Ancestral Land Grants Are Not Enough: The Eleventh Circuit’s Application of Georgia Ejectment Law and Federal Pleading Standards in Brown v. Israel

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in Scott Brown v. Beverly Israel Johnson, et al., No. 24‑11577 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), arising from a pro se ejectment and damages action in the Middle District of Georgia.

The case sits at the intersection of:

Georgia real property and ejectment law;
Federal pleading standards under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly;
Diversity jurisdiction and the citizenship of estates;
Procedural rules governing substitution of parties after death; and
Discovery management while a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is pending.

Scott Brown claimed ownership of land in Georgia based on an 1831 land grant to his alleged ancestor, Edmund Lashley, and sought both ejectment of the Israels and damages for alleged unauthorized timber and mineral operations. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of his complaint, holding that:

Being a descendant of the original grantee is not, by itself, enough to establish present legal title for ejectment under Georgia law;
Conclusive, lineage-based assertions and “upon information and belief” allegations about supposed wrongful extraction activities do not satisfy federal pleading standards; and
The district court acted properly in staying discovery, handling substitution of estates, and resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion before further case development.

Although the opinion is designated “Not for publication” and thus is non-precedential, it gives clear, practical guidance on how federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit will handle ejectment claims premised on very old land grants, as well as several recurring procedural questions.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The parties and the property claim

Scott Brown, a citizen of Washington State, sued Harold and Peggy Israel, citizens of Georgia, in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Brown alleged that he was the rightful owner of a parcel of land that the Israels possessed. His theory rested on:

An 1831 Georgia land grant issued to “his ancestor,” Edmund Lashley;
Language in the grant conveying land “unto the said Edmund Lashley his heirs and assigns, to his and their proper use, benefit and behoof forever in fee simple”; and
Supporting genealogical evidence (family tree, birth certificates, census records) purporting to show that Brown is Lashley’s direct descendant and “heir.”

From these premises, Brown argued that, because he is Lashley’s direct descendant, he is the current owner of the land, and the Israels are wrongfully in possession.

Brown sought:

Ejectment of the Israels from the property; and
Damages exceeding $75,000 based on alleged “unauthorized timber and/or mineral operations” on the land.

B. Motions in the district court

The Israels moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that:

The 1831 grant created a fee simple absolute in Lashley;
A fee simple may be freely sold or otherwise alienated under Georgia law, so mere descent from Lashley does not show present ownership; and
To the extent Brown characterized the grant as creating a “fee tail,” Georgia had already abolished fee tails by statute.

They cited Georgia Code provisions, including:

Ga. Code Ann. § 44‑6‑24 (a grant to a person and “his heirs and assigns” creates a fee simple; fee tails are abolished); and
Ga. Code Ann. § 44‑6‑20 (fee simple estates are freely alienable).

The Israels also moved to stay discovery, arguing there was no reason to undertake discovery until the court resolved whether the complaint stated a claim. Brown, in response, moved to compel a Rule 26(f) conference and sought to press forward with discovery.

The district court:

Granted the Israels’ motion to stay discovery, holding that dismissal would render discovery unnecessary and that Brown had shown no immediate harm or risk of loss of evidence; and
Denied Brown’s motion to compel a discovery conference.

C. Deaths of the original defendants and substitution of estates

During the litigation, both original defendants died:

Harold Israel died while the case was pending in the district court; and
Later, after the appeal was underway, Peggy Israel also died.

For Harold, the defendants’ counsel moved to substitute the Estate of Harold Israel, with Peggy as executor, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25. The district court found Rule 25’s notice requirements satisfied and granted substitution.

On appeal, after Peggy’s death, her counsel moved under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43 to stay the appellate proceedings and then to substitute:

The Estate of Peggy Israel as a party in place of Peggy; and
Beverly Israel Johnson, Charles Lee Israel, Harold James Israel, Jr., and Mark Wendell Israel as co-executors of the estates of Peggy and Harold.

The Eleventh Circuit granted this substitution as well.

D. The district court’s dismissal

Judge W. Louis Sands granted the motion to dismiss, holding that Brown had not pled sufficient facts to show legal title or a right of entry at the time he filed his complaint, as required for an ejectment action under Georgia law.

