Ambiguous References to § 3553(a) at Revocation Do Not Establish Plain Esteras Error Absent Clear Reliance on Retribution

I. Introduction

United States v. Joseph Jones (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026) (unpublished) addresses how appellate courts should evaluate an alleged Esteras-type error—i.e., improper consideration of “retribution” factors in supervised-release revocation sentencing—when the defendant did not object in the district court.

Joseph Jones, originally convicted in 2014 for possessing stolen firearms (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j) & 924(a)(2)), repeatedly violated supervised release primarily through marijuana use. After his first revocation (six months’ custody, then a new supervised-release term), Jones again tested positive for THC multiple times. The district court repeatedly held the violations “in abeyance” to allow him to pursue treatment, but ultimately revoked and imposed a 7-month prison sentence (Guidelines: 6–12 months; statutory max: 2 years).

On appeal, Jones argued (1) procedural unreasonableness because the court allegedly considered retribution—an impermissible factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) as clarified by Esteras v. United States, and (2) substantive unreasonableness because imprisonment would not help his addiction and he was otherwise doing well on supervision.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying the revocation “two-step” reasonableness framework, the court held:

No reversible procedural error: even assuming arguable Esteras error, Jones did not show plain error because it was not “clear or obvious” that the district court actually relied on forbidden § 3553(a)(2)(A) retribution factors, and he did not show a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
No substantive unreasonableness: the 7-month sentence was within the Guidelines range and well below the statutory maximum; the district court permissibly emphasized Jones’s repeated noncompliance and failure to follow instructions despite multiple chances to seek treatment.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is structured around established Eleventh Circuit sentencing review doctrine and the Supreme Court’s recent revocation decision in Esteras v. United States.

1. Framework for reasonableness review

United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016): supplies the “two-step process” for sentencing reasonableness: procedural review first, then substantive review.
United States v. Steiger, 107 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2024): confirms the same framework applies “in the supervised release context” and emphasizes plain-error review when procedural objections are raised for the first time on appeal.

2. Plain-error doctrine and what makes an error “plain”

United States v. Utsick, 45 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2022): sets out the four-part plain error test (error; plain; affects substantial rights; and discretionary correction for fairness/integrity).
United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003): limits “plainness” to issues clearly resolved by statute/rule text or controlling Supreme Court/Eleventh Circuit precedent.
United States v. Humphrey, 164 F.3d 585 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)): defines “plain” as obvious and clear under current law.
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016): articulates the “reasonable probability” standard for showing an effect on substantial rights.

3. The revocation-specific limitation on sentencing factors: Esteras and Tapia

Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011): describes § 3553(a)(2)(A) as reflecting “retribution.”
Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025): holds revocation sentencing under § 3583(e) may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) or § 3553(a)(3); and on plain-error review the sentence stands unless it is “clear” or “obvious” the district court actually relied on those factors expressly or by “unmistakable implication.”

4. Substantive reasonableness principles (deference and indicia of reasonableness)

United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): explains abuse-of-discretion review, the “ballpark of permissible outcomes,” and three pathways to substantive unreasonableness (misweighting/irrelevant factors/clear error of judgment).
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): anchors the “clear error of judgment” concept in weighing factors.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) (Opinion of E. Carnes, J.): quoted for the “ballpark” framing.
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008): presumption-like “expectation” that within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable; and that being well below the statutory maximum supports reasonableness.
United States v. Castaneda, 997 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014): reinforce the “within Guidelines”/“below max” reasonableness indicators.
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): a court need not explicitly discuss every mitigating point to show it considered them.
United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009): acknowledgment of considering § 3553(a) and arguments is typically enough.

5. Auxiliary citations used to resolve categorization and avoidance

United States v. Braswell, No. 24-11521, 2025 WL 2303790 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2025): noted for treating some Esteras-type claims as substantive reasonableness and for observing an open question: whether “retribution” for the violation conduct (as opposed to the underlying offense) is barred.
United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom, J., concurring): cited for inconsistent categorization of procedural vs substantive challenges.
United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2011): supports bypassing the “error” prong when prongs two/three defeat plain-error relief.
United States v. Deason, 965 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2020): cited on the substantial-rights inquiry.
United States v. Beaufils, 160 F.4th 1147 (11th Cir. 2025), Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d 159 (11th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013): collectively frame the breadth of sentencing discretion and when factual/legal mistakes become abuse of discretion.
United States v. Butler, No. 25-12027, 2025 WL 2642292 (11th Cir. Sept. 15, 2025): cited (as an additional unpublished example) on the open question around Esteras’s scope.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Procedural reasonableness: how Esteras is operationalized on plain-error review

The court treated Jones’s Esteras claim as procedural (while acknowledging some Eleventh Circuit decisions analyze it as substantive). Because Jones did not object below, the panel applied plain-error review per United States v. Steiger and United States v. Utsick.

