Amendment 3 Expungement: “Marijuana Offense” Excludes Firearm-While-Possessing-Felony-Marijuana (Conduct that Endangers Others)

1. Introduction

This case interprets Missouri’s 2022 “Amendment 3” marijuana legalization framework—specifically, its expedited expungement-and-release provision for certain incarcerated people. C.S. was serving sentences arising from a single episode: (i) felony marijuana possession (more than 35 grams), and (ii) unlawful use of a weapon under § 571.030.1(11) for possessing a firearm while also possessing a controlled substance in an amount sufficient for felony possession.

After Amendment 3 took effect, C.S. petitioned under Mo. Const. art. XIV, § 2.10(7)(a)c to expunge both convictions. The circuit court expunged the marijuana possession count but denied expungement of the weapon count, treating it as a “weapons offense” outside Amendment 3. The Missouri State Highway Patrol Central Repository intervened. The key appellate issue became whether the firearm-while-in-felony-marijuana-possession conviction is itself a “marijuana offense” eligible for expungement.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed. It held that a conviction under § 571.030.1(11) (possessing a firearm while knowingly possessing a controlled substance sufficient for felony possession) is not a “marijuana offense” for purposes of Amendment 3 expungement under art. XIV, § 2.10(7)(a)c. Although marijuana possession is an element “in the chain” of the weapon offense, the Court reasoned that the weapon statute’s purpose is to criminalize dangerous conduct—i.e., conduct that “endangers others”—and therefore it falls outside the expungement category aimed at removing penalties for limited, personal-use marijuana conduct.

New rule/precedent: For Amendment 3’s incarceration-based expungement provision, “marijuana offense” is limited to offenses whose gravamen is marijuana personal-use conduct contemplated by Article XIV (e.g., possession/transport/use of small amounts), and it does not extend to distinct public-safety crimes merely “triggered” by marijuana possession—such as § 571.030.1(11).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court’s method is built from a line of Missouri constitutional and statutory interpretation cases emphasizing text, voter-understood meaning, and structural context:

• In re Expungement of Arrest Records Related to Brown v. State — supplied the standard of review formulation: where no fact dispute bears on the issue, review asks whether the trial court properly declared and applied the law.
• Fletcher v. Young — reinforced de novo review for constitutional and statutory interpretation questions.
• State v. Honeycutt — anchored the Court’s constitutional-interpretation approach: give words the meaning voters understood when adopted, and treat every word as non-surplusage.
• Boone Cnty. Ct. v. State — supplied the “ordinary and usual meaning” framework for voter-understood meaning.
• Ivie v. Smith — emphasized that if the constitution defines a term, that definition binds courts and displaces dictionary meanings; here, marijuana is defined, but “marijuana offense” is not.
• Zahner v. City of Perryville — supported resort to dictionary meaning where the constitutional text does not define a term (the Court used a dictionary definition of “offense”).
• Mo. Prosecuting Att'ys v. Barton Cnty. — underscored the requirement to read constitutional provisions as a whole with their primary objectives in mind.
• Six Flags Theme Park, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, Springfield City Water Co. v. City of Springfield, and McGrew v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (and its later treatment in McGrew Coal Co. v. Mellon) — limited reliance on expressio unius (the dissent invoked surplusage-type concerns; the majority cautioned that omissions are not a reliable guide here and that expressio unius is weak in constitutional cases).
• Sun Aviation, Inc. v. L-3 Comm'ns Avionics Sys., Inc. and State ex rel. Nixon v. QuikTrip Corp. — provided statutory-construction principles: plain language, legislative intent, and the object sought to be accomplished.
• State v. Onyejiaka — central to the majority’s “distinct purposes” rationale: drug possession and weapon offenses address “separate and distinct evils,” supporting the conclusion that § 571.030.1(11) is primarily a firearm/public safety statute rather than a marijuana statute.
• Bullington v. State and State v. Wade — used to justify looking to a statute’s title and codification location (Chapter 571 vs. Chapter 579) as indicia of legislative intent.
• Sch. Dist. of Kan. City v. State — reiterated that constitutional construction must effectuate voter intent.

The dissent’s analysis, while not adopted, also leaned on textual principles:

• Buechner v. Bond — invoked to argue against treating the expungement provision’s enumerated exclusions as meaningless surplusage if “endangers others” already excludes them.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The interpretive dispute: a “but-for marijuana” test vs. a purpose-and-structure test

C.S. argued for a “but-for” approach: if marijuana possession is an element of the conviction (or necessary to prove it), then the conviction is a “marijuana offense.” Under that view, § 571.030.1(11) is “marijuana-related,” hence expungeable.