The court reasoned that:

The 1831 grant was “obscured and illegible” and could not, in itself, prove legal title in Brown.
Even assuming the grant’s content and Brown’s ancestry, “mere descendancy” from an original grantee does not establish present title. Brown had “provided no other form or proof of current record title or current prescriptive title” sufficient to sustain an ejectment claim.
The allegations about unauthorized timber and/or mineral operations were conclusory and lacked factual detail, thus failing to put the defendants on fair notice of the allegedly wrongful conduct.

The district court dismissed the complaint and stayed discovery as unnecessary in light of dismissal.

E. Limited remand on diversity jurisdiction

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit identified a potential question regarding diversity jurisdiction and remanded for the limited purpose of determining the parties’ citizenships. Brown moved in the district court to amend his complaint to add additional jurisdictional facts. The court:

Granted leave to amend; and
Found that complete diversity had indeed existed all along—Brown was a citizen of Washington, and the Israels (including Harold at the time of his death) were citizens of Georgia.

Having resolved the jurisdictional concern, the case returned to the Eleventh Circuit for resolution of the merits of the appeal.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects.

A. Substantive holding on ejectment and damages

The court held that Brown failed to state a claim for ejectment under Georgia law because:

A plaintiff in ejectment must recover on the strength of his own title, not on the weakness of the defendant’s; and
Brown did not plead sufficient facts to make plausible that he held legal title—and a right of entry—when he filed suit.

The panel accepted, arguendo, Brown’s assertion that he descends from Lashley, but emphasized that:

The 1831 grant conveyed a fee simple absolute to Lashley (“his heirs and assigns” under Georgia’s statute); and
Because fee simple is fully alienable, a present-day descendant’s status says nothing—without more—about current title.

The court likewise upheld dismissal of Brown’s related damages claim for alleged timber/mineral operations, finding the allegations purely conclusory and lacking the factual content required by Twombly to make liability “plausible.”

B. Rejection of Brown’s procedural challenges

The court rejected Brown’s procedural arguments one by one:

Jurisdiction before ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion. The panel held that the district court had diversity jurisdiction over all defendants—including the Estate of Harold Israel—because an estate adopts the decedent’s domicile for diversity purposes, and Harold had always been a citizen of Georgia.
Right to amend before dismissal. While Brown argued he was denied an opportunity to amend to cure jurisdictional defects before the Rule 12(b)(6) ruling, the Eleventh Circuit noted that neither the parties nor the district court were aware of any jurisdictional issue until months after dismissal, and, in any event, Brown was permitted to amend on remand to address jurisdictional facts.
Use of decedents’ motions by substituted estates. Brown argued that the estates could not “benefit from” Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed by the original defendants. The court held the opposite, citing precedent that a substituted party “steps into the same position” as the original party, inheriting all procedural advantages and pending motions.
Stay of discovery and refusal to issue a Rule 16 scheduling order. Brown relied on Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp. for the proposition that a motion to dismiss must be denied if the court has not allowed discovery to test the factual basis of the claim. The panel pointed out that Chudasama says the opposite: facial Rule 12(b)(6) challenges should be resolved before discovery begins, and discovery is not meant to help a plaintiff make a case when the complaint itself fails to state a claim.

Finding no error of law and no abuse of discretion, the panel affirmed the judgment of dismissal and the procedural orders.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Georgia ejectment law and the “strength of plaintiff’s title” requirement

1. Statutory and case law framework

The panel’s core substantive holding arises from Georgia’s ejectment statute and case law:

Ga. Code Ann. § 44‑11‑1—“A plaintiff in ejectment must recover on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s.”
Brown v. Christian, 276 Ga. 203, 576 S.E.2d 894 (2003)—To succeed in ejectment, a plaintiff must prove legal title to the land and the right of entry at the time suit is filed.

The Eleventh Circuit explicitly invokes both:

“[U]nder Georgia law, ‘[a] plaintiff in ejectment must recover on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s.’ Ga. Code Ann. § 44‑11‑1. To succeed in his ejectment action, at the time he filed his complaint, Brown had to sufficiently allege that he possessed title to the land and had the right of entry. Brown v. Christian…”

This means an ejectment complaint must do more than cast doubt on the defendant’s title. It must allege facts showing that the plaintiff himself holds:

A valid legal title (either record title or a legally cognizable prescriptive title); and
A right to immediate possession (right of entry).