The key move in the court’s reasoning is its application of Esteras v. United States’s plain-error gloss: revocation sentences are affirmed unless it is clear or obvious the district court actually relied on forbidden § 3553(a)(2)(A) considerations (seriousness/respect for law/just punishment) or § 3553(a)(3).

Here, the record contained some ambiguity: the district court stated it was acting consistent with “goals under [18 U.S.C. §§] 3553(a) and 3583(e).” That could be read as referencing impermissible § 3553(a) factors, but it could also be read as shorthand for the subset of § 3553(a) factors incorporated by § 3583(e). The panel emphasized the absence of explicit reliance on retribution and the absence of “unmistakable implication.”

The panel also flagged a practical point: the government’s recommendation arguably sounded in “seriousness” logic—suggesting a slightly harsher term than the prior revocation because Jones had repeated the same behavior. While the panel admonished that prosecutors should avoid recommending revocation sentences on impermissible § 3553(a)(2)(A) grounds, it still held the record did not make any error “plain.”

Finally, prong three (substantial rights) independently defeated relief: given the court’s emphasis on repeated noncompliance, failure to follow instructions, and repeated opportunities to obtain treatment, Jones could not show a reasonable probability of a lower sentence absent the claimed error.

2. Substantive reasonableness: persistent noncompliance as a permissible centerpiece

On substance, the panel relied on the district court’s wide discretion to weigh permissible factors. The court accepted that Jones had mitigating attributes (employment, general compliance, not dangerous), but emphasized that revocation sentencing may heavily weigh repeated noncompliance with supervision conditions and directives.

Two contextual features supported reasonableness:

Guidelines alignment: 7 months fell within the undisputed 6–12 month range.
Statutory headroom: 7 months was far below the 2-year maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

The panel also treated the district court’s incremental approach—holding violations in abeyance multiple times—as evidence of reasoned judgment rather than punitive reflex. The ultimate custody term was justified not as punishment for addiction itself, but as a response to repeated failure to comply with court-ordered steps (especially treatment engagement).

C. Impact

1. Practical rule of decision for post-Esteras appeals

Although unpublished, the decision signals how the Eleventh Circuit is likely to apply Esteras v. United States in revocation cases where no objection was made: ambiguous references to § 3553(a) will not suffice; the appellant must show the district court’s reliance on forbidden retribution factors is explicit or unmistakably implied.

2. Guidance for district courts and prosecutors

The opinion contains an explicit caution: district courts “should be clear” they are not considering impermissible § 3553(a) factors at revocation, and the government “should be clear not to recommend sentences based on those impermissible factors,” because § 3583(e) supplies the controlling list. That admonition is likely to influence best practices in revocation colloquies and sentencing arguments.

3. The open question: retribution for the violation conduct vs. retribution for the original offense

The panel noted (citing United States v. Braswell and United States v. Butler (2025 WL 2642292)) that Esteras may not “directly answer” whether § 3583(e) forbids “retribution” as to the supervised-release violation itself, as distinct from retribution for the underlying conviction. By treating any potential error as not plain, the court effectively preserves that doctrinal uncertainty for a future published case.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Revocation of supervised release: If a defendant violates supervision conditions, the court may revoke supervision and impose prison time (18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)).
§ 3583(e) “incorporates” only some § 3553(a) factors: At revocation, Congress required consideration of certain sentencing factors (e.g., deterrence, protection of the public), but omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness/respect for law/just punishment) and § 3553(a)(3).
Retribution: In this context, shorthand for punishing to provide “just punishment” or reflect “seriousness” (as described in Tapia v. United States). Esteras v. United States says retribution is not a proper basis for revocation sentencing under § 3583(e).
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: procedural asks whether the court used the right process (proper factors, correct Guidelines, adequate explanation); substantive asks whether the final sentence is within the range of permissible outcomes.
Plain error: When an issue wasn’t raised below, the appellant must show an obvious legal error and that it likely changed the outcome. Ambiguity in the record generally defeats the “obvious” requirement.
Held “in abeyance”: The court temporarily pauses imposing a revocation sentence to allow the defendant an opportunity to comply (here, to engage in treatment).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Joseph Jones reinforces that post-Esteras v. United States challenges to revocation sentences will often fail on plain-error review unless the record clearly shows the judge relied on forbidden retribution factors. The decision also underscores a pragmatic theme in revocation practice: repeated failure to comply with supervision directives—especially after multiple lenient opportunities—can justify a within-Guidelines custodial sentence, even when the underlying violations stem from addiction and the defendant is otherwise relatively compliant.