then. A later change in “willingness” is not newly discovered evidence under Dailey; Suggs also failed to proffer a current affidavit.
Pattern‑and‑practice deposition (Ozio): Under Sliney, the time bar runs from discovery of the predicate facts (alleged false testimony), not later evidence used to prove those facts. Because Suggs had already litigated the false‑inmate‑testimony claim, he could not use a new deposition from another case to re‑open or reset the clock. Substantively, Ozio’s deposition was speculative, of dubious admissibility, and would not probably change the outcome.
Deputy Crenshaw: Suggs knew of Crenshaw’s potential relevance by 2003 (from an evidentiary hearing reference). With due diligence, he could have obtained this information long ago; the claim was thus untimely and procedurally barred.

3) Brady Claims

Alleged suppression of Riebe’s confessions: Time‑barred for the same diligence reasons noted in the Jones analysis. Substantively, Brady did not apply because there was no showing the State knew of such confessions before trial. The Court cited Eleventh Circuit authority (In re Bolin) that Brady does not encompass post‑trial confessions.
Alleged suppression of pressure on inmate witnesses: Time‑barred and procedurally barred; Suggs knew of the alleged falsity since 1996/2003 and could have raised the claim earlier.

4) Giglio and Massiah

Giglio (knowing use of false testimony): Untimely and independently barred because the identical claim—that Taylor and Byars lied and the State used their testimony—was litigated and rejected in Suggs’ initial postconviction proceeding (Suggs II).
Massiah (post‑indictment deliberate elicitation): Also untimely and already litigated and rejected in Suggs II. The Court holds the claim procedurally barred.

5) Stand‑Alone Due Process Claim

Suggs asked the circuit court to grant relief from a Florida Supreme Court decision in a prior postconviction appeal, alleging that the Court considered extra‑record material. The Court characterized this as “stretching the bounds of credulity.” The circuit court had no power to grant such relief because it is bound by Florida Supreme Court decisions. The claim was meritless and, in any event, procedurally barred under Rule 3.851(e)(2).

Impact and Significance

Sharper timeliness doctrine for successive postconviction litigation: By expressly applying Sliney’s “predicate facts” rule, the Court reinforces that new corroborative material (e.g., later depositions in other cases) does not restart Rule 3.851’s one‑year clock. This will meaningfully limit attempts to revive previously known or previously litigated claims with “new spin” or “new support.”
Heightened screening of third‑party confessions: In capital cases especially, third‑party confessions must clear evidentiary hurdles (hearsay exceptions with unavailability and corroboration) and demonstrate trustworthiness under Chambers before a court can even assess their Jones probative impact. Repetitive confession‑recant cycles will weigh heavily against reliability.
Practical constraints on recantation-based claims: A witness’s later “willingness” to recant without a sworn statement, after decades of known allegations, is not newly discovered evidence. This discourages speculative or iterative recantation claims absent concrete, timely, and admissible proof.
Finality interests reaffirmed: The Court continues to stress finality in capital litigation, making clear that (i) claims previously rejected cannot be re‑pleaded under new packaging, and (ii) circuit courts cannot be used as vehicles to collaterally attack Florida Supreme Court rulings.
Defense practice implications: Counsel must promptly investigate all reasonably apparent leads (e.g., known associates or family members of alternative suspects, informant handling officers) and document a timeline of discovery efforts. Failure to do so will doom later attempts to invoke the “newly discovered evidence” exception.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 3.851 one‑year time bar: After a death judgment becomes final, a prisoner generally has one year to file postconviction claims. There are exceptions, including for “newly discovered evidence.” But the defendant must show diligent efforts and that the claim is filed within one year of when the predicate facts could have been discovered with diligence.
“Predicate facts” vs. “new support”: The clock runs from when you knew or should have known the facts forming your claim (e.g., “the inmate testimony was false”), not when you find more evidence to support those facts (e.g., a later deposition from a different case alleging pressure on inmates).
Jones two‑prong test: To win a hearing on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show (1) the evidence was not and could not have been known at trial despite diligence, and (2) the new evidence would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Courts first ask: would this evidence even be admissible?
Hearsay and exceptions: Out‑of‑court statements offered for their truth are generally inadmissible (Section 90.802). A confession by a non‑testifying third party may sometimes come in as a statement against interest (Section 90.804(2)(c)), but only if the declarant is unavailable and corroborating circumstances clearly indicate trustworthiness.
Chambers v. Mississippi: A due process safety valve that allows some reliable third‑party confessions despite hearsay rules. But Florida courts limit Chambers to statements with solid indicia of trustworthiness. Serial confess‑recant behavior undermines reliability.
Brady and timing: Brady requires the State to disclose material, favorable evidence in its possession before trial. Post‑trial developments (like new confessions) are not Brady material because the State did not possess them in time.
Giglio and Massiah: Giglio addresses the State’s knowing use of false testimony; Massiah bars deliberate post‑indictment elicitation by government agents or their proxies after the right to counsel attaches. Both are often fact‑intensive and may be barred if previously litigated.
Summary denial and de novo review: A court can summarily deny a claim that is legally insufficient, time‑barred, procedurally barred, or conclusively refuted by the record. Appellate review of such denials in successive postconviction settings is de novo.

Conclusion

Suggs v. State powerfully restates and refines Florida’s approach to successive capital postconviction litigation. The Court’s opinion crystallizes three working rules: (1) new corroboration does not convert an old claim into a timely one—timeliness runs from the discovery of predicate facts; (2) third‑party confessions must be admissible and trustworthy and must probably change the result when weighed against the trial evidence; and (3) litigants cannot relitigate Giglio or Massiah theories (or similar claims) that were previously rejected, nor can they ask the circuit court to overturn a Florida Supreme Court decision.

For practitioners, the lessons are practical and immediate: investigate early and thoroughly; preserve and document diligence; ensure proffered evidence is admissible and reliable; and align legal theories with the precise procedural posture. For courts, the decision fortifies finality and evidentiary rigor in Florida’s capital postconviction landscape, ensuring that only truly new, admissible, and outcome‑changing evidence can reopen decades‑old verdicts.