2. Why Brown’s “ancestral patent” theory fails under Georgia law

Brown’s core argument was that the 1831 grant to Lashley, together with his status as Lashley’s descendant, “is conclusive evidence of title” in himself, especially since the Israels allegedly could not show a “better” or earlier title.

The Eleventh Circuit rejects this, because:

The grant language—“unto the said Edmund Lashley his heirs and assigns…forever in fee simple”—triggers Ga. Code Ann. § 44‑6‑24, which states that such language creates a fee simple absolute, not a limited inheritance (like a fee tail);
Under Ga. Code Ann. § 44‑6‑20, fee simple estates are freely alienable by their owners—they can be sold, devised by will, conveyed by deed, or otherwise disposed of; and
A fee simple grant from 1831 says nothing about what has occurred in the nearly 200 years since. Lashley or any successor could have sold or devised the property multiple times.

Thus, even if Brown’s genealogical materials perfectly establish that he is Lashley’s lineal heir, that alone does not reasonably support an inference that, in 2023, he is the legal title holder to the land in question.

The panel underscores this point:

“Because the owner of a fee simple estate can freely alienate the property, Brown’s lineage suggests nothing about how the property has been devised over the last two hundred years or who presently owns the land.”

Equally important, Brown did not offer:

Evidence or allegations of a current deed or other record instrument naming him as owner; or
Allegations supporting a claim of prescriptive title (e.g., adverse possession over a statutory period under color of title or claim of right).

The district court observed that Brown “provided no other form or proof of current record title or current prescriptive title,” and the Eleventh Circuit adopted that conclusion. This is decisive for a Georgia ejectment claim.

B. Federal pleading standards: Twombly, plausibility, and conclusory allegations

1. Basic standard applied

The Eleventh Circuit applies the familiar federal pleading standard, drawing on:

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)—A complaint must contain enough factual matter to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and to make a claim “plausible on its face.”
Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Venequip Mach. Sales Corp., 147 F.4th 1341 (11th Cir. 2025)—Quoted for the proposition that a claim is facially plausible when the complaint’s factual content allows a court, using “judicial experience and common sense,” to draw a reasonable inference of liability.
Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2002)—Conclusive allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations cannot prevent dismissal.
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005)—Reinforces that conclusory statements do not suffice.

The court also invokes Twombly again in addressing the “upon information and belief” pleading style used by Brown, emphasizing the Supreme Court’s refusal to credit similar conclusory allegations absent supporting factual context.

2. Application to the ejectment claim

On the ejectment claim, the panel acknowledges Brown’s factual allegations about:

The existence and general content of the 1831 land grant; and
His familial relation to Edmund Lashley.

However, those facts do not, as a matter of law and common sense, make plausible that Brown currently holds legal title and a right of entry. No chain of title, deed, probate documents, or allegation of continuous adverse possession is alleged.

As the panel concisely puts it, the complaint, even read in Brown’s favor:

“does not permit ‘the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”

Without well-pleaded facts suggesting Brown’s legal title now—not merely in 1831—the complaint fails the plausibility standard.

3. Application to the timber/mineral damages claim

Brown’s damages count alleged that:

“[u]pon information and belief, Defendants…may have been engaged in unauthorized timber and/or mineral operations” on the parcel.

The panel finds this allegation “conclusory and devoid of any supporting facts,” noting that the complaint:

Did not specify what activities occurred;
Did not identify any particular time frame or location details beyond the general parcel;
Did not describe who allegedly carried out the operations, how Brown became aware of them, or what specific statutes or property rights were violated; and
Did not give the defendants sufficient notice of the alleged unlawful conduct to formulate a meaningful response.

Citing Twombly, the panel draws a direct parallel between Brown’s “upon information and belief” assertion and the kind of formulaic, unsupported allegations that the Supreme Court refused to credit.

Because both the ownership and the damages theories rest on insufficient factual underpinnings, the complaint fails to state any plausible claim for relief.

