Ambiguous Lien Language, Entireties Accounts, and Constructive Fraudulent Transfer: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Summary-Judgment Standards in Bankruptcy Disputes (UBS v. Esteva)

1. Introduction

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in UBS v. Lorenzo Esteva (No. 23-14050, decided 31 July 2025), revisited fundamental bankruptcy and state-law property doctrines that intersect when a debtor deposits employer loan proceeds into a joint marital brokerage account. The appellate panel (Chief Judge William Pryor, Judges Grant and Luck, opinion by Judge Grant) vacated large portions of the bankruptcy court’s summary-judgment ruling that had insulated a $2 million “House Account” from UBS’s reach on the theory of tenancy-by-the-entireties and rejected the lender’s fraud counterclaims.

The opinion grapples with three central issues:

• Whether ambiguous lien clauses in a brokerage Client Relationship Agreement (“CRA”) allowed the bankruptcy court to enter summary judgment finding no enforceable security interest in the account.
• Whether transferring employer-loan proceeds into a spousal entireties account may constitute a constructive fraudulent transfer under Florida’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (FUFTA) when the debtor soon becomes insolvent.
• Whether UBS’s setoff claims, pled chiefly under 11 U.S.C. § 553, survive Rule 12 scrutiny and summary judgment.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit:

• Reversed the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment for Esteva on the lien, turnover, tenancy-by-the-entireties, and constructive-intent fraudulent-transfer issues, holding that genuine factual disputes stemming from ambiguous contractual language and FUFTA’s standards preclude judgment as a matter of law.
• Affirmed summary judgment in favor of Esteva on UBS’s actual-intent fraudulent-transfer and state/common-law setoff counterclaims (insufficiently pled).
• Dismissed UBS’s appeal regarding an unrelated unjust-enrichment count as not yet ripe for appellate review, and denied Esteva’s late motion to dismiss the appeal as moot.

Practically, the panel remanded for trial (or further proceedings) on (i) whether a valid UBS security interest encumbers the House Account despite its entireties status and (ii) whether the transfer of loan proceeds into that account was a constructive fraudulent transfer.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011) & Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015) – established the constitutional limits on bankruptcy-court jurisdiction and the doctrine of party consent, which the Eleventh Circuit relied on to confirm jurisdiction over the core claims while acknowledging the parties’ consent for non-core matters.
• Havoco of Am. v. Hill, 197 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 1999) & Beal Bank v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So.2d 45 (Fla. 2001) – authoritative Florida cases articulating the scope of tenancy-by-the-entireties protection; pivotal in determining that the House Account presumptively barred creditor levy absent waiver.
• Berkeley Research Group v. FTI Consulting, 69 N.Y.S.3d 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) & Eleventh Circuit’s own West Group Nurseries v. Ergas, 167 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999) – reiterated New York’s rule that ambiguous contracts yield fact issues unsuitable for summary judgment, directly informing the lien analysis.
• Bennett v. Jefferson County, 899 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2018) – addressed equitable mootness in bankruptcy appeals; the panel used it to deny Esteva’s mootness motion.
• Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995) & In re Patterson, 967 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1992) – clarified that § 553 does not create a substantive right of setoff; this controlled dismissal of UBS’s § 553-only claims.
• Florida FUFTA authorities—Valdivia v. Valdivia, 593 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) – underscored that transferring property into entireties form to defeat creditors can be a fraudulent transfer.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in three layers:

1. Ambiguous Contract = Fact Issue. Applying New York law (per CRA choice-of-law clause), the Court found the lien language ambiguous:

   “You hereby grant … a security interest in … any UBS Account(s).”