The Court rejected that approach as too isolated and insufficiently attentive to Article XIV’s structure—especially art. XIV, § 2.3(1)(j), which preserves laws regulating “[c]onduct that endangers others,” unless otherwise provided. For the majority, this structural “limitation” requires courts to distinguish between (i) marijuana personal-use conduct the amendment sought to decriminalize and cleanse from records, and (ii) distinct public-safety crimes in which marijuana is merely a component.

B. Reading “marijuana offense” in light of Article XIV’s purpose and internal signals

The majority identified Article XIV’s stated purpose—“prevent arrest and penalty for personal possession and cultivation of limited amounts of marijuana by adults twenty-one years of age or older”—as a decisive interpretive lens. It then connected that purpose to the “not unlawful” list in art. XIV, § 2.10 (e.g., possessing/transporting/using small amounts).

On that basis, the Court concluded “marijuana offense” in the incarceration-expungement clause refers to offenses whose core conduct is the marijuana personal-use behavior contemplated by the amendment (possession/transport/use within the amendment’s limits), not to offenses aimed at suppressing heightened risk to others.

C. Why § 571.030.1(11) is treated as a firearms/public-safety offense

The Court’s “not a marijuana offense” conclusion rests on multiple reinforcing considerations:

• Distinct statutory purposes: relying on State v. Onyejiaka, the Court treated Chapter 579 drug crimes and Chapter 571 weapon crimes as addressing different harms. Even if the weapon offense incorporates a drug-possession threshold, its object is the firearm risk.
• Text and placement: the legislature placed the provision in Chapter 571, within “unlawful use of weapons,” and the enacting bill was “relating to firearms.” The Court treated these as signs that the legislature’s chief concern was public safety, not drug regulation.
• Context within § 571.030: neighboring subsections (e.g., brandishing in a threatening manner, bringing firearms into schools, handling firearms while intoxicated) are paradigmatic “danger-to-others” prohibitions. That contextual company supported the inference that subsection (11) likewise targets elevated danger.

D. The dissent’s competing reading

The dissent maintained the plain meaning of “marijuana offense” is any offense for which marijuana involvement makes the conduct criminal, and therefore § 571.030.1(11) (when predicated on marijuana) qualifies—subject to the expungement clause’s explicit exclusions (distribution to a minor; violence; driving under the influence). It further argued:

• art. XIV, § 2.3 is largely prospective and concerns continuing “laws that assign liability,” not the retrospective expungement remedy; and
• if “endangers others” already screens out dangerous offenses, the expungement provision’s enumerated exclusions risk becoming redundant.

The majority nonetheless treated § 2.3 as part of the constitutional “whole” that shapes what qualifies as a marijuana offense, and it resolved the dispute by classifying the weapon offense as outside the expungement target.

3.3 Impact

This decision narrows Amendment 3 expungement eligibility for incarcerated petitioners by rejecting “marijuana as an element” as sufficient. Practically, it:

• forecloses expungement (under art. XIV, § 2.10(7)(a)c) for convictions under § 571.030.1(11), even when the controlled substance is marijuana and the marijuana amount is within Amendment 3’s broader expungement thresholds;
• signals that courts will classify offenses by their primary statutory purpose (public safety vs. marijuana personal-use regulation), not merely by whether marijuana is a required predicate fact;
• sets up future litigation over other “hybrid” crimes (e.g., marijuana presence enhancing penalties, or marijuana-linked conditions in non-marijuana statutes) and over how far art. XIV, § 2.3 shapes the meaning of “marijuana offense” in different Amendment 3 subsections.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “De novo” review: the appellate court gives no deference to the lower court on legal interpretation; it decides the meaning of the constitution/statutes for itself.
• “Voter intent” in constitutional interpretation: because the people adopted Amendment 3, the Court focuses on what the words would ordinarily have conveyed to voters at adoption, read in context of the entire amendment.
• Reading provisions “as a whole”: the Court does not interpret the expungement clause alone; it reads it alongside Article XIV’s purpose section and the “limitations” section to avoid contradictions.
• “Separate and distinct evils”: the idea (drawn from case law) that two statutes can involve related facts but still aim at different harms—here, drug possession vs. elevated firearm danger.
• Expressio unius: a canon suggesting that listing some exclusions implies others are excluded. The majority noted this canon is applied cautiously, especially in constitutional interpretation.

5. Conclusion

C.S. establishes a significant boundary on Amendment 3’s incarceration-based expungement: not every conviction that factually involves marijuana is a “marijuana offense.” When the conviction’s core purpose is to punish conduct deemed to endanger others— here, firearm possession coupled with felony-level drug possession under § 571.030.1(11)—the offense is treated as a firearms/public-safety crime and is ineligible for expungement under Mo. Const. art. XIV, § 2.10(7)(a)c.