C. Key precedents and their influence on the decision

1. Property and ejectment: Brown v. Christian; Jenkins v. Shuften

Brown v. Christian, 276 Ga. 203, 576 S.E.2d 894 (2003)—Establishes that, to prevail in ejectment, a plaintiff must have legal title and right of entry at the time suit is brought. The Eleventh Circuit uses this Georgia Supreme Court decision to set the state-law elements of the ejectment claim.
Jenkins v. Shuften, 206 Ga. 315, 57 S.E.2d 283 (1950)—Cited for the proposition that a fee simple estate is “the entire and absolute property in the land.” This underlines that fee simple ownership gives broad power to alienate property, undermining any presumption that a descendant, centuries later, retains title.

Together with Ga. Code Ann. §§ 44‑6‑20 and 44‑6‑24, these authorities supply the substantive rule that a modern plaintiff cannot rely solely on ancestral grants to prove present title.

2. Pleading sufficiency: Twombly, Caterpillar, Oxford Asset Mgmt., Aldana

Twombly—Sets the national baseline for pleading standards; the panel uses it, both directly and through Caterpillar, as the measure for plausibility and for rejection of “upon information and belief” allegations that lack factual enhancement.
Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Venequip Mach. Sales Corp., 147 F.4th 1341 (11th Cir. 2025)—Provides the Eleventh Circuit’s articulation of the practical “judicial experience and common sense” test when judging plausibility.
Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2002) and Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005)—Used to reinforce that courts will not credit conclusory, label-like assertions or legal conclusions presented as if they were factual allegations.

These precedents support the court’s refusal to accept Brown’s bare conclusions about ownership and wrongdoing without factual elaboration.

3. Jurisdiction and estates: King v. Cessna Aircraft Co.

The panel cites:

King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2007)—for the proposition that “an estate is a citizen of the same state in which the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death.”

This rule resolved any concern that substitution of estates might undermine diversity; since Harold Israel had been a Georgia citizen up to his death, his estate is also a Georgia citizen. Brown is a Washington citizen, so complete diversity exists.

4. Substitution of parties: Ransom v. Brennan and Bonner v. Prichard

To reject Brown’s assertion that substituted estates cannot benefit from motions filed by the original decedents, the court relies on:

Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1971)—Holds that a substituted party “steps into the same position of the original party” for purposes of the litigation.
Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981)—Establishes that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, making Ransom authoritative.

This forecloses any suggestion that estates must re-brief or re-file motions already properly made by the original defendant; the procedural posture simply continues seamlessly with the substituted party.

5. Discovery management: Chudasama, Khoury, and Kaylor

Brown argued that Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997), required the district court to permit discovery before granting a motion to dismiss. The panel corrects this:

Chudasama—In fact, held that facial challenges to the legal sufficiency of a claim “should…be resolved before discovery begins” and that “[d]iscovery…is not a device to enable a plaintiff to make a case when his complaint has failed to state a claim,” quoting:
Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1981)—articulating this principle.
Khoury v. Miami‐Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th 1118 (11th Cir. 2021)—Provides the abuse-of-discretion standard for review of discovery rulings. The Eleventh Circuit uses it to uphold the district court’s stay of discovery and denial of Brown’s motion to compel.

These authorities collectively support the district court’s approach: pausing discovery while considering a facial Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and denying the request for a scheduling order under Rule 16(b) until after resolving the dispositive motion.

D. Diversity jurisdiction and the timing of jurisdictional inquiries

The Eleventh Circuit’s handling of jurisdiction illustrates several points about diversity jurisdiction practice:

Jurisdiction is assessed at filing. The district court, on remand, found that diversity “was and had always been” complete. The relevant time is when the complaint is filed; later events do not normally destroy diversity (with some exceptions not implicated here).
Estates take the decedent’s domicile. Under King v. Cessna, the Estate of Harold Israel, for diversity purposes, is a Georgia citizen because Harold was domiciled in Georgia at death.
Limited remand for jurisdictional fact-finding. The Eleventh Circuit’s remand for the sole purpose of clarifying the parties’ citizenship underscores the appellate court’s independent obligation to ensure jurisdiction before addressing the merits.
Post-dismissal amendment to clarify jurisdiction. Brown was allowed to amend his complaint on remand to allege additional jurisdictional facts. While he complained that he had not been allowed to amend earlier, the panel notes that no one had identified the jurisdictional problem until after the initial dismissal. Ultimately, he received the opportunity to cure jurisdictional allegations, and complete diversity was confirmed.

