Analyst Testimony Requirement for Forensic Evidence: Enforcing the Confrontation Clause in State v. Hall-Haught

Introduction

State v. Hall-Haught is a landmark decision of the Washington Supreme Court, filed May 29, 2025, that revisits the Sixth Amendment and Washington Constitution Confrontation Clause in the context of forensic toxicology. Petitioner Samantha Hall-Haught was prosecuted for vehicular assault after a head-on collision revealed drug paraphernalia at the scene and her blood tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). At trial, the State introduced her blood‐test results through Katie Harris, a laboratory supervisor, rather than Mindy Krantz, the actual analyst who performed the test. Hall-Haught objected, claiming her right to confront the witness against her had been violated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld admission of the surrogate testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, clarifying post-Smith v. Arizona that testimonial forensic reports cannot be admitted through a surrogate expert who did not perform or observe the underlying testing.

Summary of the Judgment

By a majority opinion authored by Justice Whitener, the Court held:

The blood toxicology report prepared by the lab analyst (Krantz) was testimonial and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause.
The State could not admit those results via testimony of a laboratory supervisor (Harris) who had not performed or observed the testing.
The surrogate testimony of Harris violated Hall-Haught’s right to confront and cross-examine the actual analyst against her.
The Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Confrontation Clause.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004): Established that testimonial statements of an absent witness are inadmissible unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006): Defined “testimonial” statements by reference to their primary purpose in the context of emergency vs. evidentiary interrogations.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009): Held that forensic certificates are testimonial; analysts must testify or be unavailable with a prior cross-examination.
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011): Reaffirmed that a surrogate analyst cannot testify in place of the actual analyst whose report is introduced.
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality): Presented a divided view on expert reliance on nontestifying analysts; ultimately abrogated by Smith.
Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024): Clarified that “testimonial” forensic statements cannot be admitted through any surrogate expert.
State v. Lui, 179 Wn.2d 457 (2014): Held that a laboratory supervisor could testify to conclusions based on subordinates’ data. Smith abrogates this aspect of Lui.
City of Seattle v. Wiggins, 23 Wn. App. 2d 401 (2022): Applied Lui to blood-alcohol testing, excluding surrogate testimony. State v. Hall-Haught aligns with Wiggins post-Smith.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court applied the Confrontation Clause standards de novo:

Testimonial Character
Under Crawford and Davis, Krantz’s lab report was testimonial because it was prepared for an accusatory purpose and logically intended to be used in future prosecution rather than to handle an ongoing emergency.
Hearsay for Truth
Smith clarifies that expert testimony reciting an absent analyst’s factual findings is offered for the truth of the matter asserted—if the underlying statements were not true, they would not support the expert’s opinion.
Surrogate Testimony Prohibited
The State’s attempt to introduce Krantz’s findings through Harris violated Smith and Bullcoming. Because Harris did not perform or observe the tests, Hall-Haught was denied her right to confront the actual witness against her.
Abrogation of Lui
The Court acknowledged that Lui’s allowance of supervisory reliance on subordinate data is unconstitutional under Smith’s unequivocal rule: surrogate analysts cannot stand in for nontestifying forensic technicians.

3. Impact

The decision has significant consequences for criminal prosecutions involving forensic evidence in Washington:

Forensic laboratories must ensure that the individual who performed the test is available to testify or properly shown to be unavailable after a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Prosecutors can no longer rely on supervisors or other experts to “parrot” test results prepared by nontestifying analysts.
Defense counsel will have enhanced leverage to demand the testimony of primary analysts, potentially lengthening trials and increasing logistical burdens on crime labs.
Rules of evidence and court procedure may need updating to accommodate the strict confrontation requirements for all testimonial forensic materials.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Confrontation Clause: Part of the Sixth Amendment (and Washington Constitution) that guarantees a criminal defendant the right to face and cross-examine witnesses who testify against them.
Testimonial vs. Nontestimonial Statements: A statement is testimonial if its primary purpose is to preserve or establish evidence for trial (e.g., lab reports, affidavits). Nontestimonial statements serve an ongoing emergency or other non-evidentiary purpose.
Surrogate Expert Testimony: When an expert witness attempts to present another person’s out-of-court statements (such as lab results) as the foundation for their own opinion, without that person testifying.
Abrogation: When a higher court’s later ruling invalidates or overrides an earlier decision (in this case, Smith v. Arizona abrogating part of State v. Lui).

Conclusion

State v. Hall-Haught reaffirms the fundamental right of criminal defendants to confront the witnesses against them, extending that protection squarely to forensic analysts who prepare lab reports. By reversing the surrogate-testimony approach of Lui and applying the Supreme Court’s clear mandate in Smith v. Arizona, the Washington Supreme Court has established a bright-line rule: testimonial forensic certificates and reports are inadmissible unless the actual analyst takes the stand (or is shown to be unavailable after a prior opportunity for cross-examination). This decision will reshape forensic evidence practice, reinforce defendants’ confrontation rights, and guide trial courts in Washington on the admissibility of expert testimony in criminal cases.