   Because “you” could plausibly refer to either (a) Lorenzo alone (the note obligor) or (b) both spouses (joint account holders), the intent of the parties and the extent of any waiver of entireties protection becomes a factual dispute for trial, not summary judgment.
2. Constructive Fraudulent Transfer Survives. Esteva indisputably received no tangible value in exchange for shifting loan proceeds into an account that—on his theory—was unreachable by creditors. Coupled with signs of imminent insolvency (loss of license, single-income household, $2 million obligation), UBS demonstrated at least a triable issue under Fla. Stat. §§ 726.105(1)(b) & 726.106(1).
3. Actual Intent & Setoff Dismissed. UBS waived actual-intent fraud by failing to preserve or brief it. Its setoff counts lacked an underlying state-law right and instead relied solely on § 553, which only codifies limitations, not entitlements. Therefore, those counts could not survive.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

• Heightened Caution for Brokers & Employers. Financial-services firms offering forgivable or incentive loans must draft CRA lien clauses with unequivocal cross-collateral language if they intend to reach joint spousal accounts.
• Bankruptcy Litigation Roadmap. The decision instructs bankruptcy courts in the Eleventh Circuit to avoid resolving ambiguous contract disputes at the Rule 56 stage; instead, such questions demand trial where witness intent and extrinsic evidence can be weighed.
• Expanded Use of Constructive FUFTA Claims. Creditors confronting debtors who convert separate assets into entireties property will likely invoke this precedent to plead constructive fraudulent transfer, even absent proof of actual deceit.
• Clarification on Setoff Pleading. Litigants must ground setoff demands in explicit state-law or contractual rights, not merely invoke Bankruptcy Code § 553.
• Procedural Reminder on Appellate Jurisdiction. The Court reinforced the need for proper Rule 54(b) certification and addressed equitable mootness concerns, serving as a procedural primer for practitioners.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Tenancy by the Entireties (TBE). A form of joint marital ownership (recognized in Florida and a handful of states) where each spouse is deemed to own the whole of the property. Creditors of only one spouse cannot seize TBE property.
• Security Interest / Lien. A creditor’s legal right to seize or control property if the debtor defaults. Whether UBS held such an interest in the House Account turns on contract interpretation.
• Summary Judgment (Rule 56). Judgment entered without trial when “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” exists. Ambiguities in contract terms typically preclude summary judgment because extrinsic evidence of intent must be evaluated.
• Constructive vs. Actual Fraudulent Transfer.
  • Actual: debtor intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors (requires proof of intent).
  • Constructive: regardless of intent, the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value and was (or became) insolvent or under-capitalized.
• Setoff. The right of parties who owe mutual debts to balance them against each other, paying only the net difference. Bankruptcy Code § 553 preserves but does not create such rights.
• Core vs. Non-Core Proceedings. Core matters arise under Title 11 or are integral to administration of the estate; non-core matters rely on external law. The distinction affects bankruptcy-court power to enter final judgment.
• Equitable Mootness. A prudential doctrine allowing appellate courts to dismiss bankruptcy appeals where re-writing the plan would be impossibly disruptive; here rejected because the plan expressly reserved the dispute.

5. Conclusion

UBS v. Esteva delivers a pragmatic reminder: contractual precision matters immensely when creditor remedies confront protective state property regimes like Florida’s tenancy-by-the-entireties. Ambiguous lien language will not suffice at summary judgment, and courts must allow factual exploration of intent and the scope of spousal liability. Conversely, debtors cannot expect entireties status to operate as an invincible shield when transfers strip their estates of value at the brink of insolvency; constructive fraudulent-transfer theories remain potent.

Going forward, bankruptcy courts within the Eleventh Circuit will likely follow UBS v. Esteva to:

• Require trials (or at least evidentiary hearings) where contract terms leave open competing interpretations affecting estate property.
• Allow creditors to proceed on constructive FUFTA claims when debtors park funds in entireties accounts without receiving contemporaneous value.
• Scrutinize setoff pleadings to ensure an underlying state or contractual basis, not merely a citation to § 553.

In sum, the decision harmonizes bankruptcy procedure, state property law, and contract interpretation doctrines, while charting a clear path for litigants navigating the delicate intersection of marital property and creditor rights.