E. Substitution under Rule 25 and FRAP 43: estates “step into the shoes” of decedents

Brown argued that the Estates of Harold and Peggy Israel could not benefit from Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed by the individual defendants while alive and that they were required to file their own motions.

The Eleventh Circuit rejects that argument based on Ransom v. Brennan. A properly substituted party (under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 in the district court or Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43 on appeal):

Inherits the decedent’s procedural posture;
Stands in the same position for purposes of rulings pending at the time of death; and
Is bound by (and can benefit from) motions and defenses already presented.

Brown did not contest the propriety of the substitution motions themselves, nor did he argue that he lacked notice or suffered any prejudice from substitution. Consequently, his challenge became a purely legal one—rejected by binding precedent.

F. Discovery stays and resolution of facial challenges first

Brown insisted that the district court erred by:

Granting the Israels’ motion to stay discovery;
Denying his motion to compel a Rule 26(f) conference; and
Failing to issue a scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(2).

The Eleventh Circuit confirms that:

Under Chudasama, facial Rule 12(b)(6) challenges should be resolved before allowing expensive and potentially unnecessary discovery; and
Discovery is not designed to give a plaintiff the facts needed to create a viable claim when the complaint, on its face, is legally insufficient.

The panel finds no abuse of discretion in the district court’s reasoning that a dismissal would moot the need for discovery and that Brown had identified no specific risk (such as imminent loss of evidence) that would justify starting discovery anyway.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Ejectment

Ejectment is a legal action by which a person who claims to be the owner of real property seeks to:

Recover possession of the land from someone currently occupying it; and
Obtain a judicial declaration of superior title.

Under Georgia law, the plaintiff must:

Prove he holds legal title to the property; and
Show a present right to enter and possess the property (right of entry).

It is not enough to show that the defendant’s title is questionable; the plaintiff’s own title must be strong and adequately pled.

B. Fee simple vs. fee tail

Fee simple absolute is the most complete form of property ownership. The owner:
- May sell, gift, mortgage, or devise the property;
- May leave it to any person (not just descendants); and
- Holds the estate without built-in termination based on events like death or failure of heirs.
Fee tail is a historically recognized estate that restricted inheritance to a person’s direct descendants. Georgia has abolished fee tails; by statute (Ga. Code Ann. § 44‑6‑24), any language that might have created a fee tail is converted to a fee simple.

The phrase “to A and his heirs and assigns forever,” especially in Georgia, creates a fee simple, not a fee tail. Therefore, Brown could not rely on a “locked-in” family ownership theory.

C. Prescriptive title

Although not developed in detail in the opinion, the district court and the Eleventh Circuit briefly refer to “current prescriptive title.”

In Georgia, prescriptive title refers to acquiring ownership by adverse possession— occupying and using the property under certain conditions for a statutorily prescribed time. It can be acquired:

With color of title (a defective deed or other instrument); or
Without color of title (longer time periods usually required).

The panel notes that Brown did not allege prescriptive title, reinforcing that he failed to allege any recognized legal basis for current ownership beyond ancestry.

D. Diversity jurisdiction and citizenship of estates

Diversity jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear civil cases where:

Parties are citizens of different states; and
The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

The Eleventh Circuit applies the rule that:

An estate is treated as a citizen of the same state where the deceased person was domiciled at death.

Since Harold Israel was a citizen of Georgia, his estate is also a Georgia citizen. Brown’s Washington citizenship means complete diversity exists between him and all defendants.

E. Rule 12(b)(6) motions and “plausibility”

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive, a complaint must:

Include enough factual matter to show that the claim is plausible—not just possible;
Allow the court to draw a reasonable inference of liability; and
Provide fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.

Labels, conclusions, and speculative or “information and belief” statements without factual support are not enough.

F. Substitution of parties when a litigant dies

Under:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25—If a party dies while a case is pending in the district court, the court may substitute the proper estate representative as the new party; and
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43—A similar mechanism applies on appeal.

The substituted estate stands in the shoes of the deceased party. All motions, rulings, and positions carry forward as if the estate had been the party from the outset.

G. Discovery stays and Rule 16 scheduling

Courts have broad discretion to control the timing and scope of discovery. In facial Rule 12(b)(6) contexts:

Courts may stay discovery to avoid needless expense if the complaint appears legally insufficient;
Under Chudasama, facial legal challenges should typically be decided before discovery; and
Rule 16 scheduling orders can appropriately wait until after dispositive motions are resolved.

The Eleventh Circuit confirms that this approach was proper in Brown’s case.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For property litigants relying on historical grants

This decision is particularly instructive for plaintiffs—often pro se—who attempt to claim modern ownership based on historical land grants or patents to distant ancestors.

The opinion makes clear that:

A centuries-old grant to an ancestor, even if valid and supported by genealogical proof, does not by itself establish present title;
Plaintiffs must plead either:
- Current record title (e.g., a deed, recorded instrument, or clear chain of title to themselves), or
- A detailed adverse possession theory supporting prescriptive title; and
Federal courts applying Georgia law will insist on this showing even at the pleading stage.

This may deter speculative or quasi-historical claims that seek to displace current occupants based solely on old patents and lineage.

B. For pleading standards in diversity property actions

The opinion reinforces that:

Even where state law supplies the elements of the cause of action (e.g., ejectment under Georgia law), federal procedural law (Twombly plausibility) governs how those elements must be pled;
Merely echoing the legal elements (e.g., “I have title,” “defendants are trespassing”) without factual grounding will not survive; and
“Upon information and belief” allegations, especially about damages, must be accompanied by some factual context making the belief plausible.

For lawyers and pro se litigants alike, the message is that property complaints in federal court must be carefully drafted to include concrete, verifiable facts about ownership and alleged wrongdoing, rather than resting on heritage or speculation.

C. For substitution of parties and estate litigation

The decision underscores that:

Upon a party’s death, estates can and do fully “step into the shoes” of the decedent; they inherit pending motions and defenses;
Substitution under Rule 25 (district court) and FRAP 43 (appeal) does not reset the litigation or require refiling dispositive motions; and
For diversity purposes, estates take the decedent’s domicile, simplifying the jurisdictional analysis.

This guidance will be useful in cases involving aging parties, estate disputes, or long-running litigation where substitution may occur midstream.

D. For discovery practice in the Eleventh Circuit

By reaffirming Chudasama, the panel signals once again that:

District courts act within their discretion when they stay discovery pending resolution of facial Rule 12(b)(6) motions; and
Requests to force a Rule 26(f) conference and full discovery before assessing the legal sufficiency of the complaint are unlikely to succeed, especially in the absence of a specific showing of prejudice or risk of evidence loss.

This is a reminder that plaintiffs should ensure their complaints are substantively viable before pushing for extensive discovery, which courts will not permit simply to see whether a case might become viable.

VII. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Brown v. Israel offers a tightly reasoned application of familiar doctrines to a fact pattern that frequently recurs in pro se property disputes:

On the merits, the court confirms that Georgia ejectment plaintiffs must plead facts showing present legal title and right of entry. Ancestral land grants, even reinforced by genealogical proof, do not automatically establish modern ownership, particularly when the original estate was fee simple and freely alienable.
On pleading standards, the opinion reinforces Twombly-based plausibility, rejecting conclusory ownership assertions and “upon information and belief” allegations of wrongdoing that lack factual detail.
On jurisdiction and procedure, the panel clarifies that:
- Estates take the citizenship of the decedent;
- Substituted estates fully inherit the decedent’s litigation posture, including pending Rule 12(b)(6) motions; and
- Facial challenges may, and often should, be resolved before discovery, validating stays of discovery and delayed Rule 16 scheduling orders where dismissal appears likely.

Although not published as binding precedent, the decision is a clear and instructive example of how federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit will enforce the requirement that plaintiffs “recover on the strength of [their] own title,” and of the insistence on factual, non-speculative pleadings in real property disputes brought under diversity jurisdiction.